Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival: An Introduction and Literature Review of New Confucian Activism

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Chapter 1
Tradition, Modernity, and the Confucian Revival:
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Introduction

On August 8th, 2008 countless viewers around the globe watched the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The ceremony included performers representing the disciples of Confucius, chanting quotations from *The Analects*. The Confucian theme was continued as the performers lifted and lowered individual blocks in a choreographed display. In the end, the blocks formed the Chinese character *he* (和), or harmony – a central principle of the Confucian tradition.\(^1\) Clearly, Confucianism was one of the central themes of the opening ceremony. As this performance was the most watched opening ceremony in the history of the Olympic games, the CCP sent a calculated message depicting Chinese culture to the globe and to citizens of the PRC. The opening ceremony was certainly an enormous international declaration of CCP interest in Confucianism. Perhaps unbeknownst to many viewers around the world, the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony reflected issues of Chinese cultural identity of great historical import. In fact, the opening ceremony is illustrative of an intellectual movement aimed at rethinking modernity through the Confucian tradition, and re-visioning the Confucian tradition to China’s contemporary context – the *Confucian revival*.

The Confucian revival refers to the renaissance of Confucianism in the PRC in the liberal intellectual and political atmosphere of the post-Mao era. The revival refers to increased CCP interest in studying Confucianism, as well as non-party intellectual activism beginning in the 1980s. This resurgence of Confucianism in the PRC is a ‘revival’ in that Confucianism was criticized throughout 20th century China as being incompatible with modernity. Particularly in

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the Cultural Revolution, Maoist China persecuted Confucianism as a backward, feudal tradition. In contrast to the preceding decades, the increased Confucian activism in the 1980s from state and non-state intellectuals marks a definite revival of Confucianism in the PRC. That said, it is important to note that ‘revival’ is a misnomer in some ways. ‘Revival’ implies that Confucianism died during the 20th century, only later to be brought back to life in the PRC. Certainly, from the onslaught of Western imperialism in the 19th century to the revolutionary struggles throughout the 20th century, China’s modern period is marked by a backlash against Confucianism. However, Confucianism never died out completely though it was vehemently attacked as counter-revolutionary by the leaders of the Communist Revolution under Chairman Mao Zedong. In fact, the ‘revival’ is only the most recent period of transformation of the Confucian tradition in the 20th century.

I argue that the Confucian revival is a complex political and intellectual movement that aims to define China’s cultural and political identity. This movement navigates the tension between tradition and modernity. Specifically, this movement disputes the idea that tradition and modernity are diametrically opposed. Rather, the Confucian revival reflects a dialectic relationship between tradition and modernity. In other words, Confucian revivalists aim to rethink modernity in terms of the Confucian tradition, and to re-vision the Confucian tradition for the modern era. The Confucian revival reflects the ability of traditional identity to be preserved and negotiated in modern society, shaped by a history of Western imperialism.

In order to understand the dialectic between tradition and modernity Chapter Two examines the transformation of Confucianism from the fall of the Qing dynasty to the post-Mao era. During this time period China engaged in a modernization project. Certainly, Western imperialism, technology, and political thought were all instrumental in the downfall of the Qing
dynasty and subsequent revolutionary movements. However, this does not mean that China’s modernization is a form of un-checked Westernization. The transformation of Confucianism throughout modern Chinese history reflects a dialectic between tradition and modernity. In other words, Confucians throughout 19th and 20th century simultaneously redefine Confucianism for modernity while also rethinking and critiquing globalization and Westernization. As I will demonstrate, the reforms of Kang Youwei, the Manifesto of Mou Zongsan and the works of Tu Weiming, and the presence of new Confucians in the PRC since the 1980s all exemplify this fact. The Confucian revival is a movement in dialogue with Chinese cultural tradition, as well as modernity, Westernization, and globalization.

Chapter Three and Chapter Four detail New Confucian activism aimed at re-appraising the tradition for the modern era during the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. These chapters argue that the Confucian revival is a statist and non-statist movement. Chapter Three, “Towards a Typology of New Confucianism,” characterizes the political ideology of new Confucian intellectuals in the PRC. Categorizing new Confucian activism in the PRC illustrates two points about the Confucian revival. First, the new Confucian movement involves the confluence of state and non-state activism; and second, there is a multiplicity of political ideology within both statist and non-statist factions. Regarding the first point, this chapter examines the prevalence of statist and non-statist Confucian activism. ‘Statist’ refers to intellectuals that have the support and sponsorship of the CCP. ‘Non-statist’, on the other hand, refers to intellectuals that operate without state sponsorship and often critique the CCP. Statists and non-statists not only differ in their relationship to the CCP, but also in their views on Westernization and modernity. For instance, non-statists are critical of any type of Western political-economic structure, particularly socialism. Furthermore, non-statists believe that
political Confucianism is the only ideology capable of addressing the social crises created by modernization. Statists, on the other hand, are interested in reconciling Confucianism and socialism. As we will see, the Confucian intellectual plays an active, but dichotomous political role in the contemporary PRC; the Confucian intellectual is involved in statist and non-statist activism.

Chapter Three also argues that there is a multiplicity of political ideologies within both statist and non-statist factions. This is demonstrated through a detailed examination of Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, two New Confucians with arguably the most exhaustive and influential vision of political Confucianism. Jiang and Kang both establish their political critique and reformist vision on the teachings of Classical Confucianism from the Han dynasty. Although Jiang and Kang are both non-statists new Confucian, they provide two distinct models for political reform in the PRC, established on two different teachings. Jiang espouses the Gongyang tradition, emphasizing *The Spring and Autumn*, a text attributed to Confucius. Kang on the other hand espouses the teachings of Mencius, particularly the Mencian ideal of benevolent government. What the new Confucians have in common is a commitment to re-fashioning China’s tradition in response to fervent modernization and Westernization. This re-appraisal of Confucianism involves a dynamic and pluralistic political discourse concerning one of China longest intellectual traditions, Confucianism, and China’s modern reality.

Chapter Four, “New Confucianism, Education, and Politics: The Confucian Revival movement in Education” addresses the confluence of statist and non-statist activism within Confucian education. Since the turn of the 21st century the CCP has sponsored a variety of Confucian education institutions. Namely, Renda (People’s University), a party university, as well as Beida (Beijing University) and Qinghua, two universities that educate China’s elite, have
started Confucian schools. Also, the CCP has endorsed a number of private Confucian academies. The CCP has also shown commitment to the Confucian project through its promulgation of Confucian principles within moral education policy. The chapter concludes with a case study of Anqing No.1 Middle School in Anqing, Anhui, China, revealing that Confucian ideals influence teaching philosophy in public, party affiliated secondary schools. These examples all demonstrate that the CCP is committed to Confucian education. However, non-party intelligentsias are also responsible for the movement to implement Confucian education. The CCP does not mandate participation in these Confucian education programs. Participation in Confucian learning is due to commitment to Confucian culture on a personal level of party and non-party intelligentsias.

The contemporary confluence of the state and non-state influences within Confucian education is a phenomenon with deep historical roots. In the Han dynasty education played an important role in the creation of the Confucian civil bureaucrat. This civil bureaucracy was vital to the ruling order of the Han dynasty for four centuries and many centuries thereafter until 1905 when the Confucian exam system was abolished. However, Confucian bureaucrats were more than instruments of the state. Rather, Confucian bureaucrats questioned the power of the emperor, holding the state accountable to the Will of Heaven. The Imperial University, a state institution, confirmed and contested the power and authority of the emperor. Confucian education and the Confucian intellectual simultaneously functioned as a voice of support and dissent, directed at the state. The contemporary Confucian revival echoes the traditional relationship between the Confucian intellectual and the dynastic state, maintaining the same relationship of legitimizing and challenging state power in the contemporary setting. The CCP endorsement of Confucianism is a matter of seeking political legitimacy in the post-Mao
ideological vacuum. At the same time, intelligentsias from within and without the CCP are engaged in applying this traditional ideology to a modern context with an agenda that does not always conform to that set by the CCP leadership.

The Confucian revival is an intellectual movement that negotiates the dialectic relationship between tradition and modernity and between the intellectual and the state. The revival involves a variety of political ideologies and interpretations of Confucianism engaging the tradition in global dialogue concerning Chinese modernization. Throughout the movement, aspects of the Confucian ideology are re-applied to the modern day. Confucian tradition is being revived not only in ideological substance, but also in the function of the Confucian intellectual in the PRC. There are statist and non-statist new Confucian intellectuals, much like the role of the Confucian intellectual throughout Chinese history.

The following historiography will frame my arguments within the context of scholarly research on new Confucianism and the Confucian revival.

**Historiography**

This introduction began with the image of the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony for several reasons. Certainly, the goal was to start with an image that is recent and globally witnessed in order to express the relevance of Confucianism in the contemporary setting. This image serves as a present day anchor for a historical issue. I also began with the Olympic opening ceremony because it was an event that attracted the attention of the U.S. government to the Confucian revival. This historiography begins with a discussion of the U.S. reaction to the Confucian revival described in “The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government.” The U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission (USCESC)
published this report in July of 2011 to explain CCP support of Confucianism in events such as the Olympic ceremony.

As the title suggests, the U.S. government is interested in the Confucian revival. The report argues that the CCP is reviving Confucianism as propaganda. The report states,

In the face of widespread public cynicism regarding traditional Communist ideology, the Party has undertaken a search for an alternative philosophical tradition that could appeal to the public without contradicting the Party’s continuing use of official Marxist theories on politics and social development. In this sense, the revival of Confucianism is instrumental to continuing the ideological legitimacy of the CCP. Certainly the CCP is invested in Confucianism. This is demonstrated in this report through the Olympic games as well as the production of a movie about Confucius in 2009 by a CCP owned movie company, and the erection of a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen Square in 2011. However, this report only acknowledges the CCP rhetoric that is involved in the Confucian revival, presenting the revival as a CCP movement. In contrast, this thesis will demonstrate that contrary to the USCESC, the Confucian revival involves a multiplicity of voices from China and around the globe. The revival is part of a complex history of China’s modernization, Westernization, and globalization.

The Confucian revival cannot be understood as a trend in CCP propaganda, but as the most recent period of transformation of the Confucian tradition in the 20th century. Tu Weiming, a Confucian scholar and New Confucian intellectual, provides a detailed account of the evolution of the Confucian tradition throughout Chinese history including the contemporary setting. Tu asserts that Confucianism is a “living tradition.” This means that throughout the history of the tradition, Confucian intellectuals have defined and re-defined Confucianism in response to the

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3 Ibid., pp. 3
changing political and social dimensions of China’s history. To argue that Confucianism is a static, un-evolving tradition would imply China’s history is devoid of intellectual transformation. This notion of a static Confucian tradition is the backdrop that Tu is arguing against. 20th century Sinologists such as Joseph Levenson argued, “the incongruity between Confucian traditionalism and rational, scientific modernism is so clear-cut that the rise of modernity in China entails the demise of the Confucian tradition.”

Tu refutes this perception of Confucianism in his publication “Towards a Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism.”

Contesting the work of Levenson, Tu presents a historical picture of the transformation of Confucianism. Tu argues that three distinct epochs mark the evolution of Confucianism throughout the dynastic period of Chinese history. The first epoch, Classical Confucianism dates from Confucius (551-479 BCE) to Dong Zhongshu (195-105 BCE). Tu writes, “the politicization of Confucian moral values characterized much of the dynamics of the Han governing mechanism.”

This means that during the classical epoch, Confucianism gained political and social prominence. Tu argues that the evolution of Confucianism continued after the fall of Han. He asserts that through the Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-907) dynasties Confucian scholarship flourished. This is exemplified by the addition of “commentaries and subcommentaries” to the Confucian classics.

The Confucian tradition entered the second epoch during the tenth century Song dynasty. During this time period Neo-Confucian thought emerged in response to the prominence of Taoism and Buddhism. Neo-Confucianism, the second epoch, stretches from the beginning of the Song in the 10th century to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Neo-

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6 Ibid., pp. 147
7 Ibid., pp. 148
8 Ibid., pp. 149
Confucianism was marked by an expansion of the Confucian cannon, absorption of Taoism and Buddhism, and the spread of Confucianism across other East Asian countries, namely Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{9}

Tu believes that in spite of the backlash against Confucianism during the 19th and 20th centuries, Confucian intellectuals continued to creatively transform the tradition. Tu praises Carsun Zhang (1886-1969), Mou Zongsan (1909-1905), and Tang Junyi (1909-1978) for their contributions to and defense of Confucianism during the 20th century.\textsuperscript{10} As preeminent as Zhang, Mou, and Tang were, Tu argues that the Confucian tradition will inevitably continue to evolve. Tu asserts that modernity has raised a number of questions that Confucian intellectuals have yet to resolve. For instance he writes, “the real challenge… is how a revived Confucian humanism might answer the question that science and democracy have raised.”\textsuperscript{11} Tu thus posited a third epoch of new Confucianism. Concerning reviving Confucianism Tu writes, “Reanimating the old to attain the new is surely still possible in Confucian symbolism, but to do so the modern Confucian must again be original and creative, no matter how difficult the task and how strenuous the effort.”\textsuperscript{12} Tu believes that the third epoch of the Confucian tradition involves the Confucian revival. This revival must involve not only an application of tradition to modernity, but also the creative evolution of the tradition.

“Towards a Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism” was published in 1993. At the time of its publication, the CCP had already begun showing interest in reviving Confucianism. For instance, the CCP founded the China Confucius Foundation in 1984 with headquarters in

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., pp. 158
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 158
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 146
Beijing, the capital of the PRC. Furthermore the CCP endorsed the celebration of Confucius’ birthday starting in 1987.\(^\text{13}\) Fang Keli, Dean of Graduate Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and member of the Office of Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council, exemplifies well CCP political investment in Confucianism in the post-Mao era. Fang lead two CCP-funded Confucian research projects from 1986 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1995, resulting in the publication of over 400 papers and numerous other works.\(^\text{14}\) During this same period of time, new Confucian scholars furthered their Confucian scholarship without the sponsorship of the state. Namely, Jiang Qing, a New Confucian that I will discuss at length in the third chapter, published Confucian scholarship during the 1980s. In the twenty years since Tu’s publication, the statist and non-statist Confucian activism has flourished. I argue that the Confucian revival has entered the third epoch that Tu predicted twenty years ago. CCP rhetoric as well as non-Party Confucian activism are all part of the current creative transformation of the Confucian tradition in the present day. Tu’s article provides a detailed historical lens that situates the Confucian revival as an ongoing development of the tradition, navigating the pressures of modernization and globalization.

John Makeham’s *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination*, published in 2003, also provides a historical lens for understanding the Confucian revival. Professor of classical Chinese language and culture at Australia National University, Makeham provides a definition of new Confucianism and the Confucian Revival, and also contributes to the new Confucian discourse. Makeham is worth quoting at length on the difference between New Confucianism and the Confucian Revival. He argues: “a differentiation needs to be made between Confucian


revivalism – a conservative cultural phenomenon that has taken on a variety of forms throughout the twentieth century – and a distinct philosophical movement with its own self-identity, which has promoted itself, and became identified as, New Confucianism.”¹⁵ According to Makeham, new Confucianism and the Confucian revival have been conflated. The Confucian Revival is a cultural movement that has been developing since the May Fourth Era in the early twentieth century. Starting as early as the Opium Wars some Chinese intellectuals and officials began to question Confucianism and eventually led a state initiated series of reforms in the late Qing that dismantled Confucianism from its position as state doctrine. However, other Chinese intellectuals and officials began to look to Confucianism as a source of cultural identity with answers to the nation’s contemporary problems. Makeham defines Confucian revivalism as a strictly cultural force, whereas New Confucianism is a unique, self-identifying philosophical movement that began in the 1980’s in Mainland China and Taiwan. These New Confucians focus on particular issues within Confucianism, such as moral-metaphysics, in addition to societal problems. Most importantly, Makeham argues that the 1980s is the beginning of self-identification within this movement.

In order to substantiate the difference between these cultural and philosophical phenomena, Makeham details a historical development of Confucianism in the 20th century. As stated above, Makeham asserts that new Confucianism itself began in the 1980’s. However, a number of scholars identify Confucians of the earlier 20th century as the founders of this philosophical school. For instance, Fang Keli, a New Confucian and scholar, identifies Liang Shuming, Zhang Junmai, Mou Zongsan, among others as the leaders during the initial period of New Confucianism.¹⁶ Makeham’s distinction between a cultural conservationist force

and philosophical movement is useful for a critical examination of the modern philosophical arguments. Moreover it is important to understand when in the 20th century the groups self-identified, so as to avoid retrospectively applying terminology. Most importantly, the fact that Confucians began to self-identify as ‘New Confucians’ in the 1980s, reflects an evolution of the Confucian tradition throughout the 20th century. Unlike the USCESC report, which focuses on CCP rhetoric Makeham’s work demonstrates that the Confucian revival has evolved throughout China’s modern history.

Like Makeham, Yen Ching-Hwang attempts to historicize the development of the Confucian revival. As a history professor at the National University of Singapore and publisher of “The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899-1911,” Yen argues the Confucian Revival begins at the end of the 19th century. Yen posits that Kang Youwei and the Hundred Days Reforms established the revival movement in Mainland China. Although the movement was ultimately defeated, Kang attempted to establish Confucianism as state doctrine, and enlist numerous reforms to restructure and preserve the Qing dynasty. The Hundred Days reform is an early example of reappraising Confucianism to strengthen China in the wake of imperialist forces and weakening dynastic power. By declaring this the beginning of the Confucian revival, Yen situates the revival as a response to Western domination and modernization.

Confucian Revivalism continued after the fall of the Qing dynasty as well. According to Yen, one hundred and thirty cities across China were home to “Confucian revivalist activities.” Such activities include, but are not necessarily limited to, publication of

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magazines discussing the importance of Confucianism and the creation of cult Confucian groups. Also, the constitution of the Republic of China states that “Confucian principles shall be the basis for the cultivation of character in national education.” Yen holds the above examples to demonstrate the strength of the Revival movement during the fall of the Qing and early Republican period. Yen’s assessment of the revival presents that Confucianism was not eradicated with the actions of the iconoclasts, fall of the dynastic system, and search for ‘new cultural spirit’ after the fall of the Qing dynasty. Modernity in China is not a function of unchecked Western dominance, but a process in which traditional cultural identity negotiated and challenged Western notions of modernity. Yen’s discussion of turn of the century Confucian conservatism presents how Confucians asserted and negotiated it’s standing in Chinese society. Yen’s work asserts that the revival was involved in defining China’s cultural identity during turn of the 20th century in response to modernization and Westernization. This discussion also situates new Confucian activism during the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries as an extension of the earlier cultural conservationist efforts. Unlike the U.S.-China Economic Security Commission report, Yen’s work contextualizes the Confucian revival as a phenomenon that has stretched over a century of Chinese history.

Whereas Makeham and Yen define the Confucian revival as part of China’s history of modernization and Westernization, William Theodore de Bary discusses the Confucian revival within the context of globalization. In Confucian Tradition and Global Education, the Neo-Confucian scholar and Professor of Chinese History at Columbia University, argues that the Confucian revival is a movement that simultaneously influences and is influenced by globalization. The Confucian Revival is situated in the current global economic context, while

also offering a critique of that context. De Barry writes, “Since East Asia itself is now part of the larger world community, and deeply enmeshed in the global economy and technology, Confucian education will have to be seen first as based in local tradition, next as connected to East Asia, and then adapted to the larger world.” De Barry suggests it is important to recognize the need to protect cultural identity from the tide of globalization, and create a system in which local traditions define globalization and modernization. de Barry coins the term “glocalization” to express the synthesis of local and global society.

deBary argues that globalization creates a number of cultural crises. Namely, technology and consumerism pose a serious threat to culture and democracy all over the globe. de Bary believes that the Confucian Revival is in many ways a response to the problems posed by globalization of democratic and economic practices. de Barry defines the Confucian revival as an example of glocalization, as it involves local (in this case East Asian) cultural tradition in connection with the larger global context. With the economic growth in East Asia in the end of the twentieth century scholars throughout East Asia argued that there is more than one model of democratic and economic development. For instance, de Bary cites Lee Kuan Yew’s argument for ‘Asian Values’ in East Asian political practice. Lee, as former president of Singapore, asserts observance of Neo-Confucian principles is necessary for successful development of Singapore. de Barry asserts that Lee’s participation in the Asian Values debate is an example of glocalization with the Confucian tradition. Confucianism, the local tradition, was synthesized with contemporary global economic context of Singapore. However, de Barry also criticizes Lee for un-democratic practices in Singapore, using traditional cultural differences as the justification.

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21 Ibid: pp. 19
22 Ibid: pp. 11
for different governmental practices. de Barry asserts that Lee’s argument is based on cultural relativism and are not capable of addressing the issues posed by globalization. This demonstrates that de Barry defines the Confucian revival within the context of globalization, discussing its significance for the development of East Asia.

de Barry claims that revitalizing global education based on the local traditions and cultures of a region is necessary to combat the challenges of globalization. He cites an example of this within the Confucian revival. The New Asia College in Hong Kong was founded in 1949 as an academy (shuyuan 书院), a humanistic educational institution based on Song dynasty Neo-Confucian schools. Tang Junyi, founder of the New Asia College, opposed the forces of modern education in many ways. First, historically, the school was founded the year that the Communists defeated the KMT in the Civil War on Mainland China, leading to an exodus of Confucian thinkers from China. Second, Tang asserted the three pillars of the New Asia College education were, “1) Our Own Heritage; (2) Nature, Technology, and the Environment; and (3) Self and Humanity.”23 Rather than assume the importance of modernization, technology, and westernization, Tang wanted the traditional style academy or shuyuan to provide a global education while critically re-examining the content of the global education. This system directly opposes the University system, which it later became a part of, which as a college (xueyuan 学院) focused on content, competition, and the economy.

Similar to de Barry, Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaibong discuss Confucianism providing a critique of unchecked liberal democracy and economics in East Asia. Bell and Chaibong write, “the essays presented in [Confucianism for the Modern World] thus represent...efforts to

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modernize Confucianism and Confucianism modernity at the same time.” Much like de Bary’s discussion of the globalization, Bell and Chaibong present the interplay between modernity and Confucianism. Bell and Chaibong assert present a collection of contemporary third generation New Confucians throughout East Asia that demonstrates the continued practice of Confucianism. These New Confucians not only discuss Classical and Neo-Confucian texts, but also “investigate linkages between Confucian ideals and concrete practices/ institutions, be they political, economic, social, or legal.” In other words, Bell and Chaibong argue the Confucian revival is not isolated to philosophical readings of classical texts, but involves practicing and institutionalizing Confucian values. However, it is neither possible, nor within the scope Bell’s work to identify all of the Confucian values alive today. Rather, like De Barry, Bell and Chaibong indicate that the Confucian Revival is in a project addressing the problems concerning globalization and modernity.

According to Bell and Chaibong reexamination is common throughout the historical development of the Confucian tradition. They argue, “what we are doing is rearticulating Confucianism for our modern world in the same way Confucians of the past rearticulated it for theirs.” Bell and Chaibong both present and participate in the current transformation of the Confucian tradition known as the Confucian Revival. *Confucianism for the Modern World* offers two arguments about this new epoch of Confucianism. First, that Confucianism and modernity are compatible, and second, that both Confucianism and modernity require critique and transformation. Bell and Chaibong explicitly examine traditional values, offering a defense or critique of their application today. Bell and Chaibong’s argument for the compatibility of

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26 Ibid: pp. 28
Confucianism is similar to De Barry’s argument in *Confucian Tradition and Global Education* and Makeham’s work in *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination*. Each of the authors not only argue for the necessity of, but also participate in the transformation of the tradition. In doing so each of the authors critique globalization, modernity, in present day society. In this regard Bell and Chaibong agree with De Barry’s argument regarding the imperfections of modernity and globalization.

Bell and Chaibong also assert the need for transformation of Confucianism along with modernity. They write, “…we are…reviving Confucianism for the modern world by bringing about a creative synthesis between the two.” In this way modernity is incomplete, but Confucianism requires reinvention as well. As such Bell and Chaibong are practicing de Barry’s theory of a new global education, by using a local context or tradition to reexamine the global issues such as democracy, economics, law, human rights, and other issues. This reinvention of Confucianism reflects many of the broader, global questions raised by Makeham, Yen, and de Barry. *Confucianism for the Modern World* embodies the questions at the heart of this paper. Specifically, this paper will address how this interplay between tradition, modernity and globalization developed throughout the 20th century history of the Confucian Revival and will historicize the cultural development that leads to modern reinvention of Confucianism.

The works of Tu, Makeham, Yen, de Bary, Bell and Chaibong are instrumental in defining the Confucian revival. The above discussion demonstrates that the Confucian revival reflects a complex history involving modernization, Westernization, and globalization in China. However, these scholars also demonstrate the complexity of voices that are currently engaged in the Confucian revival discourse. Scholars Makeham, de Barry and Bell are Westerners –

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Makeham is Australian, de Bary is American, and Bell is Canadian. Tu Weiming was born in Mainland China, but then moved to Taiwan after the KMT retreated in 1949. Tu was then educated in Taiwan and eventually Harvard University. Tu has lived and taught in the United States for the majority of his career. As a Chinese man, Tu has engaged the Western world in the Confucian tradition and the Confucian revival. Furthermore, as a Confucian, Tu has not only been a scholar but also a participant in the creative transformation of the Confucian tradition. Yen Ching-Hwang was also born in Mainland China before the CCP defeated the KMT in the 20th century. Yen was educated in Confucianism in Singapore. Lastly, Hahm Chaibong is a South Korean scholar. Contrary to the USCESC report, the Confucian revival is not simply a movement isolated to the contemporary CCP. The Confucian revival not only involves the history of Westernization and Globalization in China, but also engages a global discourse.

The question remains, what does the Confucian Revival reflect about the hegemonic trends of modernity and globalization? In other words, does Confucianism reflect the ability of traditional identity to be preserved and negotiated in modern society, shaped by a history of Western imperialism? Or does the Confucian Revival indicate the unchecked dominance of modernization and disregard for tradition, to the extent that traditional culture serves the interests of modernity in Mainland China? In the chapters that follow I will argue that the transformation of Confucianism throughout the 20th century reflects the negotiation with, not the unchecked dominance of, globalization and modernization. I assert that the Confucian Revival reflects that Chinese identity in the present day navigates between the twin poles of cultural traditions and global forces. In this way I argue that a dialect operating between tradition and modernity shapes Chinese cultural identity in the 20th century. The Confucian revival demonstrates the ability of traditional culture to participate in global discourse. I will address the historical tension between
the Confucian tradition, modernization and Westernization throughout 19th and 20th century China in Chapter Two. Drawing on the works of Makeham, Sen, and Tu, this chapter will demonstrate that Confucian revival is part of a dialogue between cultural tradition and modernity throughout China’s recent history. Chapter Three and Chapter Four will present the confluence of Party and non-Party activism in the Confucian revival. These chapters will demonstrate that this relationship between statist and non-statist Confucian intellectuals is a historical trend in the Confucian revival. This means that Confucianism is not being revived only in ideals, but the historical role of the Confucian intellectual is also being revived in contemporary China. Together these chapters will demonstrate that the Confucian revival is a movement negotiating the tension between tradition, modernity and globalization. This negotiation is pluralistic, involving a complexity of voices attempting to re-envision China’s Confucian tradition for the modern era.
Works Cited

Understanding the scope and complexity of Chinese modernity is a daunting task. This is because a century and a half of imperialism, revolution, and economic development is not a ‘Chinese’ history alone. Rather, the social transformation from the Opium Wars to the era of reform under Deng Xiaoping reflects an ever-evolving process of defining and redefining identity within a global context. The transformation of the Confucian tradition is demonstrative of this fact. Confucianism was a primary organizational force for Chinese politics, culture, religion, and education for millennia. However, this paper challenges the assumption that Confucianism is a relic of Chinese dynastic history. As Chinese political, economic, and social milieu has changed, Confucianism, as a living staple of Chinese cultural identity, has changed too. This paper will examine significant events in the last two centuries of Chinese history to demonstrate how Confucianism has changed and remained pertinent in the discussion of Chinese modernity. Focusing on Confucianism will therefore provide the breadth of the social changes, as well as depth into one facet of Chinese culture. This examination will serve to illustrate several points. First, the process of definition and redefinition is one of navigating Chinese domestic and traditional identities as well as China’s relationship with the Western world. However, this does not mean that Chinese cultural identity is one subject to strict binaries, such as tradition and modernity or China and the West. The transformation of Confucianism demonstrates the fluidity of such binaries. In other words, Chinese modernity is not traditional or modern. Such an analysis of imperialist history and cultural transformation is categorically limited. With that, this paper will begin with an examination of the one of the most formative memories in Chinese-Western history - the Opium War.
The Opium War was a product of several centuries of changing and frustrated trade relations between China and several European powers. In fact, the Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and British established trade in the Pacific, including China, during the 16th century. While many European traders were restricted to coastal regions, many Jesuits reached China’s interior. Specifically, following Matteo Ricci’s mission to Beijing in 1601, both Dominican and Franciscan missionaries proselytized in China. However, the Chinese Empire also played an active role in this growing East-West relationship by strictly controlling where and how Europeans could trade in China. For instance, in 1685 the Chinese Emperor reopened four trading ports. While both the Qing dynasty and European states played active roles in this relationship, it was not without frustrated cross-cultural obstacles. The Confucian belief that merchants are the lowest social strata posed the first obstacle. Although Europe was economically expanding during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries due to merchants, exploration and industrialization, China had little interest in merchants and trade relations. Instead, as R. Keith Schoppa confirms, “China was ‘everything under Heaven,’ by definition self-sufficient, and therefore needing nothing from outside”28. Furthermore, China viewed trade as a form of tributary to the Emperor, rather than a simple economic enterprise. Not only did Confucianism degrade the social standing of the European merchants, but the dynastic worldview also impeded the economic expansion that European traders pursued.

Between the European industry and trade and the Chinese tributary practices, China and Britain spoke two different economic and diplomatic languages. Following such frustrations the British sent several diplomatic missions to Beijing to discuss the restricted role of trade in China.

The Macartney mission of 1793, took scientists and artists in an entourage of 100 on a 66-gun man-of-war plus two escort vessels loaded with examples of British manufacturing technology that the Qing promptly labeled ‘tribute from England.’ The Industrial Revolution was gaining momentum, but remained quite unknown to the senescent Qianlong Emperor. The British requests for broader trade opportunities under a published tariff, as well as diplomatic representation at Beijing, were an invitation to China to join the modern word then being born. Beijing politely turned it all down.²⁹ The Macartney mission was not the first or last attempt by the British to expand trade relations. The Chinese empire denied both James Flint in 1759 and Lord Amherst in 1816.³⁰ However, the British were also economically frustrated. As the British lacked resources the Chinese desired, the British suffered from unbalanced trade. Without goods to trade the British paid for commodities with silver. In fact, “the annual flow of silver into China reached over three million taels in the 1760s but soared to sixteen million twenty years later.”³¹ With unsustainable trade frustrating diplomatic relationships, the British began to import opium into China as a remedy. As a cheap drug, opium offered the British more economic benefits than trading with silver. Also, as highly addictive substance, the British were able to increase demand of the Chinese population to trade with Britain. Opium trade gave Britain the upper hand in the economic relationship, and weakened the ability of the Chinese government to control the trading ports.

The importation of opium and ensuing military conflict with Britain carried more than economic and diplomatic significance. In fact the Opium War proved the Chinese empire incompetent in diplomacy and warfare, as well as enforcing its own edicts domestically. The

Daoguang emperor reacted promptly to the importation scheme by banning the importation and smuggling of opium through a number of edicts. However, the emperor was unable to eradicate the smuggling of opium completely, and even officials commonly used opium. Furthermore, opium reversed the trade imbalance and the Chinese government suffered economic turmoil with the amount of silver being paid to Britain. The resulting loss in the armed conflict was also an overwhelming embarrassment for the Chinese. Lastly, the war ended with the establishment of the Treaty of Nanjing, which resulted in foreign concessions. Not only was this treaty unequal given that the Chinese received nothing in exchange, but the resulting foreign concessions allowed for extraterritoriality, and differing to foreign authority within the concession areas. After the Opium War the Qing dynasty appeared domestically and internationally impotent. Not only did the government have a difficult time regulating opium before the conflict, but the unequal treaties left the government powerless to Western states within the concessions. This doubt in the Qing government is one of the most formative events in the end of dynastic China. Moreover, the embarrassment of the concessions resulted in an increase of thought regarding new Chinese national spirit and ways in which to strengthen the nation. In the end, the Opium War was not the simple, bloody opening of China. Rather, this conflict reflects centuries of Sino-European relations, cross-cultural frustrations, and the transformation of the inter-state relations and Chinese identity in an increasingly globalized world.

Throughout the decline of the Qing, China’s scholars and elite underwent dramatic intellectual change to contend with the challenges posed by the Western powers. Like any other Chinese dynasty, the Qing inherited a long history of Confucian Classics including numerous

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philosophical texts and a canon that was entrenched in Chinese rulership for millennia. However, during the Qing many scholars began to interact with classics in a new way. Specifically, the Qing gave rise to the New Text movement, where, “Scholars were, ‘dissatisfied with the unverifiable ideas that had pervaded’ Song and Ming interpretations of Confucianism.” In other words, Confucian scholars began to reinterpret and reanalyze texts. This reflects that during a time of great change, and challenges from the West scholars looked into the Confucian tradition for answers. Regarding this reappropriation of classical texts, Fairbanks and Goldman write,

By the 1840s the sudden triumph of seapower led to the drawing together of two lines of Chinese reformist thought – the New Text movement…and the statecraft movement for the scholar-official to become more involved and more effective in administration. For many scholar officials and elite during the 19th century, Chinese culture appeared to have the answers for their societal problems. However, this reappraisal of Confucian Classics from within the Qing dynasty demonstrates that Confucian tradition in China is not static, but actively questioned and changing. The New Text Movement shows that on the elite level, the Confucian canon was reinterpreted, transformed, contested, and shaped by scholars confronted by international affairs and domestic turmoil.

Intellectual change and reform affected more than the reading of texts. For instance, the Self-Strengthening movement addressed the structural political, military, and technological disparity between China and Western powers. Many scholars held that although the West and Japan were barbarous, Chinese civilization was no match for Western military technology. As such Li Hongzhang, a major leader in the movement, said, “I firmly believe that to strengthen

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34 Ibid: pp. 225
herself as a nation, China must learn Western technology.” However, this technology was only a means, or *yong* (用), to uphold the Chinese essence, *ti* (体). In fact, yong and ti became the backbone of the self-strengthening platform. However, Li and other Self-Strengtheners such as Zeng Guofan faced critique from other literati as well as set backs from several armed conflicts. Specifically, defeats in the Sino-French conflict of 1884 and the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 proved the reform movement an embarrassing failure. It appeared again that the Qing government did not have the means to reform and develop technology comparable to the West.

However, this era of reform reflects Chinese thinkers actively pursuing independent means to survival while maintaining traditional cultural identity. As a result two important dialogues transformed Chinese culture – internal and external. First, scholars debated China’s internal ideology. This is shown through the debates surrounding the New Text movement. The second dialogue was external between East and West. The dichotomy of China and the West shaped the modern era of Chinese identity. The Self-Strengthener’s notion of Substance and Function (*ti-yong* 体用) argued that China was in fact superior to the West, in spite of the decades of military and technological defeat. Substance and Function was the notion that Chinese culture should be preserved as the ‘Substance’ of China’s cultural identity. However, given the defeats of the Opium War, Western technology would be utilized for its ‘Function.’ They argued that genuine Chinese cultural identity should be valued over the West, but China could only be preserved through Western technological and political developments. Thus Chinese scholars and officials struggled to create and implement a new Chinese national narrative that was informed simultaneously by tradition and modernity, by the West and China.

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Confucian scholar Kang Youwei’s role in the reform movement perfectly reflects this tension between tradition and modernity in China. Kang grounded his reform ideology in the New Text interpretations of Confucianism. Kang’s reform movement targeted Confucian orthodoxy. However, its goal was to create “a new reformist tradition derived from Confucianism” and “Kang introduced new ideas under a Confucian cover or enlisted Confucius as a companion in reformist campaigns.” For instance, Kang argued that existing Neo-Confucian interpretations of Confucian Classics were flawed. Kang directly criticizes existing orthodoxy, but believed in reforming Confucianism as part of Qing reforms. Kang sought to re-imagine the Confucian tradition to address China’s modernity.

Kang’s political life also reflects the tensions between tradition and modernity of the reform era. Kang was a member of the literati and passed the jinshi exam, becoming a scholar elite. This means that Kang was classically trained in Confucian universities. However, even before the Hundred Days Reforms of 1898, Kang lobbied for modernizing Chinese governmental structure. Kang “proposed a thorough remodeling of the Qing state, arguing that superficial borrowing from the West without a fundamental change of the political structure would be insufficient to make China wealthy and powerful.” Kang’s reforms were comprised of transforming the understanding of Confucius as well as the governmental structures of the Qing. As such, Kang Youwei demonstrates an attempt to transform the Confucian tradition to save China. However, some Confucian literati contested these reforms, as officials debated the reappropriation of the canon and government structures during the end of the 19th century.

The Empress Dowager resisted Kang’s “Hundred Days Reform” and attempted to

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centralize power and control throughout her rule. The Empress lead the Qing court to major reforms during the last decade of the dynasty. As the Empress attempted to modernize political structure, military, technological, and economic capability, the educational system also changed. Before 1905, the Qing dynasty relied on the Confucian exam system to educate civil bureaucrats and elite of the dynasty. By 1904 the Qing decreed a new educational model, “set up in counties, prefectures, and provinces, with a Japanese-style of old and new subjects,” however, “it was soon found that students would continue to aim mainly at the old examinations as a more prestigious and much cheaper route of advancement.”

As a result, the Qing court abolished the Confucian examination system in 1905 in order to establish fundamental change by modernizing, in fact Westernizing, education. This edict alone created a watershed of political, social, educational, and intellectual transformation in China.

The Confucian exam system was the backbone to the dynastic Chinese government and society. Not only was the examine system central to educating the ruling elite, but it also conferred the Confucian canon and its centrality in Chinese politics and culture. However, its abolition,

…stopped production of the degree-holding elite, the gentry class. The old order was losing its intellectual foundation and therefore its philosophical cohesion, while the student class that replaced it would be buffeted by discordant fragments of Chinese and Western thought. This paradigm shift is significant in several ways. First, the ruling dynasty no longer supported Confucianism as state doctrine. Until 1905 Confucianism influenced the language of reform for modern China. For instance, Kang Youwei was a Confucian literati, and Confucianism was central to the cultural essence that reformers attempted to preserve. However the abolition of

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this examine admonished Confucian doctrine in the ruling elite. Second, as the above quote mentions, this left the ruling elite without one solidified ideological framework. The old doctrine was not replaced by an organized cohesive system. Rather, a new generation of elite and students were left contending with Chinese and Western thought in the process of shaping a new Chinese ideology. Combined with political upheaval, turn of the 20th century China was not only in a governmental, but an ideological revolution as well.

In the ideological vacuum following the abolition of the Confucian exams, thinkers such as Chen Duxiu began a new era of political and cultural identity. Furthermore, such new identity directly criticized traditional Confucian norms. Works such as “Call to Youth” exemplify Chen’s emphasis on the new generation of Chinese to establish a modern China. Chen addressed China’s youth at a pivotal time, as “Call to Youth” was published in 1915, ten years after the end of the Confucian exam system. Young men at this time were radically disconnected from traditional Confucian education. In the decade following the abolition of the Confucian exam, not only were Chinese youth devoid of traditional educational systems, but they also witnessed the complete fall of the Qing and the republican revolution. Such developments resulted in the introduction of Western political thought, such as constitutionalism, democracy, and citizenship. Chen, like other thinkers of his time, believed that Western thought was the key to modernization. With this, Chen encouraged youth to sever any connection to Confucian thought. He writes, “out of every ten youths who are young in both age and physique, nine are old in mentality.”40 Thus, Chen argues that it is the mental attitude that must change in China, and he makes a plea to the youth to seize this moment and completely leave the old China behind. As such, Chen lays out a critique of Confucian culture, arguing that Confucianism is incompatible

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with the modernization necessary to cope with the new international and national issues China faced. Chen creates a tactful metaphor for societal progress to demonstrate this point. He writes, “The function of youth in society is the same as that of a fresh and vital cell in a human body. In the process of metabolism, the old and the rotten are incessantly eliminated to be replaced by the fresh and living…” In Chen’s conception, the continuation of traditional values blocks societal progress like “old” or “rotten” cells in the body stopping new growth. And similar to the human body, “old” elements are unable to sustain life and lead to the death of Chinese society. This is because old elements refer to the Confucian hierarchy that Chen believes suffocates new ideas that can save the country.

Specifically, Chen critiques the formalism of the Confucian tradition, and argues for modern China to embrace ‘Western’ progressive scientific rationalism. Chen writes, “Empty formalism was emphasized in the Rites of Chou, and under the Han dynasty Confucianism and Taoism…were elevated to high positions, while schools of thought were interdicted.” For Chen, Confucian rites support oppressive, feudalistic social hierarchies. Furthermore, this formalism cannot be questioned or changed within tradition. As such, Confucianism impedes progressive thinking necessary to advance the nation. For instance, regarding Chinese and western medicine Chen writes, “they can only parrot the talk about the five elements…and prescribe medicine according to ancient formulae.” Clearly, Confucianism does not contain the critical objective thinking skills that are necessary of a modern nation. With this language of critique, Chen and attempted to redefine Chinese identity. In fact, this task of redefinition consumed every revolutionary party in China during the twentieth century.

42 Ibid: pp 244
43 Ibid: pp. 245
In keeping with the tradition of Chen Duxiu and May Fourth Movement writers, Mao Zedong focused the Communist Party on the production of new socialist culture, and critique of old, backwards traditional culture. Mao Zedong’s *Talk at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art* in 1942 reflects the first chapter in the communist re-appraisal of Chinese culture. Like the other revolutionary movements in China, culture played a highly political, central role in the struggle of the Communist party. The politicization of culture is shown when Mao opens the 1942 forum saying, “In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts, among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the military fronts.”

Mao sought transformation of the cultural milieu in China in order to aid the process of revolution. Therefore just as the efforts of the gun would overthrow the bourgeoisie, the pen was also necessary to transform and revolutionize Chinese cultural identity.

This revolutionary culture was therefore oriented towards class struggle in order to aid the Communist efforts. As such Mao says,

> Writers and artists should study society, that is to say, should study the various classes in society, their mutual relations and respective conditions…only when we grasp all this…can we have a literature and art that is rich in content and correct in orientation.

Clearly, Mao attempted to forge political and cultural cohesion. Therefore, Mao did not only say that society should be studied; rather he distinctly emphasized class awareness. In addition to making ideological intent explicit, Mao also argues that literature should have a transformative affect on the struggle. He argued that peasants, workers, and soldiers fighting for the communists, “…are eagerly demanding a widespread campaign of enlightenment, education, and works of literature and art that meet their urgent needs and that are easy to absorb in order to heighten their enthusiasm in the struggle and confidence in victory.”

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44 Mao, Zedong. "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art.": pp. 459
46 Ibid: pp. 471
should highlight the importance of the war in order to maintain the persistence of the people waging it. This speech reveals that from early in the history of the Communist party, culture is used to tow the party line. From late Qing through early republican history culture has played an explicit role in Chinese political developments. International influence and internal debate, reform, and activism also shaped culture throughout China’s modern history. However, the Communist relationship to mass culture is distinct from early in the twentieth-century where culture was radically changing under numerous influences without a political unity. This example of early Mao Zedong thought reflects cultural politics united under a single doctrine and figurehead. Granted, this doctrine changed throughout the following decades, however, the Communists Party’s political ideology persists as a dominant cultural narrative to the present day.

This politico-cultural narrative trend continued and was intensified during the Cultural Revolution from 1966-76. During this time Mao Zedong thought developed into a highly widespread form of political rhetoric that greatly shaped political discourse radically antagonized the traditional culture. ‘The Four Olds’ and ‘the Four News’ are the rhetorical basis for this ideological radicalism. A publication of Mao Zedong thought, explains ‘the Four Olds,’ “Break away from old ideology, old culture, old custom, and old habit”\(^{47}\). The CCP published *Red Flag* also continued to denounce tradition through explicit critique of Confucianism with sayings such as, “Confucius and Lin Biao were political swindlers.”\(^{48}\) According to Xing Lu, author of “An Ideological/ Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China,” such slogans were the basis of establishing fanatic ideological fervor in society and transforming popular conceptions of acceptable culture. The violence of the Red Guard demonstrates how Maoist ideology was

\(^{47}\) In "An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China" Xing Lu: pp. 494
\(^{48}\) Ibid: pp. 495
actualized. During the early years of the Cultural Revolution the Red Guard, holding Mao
Zedong thought as holy doctrine, “rampaged throughout China, seeking and destroying anything
representative of the feudal past and the bourgeois present.”

Thus political rhetoric during the
Cultural Revolution, much like Mao’s Yan’an Talks on Art and Literature two decades earlier,
initiated a change in social and cultural ideology.

With its severity and radicalism, the Cultural Revolution carries a number of implications
for the construction of Chinese modern national and cultural identity. Certainly, the Cultural
Revolution is inseparable from the early years in the People’s Republic of China before 1966
and the drastic social, economic, and cultural changes following 1976. Tang Shaojie, a
contributing scholar to the journal *Culture and Social Transformation in Reform Era China*,
asserts that the Cultural Revolution simultaneously presents contradictions as well as continuities
with the years leading up to, and following the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution
was an opportunity to stabilize Mao’s control over the party. Furthermore, Mao attempted to
solidify an exhaustive commitment to the communist party throughout society during the
Cultural Revolution. However, the years following the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao
Zedong in 1976 lead to a reversal of the radical social, political, and economic mission of the
CCP during the Cultural Revolution era. Post-1976 China began a new era of reform and
development, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

After the death of Mao Zedong, China opened yet another chapter in its political-cultural
redefinition. Mao’s revolutionary politics left the economy in shambles and created a virtual

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famine. Under Deng Xiaoping, president of the CCP after Mao, revolutionary politics took a backseat to economic modernization. Ideologically the ‘Four News’ of the Mao era were replaced with the ‘Four Modernizations,’” referring to developing the areas of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. China’s economic growth and embrace of laissez faire capitalism, appears contradictory to the fervent socialist political orientation of the preceding decades. However, Deng Xiaoping’s address at the Third Plenum in 1978 reflects the nuance of this ideological shift. He said, “Carrying out the Four Modernizations requires great growth in the productive forces and…changes in all methods of management, actions, and thinking that stand in the way of such growth. Socialist modernization is therefore a profound and extensive revolution.”

Deng regards modernization as an extension of socialism and the Chinese revolution. Therefore, while the message may appear contradictory to the Maoist thought that ruled the nation for decades, Deng embraced the ideological power of the Communist Party. Throughout its lifespan the Communist Party has been able to shape pervasive social and political movements, although the ideology itself has changed.

The transformation of CCP policy from Mao to Deng demonstrates a dialectic between populous social reality and the ideology of the CCP. In other words, one affects the other – social and cultural reality, as well as CCP ideology and policy impact one another. For instance, social reality necessitated the ‘Socialist modernization’ that Deng discusses in the excerpt above. After the Cultural Revolution many farms and communes were left in desperate conditions and were not able to produce large amounts of agriculture. Deng implemented the ‘responsibility system,’ abolishing the commune system established under Mao, and giving farmers incentive

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through the ability to profit from production.\textsuperscript{52} In this case, the social realities of the Chinese populous gave rise to sweeping reform that changed prior ideological orientations. However, “ideological indoctrination…does not simply reflect but also shapes thought and culture.”\textsuperscript{53} This means, while society impacts political policy, political thought in turn transforms cultural and social reality. In the case of Deng reforms, social reality was the primary impetus for the reforms. However, the economic and political liberalization of the reform era, in turn, lead to a new era of re-defining Chinese culture in terms of modernity and tradition. The Confucian revival in the PRC beginning in the 1980’s is a prime example of such social and cultural transformation in an era of reform. This chapter will now discuss the transformation of Confucianism during the mid-20th century in order to understand the historical context of the Confucian revival in the 1980’s in the PRC.

In the wake of the fall of the Qing dynasty and the subsequent backlash against the ‘olds’ by the May Fourth Movement and Communist Party, Confucianism appeared to be a relic, unable to modernize. In the early 1970s sinologist Vitali Rubin asserted that Confucianism was significant to understand thousands of years of history and tradition, but was an opposing force to the revolutionary culture of the twentieth century. Moreover Rubin argued that the revolutionary side of China is not a recent development, but rather groups such as the Yellow Turbans demonstrate a tradition of radicalism in Chinese history. However, these groups operate in opposition to dominant Confucian society. Rubin believes that Confucianism was an unrelenting hegemonic ideology. Rubin argues that Confucianism, achieved high standing, but

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{53} Xing, Lu. "An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China." \textit{Discourse and Society} 10.4 (1999): pp. 503
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
also great stagnation, particularly through the Neo-Confucian era.\textsuperscript{54} Certainly, Confucianism, as well as officials and literati, have played a central role in Chinese political, social, and intellectual history. However, Rubin purports this side of intellectual history stifles progress and culture, and is incompatible with the modern era. Rubin assumes that Confucianism and modernity are opposing forces – as thesis and antithesis.

Rubin’s discussion of Confucianism as incompatible with modernity must be historicized in order to understand his logic as a sinologist, and in order to illustrate the oversights in his argument. By the late 20th century China was marked by more than a century of radical transformation. As a result it is easy to understand why Confucianism, a prevalent dimension of Chinese dynastic life and a highly criticized dimension of modernity, was dismissed as a piece of Chinese past. Throughout the 20th century various Chinese and Western thinkers attacked Confucianism. Also, as the cultural and political revolution continued under the Chinese Community Party, Mao and his anti-Confucian ideology enjoyed a cult-like status. As Rubin correctly indicates, during the Cultural Revolution Maoist literature was published and consumed with fervor comparable to “the dissemination of the holy sutras.”\textsuperscript{55} This cult behavior radically opposed the olds and addressed modernity and progress. Following the decades of revolution under Mao, Confucianism was readily understood as antithetical to modernity as it was the subject of critique for so long. Rubin focused on the developments of Maoist China, certainly the most important political-cultural force in China in 1970, the year Rubin published his article. Rubin does not consider the transformation of Confucianism. Responding to the revolutionary movements and modernization Rubin assumes that Confucianism is incompatible.

\textsuperscript{54} Rubin, Vitali. "The End of Confucianism?" : pp. 69-70
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid: pp. 72
with modernity. As we will see below, Confucianism and modernity are not diametrically opposed. Rather the transformation of Confucianism reflects a dialectic between tradition and modernity in Chinese culture.

The large number of Confucian thinkers in the twentieth century not only disproves the myth that Confucianism died with the communist revolution, but also demonstrates that Confucianism transformed in the 20th century with the development of modern China. In fact, Yen Ching-Hwang, history professor at the National University of Singapore and publisher of “The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899-1911,” argues the Confucian Revival movement began as early as the end of the 19th century. Yen posits that Kang Youwei and the Hundred Days Reforms established the revival movement in Mainland China. Confucian Revivalism continued after the fall of the Qing dynasty as well. According to Yen, 130 cities across China were home to “Confucian revivalist activities.” Such activities included magazine publications discussing the importance of Confucianism or the creation of cult Confucian groups, and the endorsement of Confucianism in a draft of the Republic’s constitution (Yen 34). Contrary to Rubin, Yen purports that Confucianism was not eradicated with the actions of the iconoclasts, fall of the dynastic system, and search for a ‘new cultural spirit’ as discussed during the May Fourth era. In fact turn, of the century Confucian conservatism redefined Confucian identity and negotiated its standing in society.

Umberto Bresciani, discussed at length in the introductory chapter, delineates 20th century Confucians into three generations to illustrate their development. During the 1920s until the end of the 1940’s the Confucians of the first generation participated in the revolutionary

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57 Ibid: pp. 34
political discourse of the era. The second generation began after the Communist Party assumed control of Mainland China in 1949, many Confucians went into exile in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and other East Asian countries. These thinkers still participated in the political rhetoric of their day, largely condemning the actions of the PRC, but also established Confucian academies to further Confucian learning. This generation is exemplified by Mou Zongsan. The third has become more politically engaged in the PRC since the 1980’s. Characterized by the works of Tu Weiming, this generation is the first group which self-identifies as New Confucian, distinct from Neo-Confucian. This description is brief as I discuss the progression of the 20th century Confucians in greater detail in the introductory chapter. The Confucians of each generation are distinguished by their political and social context of the three time periods. Throughout the three generations, the position of the Confucian within Chinese society changed. However, Confucians continued to participate in political and social discourse throughout these three different time periods in the 20th century.

The work of Yen and Bresciani confirm that the Confucian Revival as a cultural movement originated as in the imperial history during the mid 19th and 20th centuries. Moreover, the several stages of the movement illustrate how the revival continually responded to China’s modernization. Certainly, there are significant differences between Kang Youwei and later Confucian thinkers of the 20th century. Kang was a Neo-Confucian who attempted to preserve the Qing dynasty and authority of the Confucian literati, negotiating the role of Confucianism in Chinese society through the Qing reforms. Later revivalist movements have not held the same political clout. Rather, the later generations of New Confucians operate from the

periphery of the dominant political discourse. Still, Yen and Bresciani’s work is important in critiquing Rubin’s position. It indicates that modernity in China is not a function of unchecked Western dominance, but a process in which traditional cultural identity was continuously negotiated in society, as Chinese intellectuals experienced increasing pressure from the West. Discussing Mou Zongsan and Tu Weiming, second and third generation Confucians Revivalists, in greater detail below demonstrates the negotiation between modernity and tradition.

Born in 1909, Mou was a member of the new Chinese generation, born after the abolition of the Confucian exam system. As aforementioned, this reform was an intellectual watershed in China at the turn of century. Many thinkers such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi attempted to define China’s cultural modernity. As the birth of the Communist Party and the years of Cultural Revolution indicate, the radicalization of culture to overthrow the ‘backwards’ traditions is a salient feature of Chinese modernity. However, Mou’s place in Chinese history indicates another side to the radical transformation of culture and tradition in the twentieth century. However, Mou was incredibly critical of the Sino-Western philosophical and political discourse from the 19th and early 20th century. According to Tang Refeng, “Mou judged that philosophers who reinterpret Chinese philosophy in terms of a particular Western school have no real understanding of Chinese philosophy at all.” With this critical perspective, Mou not only criticized former discourse, but also devoted his life and work to the development of Confucianism in modernity.

Along with Carson Zhang, Dang Zhunyi, and Xu Foguan, Mou Zongsan published “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” in 1958. While

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60 Ibid: pp. 327

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this manifesto was published almost two decades prior to Rubin and Bauer, it criticized many of
the perspectives in Sinology to which they adhered. Mou and his colleagues proposed that
Sinology has had three incompetent modes of thinking. First, Jesuit missionaries established
contact with China centuries ago, but utterly misunderstood the role of religion in China in order
to embolden the chance of religious compatibility and conversion. Second, Sinologists began to
study Chinese history and cultural life, but in a way “analogous to that in the relics of ancient
Egypt and Asia Minor.” This is one of the issues that Rubin and Bauer face in their critique of
Confucianism; they appear to discuss Confucian for its role in China before the twentieth
century. The, during the time of the manifesto’s publication many governments were taking new
interest in China. However, this interest in China appeared exclude a genuine appreciation for
Chinese history and culture (457-9). With this criticism of Sinology, Mou and his colleagues
offer a new approach in order to understand culture as alive and dynamic in China.

The Manifesto reappraises Chinese culture and does so through Confucian discourse.
Mou offers two essential statements about Chinese culture. Namely culture is alive in China, and
that “culture is the objective expression of the spiritual life of mankind.” In true Confucian
form, culture has a direct connection to spirituality. For Mou and the other New Confucian
thinkers of the manifesto, human ‘Heart and Nature’ (xinxing 心性) is the basis of China’s
cultural spirit. The manifesto defines Heart and Nature as the “concentration of mind on an
exhaustive study of the nature of the universe.” With Heart and Nature, Chinese thought does
not deal with morality or social order alone. Rather, philosophy is substantiated through

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62 Ibid: pp. 460
contemplation of the universe. It is no wonder that Tang Refeng notes, “according to Mou, the quintessence of Chinese philosophy is in its metaphysics.” Morality is not unique to the New Confucians. In fact, the metaphysical support for morality and philosophical thought may be traced to classical Confucian texts such as *Doctrine of the Mean*. However, the manifesto asserts the importance of this metaphysical contemplation as, “[Heart and Nature] is the root of Chinese thought.” Moreover, it is through contemplation of Heart and Nature that people create an active dialogue with heaven and the rest of humanity. Following xin-xin, the Neo-Confucians of the Song-Ming era, “equate… the human heart with the cosmic heart.” The manifesto argues that Chinese thought and culture from Confucius and Mencius until the present day is grounded in a communion with the rest of humanity and Heaven. Although Mou and his generation of Confucian thinkers did not identify as ‘New Confucians,’ Mou’s work responds to and participates in the discourse concerning Chinese modernity. Mou’s philosophical claims in the Manifesto reflect that Confucianism was not dominated by modernization and revolution. Rather, Confucians of the 20th century provided a critique of modernization and staked a claim in defining modern Chinese cultural identity and continue the practice and teaching of Confucianism.

Mou’s discussion of Confucian culture also takes on global significance. In the above-mentioned quote regarding culture as the expression of humanity’s spirituality, the manifesto asserts that culture in general assumes metaphysical importance. In addressing culture at large, Mou and his colleagues are able to turn the discussion about China into a universalist discourse.

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66 Ibid: pp. 464
While Confucianism is not universal, Mou and colleagues believe that modernization carries drastic consequences for culture in every state. As such, the manifesto not only discusses Chinese culture, but issues of world culture. For instance, Mou and his colleagues assert that the West is in need of many cultural and spiritual changes in order to strengthen in modernity. They argue, “the strength of the West’s cultural spirit lies in its ability to push ahead indefinitely. However, there is not secure foundation underlying this feverish pursuit of progress.”

Following the logic of the manifesto, if the West develops without stable cultural foundations then this is a crisis of Western spirituality. Therefore, for the New Confucian thinkers of the manifesto, the West is also subject to the crises of modernization and globalization. Thus, Mou globalizes his discussion of Confucian culture. He claims that Confucian culture, like spirituality in the West, is in the midst of a crisis of modernity.

Like Mou Zongsan, Tu Weiming reflects Confucian principles to issues of globalization and modernization in a worldwide context. Both Mou and Tu argue that Confucianism can address global issues. In “Multiple Modernities” Tu describes the current state of the global community as “creative confusion” where the entire world is grappling with several dichotomies: “the traditional/modern, the West/rest and the local/global.” Certainly the imperialist, colonialist history is apparent in the Chinese memory. However, Tu is committed to the fact that these dichotomies affect each of the parties involved. In other words, within the ‘West/rest’ dichotomy, both the West and the rest of the globe contend with imperialist histories and co-create the present moment. Tu uses North America as an example of such global concerns.

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“The recent North American upsurge of interest in community may have been stimulated by a sense of crisis that social disintegration is a serious threat to the well-being of the Republic, but the local conditions in the United States and Canada, precipitated by the ethnic and linguistic conflicts, are generalizable throughout the highly industrialized, if not post-modern, First World.”

This demonstrates that on the local and global level, societies are grappling with universal problems of culture, tradition and modernity. Furthermore, although the West is conventionally imagined as modern, modernity creates seemingly irreconcilable hardships for the West as well.

With such concerns for modernity, Tu makes the case that the Confucian revival has arisen to answer the questions of the local-global and modern-tradition dichotomies. Tu says, “The rise of Confucian East Asia suggests that traditions are present as active agents in modernity and, by implication, the modernizing process can assume different cultural forms.”

Tu remarks that imperialist history often frames ‘Western’ as ‘global.’ Tu argues that Confucianism, a tradition local to East Asia, is in fact compatible with global, modern realities. Tu transcends the tradition-modernity dichotomy as he illustrates that political Confucianism “as a response to the Western impact…[has] been thoroughly reconfigured in a new constellation.”

Under this ‘new constellation’ Tu argues that Confucianism not only supports democratization and open economic development, but actually demands it as well as other requirements for a stable modern society.

In “Multiple Modernities” Tu enumerates the dimensions of a new political Confucianism that addresses modern needs. First, New Confucianism demands an active role of the government in economic development as, “The government is perceived, in principle, as a positive force for social stability.” This clearly corresponds to the nature of government under

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69 Ibid: pp. 59
71 Ibid: pp. 63
72 Ibid: pp. 64
Neo and Classical Confucianism, only reacting to the advent of market economy and its impact on the stability of the modern state. Second, New Confucianism also grapples with the modern concept of Law. Whereas Confucianism has been critiqued for its incompatibility with Law, Tu asserts that social peace is central to a Confucian society. These two notions show a reaction to the Enlightenment dominated discourse around political modernity that has shaped many modern states. While Chinese thinkers have and continue to study Enlightenment thought, New Confucianism demonstrates that it is not the only source for political thought or discourse in the global setting. Tu also highlights the importance of the family in modern East Asia. The family is responsible for transmitting the values that support and stabilize society. And as a result, the family and the state share a very sensitive relationship.\(^7^3\) Whereas autonomy and individualism are emphasized in ‘modern’ or ‘western’ discourse, Confucianism supports a notion of the collective centered on the family and its benefits for national stability.

Lastly, Tu stresses two central principles to Confucianism, education and cultivation. Each of these concepts are pivotal to the peace of the person, family, and state, but also help resolve issues of modern politics.\(^7^4\) Specifically, education is believed to equip students with the tools necessary to become upright citizens. While this is a conventionally Western-Enlightenment perspective, education under the New Confucian paradigm “must be congenial to the development of cultural competence and appreciation of spiritual values.”\(^7^5\) Similarly, self-cultivation is oriented towards maintaining stability in society and creating virtue-oriented political leaders.

The above listed methods of applying Confucian ideology to modern political, critiques

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\(^7^4\) Ibid: pp. 65
\(^7^5\) Ibid: pp. 66
the modern Western concept of progress. Tu writes,

The time is long overdue to move beyond a mindset shaped by modernization as a unilinear progression. As politics of domination fades, we welcome the drawing of an age of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing, and collaboration.\textsuperscript{76} Tu uses the New Confucian discourse to change the way Western scholars and political leaders conventionally think of modernity. Tu believes that modernity cannot be thought of as a ‘unilinear progression.’ In other words, modernization is not Westernization. Rather, Tu claims that modernity must be defined on Chinese Confucian cultural traditions. On the one hand, Tu asserts the inevitability of democracy, popular elections, and economic liberalization in Confucian culture, a statement that obviously supports a universalistic approach to modernity. However, Tu also supports a diachronic model of the Confucian tradition. In this way, political structures appear secondary to the centrality of Confucianism and culture in East Asian societies. As democracy in East Asia is very new, and in China has yet to be completely realized, the Confucian model for a new political era is still incredibly young and developing. What is perhaps most significant about this application of New Confucianism to local and global problems is the discursive power of Confucianism. While some may argue that these debates are still framed by Western political and economic hegemony, Tu offers his own perspective on politics, economics, and citizenship. In its modern history, Confucianism has therefore changed in reaction to political development, such as Civil War and social upheaval, as well as the Open Door policy, Four Modernizations and economic liberalization. However, New Confucianism has in turn shaped political debate in those two spheres as well. This is best indicated by the prevalence of New Confucian in Mainland Chinese political discourse in the post-Mao period.

As two leaders in the Confucian Revival, Mou and Tu present the two main tenets of the revival movement – the creative transformation of the Confucian tradition, and engaging in a

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid: pp. 75
dialogue between Confucianism and modernization and globalization. In the above discussion Mou and Tu present the work of Confucian revival to continue Confucian learning. Not only do contemporary Confucians continue to propagate Confucianism, but they also reappraise Confucian texts and practices to address present day issues. This is best illustrated by Tu’s discussion of global issues presented in “Multiple Modernities.” In spite of the revolutionary pressures of modernization that have defined China in the 20th century, the Confucian revival continues to creatively redefine the Confucian tradition. More importantly, Tu and Mou illustrate that the Confucian Revival has not only occurred in spite of, but also in response to modernization and globalization. They recognize crises provoked by globalization and modernization. They simultaneously redefine Confucianism for the 20th century and rethink globalization through critique.

In the 1980’s New Confucianism entered political discourse in Mainland China. As stated above, China found itself redefining culture as it left the political and social chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Song Xianlin, a contributing scholar to the book *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination*, argues, “While many agreed that the ‘revolutionary legacy’ of Mao’s era did not represent the Chinese cultural tradition, confusion and strained arguments permeated the debates that initiated ‘the cultural craze’.” With this context the culture craze of the post-Mao era inspired news publications, scholars, and philosophers to reevaluate Confucianism. This era of redefining culture was not without debate. On the one hand, scholars such as Zhang Dainian asserted, “now was the age for studying Confucianism with scientific Marxist philosophy.” On the other hand, Bao Zunxin argued, “the cultural disasters of recent history were the direct

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78 Ibid: pp. 84
legacy of what Mao and his colleagues had inherited from Confucianism.” Criticizing Maoism, let alone comparing Mao to Confucius was all together unimaginable in the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, arguing for the compatibility between Marxism and Confucianism was similarly absurd in the decades prior. Even though Bao is critical of the role of Confucius in China’s modernity, this represents the massive sea-change of the 1980’s in China.

Within a decade after the death of Mao Zedong, the People Republic of China recognized the centrality of Confucius to Chinese national identity. The Culture Craze of the 1980’s radically reevaluated and redefined the national spirit, as Deng Xiaoping made the case for ‘Socialist Spiritual Civilization’ and concerns for ‘Spiritual Pollution.’ As Mou Zongsan argued for the importance of culture to national spirit, the PRC officially regarded Confucius as, “the founder of Chinese traditional culture.” Not only did the PRC begin to celebrate Confucius birthday, but it also invited Tu Weiming to Beijing. While New Confucians recognized the new epoch of Confucianism for decades, in the 1980’s the Communist Party resuscitate Confucius for its nationalist agenda.

The relationship between third generation new Confucians and the politics of the CCP is problematic for scholar Thierry Pairault, professor at the French National Scientific Research Centre. Pairault authored “China’s Response to Globalization: Manufacturing Confucian Values,” in Globalization and Transformation of Local Socio-economic Practices in 2008. As the title of his article suggests, Pairault claims the Confucian Revival is a disingenuous form of cultural preservation. According to Pairault, since the 1990’s the CCP has used the Confucian Revival to “Sinicize Socialism.” In other words, Pairault believes that CCP endorses the revival.

79 Ibid: pp. 89-90
81 Ibid: pp. 86
to ideologically validate the policy of the CCP. For instance, Pairault presents that the Ministry of Education in the CCP claims, “History ree off records proving that the roots of Marxist ideology are already in the genes of Chinese traditional culture.” 82 Certainly, the use of Confucian ideals in political rhetoric creates the sense of the revival as utilitarian, or towing the Communist Party line. However, this is only one aspect to the place of the Confucian Revival in contemporary Mainland society. As the discussions of Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang in the following chapter will demonstrate, the role of third generation Confucians is more complicated than the political instrumentalism of the CCP.

In the present day, China stands in a continuing process of redefining culture in terms of modernity and tradition. Clearly, the role of culture in the last two centuries has played a crucial role to the political structure in China. Moreover, Confucian culture is negotiated through both internal dialogues within China, as well as external dialogue with global forces. The creative evolution of the Confucian tradition during the 19th and 20th centuries demonstrates these internal and external dialogues. The work of New Confucians to redefine the Confucian tradition is an example of an internal dialogue. The New Confucians continuously debated Confucian culture throughout China’s modern history. This transformation was not only between Confucians, but was also an external dialogue. Under the constant pressure of Westernization, New Confucians adapted to, participated in, and critiqued modernization. New Confucians throughout the 19th and 20th centuries redefined the relationship between Chinese cultural tradition and modern Western notions of profess. As China is one the most dominant economic super powers on the globe, the nation’s history indicates rampant modernization and globalization. However, contemporary Chinese cultural identity is not a product of unilateral

Westernization. Rather, culture in China must be understood as a dialectic of tradition and modernity, in which the two elements are in dialogue with one another. This is why the Confucian Revival is such an important movement in the modern Chinese history. It reflects that cultural identity is one of transformation and a negotiation between the forces of tradition and modernity.
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Introduction

While the term New Confucianism refers to a specific movement in Mainland China and abroad, there is great diversity in political ideology across the movement. This chapter characterizes the political ideologies of the New Confucian movement. In a broad sense the political ideology and affiliation of New Confucian activists can be conceived as either statist or non-statist. Statist refers to Confucians who support the political ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or those who are endorsed or sponsored by the CCP. Non-statist refers to New Confucians who do not support the political ideology of the CCP, and idealize a China where Marxism is replaced with Confucian ideology and political organization. In either case, the New Confucians illustrate the movement in Mainland China to fashion a contemporary political ideology out of traditional culture and cultural nationalism.

The first section of this paper will address the prominence of state and non-state Confucian intellectuals historically and in the present day. However, the politics of the New Confucian movement are more complex than the political dichotomy described above would suggest. Moving toward a more nuanced typology, this chapter then discusses the characterizations of New Confucianism proposed by scholars Jiawen Ai and Sebastian Billioud. Jiawen Ai is a doctoral student in politics at the University of Melbourne, Australia and Sebastian Billioud is professor of Chinese Civilization at the University of Paris-Diderot, who has published numerous articles regarding New Confucianism in Mainland China in China Perspective, a quarterly journal that examines Chinese politics, economics, culture and society. Each scholar’s typology of the movement offers differing, but significant modes of analysis.
This chapter will then use Ai and Billioud’s typologies to characterize the works of two of the most important New Confucians on Mainland China today – Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang.

**Statist and Non-Statist Intellectuals of the Confucian Revival**

The intellectuals in the Confucian revival play statist and non-statist roles in contemporary China. In regards to the statist Confucian activities, the CCP began shifting their focus to Confucian political ideology in the 1980’s. Mao Zedong thought and Marxism-Leninism were the authoritative ideological voice in China for the preceding decades. With the death of Mao and the beginning of a new era of reform, the ideological landscape in China began a period of re-definition. At the same time, the Confucian Revival in Mainland and abroad gained more momentum. For instance, the China Confucius Foundation was established in 1984 with headquarters in Beijing, the capital of the PRC. Furthermore the CCP endorsed the celebration of Confucius’ birthday starting in 1987.\(^{83}\) Fang Keli, Dean of Graduate Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and member of the Office of Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council, exemplifies well CCP political investment in Confucianism in the post-Mao era. Fang lead two CCP-funded Confucian research projects from 1986 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1995, resulting in the publication of over 400 papers and numerous other works.\(^{84}\) Moreover, in 1986 the State Education Commission sponsored research into Confucianism, lead by Fang. At the Commission, Fang spoke on the compatibility of Confucianism and modernity.\(^{85}\)

Fang, and statist Confucian activities as a whole since the 1980’s, must be understood in

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the context of the political landscape of the CCP in the Post-Mao era. Jiawen Ai describes this as a liminal period in Chinese ideology, arguing China has experienced a political ideological vacuum in the last several decades. She writes, “it is evident that the CCP’s leadership has been seeking a certain political ideology to supplement the void left by Marxism-Leninism.”

Ai supports this claim by citing the CCP’s opening and reformation of the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping, as well as President Hu Jintao’s speeches regarding innovating the CCP’s methods and socialist culture. In this context, the efforts of Fang demonstrate the statist Confucian mission. The Party supports Fang’s Confucian interest. This demonstrates Hu’s sentiment of innovating the socialist culture. As the CCP has entered a new ideological paradigm in the post-Mao era, the Party has created the intellectual space to explore Confucianism.

There are also examples of non-statist Confucian activism in the post-Mao era. For instance, in 1989 Jiang Qing published an article in Taiwan arguing for the replacing Marxism with Confucianism in Mainland China. This publication is significant in terms of the time period in which it was published. Jiang Qing published his article only three years after Fang Keli initiated state sponsored scholarship on Confucianism. Clearly, this indicates Qing disagreed and responded to the direction of the state-sponsored Confucian activities and the principles of Fang Keli. Another important factor is the place of publication – Taiwan. Although Jiang Qing is a citizen of the PRC, he was either unable or chose to publish in Taiwan. Either possibility indicates the political sensitivity of his publication and his opposition to the CCP. Jiang Qing’s work “openly challenged the legitimacy of a communist party.” These factors reflect the non-statist nature of Jiang Qing.

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The difference between Qing and Fang demonstrate that the CCP endorsed Confucianism is not representative of the entire New Confucians movement. The CCP was selective about the scholars and content it sponsored or published. This indicates that while there is political affiliation between the CCP and some Confucian activities, there is also tension between Confucians and the CCP. However, this also indicates tension within Confucian scholarship, as Jiang and Fang reflect differing political views in their work. Jiang Qing and other Confucians disagree with state-sponsored CCP Confucians whose “researches are aimed at meeting the party’s needs and legitimizing the party’s power.”

In examining the Confucian revival as an entire movement there are two extremes of political affiliation; there are statist intellectuals, such as Fang, and non-statist intellectuals, such as Jiang, that are both dedicated to the Confucian project. This demonstrates that there is dynamism within the Confucian revival; the revival movement involve the confluence of statist and non-statist intellectuals. While this statist and non-statist Confucians are apparent, a more nuanced typology is necessary to understand the complexity of the political motivations of any particular New Confucian intellectual. In other words intellectuals of the Confucian revival hold motivations that are more intricate than dichotomous categories of statist and non-statist. To that end the following section discusses two prominent models proposed by Jiawen Ai and Sebastien Billioud.

**Beyond the Statist and Non-statist Dichotomy**

The typologies proposed by Jiawen Ai and Sebastien Billioud provide a more nuanced framework for analyzing the intellectuals of the Confucian revival. Ai’s model categorizes new Confucians in terms of three ideological groups – Confucians, liberal Confucianists, and socialist Confucianists. As explained below, these categorize expand on the statist and non-statist

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88 Ibid, pp. 694.
dichotomy by analyzing New Confucians according to their political ideologies and affiliations with the CCP. Billioud, on the other hand, examines the motivating factors behind New Confucian activism. His three motivations are adherence to the Confucian worldview, as well as political and economic gain. Whereas Ai characterizes Confucians in terms of rigid political affiliation, Billioud’s model provides a more fluid framework for analyzing the interest of Confucian intellectuals. This section discusses the typologies of Ai and Billioud and argues that the application of both frameworks allows for a more nuanced characterization of Confucian intellectuals.

In “Refunctioning of Confucianism: The Mainland Chinese Intellectual Response to Confucianism since the 1980’s” Jiawen Ai describes the three categories of her model for analyzing Confucian intellectuals. Ai’s categories are useful for understanding the diverse ideology across the New Confucians, but also contain a judgment on the extent of sincerity in Confucian belief. Ai writes, “Confucians… are adherents of Confucianism and look to it as an alternative way of being, and ‘Confucianists’…specialize in studying Confucianism but are not true believers.” 89 The notion of being a “true believer” is subjective and problematic. Ai’s article does not mention self-determination on the part of those labeled Confucianists. In other words, it is difficult to know whether or not someone labeled Confucianist by Ai does not consider him or herself an ardent Confucian. However, these terms are useful in that they indicate political affiliation. As such they illustrate the diversity of political ideology that informs the revival.

“Confucians” are those who believe that Confucianism is the only ideology that can unite China, and should therefore be the basis of China’s political system and ideology. Confucians believe that Westernization has lead to the degradation of China’s moral condition, causing

social and political chaos. They reject both Marxism and liberal democracy as viable options for political ideology. As these two ideologies are Western, they are incapable of capturing the national identity. For example, Jiawen Ai writes, “while class struggle turns sons against fathers, wives against husbands, and sibling against sibling, harmonious cooperation among all the individuals and units of community contributes to the welfare of the national community and moral values are capable of uniting the nation.”  

Confucianism provides the national spirit that will remedy the chaos brought on by Westernization. According to Jiawen Ai, the “ideal regime seems to be the antithesis of both Western liberal democracy and Marxism” for Confucians. The details of the political and ideological arguments of Confucians will be discussed later in this chapter. However, it is important to note that Confucians, such as Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, propose, “Confucianizing the CCP”. In other words, this group of Confucians is rethinking the government on a structural level, bringing Confucian religion and culture into the fore. Through Confucianizing the CCP, Confucian elite and doctrine become the source of political ideological legitimacy. Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang both propose Confucianism should be endorsed as the state religion (although Confucians such as Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang support freedom of religion too). Furthermore, the government itself would be restructured in a way that a group of Confucian elite would organize and run part of the government. The details of this reformist vision will be provided later in this chapter. Here it is important to note that Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang’s political models assume Confucianism should be the political, spiritual, and cultural foundation of the government.

The “Socialist Confucianists” are the next category of New Confucians described by

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90 ibid, pp. 35
91 ibid, pp. 37
93 ibid, pp. 36-7
Jiawen Ai. “Socialists Confucianists” believe that studying Confucianism functions to serve the political authority of the CCP. This group of Confucians, typified by Fang Keli believes that Confucianism is vital to the future of China. However, Marxism is the fundamental political ideology. Whereas “Confucians” believe in Confucianizing the CCP, the “socialist Confucianists” believe in adapting Confucianism to Marxism. While many socialist Confucianists argue that Confucianism can provide the legitimacy for Marxism, Ai argues these Confucianists believe in tailoring Confucianism to fit Marxist ideology. Ai claims, although “Confucianists portrayed themselves as true believers in Confucainism…when Confucians argued in favor of ‘Confucian authoritarian regime… the socialist Confucians showed their true identities as socialists, not Confucians.” Given the iconoclasm of the Maoist era, Confucianism legitimizing Communist authority appears contradictory. Scholars such as Ai question the ultimate motivations and allegiances of this group. In any case, “socialist Confucianists” enjoy a closer affiliation to the CCP and envision a different political reality for the future of the People’s Republic of China. The most obvious difference is that the “socialist Confucianists” argue for cultural nationalism to strengthen spirit and legitimacy of the political system, preserving the authority of the CCP. As such, it is considered statist as opposed to the non-statist perspective of the Confucians.

Finally, “liberal Confucianists” constitute the third category in Ai’s model. The primary political object of this group is “political transparency within China” moving toward a democratic system. This group of Confucianists is part of a broader movement for political liberalization in the PRC. However proponents of liberalization, whether Confucian or not, do

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94 ibid, pp. 38
96 ibid, pp. 41.58
not support a model of democracy identical to Western democracy. This notion challenges the idea of cultural universalism, arguing that different cultures provide different interpretations of democracy. Ai cites Yijie, a professor at Beijing University, “it is impossible to categorize human ideologies as either Western democracy or Confucian authoritarianism; what is needed is a combination of both.” This reflects the nature of liberal Confucianists to be critical of democracy and the Confucian tradition. While Confucianism is vital to modernization and political reform, it requires the transformation of the tradition. This starkly contrasts with the Confucians who ardently support the adherence to the texts and practices of the tradition. However, it is similar to the Confucians in that they both call for replacing Marxist ideology.

While Ai’s typology is useful for showing the ideological differences across the New Confucian movement, it also reveals their most important similarity. Ai writes, “socialist Confucianists, liberal Confucianists, and Confucians all give favorable consideration to the feasibility of applying Confucianism to the modernization of China.” Each of the three groups is concerned with negotiation between tradition and modernity. All types of Confucians argue modernizing the PRC via the Confucian tradition. Certainly only the socialist Confucianists can be considered statist; the rest oppose Marxist ideology for different reasons. However, each group of New Confucians challenges the CCP to define its modernizing project in relation to the Confucian tradition in one form or another.

Sebastien Billioud offers another typology of the New Confucian movement. Similar to Ai, Billioud believes the contemporary Confucianism movement in China contains a multiplicity of ideals and motivations. Billioud writes, “The frequently encountered expression of ‘Confucian

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97 ibid, pp. 41
98 ibid, pp. 43-44
revival’ is indeed very problematic: not only does it point today to very different social phenomena, but it also artificially gives the impression of a community of worldviews among Confucian activists and sympathizers.” 100 In “Carrying the Confucian Torch to the Masses” Billioud establishes three motivations behind Confucian activism; they are adherence, politics, and economics. 101 Diversity is the best way to characterize the Confucian movement in China today. However, Billioud’s typology reflects a more dynamic relationship among the cultural, philosophical, religious, and political ideals than Ai’s rigid categorization of political ideology. The reason for such a difference is that Billioud discusses motivations rather than political categories. Motivations are more subjective in nature, and as a result Confucian activists with different political ideologies may share the same motivations.

Confucians motivated by conformity to the cultural, religious, and philosophical elements of the Confucian tradition represent the category of adhesion. Billioud describes this first motivation as, “adhesion to some elements of the ‘Confucian worldview,’ whatever these elements may be.”102 This category is significant for it contrasts with Ai’s methodology in several ways. Billioud’s language is intentionally vague. Phrases such as “some elements” reflect that this type of Confucian is not necessarily devoutly religious. As Confucianism was the nexus between Chinese social, political, religious, and cultural life for millennia, the tradition resounds today in everyday life. In this sense, adherence to the Confucian worldview may manifest in children displaying filial piety or devout religious academies where Confucian texts are studied closely. This vagueness is further reflected in the use of quotation marks around “Confucian worldview.” Without qualifying what this view is, it suggests multiple definitions of what

102 Ibid, pp. 202
constitutes the Confucian worldview. In this sense, Ai’s concepts of Confucians, socialist Confucianists, and liberal Confucianists fit Billioud’s model of adherents; Ai’s three categories all adhere to a Confucian worldview, although they disagree with each other on the specifics of their ideals. While Billioud does not provide a rigid framework for analyzing the movement, he succeeds in illustrating the complexity, interconnectedness, and plurality of Confucian activists.

The complexity of the Confucian movement is shown by the other two motivations identified by Billioud: the economic and political. Both motivations are instrumental in nature; economic refers to the material gains associated with Confucianism, and political refers to use of Confucianism to support a political ideal. Examples of economic or material incentive motivating Confucian activities include the companies publishing the Confucian classics for profit or the rise of the tourist industry where traditional culture may be the main attraction.103 Political motivations are similar to the socialist Confucianists described by Jiawen Ai; both are endorsements of Confucianism that involve political gains with the CCP.104 Ai’s liberal Confucianists do have political motivations as well, but Billioud’s notion of political motivation is that support of Confucianism will manifest in gains within the CCP. While these two categories are classified as material or political gain, “it is very difficult to speak simply in terms of instrumentalisation, since a set of intertwined motivations needs to be taken into account when analyzing such phenomena.”105 In other words, individuals and groups may benefit politically or economically from endorsing or studying Confucianism, but many such individuals believe they are adhering to a Confucian worldview as well.

The difference between statist and non-statist Confucians is still a relevant framework of

104 Ibid
105 Ibid
the revival as a whole. However the statist / non-statist model does not provide the analytical depth of the models of Ai and Billioud. Combining the frameworks of Ai and Billioud offers the necessary nuances to analyzing the New Confucians. While Billioud argues for the fluidity of motivations, Ai provides a rigid categorization. These two models are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement each other. Given the lack of unity, political affiliation, and motivation across the movement it is vital to understand these New Confucians in both fluid and rigid terms. For instance, Fang is a socialist Confucianist according to Ai’s typology, as his efforts serve, and are supported by, the CCP. However, Fang may not be interested in Confucianism because it is politically advantageous. Fang’s close political affiliation does not require political motivations. Rather he may be motivated by belief in a Confucian worldview. With the understanding of the statist and non-statist models, as well as the frameworks provided by Ai and Billioud, the following section will categorize two prominent New Confucians in the PRC, Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang.

**Jiang Qing**

Jiang Qing’s publications and teachings make him one of the most unique and influential New Confucians in Mainland China today. Jiang’s work is groundbreaking in proposing and conceptualizing a current day political-Confucian reality. As mentioned above, Jiang Qing has been a prominent voice of Confucianism since the 1980’s. Jiang Qing not only endorses Confucianism as a means of political organization, but has also established a traditional Confucian academy in Guizhou province. As Daniel Bell describes in *The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China*, “Jiang has written the most systematic and detailed

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defense of political Confucianism since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.”

Jiang espouses a political schema for realizing a Confucian-lead PRC, educates disciples on the classics in an exclusive traditional academy, and has been a driving force in a movement to educate Chinese youth on the Confucian classics. Most importantly, Jiang’s model for political Confucianism is a contemporary expression of the Gongyang tradition and the teachings of Dong Zhongshu, a Han dynasty Confucian intellectual. Jiang’s vision of political Confucianism not only critiques the CCP as illegitimate, but also distinguishes Jiang from other new Confucian intellectual of the 20th and 21st century.

“From Mind [and Nature] Confucianism to Political Confucianism” illustrates Jiang’s ideals regarding the direction and ideology of the New Confucian movement for the future of China. As the title suggests, Jiang differentiates between Political Confucianism (zhengzhiruxue 政治儒学) and Mind-Nature Confucianism (xinxngruxue 心性儒学). Political Confucianism emphasizes creating political and legal institutions based on Confucian values that would address China’s current social and cultural crises. According to Jiang, Mind-Nature Confucianism is primarily concerned with “the existential life of human individuals and their minds, rather than the socio-political institutions.” This type of Confucianism esteems individualism; claiming the individual is capable of transforming the immorality of the world through personal cultivation. ‘Mind Confucianism’ emphasizes metaphysics, internalization, and transcendentalism, which Jiang finds problematic as he holds that such principles involve

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107 Bell, Daniel. "Jiang Qing's Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011. pp. 139
108 Ruiping Fang, the editor of The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, translates Mind-Nature Confucianism as simply Mind Confucianism. The original Chinese is xinxngruxue 心性儒学; xin refers the human mind and heart, Xing refers to human nature. As such Mind-Nature Confucianism is more accurate to the original Chinese meaning and will be used in place of Ruiping Fang’s translation.
109 Jiang, Qing. "From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011. pp. 18
influence from Western philosophy and distracts from social reality.\(^ {110}\) The overemphasis on Mind-Nature Confucianism undermines the ability of Confucianism to create harmony, as it ignores the demand for political and social systems to govern China.

In Jiang’s view, the political system is necessary for the cultivation of the individual and the realization of social harmony. He writes:

> Every great civilization in the history of mankind consists of at least two components. The first component is a conception of the origin of the universe that gives rise to human life, and the rules and laws that sustain the order of the universe and human life. The second component is the development of socio-political institutions that make it possible to maintain an orderly human society.\(^ {111}\)

Jiang’s religious overtones are apparent here. As opposed to the cultural nationalism of the statist Confucians, such as Fang Keli, Jiang asserts that a society first needs faith in a cosmogony and a cosmology. Without such a metaphysical anchor, a society will not be ‘outstanding.’ Furthermore, the socio-political system stems directly from this metaphysical framework. It is no surprise that Jiang mentions “rules and laws that sustain the order of the universe and human life.” This sentiment speaks to the role of rites in the Confucian tradition, which are meant to reflect and embody the greater cosmic patterns of the world, making them instrumental in maintaining harmony. Thus, Jiang Qing argues, it is impossible to create socio-political order without this metaphysical grounding.

Governance based on such a metaphysical foundation must reflect the Confucian ideal of ‘Inner Sagliness and Outer Kingliness,’ *neisheng waiwang* 内圣外王.\(^ {112}\) Tu Weiming, a scholar of Confucianism and fellow New Confucian, argues this ancient Confucian

\(^{110}\) Jiang, Qing. "From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011, pp. 19-20
\(^{111}\) ibid
\(^{112}\) ibid, pp. 18
ideal, “means... that only a sage is qualified to be a king.” The rule of a sage ensures that political institutions reflect laws to maintain social harmony. Jiang asserts that the overemphasis on Mind-Nature Confucianism does not allow this political social harmony to be realized. Mind Confucianism emphasizes the individual cultivation of morality and virtue to the neglect of social concerns. This emphasis on the individual excludes the important role of the sage-king and implies that harmony can be achieved through individual cultivation alone. Jiang argues Mind-Nature Confucianism is incapable of providing the political structure that is in accordance with the Confucian metaphysical understanding, which would provide harmony in society. Political Confucianism is about realizing Outer Kingliness to achieve the Kingly Way (wangdao). Applying Jiawen Ai’s model, Jiang is a Confucian critical of both Marxism and liberal democracy. Both political models are imported from the West, and therefore are not based on the ethico-religious system necessary to maintain social harmony.

Jiang’s political Confucianism and emphasis on ‘Outer Kingliness’ is part of a tradition of Confucian scholarship dating back to the original writings of Confucius. Political Confucianism, Jiang argues, was established by the Gongyang tradition. The Gongyang was, “derived from classical Confucian texts, especially The Book of Rites and The Spring and Autumn Annals.” With that, Jiang claims that the Gongyang school was established on the original writings of Confucius which were later elaborated by disciples Xunzi and ultimately Dong Zhongshu. Thus, Jiang declares himself part of the Gongyang tradition. In doing so Jiang declares that his scholarship is based on a long-established Confucian tradition with its

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114 Jiang, Qing. "From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011. pp. 25
115 ibid, pp. 25
own political history based on classical Confucian texts and a lineage of Confucian scholars including Confucius, Xunzi, and Dong Zhongshu. Before discussing Jiang’s political structure it is important to undersatnd the role of the Political Confucianism espoused by Dong Zhongshu in the Han dynasty. Discussing Dong’s Political Confucianism will contextulize Jiang as a contemporary revivisioning of the Gongyang tradition.

Dong Zhongshu (195-104 BCE) was a Han dynasty Confucian scholar and erudite of the Gongyang commentary to *The Spring and Autumn*, a text attributed to Confucius. During the rule of Emperor Wu, beginning in 140 BCE, Dong was instrumental in the establishment of an Imperial University and the rise of Confucian civil bureaucracy. Dong’s belief in the function of the King in governing a state is the foundation of Jiang Qing’s Political Confucianism. This is demonstrated as Jiang argues,

Today’s Confucians must develop a Political Confucianism… derived from the classical Confucian texts, especially… *The Spring and Autumn*… traced back to Confucius’ original writings…elaborated by… Dong Zhongshu.\(^{116}\) As Jiang declares his Political Confucianism part of the lineage of Dong Zhongshu, it is important to understand the Dong’s political vision of Confucianism.

Dong’s Political Confucianism is established on the rule of a sage-King. Dong argued that the purpose of the ruler was to “initiate and facilitate the process of aligning the order and values of the human world with those of Heaven…”\(^{117}\) This demonstrates a metaphysical dimension to the rule of a King. The King must be capable of uniting human kind with the Way of Heaven, thus ensuring social and cosmic harmony. Because of this metaphysical role, Dong argued that the King must be a sage. Sarah Queen, professor of History at Connecticut College

\(^{116}\)Jiang, Qing. "From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011. pp 25

and Han dynasty scholar, writes,

By first establishing unity in his own person, Tung Chung-shu argued, the ruler thereby transformed others through his example... The sage-king had earned his position of leadership precisely because he had surpassed the average person in his endeavor to cultivate his Heavenly virtues.\(^{118}\)
The unity of Heaven and the state requires the King to cultivate the qualities of a sage. The King has the authority to rule if he has reached sage-hood and is personally united with the Way of Heaven.

Dong Zhongshu’s ideal sage-King expresses the meaning of the ideal “Inner Sageliness and Outer Kingliness” (neisheng waiwang 内圣外王). Kingliness is the cultivation of Sageliness. Dong Zhongshu asserts that the ruler must be a sage. The sage understands the Way of Heaven and Humanity and is capable of uniting the two. Although individual moral cultivation and propriety of social relationships is important, Dong Zhongshu emphasizes the importance of the King in maintaining cosmic order. This is significant for understanding the work of Jiang Qing. Jiang believes in the importance of political order, involving the rites, based on a metaphysical understanding, that preserves social harmony. Furthermore, he is critical of Mind-Nature Confucianism which emphasizes individual cultivation of Inner Sageliness at the expense of Outer Kingliness. Jiang believes that the emphasis on the individual excludes an enlightened government that Dong Zhongshu held as necessary. Thus, Jiang emphasizes the Gongyang tradition and the writings of Dong Zhongshu as it provides a political-social framework that is based on Confucian moral metaphysics.

The role of understanding the Way of Heaven and the Way of the human kind did not provide the King with unchecked divine power. Rather the moral-metaphysical significance of the King placed immense social, political, and religious responsibility on the emperor. The emperor

\(^{118}\) Queen, Sarah A. From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn, According to Tung Chung-shu. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. pp. 239
was held accountable by the “mutual responsiveness of heaven and man.”\textsuperscript{119} This meant that when the King was unsuccessful in governing the people, the cosmos and the state would be in disarray. Certainly the King was responsible for uniting Heaven and human kind, but this also meant that the King was ultimately obligated to answer to Heaven. Queen discusses Dong’s notion of Confucian political dissent:

[Dong] helped establish a Heaven-centered mode of political criticism, providing opportunities for officials to censure the emperor through their interpretation of omens. It became a powerful political weapon during the Han and persisted as a traditional form of political dialogue between the emperor and his officials.\textsuperscript{120} In this sense, Dong Zhongshu believed that Confucian intellectuals provided legitimacy and a check on the king’s power.

Jiang’s political vision involves a government that would unite the Way of Heaven and Humanity. Jiang’s governmental organization is based on three forms of political legitimacy – being in accordance with the Dao, the national heritage of a people, and having the consent of the common people that are governed.\textsuperscript{121} Another way to conceptualize legitimacy in Confucian terms would be that the government must have the consent of Heaven, earth and the people.\textsuperscript{122} This notion of legitimacy lies in the historical tradition of the Han dynasty Gongyang school. Quoting Dong Zhongshu, Jiang writes, “the Gongyang Scholars held that ‘the King is he who penetrates the three of Heaven, Earth and Human’, and that ‘the Kingly Way combines the three into one…’”\textsuperscript{123} This reflects the importance Jiang places on Outer Kingliness; that having a king that rules with legitimacy from Heaven, Earth, and the people has the ability to restore

\textsuperscript{120} Queen, Sarah A. From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn, According to Tung Chung-shu. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.pp 229
\textsuperscript{121} Wang, Ruichang. "The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011: pp. 38
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid
\textsuperscript{123} Wang, Ruichang. "The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011: pp 38
harmony. Jiang, like Dong Zhongshu, believes that if the governing body does not have the legitimacy of Heaven, it is not suitable to rule. This places great importance to the government, while also holding the government accountable.

While in ancient China this ideal of the ruler who unites Heaven, Earth, and Humanity was personified as a sage-king, Jiang’s governmental structure uses a tri-cameral legislature to address these three sources of legitimacy. The three houses are the House of Profound Confucians, House of National Continuity, and of House of Plebeians, referring to Heaven, Earth, and the people respectively.\textsuperscript{124} A complete description of the three houses is not available in English, and Jiang’s book, \textit{Political Confucianism}, is difficult to find in the US and China. For this reason I will rely on the discussion of the three houses provided by Ruichang Wang and Daniel Bell, both being authorities on Confucianism and Jiang Qing’s work in particular.

According to Ruichang Wang, editor of \textit{The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China}, “the particular way the members of each house of the legislature are chosen and the mechanism of checks and balances among the three houses are quite complex and are still being elaborated.”\textsuperscript{125} Wang explains that the House of Profound Confucians will be elected by an independent, nongovernmental group of Confucian scholars. This house will be the highest of the three in terms of political power, although the specifics are not detailed in Rui’s description. It is important to note that the Confucian scholars will be elected by a nongovernmental organization of Confucians. Jiang believes that the Confucian are suitable to hold the most political power because of their sage-like qualities. However, Jiang’s political model maintains a body of Confucian scholars outside of the government. Although it is not explicitly stated, this implies that these non-governmental Confucian scholars are a source of legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{124} ibid, pp. 40-1
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid
and a check on the state power. They provide legitimacy in that they appoint and endorse the
government leaders. However, Confucians will also hold the government accountable by holding
to power to elect new leadership to the government. This is one example where Jiang’s political
structure applies the teaching of Dong Zhongshu. Like Dong, Jiang envision a government that is
given empowered and held accountable by Confucian scholars.

The other two houses of the government are the House of National Continuity and the
Plebian House. The House of National Continuity will consist of representatives from
Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and Christianity, the major religions of the nation.
Additionally, the House of National Continuity will include descendants of important leaders in
those religions. Lastly, the Plebian House will be elected through elections. The House of
National Continuity would have less power than the Confucians, and the Plebian house has the
least power. Not only would this structure reshape the government of the PRC, but also it
would replace Marxism or economic development as the source of legitimacy or dominant
political concern. Moreover, this system is non-democratic. The will of the people is not second,
but third to the historical-cultural norms and Confucian doctrine. As mentioned above, the
details of the checks and balances are unclear. Also, the three houses are intended to function in
harmony, and it is unclear how all three houses will ensure agreement and decision-making.
While there is still much to be developed further in this system, Jiang presents a clear-cut
example of a Confucian who is against socialist and liberal Confucianists in Ai’s
characterization. Furthermore, the governmental structure and ideology of Jiang illustrates
Billioud adherent motivation.

Jiang’s argument for political Confucianism based on the Gongyang tradition criticizes

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Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011pp. 41
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several 20th century Confucians, such as Mou Zongsan, Carson Zhang, and Tang Junyi. The works of Mou Zongsan, discussed in chapter two, is usually hailed as one of, if not the most, important political treatises to reframe Chinese modernity and tradition. However, Jiang claims that Mou’s view supports Mind-Nature Confucianism and was not capable of realizing the political structure necessary for saving China. Jiang claims that Mou, as well as Tang Junyi and Carson Zhang, “contend that the most fundamental concern of Confucianism should be to teach individuals to cultivate virtue and to perfect their personality through self-effort and self-study.”

Jiang appreciates the impact of Mou’s work on the 20th century movement, and the preservation of the tradition. However, Jiang does not believe that Mou’s model is capable of saving China. Mou and other supporters of Mind-Nature Confucianism do not provide the political structure, based on metaphysical prinicples, that Jiang holds to be an important part of the Confucian tradition and necessary for saving Chinese society.

Jiang’s work is one of the most involved models for political re-structuring offered in the Confucian revival. His political vision is exhaustive; not only does it describe the bodies of government, but also a new role of the government based on the Gongyang tradition. Jiang’s view of political Confucianism is also distinctly opposed to the politics of the CCP. Jiang’s political vision is one without a Chinese Communist Party all together. This establishes Jiang as a staunch non-statist. Jiang examplifies the role of the Confucian intellectual in critiquing the state. As Dong Zhongshu held the emperor’s leadership accountable to Heaven, Jiang demands a political structure that will reflect metaphysical order and garuantee social harmony. With that, Jiang is not satisfied with intellectuals, such as Mou Zongsan, who emphasize Mind-Nature Confucianism. This demonstrates that Confucian intellectuals do not share the same cohesive

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political view. Within the Confucian revival, Jiang represents one of a multiplicity of political and social visions. Jiang critiques and engages the CCP and other Confucian intellectuals in envisioning the Chinese political and social reality out of a reassessment of the Confucian tradition.

**Kang Xiaoguang: Benevolent Government**

Kang Xiaoguang is a New Confucian who provides a critique of the CCP and Chinese society and provides a new government model based on religious political Confucianism. Kang envisions a “Benevolent Government” which is a form of Confucian authoritarianism. The goal of this government is to provide a legitimate and stable political structure for China that will create national growth and harmony. Unlike Jiang Qing, Kang’s Political Confucianism is established on the teachings of Mencius (371-289 BCE). Even though Jiang and Kang are both non-CCP intelligentsia with similar motivations in reviving politico-religious Confucianism, they support two different revisionings of Confucianism. Jiang is part of the Gongyang, while Kang is part of the Mencian tradition. The differences between Kang and Jiang demonstrate the pluralism and dynamism throughout the movement to re-imagine the Confucian tradition for Chinese modernity.

In 2005 Kang published *Benevolent Government: The Third Road to China’s Political Development*, in which he details a political critique and proposes new government mechanisms. As the title suggests, the ancient Confucian virtue benevolence (*ren 仁*) is the central tenet of political legitimacy for a government. The ideal of benevolent government (*renzheng 仁政*) is crucial in the works of Mencius. Throughout Kang’s article “Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition” Kang argues that his beliefs on human nature and the necessity of a benevolent
government are inspired by the teachings of Mencius. Kang cites Mencius, “that whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small.”128 The small difference is that humans are capable of empathy, which is the root of benevolence. Kang argues that a government is needed to bring out the benevolent, empathetic side of humanity, which will stop humans from being lower animals. As Kang states the importance of Mencius, I will briefly discuss the Mencian ideal of benevolent government in order to contextualize Kang as a revisioning of the teachings of Mencius.

Benevolent government is explicated in Book 4 Part A of the *Mencius*, the Confucian classic attributed to Mencius. This book begins with asserting that benevolence is the foundation of effective government. Mencius writes, “even if you knew the way of Yao and Shun, you could not rule the Empire equitably except through benevolent government.”129 Mencius elaborates in 4.A.2, “There are two ways and only two: benevolence and cruelty.”130 Mencius claims that cruel governments lacking benevolence disregard their subjects. Not only are these governments ineffective, but they will not receive the Mandate of Heaven and are therefore destined to fail.

Mencius claims that benevolent government is the only way to rectify the state, creating social and cosmic harmony. This is because the virtue of the emperor effects the virtue of the governed. Mencius writes, “The great man alone can rectify the evils in the prince’s heart. When the prince is benevolent, everyone else is benevolent.”131 Benevolent government is effective because the ruler is in a place of moral influence over subjects. This means that the King must

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131 ibid, 4.A.20
personally cultivate benevolence in order to rule. Mencius explains:

If a man in a subordinate position fails to win the confidence of his superiors, he cannot hope to govern the people. There is a way for him to win the confidence of his superiors. If his friends do not trust him, he will not win the confidence of his superiors. There is a way for him to win the trust of his friends. If in serving his parents he fails to please them he will no longer have the trust of his friends. There is a way for him to please his parents. If upon looking within he finds that he has not been true to himself, he will not please his parents. This passage explains how one can cultivate the ability to govern. Self-reflection, and sincerity are fundamental to being filial. Being filial is an expression of one’s personal rectitude and cultivation. Therefore, if one is filial then they will receive the trust of friends and the confidence of superiors. In this way, moral rectitude and cultivation is central to becoming a benevolent leader. Most importantly, the reflection involved in cultivating character not only requires self-reflection, but also reflection on the Way of Heaven. Mencius explains, “Hence being true is the Way of Heaven; to reflect upon this is the Way of man.” Cultivation involves understanding and uniting with Heaven. It is because of this connection with Heaven that one is able to govern and rectify the state. Mencius writes, “There has never been a man totally true to himself who fails to move others.” Bringing order to a chaotic state requires the cultivation of benevolence through understanding Heaven.

According to Kang, China is in a state of disorder that only benevolent rule can remedy. Kang argues that China lacks benevolence at all levels of society from the government to the rich, the intelligentsia, and the masses. As such Kang calls for a community of Confucian scholars to head the government. In Kang’s political organization, Confucians would dictate in

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132 ibid, 4.A.12
135 ibid, pp. 12
“benevolent authoritarianism.” The notion authoritarianism is significant for Kang’s political model. Obviously, authoritarianism is anti-democratic. However, Kang argues that democracy is not able to achieve benevolence because it asserts that people are sovereign. Kang believes that the masses are capable of empathy and benevolence, but human nature is such that people can be good or bad. Given the quality of human nature, democracy is flawed because it does not provide the proper governing mechanism for making people realize the goodness in human nature. Thus, Kang believes sovereignty should lie with the Confucian scholars who understand the Way of Heaven. Kang writes, “the Way of Heaven is higher than public opinion, and only the community of Confucian scholars can understand the Way of Heaven.”

Kang’s ‘benevolent authoritarianism’ reflects the principals of political Confucianism explicated in Mencius. In the passage discussed above, Mencius explains that ability to govern is dependent on personal cultivation based on unity with the Way of Heaven. The only person suitable to be King is one who is cultivated. This relates to Kang’s notion of authoritarianism, as the masses did not hold political authority in Mencius’ view. The cultivated, benevolent ruler is alone capable of rectifying the society. As Kang claims that society is in disorder, a benevolent governing authority is necessary for creating social harmony.

To realize a benevolent authoritarianism, Kang proposes a system of integration between the Confucian orthodoxy, educational system, and political rule. The Confucian orthodoxy, which is the political philosophy that established rules of political practice, is the foundation of this system. The orthodoxy is passed down through the educational system. Such education can be through public or private organizations that promote the practice of Confucianism. Confucian

136 ibid, pp. 13
137 ibid, pp. 13
education would be required of the political system. Government officials and elite would be educated in Confucianism, learning the orthodoxy and then being assessed on their knowledge through an exam system.\textsuperscript{139} Passing the exam system would be the pre-requisite for political office. This is the final step in realizing Kang’s benevolent authoritariansim – establishing Confucian officials within the government. Kang claims that Confucian scholars would hold the power to support, or dissent and confront government policy.\textsuperscript{140} It is important to note that Kang’s plan does not seek to eliminate the CCP. Rather, through the educational system, Party members would be educated in Confucian orthodoxy. In this sense, Kang’s model replaces Communist ideology with Confucian orthodoxy. As such the CCP could be renamed the Chinese Confucian Party. The Confucian orthodoxy, as enforced by the Confucian educated officials, would serve to provide legitimacy and harmony to social rule.

This three-pronged Confucianization, involving orthodoxy, education and scholar officials, is historically rooted in a tradition of political Confucianism established in the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE). During the Han dynasty, the new empire realized that although the state was conquered by military might a form of “civil bureaucracy” was necessary to maintain power and organize the dynasty.\textsuperscript{141} In the second century B.C.E., the Han dynasty established the Imperial University for studying Confucianism. By the first century C.E. one-hundred officials assumed their role in the government after successfully passing an examination system based on Confucian classical texts.\textsuperscript{142} Confucianism became the core-curriculum of education during the Han dynasty. In other words, the Han dynasty institutionalized Confucian education within the

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, pp. 23

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governing system. This form of education persisted through 1911 when the last traditional dynasty fell. With that Confucianism became intrinsic not only to civil bureaucracy, but also to the education of the political elite. Like the Han Confucian system, Kang envisions an educational system that teaches government officials Confucian orthodoxy.

Although Kang advocates an authoritarian scheme he includes a system of public voice within the benevolent government. He cites the Book of Shang, “What Heaven sees is what we the people see; what Heaven hears is what we the people hear.” The government must be vigilant of the will of Heaven and the will of the people. If the government has achieved harmony and social order, then it will possess the will of the people as well as the will of Heaven. In order to ensure that Kang’s benevolent government secures the will of the people, Kang proposes three mechanisms for voicing public opinion. First, the liberalization of mass media should be used to allow public dissent or support of the government be voiced, unlike the largely state-sponsored news agencies in the PRC today. Second, Kang purports a system of “administrative politics” or “administrative absorption politics.” This is a means of consultation from different interest groups before a government makes a decision. Kang claims that this system has already been successfully used in Hong Kong and Mainland China. This also quells the claim that Kang’s benevolent authoritarianism is like any other form of single-party rule. Corporatism, the third method, is similar to administrative absorption. Corporatism is a form of unionizing people around their profession. Such organizations need to be established on democratic practices to ensure that they will recognize their constituents. This is simultaneously a method of ensuring public voice affects government policy and the resolution

145 ibid, pp. 18-19
of conflicts and legislature, while also limiting the role the people have in their government.

There are several similarities between the political Confucian models of Kang and Jiang. Both believe that China’s national moral crises can only be resolved through a Confucian system. Applying Jiawen Ai’s typology, both Kang and Jiang are Confucians, as opposed to liberal or socialist Confucianists. They are opposed to any political form that is not established on the Confucian tradition. Regarding Sebastien Billioud’s typology, Kang and Jiang are adherents; they clearly adhere to classical Confucian principles.

That said, there are also many differences between these two new Confucians. Namely, although Kang and Jiang are both non-party intelligentsia who seek to implement a politico-religious Confucianism, they each espouse different Confucian teachings. Jiang believes that the Gongyang tradition and Dong Zhongshu provide the best model for Political Confucianism. As the Gongyang is based on The Spring and Autumn, which Confucius authored, Jiang believes that it provides a Political Confucianism that is most accurate to the teachings of Confucius. Kang, on the other hand, supports a model of benevolent government established on the teachings of Mencius. These two New Confucians offer two distinct revisionings of the Confucian tradition in order to address the issues of China’s modernity.

Conclusion

A nuanced typology of the Confucian revival involves categorizing the multitude of political affiliations, motivations, and actions of New Confucian intellectuals. Furthermore, one must historicize the Confucian intellectual, as well as contextualize the relationship between the Confucian intellectual and the state. This is demonstrated in the statist / non-statist dichotomy, as the Confucian intellectual has historically played the role of state institution as well as state critique. This is demonstrated in the contemporary setting with the differences between Fang
Keli and Jiang Qing in the 1980s. The above sections also demonstrate the dynamism across the Confucian revival. Beyond the statist and non-statist division, Ai and Billioud provide or more detailed analysis of political affiliation and motivations. However, the above discussion of Kang and Jiang demonstrated further dynamism. Jiang and Kang embody similar political affiliation and motivations, envisioning political Confucianism based on the Classical Confucianism. However, they provide two different models of political re-structuring for the CCP. The differences between statists and non-statists, as well the differences between Jiang and Kang, reflect that the movement is fragmented by various and at times contradictory motivations. This demonstrates that the reappraisal of Confucianism for Chinese modernity is pluralistic and complex.
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Chapter Four
New Confucianism, Education, and Politics:
The Confucian Revival movement in Education

Introduction

This chapter examines the role education plays in the contemporary Confucian revival in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Historically, education was fundamental to the Confucian tradition. Therefore it is not surprising that the Confucian revival involves an increasing number of educational institutions dedicated to Confucianism. Since the turn of the 21st century there has been a significant development – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has begun to play a central role in the establishment of Confucian learning institutions. Consequently, the CCP and Confucian education share a complex relationship. This chapter will explore this relationship and the role of Confucian education in the PRC.

The first section of this chapter examines the political role of Confucian education and the Confucian intellectual between the Warring States period (403-221 BCE) and the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). This section asserts that the role of the Confucian intellectual and Confucian education involves a tension between state and non-state interests. Confucian intellectuals and the Imperial University legitimized the Han dynasty. However, section one will argue that Confucian intellectuals also functioned as a voice of dissent, holding the emperor accountable to the Way of Heaven. Through examining the relationship between the CCP and Confucian education institutions, the subsequent three sections posit that the current Confucian revival involves the same confluence demonstrated during this classical Confucian historical period.

The second section addresses the establishment of Confucian educational organizations in the PRC. Specifically, it examines the CCP’s establishment of Confucian educational institutions
within state universities, as well as the party’s endorsement of private Confucian academies. The third section discusses trends in moral education since the turn of the 21st century. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, moral education consisted of political ideological teachings that supported socialism. However, in the past two decades the CCP has transformed the content of moral education. One of the most important transformations is replacing socialist ideology with an ideology that applies traditional Confucian ideals. The CCP has implemented Confucian teachings within moral education. This discussion consists of an analysis of Zhu Xiaowan’s research on moral education. Zhu is an educational policy adviser in the CCP and her work is dedicated to reforming moral education policy. Lastly, this chapter examines a case study of Anqing Number 1 Middle School, located in Anhui Province, China. I conducted this case study during the summer of 2011 while interning at the middle school. An interview with the Shen Bo, principal of the school, demonstrates that the educational philosophy of the school administration is motivated by Confucian morality.

Confucian education, historically and in the present-day PRC, involves the confluence of state and non-state interests and activism. The state interest and activism refers to the state’s role in reviving Confucianism. This is demonstrated in section one, where the Han dynasty adopted Confucian civil bureaucracy and education; this is also discussed in sections two through four, where the role of the CCP in Confucian education institutions is discussed. The Confucian tradition also involves non-state interests and activism. The Confucian revival is spearheaded by members of the Chinese intelligentsia with a range of motivations and affiliations. Thus, the revival demonstrates a historical tension between the statist and non-statist role of Confucian intellectuals and Confucian education in China. Again, this is demonstrated during the pre-Han period and Han dynasty in section one, as well as the contemporary period in sections two
In order to understand the impact of Confucianism on education in the PRC one must first examine the historical role of Confucian education and the Confucian intellectual in China. To this end this section examines the work of Tu Weiming, an internationally recognized and published scholar of Confucianism. Tu’s book *The Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual* explores the political, cultural, and social role of the Confucian intellectual in ancient China. This section introduces the transforming political role of the Confucian intellectual between the Warring States period (403-221 BCE) and the Han dynasty (206 BCE- 220 CE). This time period presents several important historical trends in the relationship between Confucian intellectuals and the Chinese government. Namely, the role of the Confucian intellectual, which involves the confluence of state and non-state interests. In other words, the Confucian intellectual is historically part of and separate from the state – simultaneously serving the dynastic government and holding the emperor accountable to the authority of Heaven. Education is central to the political and social role of the Confucian intellectual.

The Confucian project did not begin as a political movement of the state. Rather, Confucianism developed as a movement of intellectuals outside of the state apparatus in ancient China. Classical Confucian humanism emerged in the 6th century BCE, established by the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BCE) and his disciples, principally Mencius (371-289 BCE) and Xunzi (298-238 BCE). The establishment of Confucianism coincides with the fall of Zhou marked by the Warring States period (403-221). The Warring States refers to the time period

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when several small states contended for control and unification of China under one dynasty. This period ended when the state of Qin united China in 221 BCE. Although Confucianism was developing during the Warring States period, it was only one of the existing intellectual traditions at the time.\textsuperscript{147} Compared to other intellectual traditions in China, Tu argues, “The Confucian intellectual… was relatively weak vis-à-vis the power structure of his time.”\textsuperscript{148} According to Tu, from Confucius’ lifetime to the establishment of the Han dynasty in 206 BCE, the Confucian intellectual did not wield significant political influence over the states of ancient China. Tu cites several examples to support his claim. He argues that the state of Eastern Zhou (8th – 5th century BCE), “was uncongenial to the Confucian project” because it involved moralizing the relationship between the ruler and his subjects.\textsuperscript{149} Tu also cites Mencius’ efforts and ultimate failure in establishing Confucian influence in the political arena.\textsuperscript{150} Mencius, much like other Confucians, did not hold significant political power during the pre-Han period. This indicates that Confucianism did not develop as a political movement, but as an intellectual tradition at the periphery of dominant political philosophies.

Beginning in the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 BCE) the Confucian intellectuals’ political influence grew drastically, as Confucian scholars played a prominent role in the state bureaucracy. Although prior to the Han dynasty Confucian intellectuals did not hold political power, “they did become a social force exerting powerful control over the cultural system.”\textsuperscript{151} In other words, before the Han dynasty Confucianism emerged as a prominent social and cultural system in spite of lacking political authority. Tu argues that the Confucian intellectual became

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid: pp. 13
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid: pp. 15
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid: pp. 15-16
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid: pp. 17
a “social force” because of the role of education within the Confucian tradition. Tu claims, “Confucian monopoly on education may have been the single most important factor for the reemergence of the Confucian intellectual in the Han dynasty.” During the Han dynasty, the new empire realized that although the state was conquered by military might a form of “civil bureaucracy” was necessary to maintain power and organize the dynasty. Given the Confucian intellectuals’ cultural and social prominence, the Han dynasty viewed Confucianism as a resource for creating a civil society. Thus the civil bureaucracy of the Han dynasty was comprised of Confucian scholars. Additionally, during the second century B.C.E. the Han dynasty adopted an Imperial University for studying Confucianism. By the first century C.E. countless officials assumed their role in the government only after successfully passing an examination system based on Confucian classical texts. Confucianism became the core-curriculum of education during the Han dynasty, institutionalizing Confucian education within the governing system. With that, Confucianism became intrinsic not only to civil bureaucracy, but also to the education of the political elite.

The political institutionalization of Confucian education transformed the role of the Confucian intellectual in Chinese society and politics. In spite of his political office, moral rectitude rather than political power was the priority of the Confucian intellectual. Specifically, the Confucian intellectual “defines what politics is from the centre of his moral being.” The Confucian intellectual believed that moral rectitude was required for any political and social order. The Confucian intellectual held the will of the people and Heaven as the measure of the morality of a governing body. Tu argues that Confucian officials assumed the role of

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152 Ibid: pp. 17
153 Ibid: pp. 18
154 Ibid: pp. 23
the “spokesperson” of the people and “witness” of the Mandate of Heaven. The Confucian proverb, “Heaven sees as the people see and heaven hears as the people hear,” illustrates the concern of the Confucian intellectual for morality in political rule. Although Confucian intellectuals held political office, they served as a check and balance on the political power of the governing Han dynasty. The Confucian intellectual objected if the ruler was immoral and compromised the will of the people and the Mandate of Heaven. Moreover, Tu argues that the dissenting role of the Confucian intellectual was not limited to the political arena alone. He writes,

the impression that the Confucian bureaucrat could only voice his discontent from within [the state] and that he was incapable of radical protest outside his social role rails to account for the Confucian ability to mobilize massive psychic energy by a direct appeal to transcendental principle…

Holding political office, the Confucian intellectual did not simply serve the Han emperor, but rather critiqued the ruler when needed. The above quote demonstrates that the Confucian intellectual exacted this dissent from within and without the state. On the one hand, the Confucian intellectual dissented within the political arena. On the other hand, Confucianism held far-reaching social and cultural influence and was able to critique the ruling dynasty from outside the state mechanism.

Dong Zhongshu, an eminent Confucian scholar of the Han dynasty, exemplified the radicalism of the Confucian intellectual. Dong Zhongshu did not support the notion of divine power of a ruler, but argued for holding the emperor responsible to the people and Heaven. Dong’s concept, “the mutual responsiveness of heaven and man” is important for understanding his ideas regarding the accountability of the emperor. The notion of a responsive

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156 Ibid: pp. 19
158 Ibid: pp. 22
Heaven reflects the Confucian concept of moral metaphysics. Within Dong’s cosmology, the universe, including Heaven, is responsive to the moral rectitude of the people and the ruler. This means that the cosmos is sympathetic to the leadership of the emperor. Simply, if the emperor ruled immorally, the human world and Heaven would be in disorder. In this sense it was the role of the Confucian intellectual to hold the ruler accountable, paying close attention to the will of the people and Heaven.\textsuperscript{159} This means that the ruler was not an absolute authority; rather, the Confucian officials could, and did, question the emperor’s leadership.

The Confucian tradition began as an intellectual movement exerting social and cultural influence before gaining a political role in the Han. Although Confucianism enjoyed political institutional power for centuries and throughout dynasties, the pre-Han period demonstrates that the Confucian project is historically a cultural intellectual movement, not a political movement. Certainly, the Confucians were involved in politics before, during and after the Han dynasty. This is illustrated through the early efforts to politically assert the teachings of Confucius, exemplified by Mencius. More significantly, statism is demonstrated in the Han dynasty where the Confucian civil bureaucracy served to maintain the order and legitimacy of the emperor. Such a bureaucracy was vital to the authority and longevity of the dynasty. However, the Confucian intellectual was not an instrument of the state, but served as a check and balance on the actions of the emperor. The Confucian intellectual dissented from within the Han bureaucracy. Non-statism is illustrated as the Confucian project began outside of the political arena as a social and cultural force in the pre-Han period. Even with the creation of a Confucian bureaucracy, Confucian intellectuals believed and reinforced the ultimate authority of Heaven.

It must be emphasized that education is central to the establishment of the Confucian

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid

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intellectual in dynastic China. It was through education that the Confucian project asserted itself as a social force and ultimately entered Han bureaucracy. Through education Confucianism became further institutionalized, as the Han officials passed through Confucian universities. Confucian education during the Han dynasty exemplifies the confluence of state and non-state interests. Education was a bureaucratic instrument of the Han dynasty. However, the Confucian curriculum emphasized the morality of rule, assessed by the will of the people and the Mandate of Heaven.

This historical examination of the Confucian intellectual and the role of Confucian education is significant for the discussion of education in the Confucian revival. Much like the Confucian project in the pre-Han period, the Confucian revival began as an intellectual movement concerning Chinese society and culture, not as a political movement. However, much like the transformation during the Han dynasty, currently the Chinese Communist Party has given political support to Confucianism through the establishment of Confucian educational institutions. This is not to say that Confucianism plays the same bureaucratic role as it did during the Han dynasty. However, as it did in the dynastic period, Confucian education in the PRC today involves the confluence of state and non-state, populous interests.

**Institutionalizing Confucian Education in the People’s Republic of China**

The increase in Confucian educational institutions beginning at the turn of the 21st century is an important trend in the Confucian revival. At the turn of the 21st century, the Chinese Communist Party began organizing Confucian educational institutions. The party endorsed schools for studying Confucianism at state sponsored universities, such as Beida and Renda, which educate party members and Chinese elite. At the same time, non-party
intellectuals also began establishing private Confucian academies. Although private academies are independent from national universities, academies are required to have state approval in order to operate. However, Confucian educational institutions are not established by the CCP alone. In fact, the effort of non-party intellectuals and populous demand are prominent factors behind the increase in Confucian education organizations. Thus, Confucian education at the academy and university level is prompted by both statist and non-statist elements. As discussed in the previous chapter, statist and non-statist are two useful categories of analysis regarding the new Confucian movement. Statist motivations refers to the Party’s endorsement of, or adherence to, Confucianism. Conversely, Non-statist motivations refers to the social movement outside of Party-affiliated academic and political elite. Although statist and non-statist motivations conflict, they are both present within the institutionalization of Confucianism in educational organizations of all levels.

Sebastien Billioud and Joel Thoraval provide one of the most comprehensive examinations of the educational institutionalization of Confucianism in Mainland China to date. “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival in China as an Educative Project,” published in 2007 in China Perspectives, discusses the prominence of new Confucianism within the various educational venues. Billioud and Thoraval’s fieldwork illuminates how contending statist and non-statist interests define the institutionalization of Confucianism in education. Billioud and Thoraval characterize the Confucian educational phenomenon by a traditional Chinese term meaning moral transformation through education (jiaohua 教化). This term refers to the “transformation of self and training dispensed to others” and it “occurs at a specific historical juncture in which past ‘traditions’ as well as future projects, both realistic and utopian, contribute
to the affirmation of the role of Chinese culture.”

In other words, the Confucian educational project is part of the revival aimed at empowering traditional culture to redefine itself and the future of the nation.

The ideal of moral transformation through education has a long history within the Confucian tradition. Dong Zhongshu, one of the most important Confucians of the Han dynasty, claimed that the imperial Confucian university system was the ultimate source of jiaohua. Dong Zhongshu believed that education was not only the means of propagating the teachings of Confucius, but also of transforming the individual and society. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the university has played a central role in the Confucian civil bureaucracy. The university educated the state officials and imbued the political system with Confucian teachings. By applying this term to contemporary China, Billioud and Thoraval imply a connection between present day national universities and those of the Han dynasty. They argue that the CCP is educating elite and officials with Confucianism in contemporary national universities. Before addressing Confucianism in the national universities of the PRC, the following discussion addresses the transformations of Confucian education in the PRC during the first decade of the 21st century.

The first important trend of the 21st century has been the popularization of Confucian education. This is where the elite are no longer the only social group with access to or interest in studying Confucianism. This also refers to Confucianism spreading from elite to popular culture. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, studying Confucianism or the classical texts was not

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a widespread or grassroots phenomenon; before the turn of the 21st century, academics and elite studied the classics. However, within the last decade Confucianism and the classics have become accessible to almost anyone in China.\textsuperscript{163} One example of this trend is the “children read classics” movement.\textsuperscript{164} Currently, it is common for children’s sections of bookstores to include a children’s classics section.\textsuperscript{165} The classics are also taught in a number of academies throughout the country.

The final trend in Confucian education that Billioud and Thoraval describe is the establishment of Confucian educational institutions. There are three dimensions to this process of institutionalization – religious, political, and educational.\textsuperscript{166} For New Confucians such as Kang and Jiang, all three dimensions go hand in hand. It is important to note that before the Communists discredited Confucianism in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the tradition enjoyed institutional power in these three areas as well. However, unlike the dynastic period, Confucianism does not currently hold institutional authority in the PRC. As such, the movement to institutionalize Confucianism is more fragmented at local, regional and national levels. Through the following discussion of Confucian educational institutions this section will illustrate the confluence of statist and non-statist efforts to revive Confucianism.

The relationship between educational institutions and the state is complex. There are many challenges to implementing the study of Confucianism within the educational system. In spite of the post-Mao reforms, Billioud and Thoraval argue that the educational system was

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{163} Billioud, Sebastien, and Joel Thoraval. "Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival as an Educative Project." China Perspectives 4 (2007): pp. 4
\bibitem{164} ibid: pp. 15
\bibitem{165} Observed by Richard Worsman in Anqing, Anhui, China during the summer of 2011
\end{thebibliography}
established under Mao and is therefore directed by the CCP. This CCP control makes it difficult to introduce a new ideological teaching into public schools. As such, “educative practices based on ‘Confucianism’ may consider the modern institution of schools and universities as either an ally or adversary.” Given this tense relationship between Confucianism and educational organizations, there are three common strategies of institutionalizing Confucianism within education. Establishing an educational organization of Confucianism involves either a complementary, rival, or substitutive relationship with the state endorsed educational system. A complementary strategy is one which works within the existing educational institutions. Schools of academic research devoted Confucianism at existing universities and party schools are one example of a complimentary strategy. A rival strategy, on the other hand, deliberately establishes rival institutions. An example of this strategy would be to start a private learning academy aimed at teaching Confucianism. The last strategy creates new educational opportunities for “non-academic organizations.” This strategy speaks to the trend of businesses or other organizations to adopt an educational model that focuses on Confucianism or the classics. Contemporary Confucian educational institutions may involve all three educational strategies.

The establishment of Confucian educational organizations in academia illustrates the simultaneous interplay of statist and non-statist motivations. For instance, Renda was established as a university with a close political relationship with the CCP; the school is intended to produce cadres who support the party. However, in 2001 the school became the first in the nation to erect a statue of Confucius and in 2002 established the “Institute for Confucian Research (Kongzi

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168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
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Billioud argues, “this testifies to the current shift of the Communist Party line towards a selective and critical re-appropriation of traditional culture.” Historically Renda shared a close relationship with the CCP. In this sense the school’s Confucian research may be categorized as statist; Renda as a Party university reflects the growing interest of the state in pursuing Confucianism. While these interests may be characterized as statist, there are conflicting perspectives towards the new Confucian education within Renda. A director of the Institute for Confucian Research explains that higher education is in the middle of two movements concerning Confucianism. The first is an academic movement, which involves scholars at the university level. The second is a social movement, which “aims to promote confidence in one’s own culture and attend to the questions of spiritual life (jingshen shenghuo 精神生活) in the context of material development of society.” However, the pursuit of Confucianism is still disputed by cadres that adhere more strictly to Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.

Beida and Qinghua universities are another example of conflicting, yet coexisting, perspectives of Confucian education. In 2006 the two prestigious universities began offering, “National Studies Classes (guoxueban 国学班) for cadres and company managers.” Upon visiting the classes in 2006 Billioud and Thoraval observed, “the sessions we were able to attend in 2006 did not include any nationalist ideology and focused on familiarizing the participants with classical language and culture.” Although the class was offered at a

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172 Ibid
173 Ibid
175 Ibid.
university of high national standing for China’s elite and party members, the class did not teach socialist ideology. Rather, the participants were motivated by having “access to culture that was previously inaccessible and to resources for existential or spiritual fulfillment.” Participants are inspired by personal fulfillment through exploring traditional culture. This speaks to a social phenomenon in which individuals identify with traditional culture as a process of meaning making for their contemporary lives.

The establishment of Confucian education at Renda, Beida, and Qinghua demonstrate the presence of a dialectic relationship between statist and non-statist motivations. In each instance, Confucian education is supported by and dependent on the state. This is illustrated as the university is fundamental to the institutionalization of Confucian education. These institutions are state endorsed and educate Chinese Communist Party members, as well as the Chinese elite of other professions. While these educational projects rely on the Party, the content of Confucian education speaks to the non-statist dimension of the Confucian revival. The participants in the class do not study Confucianism in the interest of political or economic gain. As described in the above paragraph, the participants studying Confucianism are interested in cultural and spiritual fulfillment. However, the absence of teaching socialist ideology does not suggest that Confucian education is politically neutral. Rather Billioud and Thoraval observe,

While [the] long-term ideal [of Confucian education] distances it from the type of rationality that governs the university, it nevertheless continues to depend on permanent exchanges with the academic community whose validity it questions. The Confucian education programs call into question the “rationality” of the academic settings they occupy. The tension between the statist and non-statist dimensions in Confucian education is clear. Confucian education is dependent on the CCP-sponsored university, yet it is separate

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176 Ibid: pp 10
from the university in terms of philosophical ideology.

The same interplay between state and non-state motivations is involved in private Confucian learning academies. One example is the Academy of Peace and Harmony (Pinghe Shuyuan 平和书院), a Confucian Academy in Zhuhai founded in 2005. This academy was established to teach Confucian classics and practice Confucian rituals. Although its founder lacks formal education in Confucianism, the academy works closely with new Confucians such as Jiang Qing. It is a private school, which means the founder chose to establish an educational organization independent of the university. However, the Academy of Peaceful Harmony is dependent on the state, as it relies on its status as, “an official member of the ‘Association for Research on Traditional Culture; (Chuantong wenhua yanjiuhui 传统文化研究会), which is registered with a department of the local government.” Without this registration, the academy would not be allowed to operate. Billioud and Thoraval describe this academy as rival to the university system. The Academy of Peaceful Harmony is independent of the university system, consists of non-party members, and is presumably opposed to state politics given its relationship with Jiang Qing. As with the universities, private Confucian education involves the convergence of statist and non-statist efforts. The academies are private and critical of the CCP, yet rely on the CCP for endorsement.

Confucian educational institutions at any level requires the interplay and interdependence of the state and populous. This suggests that the Confucian revival involves the convergence of Party and Populous movements. Regarding the popularization and institutionalization of Confucianism Billioud and Thoraval write,

The fact that these initiatives often emanate from the ‘people’ (however this term may be

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178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
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interpreted) indicates that they are not purely ideological phenomena that can be reduced to mere political instrumentalization or the invention of a new cultural market. Confucian education is in part a populous movement, as it “emanates from people.” The university setting reflects this popularization; personal interests in cultural and spiritual fulfillment rather than political or economic profit can motivate the participants in the university classes. Therefore political or economic “instrumentalization” is not the primary motivation behind Confucian institutions at the university level. Private academies also demonstrate popularization; private citizens, rather than the CCP, organize these educational initiatives.

Like the discussion in the first section, the Confucian education project in the present day involves the confluence of the state and the populous. At Renda, Beida, and Qinghua, the government has established Confucian learning for Chinese elite. Although this is not the same as the Han dynasty Imperial University, it demonstrates that the Party actively supports Confucian education for Party members and elite. Moreover, the Party is not the only cause for the establishment of these learning institutions. Rather, the people are the impetus for Confucian learning. This is demonstrated where the people are concerned not with political and economic gain, but out of cultural and spiritual fulfillment. In the Han dynasty, the prominence of Confucianism as a social and cultural force was a significant factor in the institutionalization of Confucian education. Similarly, in the present day, interest in Confucianism ‘emanates from the people’ as a populous movement, which has created state institutional support. The party has created an ideological space that at times conflicts with and criticizes Party actions and policy. Even though Confucian education at the university and private level is critical of socialism, the CCP supports these educational institutions. Confucian education is a Party and populous movement that simultaneously supports and critiques the Chinese Communist Party.

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Current Trends in Moral Education

At the same time that Confucian education has become increasingly widespread and institutionalized in state affiliated universities and private academies, the CCP has also promulgated a series of new directives concerning moral education to be implemented at the primary and secondary level. This section presents the changes to moral education curriculum in the past two decades, as well as an example of CCP research on moral education directed at advising future moral curriculum. The moral education policy described in this section illustrates that the CCP is reviving Confucianism within the educational system. Like the previous examples, state efforts to implement Confucian ideology does not mean that the Confucian revival is a statist project alone. Rather, the state’s directives are confluent with a populous movement aimed at reviving traditional culture.

In the Maoist era, moral education was directed at maintaining the socialist character of schools and the individuals they educated. The term moral education is transposable with ideological education or political education. This suggests that the ideology diffused through moral education joins the concepts of social and political ethics. Wing On Lee and Chi Hang Ho, scholars from the University of Sydney, Australia and the Hong Kong Institute of Education respectively, have identified a transformation in moral education since the 1990s. These two scholars argue that until 1978 moral education was socialist, political education. Beginning in the 1990s the emphasis of moral education shifted to individual ethics. The publication of a new syllabus by the Ministry of Education in 2002 demonstrates this change in moral education. The ministry emphasizes, “The person as the foundation of education”

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182 Ibid: pp. 414
with “curriculum [that] is focused on cultivating civilized behaviors and habits, good moral quality and healthy social development…” Lee and Ho suggest that this change in moral education is correlative to economic, social, and political modernization in the past two decades. This indicates that moral education curriculum is not dogmatic but is responsive to social transformation and modernization. Confucian morality has emerged as one of the most recent transformations of contemporary moral education.

The work of Zhu Xiaowan concerning moral education policy reflects the connection between moral education and the Confucian revival. However, it is important to note that Zhu is first and foremost a member of the Chinese Communist Party. As such her education policy reflects statist interests. Zhu’s career in the education field is the best indication of her statist proclivities. Zhu serves as the President and Party Secretary of the Central Office of Educational Research and as a national school inspector. Zhu is employed by the state to conduct education research and observe schools. Also her research is published in journals affiliated with the CCP. The article discussed in this section, “Facing the Challenge: Adjusting and Innovating Moral Education in Schools” (mianduitiaozhan: xuexiao daodejiaoyu de tiaozheng yu gaixin 面对挑战：学校道德教育的调整与该新), was published in Education Research (jiaoyu yanjiu 教育研究), which is closely connected to the Communist party. This journal’s mission is to “investigate the educational system of Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (tantaoyou zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi jiaoyu lilin tixi 探讨有中国特色的社会主义教育理论体系). This suggests that the intent of this publication is to support and guide the party’s mission of implementing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.

183 Ibid: pp. 424
In “Facing the Challenge: Adjusting and Innovating Moral Education in Schools” published in *Education Research* in 2011, Zhu asserts the importance of moral education for the future of the PRC. Zhu argues that modernity has created a number of crises that affect China’s youth as well as the nation as a whole. According to Zhu, China’s development in the last two decades is problematic for national culture and the future of the country’s youth. Globalization and economic growth pose problems to the culture of any developing or developed country.\(^\text{186}\)

In China specifically Zhu is critical of the ‘Reform and Open China to the outside world’ policy that has guided China’s economic liberalization since the end of the 20\(^{th}\) century. Zhu acknowledges progress made in economics, technology, and education. However, progress has jeopardized Chinese culture. Namely, Zhu argues that China’s culture has been transformed into a consumer culture (“wenhua de shanyehua 文化的商业化”).\(^\text{187}\) The problem is caused by focusing on “economic development and technological progress” (*jingji de fazhan he keji de jinbu 经济的发展和科技的进步*) to the exclusion of cultural values.\(^\text{188}\) Priority has been given to progress and rather than culture in China.

The crises of Chinese culture also present a series of problems for the current generation of Chinese youth. Zhu writes,

> In the continued process of Reform and Open Policy will inevitably magnify the series of difficult problems faced by education (在中国继续推进改革开放的进程中必然会进一 步放大教育所面临的一系列难题).\(^\text{189}\)

According to Zhu the challenges for China’s school-aged youth include turbulent employment circumstances for parents, as well as academic pressure, competing for grades and ultimately

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\(^\text{186}\) Zhu, Xiaowan. "面对挑战：学校道德教育的调整与革新." *Education Research*: pp. 1
\(^\text{187}\) ibid
\(^\text{188}\) ibid.
\(^\text{189}\) ibid.
for employment.\textsuperscript{190} Education does not serve a cultural or moral goal, but rather economic imperatives. In other words, education is a matter of achieving economic success and gainful employment in the liberal market economy. Therefore education is not equipped to address this national crisis; education lacks a cultural or moral compass. Zhu summarizes the impact of societal transformation on Chinese youth,

\begin{quote}
Living in a ‘consumerism as purpose, information-based, advertising as the driving force’ type of culture, children have seen and experience too much before they are mature enough(身处一种“以消费为目的,以信息为基础,以广告作驱动”的文化中,孩子们在尚未成熟之前就已经看到和经历过太多太多).\textsuperscript{191}
\end{quote}

China’s consumer culture creates not only a moral vacuum for the nation, but a moral and cultural crises for the country’s youth.

Given the moral and cultural condition, moral education is a necessity in the PRC. According to Zhu a reassessment of moral education is needed to address the problems created by globalization and modernization. Zhu writes,

\begin{quote}
…Especially, the schools need to emphasize the moral education on younger generation. Not only because schools have the scientific and cultural advantage on personal value systems and morality, but also because the integral and complete humanism that the school may have in its education values will help the younger generation with a moral basis (…尤其需要加强学校对未成年一代的思想道德教育，这不仅因为学校对于个体道德发展的精神世界的形成具有科学和文化意义上的优势，而且学校教育可能特有的那种统一和完整的人道主义的育人价值观将有助于青少年奠定品德基础).\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

Zhu acknowledges the powerful role that schooling plays in the formation of cultural and moral values. Because of this significance schools can serve as a site of formation of cultural identity and morality. Schools must provide a moral education based on the humanism (\textit{rendao zhuyi} 人道主义) China’s consumer culture is filled with competition. Focusing on the humanism will provide students with humanitarian values. This will balance out the dog-eat-dog competitive

\textsuperscript{190} Zhu, Xiaowan. "面对挑战：学校道德教育的调整与革新." Education Research: pp. 1
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
culture given the current economic goals of education.

Lastly, Zhu’s arguments for policy reformation reflect historical trends in moral education discussed by Lee and Ho. Zhu argues that modern consumerism marginalizes social and cultural morality. Moral education should educate individuals with concern for humanitarianism. This reflects the sentiments of the Ministry of Education publication cited by Lee and Ho where the state emphasized teaching individuals “good moral quality and healthy social character.” Not only does Zhu’s education policy resemble the trends of moral education described by Lee and Ho, but they also resonate with the sentiments of the new Confucian movement.

Comparing Zhu and Kang Xiaoguang demonstrates the similar trends in moral education policy and the beliefs of the new Confucians. Both Zhu and Kang are concerned with the effects of the market structure and economic growth on the Chinese nation. Kang writes, “market orientation has not only changed China’s economic structure, but also its political and social structure, and even its culture and ideology.” As a Party member, Zhu does not critique the CCP. However, Zhu and Kang would both agree that economic liberalization changed China’s cultural values. Zhu and Kang also agree that the current system is devoid of morality. Kang critiques the “heartless-rich” and the “heartless government” whereas Zhu is primarily concerned with the cultural crises. However, they agree that there is a social crises in the PRC given the prioritization of rampant economic growth.

Kang and Zhu both propose teaching a traditional ideology to address China’s current

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issues. For instance, Kang argues, “China’s future should emerge from its tradition and should be constructed in accordance with the spirit of Confucianism.” Zhu, on the other hand, does not explicitly endorse Confucianism but does support incorporating traditional moral norms in moral education. Specifically Zhu argues that moral education should center on “humanism” (rendao zhuyi 人道主义). While Zhu does not support a Confucian curriculum, both argue for filling China’s current ethical vacuum with traditional morality. Given this support of traditional morality, Kang and Zhu provide a critique of Marxist and Liberal ideology. Kang directly opposes Marxism and Liberalism as foreign systems that lack legitimacy. He proposes replacing Marxist teachings in party schools with teaching Confucian texts. Zhu is more tacit in her suggestion to replace Marxism. Zhu does not critique the Marxism or liberalism outright. However, Zhu proposes teaching humanism rather than Marxism. This implies that Marxism is incapable of providing the moral direction that the nation requires.

Finally, Zhu and Kang both support the Substance-Function (ti yong 体用) strategy for solving China’s national issues. The Ti Yong argument was proposed during the final decades of the Qing dynasty as a means of adopting Western learning while preserving Chinese cultural identity. This was an educational scheme that suggested that Chinese learning be preserved as the essence (ti 体) where as Western learning and technology was applied (yong 用). In “Confucianization: a Future in the Tradition”, substance and function is illustrated in Kang’s model of Benevolent government. Kang claims to apply Western ideas to his model of government. For instance, Kang explains that corporatism, a means of organizing individuals into groups for political representation and participation, is a Western concept that he applies to

196 Ibid: pp. 1
197 Ibid: pp. 27
his model of government. However, Confucianism is the essence of Kang’s government, as he proposes a “Confucian State” in which Confucian culture is the foundation of Chinese society.\(^{198}\) Similarly Zhu is concerned with preserving Chinese essence while implementing Western techniques or models. However, again Zhu is more discrete in her critique and proposed solution. Zhu holds modernization, globalization and economic growth accountable for many of China’s social-cultural crises. However, Zhu does not propose removing China’s free-market economic structure. Rather, Zhu propose reforming education to emphasize morality. Zhu believes that morality is necessary to “nurture the whole person” (peiyang wanzhengde 培养完整的).\(^{199}\) Currently schools do not educate individuals completely; they lack morality. Through emphasizing moral education, schools will educate a future generation to be concerned with culture rather than unadulterated economic development. As such Zhu supports continued use Western economic schema. However, moral education must be implemented to fill China’s current moral vaccum. In this sense, both Kang and Zhu believe that empowering culture is central to establishing a brighter future for the PRC.

Zhu’s moral education policy also relates to the teachings of classical Confucian texts such as *The Analects* and *The Doctrine of the Mean*. Zhu’s emphasis on humanism in moral education best exemplifies her connection to Confucian philosophy. As humanism is a central tenet of the Confucian tradition. Humanism and the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道) share a responsive metaphysical relationship. Tu Weiming claims that within Confucianism the Way of human kind cannot be separated from a metaphysical relationship with the Way of Heaven.

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\(^{199}\) Zhu, Xiaowan. "面对挑战：学校道德教育的调整与革新." Education Research: pp. 1
The notion of cultivating morality involves a metaphysical relationship between the individual and the cosmos. Dong Zhongshu, the Han dynasty Confucian discussed in section one, best described the notion of moral metaphysics as “the mutual responsiveness of heaven and man.” This quote means that heaven and humanity are responsive to one another. Tu writes, “true humanity must be sought in the anthropocosmic vision of the unity of man and heaven.” True humanity is achieved through cultivating morality. Therefore morality is the key to realizing the unity of rendao and tiandao.

Individuals cultivate morality through education. Again, the notion of transformation through education (教化), is pertinent. Through education, one cultivates morality, thus achieving a metaphysical unity with Heaven. The Analects also expresses the metaphysical goal of moral education:

The master said, “at fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took my stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I followed my heart’s desire without overstepping the line.” In this famous passage Confucius describes his process of education and cultivation throughout his lifetime. He states that through his life-long education he was able to “understand the Decree of Heaven.” Knowing Heaven is one of the educational goals for Confucius. Although this passage does not explicitly mention the relationship between the Way of Humanity and the Way of Heaven, it does imply that education has a transformative effect on humanity, and one can understand heaven through education. Zhu Xiaowan does not discuss the transcendence of Heaven, or any notion of moral metaphysics like that of classical Confucian texts. However, Zhu

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201 Ibid: pp. 23
202 Ibid: pp. 8
204 The Analects 2.4 : pp. 63
holds that humanism is central to moral education and cultivating a prosperous Chinese society. In other words, Zhu’s moral education is a re-visioning of transformation through education; Zhu believes that moral education is capable of transforming Chinese society. Although Zhu does not discuss Heaven, she emphasizes humanism and believes moral education is a form of transformative education (jiaohua 教化). In this sense, Zhu’s moral education is philosophically connected to the Confucian teachings of The Analects and the Doctrine of the Mean.

Although Zhu is a member of the CCP, her work on moral education also demonstrates non-statist interests. Zhu believes that spiritual fulfilment, not politics, is the goal for Confucianizing moral education. This is illustrated where Zhu asserts that schools have influence over “individual moral development and spiritual life” (daode fazhan de jingshenshijie 道德发展的精神世界). Similarly, Billioud and Thoraval identify ‘spiritual life’ (jingshen shenghuo 精神生活) as a concern among the Chinese population motivating Confucian moral education. Billioud and Thoraval argue that students at the national universities and private academies partipate in Confucian “to promote confidence in one’s own culture and attend to the questions of spiritual life (jingshen shenghuo 精神生活) in the context of material development of society.” Zhu, as well as Billioud and Thoraval demonstrate that reviving Confucian education is motivated by cultural and spiritual concerns.

Humanism is also a common concern of Zhu’s moral education policy and the participants of the Renda Confucian studies. Zhu mentions humanism in the context of

205 Zhu, Xiaowan. "面对挑战：学校道德教育的调整与革新." Education Research.: pp. 1
teaching humanitarianism in moral education. The participants at Renda refer to humanism in the context of achieving spiritual fulfillment through the teachings of Confucius. This demonstrates that the Confucian revival in education is spearheaded by members of the Chinese intelligentsia with a range of political affiliations and motivations. Zhu and the students from Renda are Party intelligentsia. Zhu is a Party secretary, researching and writing educational policy for the CCP. Renda on is responsible for educating the elite party members in the PRC. However, the fieldwork of Billioud and Thoraval indicate that spiritual fulfillment is a prominent concern non-statist educational contexts. Namely, private academies and Beida and Qinghua universities are responsible for educating intellectuals that are not necessarily Party members. Therefore, the same under-girding cultural concerns motivates statist and non-statist intelligentsia involved in the Confucian revival.

Zhu’s work must be understood within the context of her position as a member of the Communist Party. This article holds the economic progress of modernization and globalization accountable for the social crises facing China’s educational system. However, the article does not critique current economic policy, or suggests a new direction in economics or politics. Rather, the article focuses on education as a way to address societal problems, while allowing economic growth to continue. Zhu simultaneously supports the Communist Party and educational policy that does not mention Socialism. Between Zhu credentials and the journal of publication, it is clear that her research is directed at and supported by the party. However supporting the Chinese Communist Party line does not mean that Zhu’s educational research must support Socialism. The focus of Zhu’s article is moral education that does not mention any form of Socialist political education. Rather this article emphasizes “moral character” (pinde 品德).

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Zhu is able to propose an educational direction motivated by a traditional view of moral education without contradicting the Communist party.

Zhu’s work illustrates that statist and non-statist interests influence moral education. Zhu’s moral education involves a Confucian view of morality in education to provide Chinese society with a moral direction in the contemporary period. However, Zhu’s work is also clearly statist. She is a member of the Party, published in Party-affiliated magazines. Furthermore, her moral education content does not propose a political or economic re-structuring. Thus, Zhu exemplifies the tense relationship between the Confucian revival and the CCP. The CCP endorses Confucian education, while ensuring that Marxist and Maoist ideology is not criticized. Zhu also exemplifies well the common concerns throughout the Confucian revival regardless of political affiliation. Zhu and the participants of the study of Billioud and Thoraval are concerned with moralizing China and seeking spiritual fulfilment. Unsatisfied with China modern reality, Party and non-Party intelligentsia alike are turning to Confucianism. Education is the ideological space where the relationship between Confucian culture and modernity is being defined.

**Anqing No. 1 Middle School: A Case Study**

Education is the ideological space where the relationship between Chinese culture and modernity is being defined - public education is no exception. This section examines the extent to which the Confucian revival is manifest in public education in China. This section discusses one specific case study – the Anqing Number 1 Middle School in Anqing, Anhui Province, China. Founded in 1906 this school’s history encompasses the political, social, and economic transformation of the 20th century. The school also enjoys a historical relationship with the CCP that continues to thrive through today. In the summer of 2011 I interned as an English teacher

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at Anqing No 1 Middle School. During this time I gathered texts published by the school and conducted interviews with one of the school’s principals, Shen Bo. The materials gathered during my research in Anqing this summer document the school’s political affiliation with the CCP, as well as the perspectives of the school administrators concerning modernization and their philosophy of moral education. Confucian values are promoted at Anqing No. 1 Middle School. Moreover, the inclusion of Confucian ideals does not come from CCP directives. Rather, Confucianism is included in the personal educational philosophy of the school administrators. Thus, the movement for Confucian education at this middle school is best understood as a non-statist movement. Anqing No. 1 Middle school demonstrates that public schools, which are closely affiliated with the Party, engage with the non-statist Confucian movement.

The school’s publication “Anqing No. 1 Middle School: Brilliant Achievements in a Century” commemorates the school’s centennial and documents the school’s history through the 20th century. The school’s account of its history reflects the school’s political affiliation and beliefs regarding modernization and globalization. The school’s history illustrates that it identifies with the revolutionary, socialist project and is dedicated to modernization. Anqing No. 1 Middle School was founded in 1906 in response to the abolition of the imperial exam system. In other words, this school was established by the late Qing dynasty as part of the mission to modernize schools and reform the educational system dominated by the Confucian academy. Following the fall of the Qing dynasty, members of the school supported the May Fourth Movement. According to Brilliant Achievements in a Century, “the school has had a revolutionary tradition for its students took an active part in the anti-imperialist movements

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therefore they gained the school the name ‘cradle of patriotic movements.’” The connection to the May Fourth Era is significant as it demonstrates how the school chooses to remember its history. The school portrays its history as revolutionary, promoting itself as the ‘cradle of patriotic movements.’ Given the Communist Party was not founded, much less in power during the May Fourth Movement, the school retrospectively asserts that its students and teachers have always been united behind a socialist project. The school more clearly became affiliated with the revolutionary, socialist movement during the 1920’s. The school established the first Communist Youth League in the province in 1921. Then in 1923 Anqing was host to the first Communist party organization in Anhui province, which was comprised mostly of students and teachers of Anqing No. 1 Middle School. It should be emphasized that this historical account is how the school chose to commemorate its centennial. The school remembers its history as a socialist, revolutionary history. First, this indicates that the school has been closely connected to the Communist Party throughout its history. Second, this suggests the school is still intimately connected to the CCP today. In this way, Anqing No. 1 Middle School’s historical account expresses the school commitment to political unity with the CCP.

Beyond the historical narrative, the school is explicit in its support of the CCP. This is illustrated in several ways. First, Brilliant Achievements in a Century publication asserts, “The school follows strictly the socialist orientation of education and dedicates itself to the implementation of educational principles of the party and the country.” The school’s political agenda supports the Chinese Community Party. Also, the principal of the school is a local Communist Party Secretary. This role of the principal and Party Secretary has been

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211 Brilliant Achievements in a Century. Anqing, Anhui, China: Anqing Number 1 Middle School, 2006: pp. 4
212 Ibid
213 Brilliant Achievements in a Century. Anqing, Anhui, China: Anqing Number 1 Middle School, 2006: pp. 26
109
maintained since the early 1970s, when the school administration began to include a local Party Secretary.\textsuperscript{214} Lastly, the provincial Party voices its support for Anqing No. 1 Middle School. This is exemplified where the Anhui Party Secretary sent a letter of congratulations to honor the school’s centennial.\textsuperscript{215} Not only does the school celebrate its political connection to the Chinese Communist Party through its historical narrative, and close relationship with the party, but the Communist Party also expresses its support of Anqing No.1 Middle School.

The school’s centennial publication also reflects a narrative of progress and modernization. This is best illustrated through another school motto, “education must [confront] modernization, of the world and of the future” (“教育要面向现代化，面向世界，面向未来”).\textsuperscript{216} The school asserts that it is part of the modernization project. Furthermore, this project engages the entire world and the future of China. As globalization and modernization influenced China throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, so too have they influenced the Anqing No. 1 Middle School. The school not only engages in a socialist mission, but also a mission that engages modernization and globalization. The above discussion identifies the political affiliation and concerns for modernization and globalization of Anqing No. 1 Middle School. The school has statist sympathies, given its affiliation with the CCP. The school also views its educational project as directly engaging with the national trends of modernization and globalization.

A second school motto illustrates that the school is also concerned for the cultivation of individual moral character. During an interview Shen Bo stated a school motto that fuses traditional and modern culture. He said,

Our school motto is ‘sincerity and resolution.’ This phrase originates from ‘The Exegesis of Characters’ (\textit{Shuowenjiezi} 说文解字), an earlier generation at our school determined this as our school motto… our traditional and modern education together

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid: pp. 11
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid: pp. 4
fosters the meaning of this motto (校训叫“诚毅”...源于说文解字的一种句式...学校的前辈就把它确定为校训诚和毅...那就说我们传统这种教育跟现代的教育来抚育这个校训新的含义). 217

The principal describes how a phrase that originates from a Han Dynasty dictionary, *The Exegesis of Characters* (*shuowenjiezi* 说文解字), is alive at the school today. This illustrates that the combination of traditional cultural ideals and modern education is pertinent to the administrators of Anqing No. 1 Middle School. Furthermore, the school motto resonates with trends in moral education described above. For instance, the principal states that these two ideals are important for cultivating one’s character (*pinge* 品格). The principal also emphasizes that education is influential to the development of Chinese society. This indicates that there is concern for cultivation of individual character that will in turn influence society. In this sense, the Principal's inclusion of traditional culture has two goals; development of positive individuals and development of a positive future for society. Traditional concepts from *The Exegesis of Characters* are aimed at cultivating the moral character of individual students. The principal of Anqing No. 1 Middle School is committed to the notion that development of character is vital for a prosperous future of Chinese society.

The sentiments of Principal Shen Bo reflect a presence of Confucianism within his broader educational philosophy. The concepts sincerity (*cheng* 诚) and resoluteness (*yi* 毅) of the school’s motto are also Confucian ideals that date back to classical Confucian texts. Sincerity and resoluteness, are concepts of central importance to *The Doctrine of the Mean*. 218 Regard sincerity, *The Doctrine of the Mean* states,

Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the Way of Man. He who is sincere is one who hits upon what is right without effort and apprehend without thinking. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a sage. He who tries

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217 Interview conducted by Richard Worsman with Shen Bo on July 16th, 2011.
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to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it.\textsuperscript{219} The above quotes indicates that sincerity is not an individual moral quality, but also a quality of the Way of Heaven. Thus it represents the convergence between the Way of Human Kind and the Way of Heaven. This is also illustrates morality is not a matter of social order alone, but also assumes metaphysical significance. As such cultivating sincerity is important for the individual to realize the Way of Heaven and become a sage.

Resoluteness is important for the cultivation of sincerity in \textit{The Doctrine of the Mean}. Tu Weiming, a Confucian scholar, describes the role of resoluteness in his book \textit{Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung Yong}. He argues that \textit{The Doctrine of the Mean} requires “moral effort” to cultivate sincerity.\textsuperscript{220} In order to realize the Way of Heaven, one must have “moral resolution,” which is “both the necessary and sufficient condition for education.”\textsuperscript{221} In other words, sincerity leads to the enlightenment of the person as a sage. However, this cultivation requires education and perserverence. Certainly, Principal Shen Bo never mentioned Heaven, metaphysics, or sagehood. However, he does assert that the two terms from the Han dynasty carry significance for education today. This school motto demonstrates that the school values traditional Confucian concepts of moral education and self cultivation. More importantly, these ideals dating back to classical Confucian texts influence the Principal’s personal philosophy concerning moral education.

The above two sections of this chapter have demonstrated the presence of non-statist activities to reappraise Confucianism for modern China. This movement is manifest in education, as illustrated by Confucian education organizations and trends in moral education. The motto expressed by principal Shen Bo suggests that the same non-statism also influences Anqing No.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[219] Ibid: pp. 107
\item[220] Ibid: pp. 115
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Middle School. Shen Bo’s intent behind including aspects of traditional culture is to cultivate individuals. As stated above, this cultivation is important to the future prosperous development of society. This school administrator believes that traditional culture is integral to the future of the Chinese nation. It should be noted that this motto is an educational philosophy, not a state directive or mandate concerning education curriculum. This motto is intended to guide the practices of the school and its teachers. This illustrates Confucianism is manifest in Anqing No. 1 Middles School, not on the state but on the individual level. In other words, Shen Bo, as a non-Party intelligentsia, brought the Confucian revival into Anqing No. 1 Middle School.

There is a multiplicity of interests and influences on Anqing No. 1 Middle School. The school asserts its commitment to the state and dedication to socialism, referring to itself as the “cradle of patriotic movements.” However the motto described by the school principal reflects an emphasis on traditional culture aimed at cultivating individual character. On the one hand this school is an ardent supporter of statist interests. Supporting the PRC is instrumental to the continued success and recognition of the school. On the other hand, the school is also influenced by a non-statist movement aimed at empowering culture to shape the future of Chinese society.

Conclusion

The examples in the sections above illustrate that the Confucian revival, while a contemporary movement, embodies the historical relationship between Confucianism and the state. Namely throughout Chinese history, education has played a pivotal role in the Confucian tradition and embodies the dichotomous political and social role of Confucianism in China. Historically, Confucian education is an instrument of the state as well as part of a voice of

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222 Brilliant Achievements in a Century. Anqing, Anhui, China: Anqing Number 1 Middle School, 2006: pp 4, 113
dissent that critiques the actions of the state when needed. The above sections demonstrate that the Party is closely involved in education, from the foundation of schools and universities, to the sponsoring of private academies, and the close political affiliation of public schools in the PRC. In many of these educational settings, Confucian education shares a close relationship to the state. For instance, the Confucian schools at the university level that educates the elite and party members based on classical Confucian texts. Also, the moral education policy discussed in section three is a prime example of the state’s direct involvement in Confucian education. However, non-Party intelligentsia are also reviving Confucian education in these settings. University level Confucian studies, private Confucian academies, moral education policy, and the case study of Anqing all reflect that the Confucian revival is not a movement exclusively lead by the CCP. That said, the private Confucian academies, the moral education publications, national universities, and Anqing No.1 Middle School are all dependent on the state. These various educational contexts depend on state sponsorship in order to function. Thus, there is confluence of Party and non-Party activism that shapes the Confucian revival in China today. Examining Confucian education illustrates that the confluence of the state and non-state is not only a trend of the contemporary Confucian revival, but is also a historical trend dating back to pre-modern times that characterizes a long-standing historical tension between statist and non-statist Confucian intellectuals.
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*Brilliant Achievements in a Century.* Anqing, Anhui, China: Anqing Number 1 Middle School, 2006.


Conclusion

This thesis began with a discussion of the 2008 Olympic opening ceremony in Beijing, China. The U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission argued that the ceremony demonstrated the interest of the CCP in resuscitating Confucianism for its nationalist agenda. The Commission argued that in the ideological vacuum of the post-Mao era, the CCP uses Confucianism to propagate its economic and political policies.\textsuperscript{223} The 2008 Olympics and the Commission’s report are significant in that they demonstrate the contemporary importance of the Confucian revival. Confucius is being resurrected as the face of cultural nationalism by one of the largest super powers in the present-day. The CCP’s message of Confucian cultural nationalism was heard throughout the world; the Commission’s report demonstrates the U.S. government recognizes the Confucian revival as an issue of great import to understanding the CCP.

However, the conception of the Confucian revival as a CCP movement is ahistorical. Chapter Two demonstrated that the Confucian revival is part of China’s modern history. The Confucian revival cannot be separated from the onslaught of Westernization and modernization during the mid-19th and 20th centuries. From the loss of the Opium War to the revolutionary politics of Mao, Confucianism was attacked as incompatible with modernity. However, during this time Confucian intellectuals responded to the attack of modernization from the West. New Confucians preserved Confucianism in China’s changing political and social landscape. Mou Zongsan’s “A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” exemplifies the Confucian project during the 20th century. The manifesto challenges the modern Western idea of progress, and asserts the importance of Confucian culture to China’s national

spirit. In other words, Mou redefines China’s modernity in terms of the Confucian tradition.
Thus, the Confucian revival is a dialogue between tradition Chinese culture and the Western forces of modernization.

During the 20th century New Confucians were also engaged in a global discourse. Tu Weiming, a New Confucian, writes,

“"The time is long overdue to move beyond a mindset shaped by modernization as a unilinear progression. As politics of domination fades, we welcome the drawing of an age of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing, and collaboration."”

This quote asserts that Western hegemony defines modernity and progress in terms of Western ideals. Tu Weiming calls for global dialogue involving ‘networking, negotiation, interaction and collaboration.’ Not only does Tu challenge the idea of modernity as Westernization, but also encourages and participates in a ‘negotiation’ between Confucianism and other ideologies throughout the globe. The Confucian revival is an extension of China’s history of globalization and modernization during the 19th and 20th centuries. This demonstrates that the Confucian revival is not only a contemporary project of the CCP. Rather it is part of a continuing process of redefining culture in terms of tradition and modernity.

The Commission Report’s assumption that the Confucian revival is a propaganda project of the CCP is incomplete. Chapter Three, “Towards a Typology of the New Confucianism,” and Chapter Four, “New Confucianism, Education, and Politics,” demonstrated that intellectuals with a variety of political affiliations and motivations revive Confucianism. The New Confucians can be categorized as either statist or non-statist intellectuals. Fang Keli and Jiang Qing exemplify these two factions. Fang, Dean of Graduate Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, spearheaded a number of Confucian research projects for the CCP during the 1980s and

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224 Tu Modern Modernities, pp 75
117
1990s. Fang research was part of the CCP’s interest in using Confucianism to support its nationalist agenda. Therefore, Fang is a statist Confucian intellectual. Jiang, on the other hand, is a non-statist. Jiang also published works on Confucianism during the 1980s and 1990s, but was not published by the CCP. Rather, Jiang was critical of the CCP support of Confucianism, arguing that it was not genuine support of political Confucianism. Before the 2008 Olympics, the CCP was engaging in the Confucian revival. However, Party-activism is only one side of the movement. Rather the revival involves the confluence of Party and non-Party intellectuals.

New Confucians not only differ regarding political affiliations, but also in their revisioning of the Confucian tradition. Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang offer to of the most extensive models for political Confucianism for the contemporary PRC. Even though Jiang and Kang are both non-statists who critique the CCP, they developed two Confucian governmental organizations, established on two distinct teaches within Confucianism. Jiang espouses the Gongyang tradition, where as Kang espouses the teachings of Mencius. The Confucian revival is a project aimed at re-applying the Confucian tradition to the modern world. Chapter Three demonstrates that this re-appraisal of Confucianism is a pluralistic and complex. A multitude of voices attempt to define and redefine the Confucian tradition in China’s contemporary context.

Chapter Four continued to examine the confluence of Party and non-Party intellectuals in the revival. Specifically, this chapter examines the role of Confucian intellectuals within various education institutions in the PRC. The CCP actively propagates Confucian education. This is

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227 Jiang, Qing. "From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism." The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2011. pp. 25
demonstrated in the rise of Confucian studies at national universities such as The People’s University (*Renda 人大*). The CCP has illustrated further commitment to Confucian education through its moral education policy. Zhu Xiaowan, a Party member and educational researcher, describes the need for humanism and morality within education in China’s public schools. The CCP is engaged in applying traditional ideology to a modern context through educational institutions.

At the turn of the 21st century, non-Party affiliated intelligentsia began to play an active role in Confucian education. Beijing University (*Beida 北大*) and Qinghua University and private Confucian academies are not affiliated with the CCP, and are organized and taught by non-Party members. The Principal of Anqing No. 1 Middles School also exemplifies a non-Party intelligentsia who is committed to Confucian education. These educational contexts demonstrate that the state as well as non-state activists spearhead the Confucian project. The prominence of non-Party intelligentsia illustrates that Confucian education does not always conform to the interests of the CCP.

Chapters Three and Four assert that the tension between the Confucian intellectual and the state government has deep historical roots. Much like the contemporary Confucian revival, the Han dynasty Confucian project involved the confluence between state and non-state intellectuals. Confucians simultaneously legitimized and criticized the Han dynastic government. Confucians were necessary to Han civil bureaucracy, which was responsible for the longevity and stability of the dynasty. However, Heaven, the same source of legitimacy of the emperor, was also the ultimate authority. The Confucian literati, as interpreters of the Way of Heaven, held the emperor accountable to ensure morality in his rule. Similarly, in the present-day the CCP turns to Confucianism to maintain stability and unite the nation under one ideology.
However, non-Party Confucian intellectuals are critical of the CCP at times. Thus, the Confucian revival is a contemporary expression of the historical tension between the intellectual and the Chinese government.

There is no doubt that the Confucian revival is important to the future of CCP ideology, as well as the discourse surrounding modernization, globalization and Chinese cultural identity. Daniel Bell, author of *China’s New Confucianism* and Professor at Qinghua University, believes “the CCP may rename itself the Chinese Confucian Party in the next decade of two.” Bell also believes that the Confucian activism presents the most fervent political and intellectual movement in decades. Whether or not the revival will result in a re-institution of a political Confucianism is a matter of speculation at this point. What is certain, however, is that one of China’s oldest cultural traditions has continuously negotiated its position in society and politics throughout China’s modern history.