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Proposed Open Access Policy Slideshow

Benjamin Panciera

Connecticut College, bpancier@conncoll.edu

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Open Access at Connecticut College

What is Open Access?

Open Access is the practice of making scholarly research available over the internet for the free use of researchers and the general public.


Why Open Access?

- Research is most effective when it is available to the widest possible number of scholars.
- Open Access removes economic and geographic barriers to the dissemination of knowledge.


Who Benefits from Open Access?

- Faculty authors get more readers for their research
- Research reputation of the College increases
- Scholars working without research libraries get increased access to published articles

Ever-Increasing Serials Costs for Connecticut College



Declining Resources for Everything but Serials



Crisis in Serials Inflation

For the last two decades, libraries in the US and abroad have been cutting journal subscriptions.

– Wellesley, Grinnell, Emory, Cornell, etc.

Pressure on collections budgets will continue.

As every year goes by, fewer readers have access to your scholarly articles being published in traditional sources.

Open Access Helps!

- Research becomes available to a broader audience.
 - Researchers overseas, faculty at smaller institutions, adjunct faculty without library access
- Open Access research receives 30%-250% more citations than traditional research.

Swan, Alma (2010) *The Open Access citation advantage: Studies and results to date*. Southampton University eprints collection. <http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/268516/>

Two Kinds of Open Access

- Author Self-Archiving

Researchers are usually given broad latitude to republish manuscripts of their articles online in their institution's repository.

- Open Access Publishing

The *Directory of Open Access Journals* lists about 8600 refereed journals in all areas of study. Most are in the hard sciences, but there are thousands in the humanities and social sciences as well.

Proposed Open Access Policy: Author Self Archiving

Key Points:

- Faculty grant nonexclusive rights to College to republish research in the institutional repository (Digital Commons)
- College will republish research in open access format, subject to conditions established by publisher
- Faculty may seek waiver releasing them from obligation for any reason

How Will This Work?

- When an article is accepted for publication, an electronic copy of the corrected manuscript should be forwarded to IS.
- IS staff will investigate the publisher's policies regarding whether and when it can be made available in the institutional repository.
- When allowed by publisher, IS staff will place the article in the repository once article has been published.
- Remember! you can opt out of this process.

Examples: Computer Science Faculty Publications



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Published in *Algorithmica*, Nov 2011. (Earlier version appeared in LATIN 2010.)

Published version may be found at

<http://www.springerlink.com/content/r5015h1708307598>.

Abstract

We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone ("fair") allocation and pricing functions for resource constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that encompasses unlimited supply auctions, knapsack auctions, and auctions with general non-decreasing convex production cost functions. We study and compare the revenue obtainable in each fair pricing scheme to the profit obtained by the ideal omniscient multi-price auction. We show that for capacitated knapsack auctions, no constant pricing scheme can achieve any approximation to the optimal profit, but proportional pricing is as powerful as general monotone pricing. In addition, for auction settings with arbitrary bounded non-decreasing convex production cost functions, we present a proportional pricing mechanism which achieves a poly-logarithmic approximation. Unlike existing approaches, all of our mechanisms have fair (monotone) prices, and all of our competitive analysis is with respect to the optimal profit extraction.

Recommended Citation

Chung, C., Ligett, K., Pruhs, K., & Roth, A. (2011). The power of fair pricing mechanisms. *Algorithmica* 63,3 (July, 2012), 634-644.

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
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