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Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectures, Volume 1

Henry Wells Lawrence

Charles Seymour

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HENRY WELLS LAWRENCE MEMORIAL LECTURES

Volume I

CONNECTICUT COLLEGE, NEW LONDON
FOREWORD

With this publication the Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Committee sees the fulfillment of its original hopes, for herein are included some of the representative writing of Dr. Lawrence, and the first Lawrence Memorial Lecture, delivered at the College, by President Charles Seymour of Yale University on February 27, 1945, with the introductory remarks made upon that occasion by Dr. Frank E. Morris.

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February 1, 1946
HENRY WELLS LAWRENCE, 1879-1942

Henry Wells Lawrence was born December 2, 1879, in Nyack, New York, the son of Henry Wells and Nancy Laymen Lawrence. He attended elementary and high school in White Plains, New York. He received three degrees from Yale University: the B.A. in 1906, the M.A. in 1907, and the Ph.D. in 1910. In 1909 he studied at the University of Paris. From 1910 to 1920 he taught history at the University of Vermont, at Dartmouth and at Middlebury Colleges. He was appointed Professor of History and Government at Connecticut College in 1920, and served as Chairman of the Department from 1921 to 1942. During the summer sessions of 1927-1941, he taught at Hampton Institute.

In 1914 he married Lillian G. Southerburg at Norfolk Downs, Massachusetts. Their children are Barbara G. Lawrence, Connecticut College '38; Major Henry Wells Lawrence, Yale '40, of the United States Army Air Forces; and Lincoln Billings Lawrence.
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First Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lecture, Dr. Seymour
I. WASHINGTON, CAPITALISM, AND NATIONALISM*

George Washington died in the year 1799, more than one hundred and thirty-two years ago. At the time of his death his fame was already widespread and secure, and the interminable series of laudatory orations which he so well deserved began at once. During the intervening century and more, tireless orators have struggled, with increasing difficulty, to pay adequate tributes of eloquence to this great man. One difficulty, which has grown with the years, is that of saying anything which has not already been said several hundred times before. Happily, however, so far as Washington’s birthday speakers are concerned, patriotic American audiences desire nothing so much on these occasions as the robust repetition of the resounding platitudes of adulation with which they have long been thoroughly familiar. Indeed they are likely to resent as inappropriate and out of order the introduction of any other than the usual facts and points of view about our foremost national hero.

However childish may be this taste for a reiteration of the obvious, it is not peculiar to America. It is characteristic of most nations to exalt, even to deify, their most popular heroes, and to wish said concerning them only words of praise, fit for the commemoration of demigods. Such words nourish a vigorous national pride, and they are supposed also to fire the hearts of impressionable youth with a reverent determination to follow worthily in the footsteps of the great departed. Whether it be the children of the obscure little state of Albania, thrilled with worshipful admiration for their warrior hero, Georges Scanderbeg; or the soldiers of militant Japan, pausing in their ruthless warfare about Shanghai to adore the spirit of an ancient emperor; or the patriotic citizens of the United States, mobilized for a bicentennial veneration of the immortal George Washington; it is clear enough that hero worship is common to them all, and that this is a potent force in the life of every nation. That this force can be of incalculable worth to any people is widely recognized. That it may also do them incalculable harm seems to be less generally understood and to stand in need of some emphasis at this moment.

In our own United States, for instance, it may seem almost sacrilegious to point out that the influence of George Washington may be productive of harm as well as of good. In his case, as in those of many other national heroes, it is entirely possible so to misuse his fame and misapply the lessons from his life as to produce results which he himself, if living now, would be the foremost in deploring. For example, Washington is commonly regarded as a steadfast supporter of political conservatism. The weight of his great name is often thrown into the scales of controversy against proposals for any radical modification of existing governmental institutions. Probably a great majority

*This article was published in The American Scholar, Volume I, No. 3, May, 1932, and is reprinted here with the permission of the publisher.
of the citizens of the United States today would deny with indignant amazement the assertion that the career of George Washington resembles in several fundamental respects those of such modern radicals as the Indian Nationalist Gandhi and the Russian Bolshevik Lenin. Yet these three world figures have at least this much in common: each of them defied the lawfully constituted authority which ruled his native land and, at the imminent risk of war and bloodshed, sought to overthrow the established political system and to replace it by one which most intelligent persons throughout the world condemned as, at best, a rash experiment, offering slight hopes of success and great probability of disaster. In winning independence for the new American republic, Washington was anything but a conservative; he was, of course, a revolutionary, quite as truly as Lenin and Gandhi were revolutionaries. He was, however, a revolutionary of the eighteenth century, and therefore his ideas differ greatly from those of the revolutionaries of the twentieth century. It is this difference which deceives many into believing that he was a conservative. It is a misuse of his fame and a misapplication of the lesson of his life, to count him steadily on the conservative side of current political controversies.

One of the easiest and most common perversions of the Washington influence is that based on his oft-quoted advice to eighteenth century America to steer clear of foreign entanglements and seek safety in a policy of diplomatic isolation. How often and how solemnly are his warning words quoted, and in how many different ways is the weight of his influence brought to bear against any steps toward international cooperation on the part of twentieth century United States! Yet Washington was giving advice concerning world conditions of the eighteenth century, with which he was competently familiar, and not concerning the unforeseeable conditions of the twentieth century. There is no reason to believe that he wished to fix the foreign policy of his country for all future time, nor that he would have given similar advice amid the conditions of today. Indeed, if we may imagine the disembodied spirit of our great first president still watchful and solicitous for the welfare of the republic he founded, it is easy to believe him sorrowful for the stupidity, or indignant at the insincerity, which prompts so many of his countrymen today to follow blindly the advice which was so helpful in 1797 and is so harmful in 1932. "It would be ironic," says a recent editorial in a powerful newspaper, "if, in the year in which all America is paying homage to its greatest citizen, the advice of Washington on the conduct of our foreign relations should be flouted." To which it may be fairly replied, "How infinitely more ironic it would be to follow the advice which, so far as our present circumstances are concerned, Washington never intended to give."

For, after all, Washington was not essentially an isolationist. He was, rather, a cooperationist when there was opportunity for cooperation on anything like a basis of equality. The historical evidence for
this is abundant and striking. There were plenty of isolationists in Washington's day, but he was not one of them. Others feared to enter into a league of sovereign states and risk the curtailment of separate independence, but he actively supported such courageous cooperation. For instance, when Washington and other supporters of a league were proposing to bring order out of chaos by adopting the present Constitution of the United States, it was Patrick Henry, famed and patriotic son of Virginia, who roared in dismay that, "This government subjects everything to the Northern majority. We thus put unbounded power over our property into hands not having a common interest with us. Sir, this is a picture so horrid, so wretched, so dreadful, that I need no longer dwell upon it." Against this nightmare of Patrick Henry, it was Washington who directed soothing words and calm reasoning in the following persuasive letter, seeking to enlist Henry's support of the new League and Constitution.

"Your own judgment will at once discover," Washington wrote, "the good and the exceptionable parts of it; and your experience of the difficulties which have ever arisen when attempts have been made to reconcile such a variety of interests and local prejudices as pervade the several States, will render explanation unnecessary. I wish the Constitution which is offered, had been more perfect; but I sincerely believe it is the best that could be obtained at this time. . . . From a variety of concurring accounts it appears to me that the political concerns of this country are in a manner suspended by a thread, and that the Convention has been looked up to by the reflecting part of the community with a solicitude which is hardly to be conceived; and, if nothing had been agreed upon by that body, anarchy would have ensued, the seeds being deeply sown in every soil."

Here we see the cooperationist Washington energetically at work. When the time was ripe for his beloved homeland, the sovereign State of Virginia, to enter upon entangling alliances with the foreign states of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and the other ten, he boldly led her forward out of a traditional isolation and into that close cooperation which had become essential to the welfare and security of all. To be sure Washington did, in the eighteenth century, advise that the infant United States of America avoid active participation in the quarrels of the adult and relatively gigantic nations of Europe. To assume from this, however, that he would advise a similar isolation for the adult and gigantic United States of the twentieth century is to disregard altogether the established fact of his cooperative and progressive action in leading Virginia to enter the League of American Nations under the Covenant of 1787.

Another common misuse of the influence of Washington consists in quoting his words when they happen to reinforce the views of the quoter, but denying equal publicity to those words of his which antagonize such views. Thus, his warning against foreign entanglements is so often quoted as to be familiar to all, but his equally vigor-
ous aversion to the rise of political parties is much less widely known. Many who urge us to follow his advice on foreign policy as perennially applicable and an evidence of Washington's almost superhuman prescience would, in all candor, be forced to admit that his warnings against political parties were almost absurd. However bad these parties may sometimes become, the almost universal experience of mankind has shown that they are as indispensable to popular government as the weather is to agriculture. Washington's failure to grasp this fact shows that his political intelligence had the usual human limitations, and that his advice on public affairs should be, like that of other statesmen, subjected to critical examination.

Toward the major governmental problems of his time, nevertheless, Washington usually showed a competent liberalism, an attitude of hospitality toward changes, even fundamental ones, if they gave promise of general betterment. Largely the economic and political world he lived in was patterned after the systems of an earlier period: systems which were on the eve of fundamental modification or replacement. The economic system of his age and region was localism, the production of commodities by household industry, for sale in a nearby market; yet signs were multiplying that this system was soon to change and that commodities would more and more be produced by machinery and factory labor for sale in markets increasingly widespread and remote. The political system of his day was imperialism, the ruling of colonies by a mother country for the interest and welfare primarily of that mother country; yet many signs were evident which foretold a changed future in which colonies would assert their right and determination to be ruled primarily each for its own welfare. So far from being hostile to these signs of change and readjustment, Washington showed an open-minded hospitality toward them. The progress of industrial and commercial capitalism he facilitated by friendly tariff and financial measures. The exchange of colonial for national status he promoted with unflagging zeal, even at the price of armed violence and rebellion. His face was steadfastly set toward a better economic and political future, and he dared to experiment with new and uncertain systems, namely, industrial capitalism and republican nationalism, when the old systems seemed no longer adequate to meet the needs and desires of a changing world.

It is this quality of open-minded hospitality toward economic and political experimentation that gives to the example of Washington an immediate significance in the year 1932. By this example we are urged, not necessarily to support the systems which he supported, but rather to maintain an open-minded hospitality toward experiments for their betterment. By way of illustration, in the following brief survey and criticism of the systems which dominate us today, an attempt is made to view our world of the twentieth century in somewhat the same spirit as that in which Washington seems to have viewed his world of the eighteenth.
Largely the economic and political world of 1932 is patterned after two great systems: capitalism and nationalism. These systems have been tested by many generations. They proved measurably adequate for meeting the needs of the nineteenth century. The twentieth century, however, has subjected them to such unprecedented strains and stresses that their continuing adequacy is gravely doubted by many thoughtful persons. Their outright destruction would imply upheaval and catastrophe; their deflation and adaptation, however, need produce no such calamitous consequences.

The rational deflation of capitalism would leave almost unimpaired the great driving power of the urge to acquisitiveness, though it would transfer some of its present inordinate gains from the individual to the community. Capitalism has long displayed two conspicuous merits: a powerful stimulus to individual effort, and an enormous productivity. Alongside these, however, there have been two equally conspicuous faults: insecurity, taking the form of recurrent depressions within nations, and of tariff competitions and imperialistic wars among nations; and faulty distribution, in which selfish shrewdness rather than public service normally won disproportionately large rewards. The problem is, of course, to preserve these merits and to eliminate the faults; to reduce somewhat the competitive element and to enlarge the cooperative; to secure in the interest of the general welfare a better coordination of effort and reward, a more reliable continuity of employment, using toward these ends the unavoidable minimum of collective coercion, and preserving the maximum of individual initiative consistent with social health. The technical task of making necessary readjustments is obviously so complex and wide-reaching as to challenge, perhaps to dismay, the most competent. Certainly nothing more can be attempted here than an extremely general indication of the direction in which progress in this matter may be sought. To give at least a suggestion of something concrete and specific amid all this vagueness I shall hazard three bits of advice for the ordinary citizen: first, stop bellowing at Bolshevism and begin to study it; second, instead of merely fearing Fascism, examine carefully its advantages and limitations; third, judge our democratic-nationalistic-capitalistic system by its apparent adaptability to the needs of today and tomorrow rather than by its past achievements.

The deflation of nationalism, long overdue, seems more nearly possible and more urgently necessary today than heretofore, and the time is ripe to urge it frankly. The large share of an exaggerated nationalism in the present stalling of the world's economic machinery is now so evident that the sufferers, however jingoistic they may have been in the past, are at last somewhat disposed to listen to facts and reason. A few timely facts on which to base a more nearly sane reasoning about nationalism are the following:
The rampant nationalisms of 1914 caused the World War, one of whose malefactions is that colossal derangement of trade and finance which so greatly helped to produce the present world depression.

The haughty and alarmed nationalisms of the victors in that War, and the resentful nationalisms of the vanquished, effectively bar the establishment of any just and orderly security on which to rebuild the welfare of humanity.

National greed for exclusive economic advantage has cluttered up the world with tariff walls, thus denying major commercial benefits to all in order to secure minor gains for a few.

The dogma, so widely and devoutly believed in today, that no nation can honorably tolerate limitations on its sovereignty, is a peculiarly malignant and provocative survival of ancient tribalism, offering only disaster to the closely knit civilization of our times.

The boastful assumption of unique excellence and unquestionable righteousness for one's own nation, as commonly fostered by the schools, the press, and the politicians of nearly all countries, makes peace precarious and war perennially imminent.

At critical moments the wisdom of international statesmanship is futile and powerless in face of the fervor and the fury of narrowly nationalistic patriotism. According to the current phrase, "no government could survive" in Poland or Germany, for instance, which took a rational position toward the problem of the Polish Corridor and Danzig, or in Japan and China which viewed the vexatious Manchurian and Shanghai tangles in a judicial rather than a jingoistic manner. With a perfervid nationalism thus passing beyond rational guidance in any grave international emergency almost anywhere in the world, the safety, or even the survival, of our civilization is doubtful.

In the presence of these facts, thoughtful and courageous persons in every nation should lead a direct attack on that inflated nationalism which the twentieth century has inherited and cherished as one of its most precious prejudices. A deflated nationalism would not, of course, solve all our international problems immediately, but it seems to be an indispensable preliminary to their solution.

It is, I believe, no fantastic presumption to claim that the influence of Washington's example is in accord with criticisms and proposals such as those just given. His support of industrial capitalism and republican nationalism in the eighteenth century carries no assurance that he would approve the continuance of these systems unchanged, if they seemed no longer adequate amidst twentieth century conditions. What his example teaches is rather that a wise conservatism includes a watchful readiness to modify, or even to replace, outmoded institutions. It is highly desirable, moreover, that the mighty influence of Washington be rescued from those who are trying to exploit it wholly in the interest of reaction and a return to eighteenth century "normalcy." Patriotic celebrations in honor of national heroes, American
and other, too often take on the character of exhortations either to stand pat where we now are, or else to go back to "the good old days," even though these very heroes we are lauding were active chiefly in leading on to better days ahead. It is a perverse and dangerous misuse of the memory of our pioneer statesmen to count them as upholders of the status quo. George Washington led armed revolt against the status quo, and his leading was forward toward the new, not backward toward the old. Now is the critical moment for emphasizing this fact. While all America is celebrating the bicentennial of his birth let us send the challenge far and wide against those who misuse his name and fame as a shelter for outworn institutions and ideas. Surely Washington was of that number who courageously turned their backs upon the false securities of the past and ventured hopefully forth into the creative uncertainties of the future. The forward-looking Americans of today have an indefeasible right to claim him as their spiritual ancestor and to invoke his blessing on their constructive efforts to rescue our common country and our common world by moving courageously forward.

II. OUR NEXT PRESIDENT'S JOB IS LIKE LINCOLN'S*

Eighty years ago, in 1860, a presidential campaign was being fought for the saving of democracy and the United States of America. It elected Abraham Lincoln. The story of how he then proceeded to save his country and democracy, may throw a little light on the terrific task ahead of Franklin Roosevelt or Wendell Willkie, in steering our ship of state through the desperate storms of the war which burst upon the world just a year ago.

In Lincoln's day the United States of America was the only large-scale experiment in government by the people under republican forms anywhere in the world; a sort of oasis of democracy in a vast desert of monarchies. Its downfall had long been predicted, and at length seemed about to happen, over slavery and secession. If it actually did happen, the cause of political democracy in the modern world was probably lost, at least for several generations.

In meeting this crisis, Lincoln not only resorted to war. He, further, began the outright abolishment of an economic system that might fairly be called 100 per cent American; a system that had antedated the nation and grown up with it, contributing largely to its material prosperity. This system was the well-established practice of human slavery. Thus in the 1860's democracy was preserved, though an outworn economic system—that of plantation slave labor—was overthrown and great violence done to numerous property rights long guaranteed by the Constitution.

*This article is dated September, 1940, and was sold to *Every Week Magazine*. Permission for reprinting has been given by NEA Service, Inc., Cleveland.
Will Roosevelt, or the man elected to succeed him, find it necessary to resort to equally desperate expedients in rescuing American democracy from its ferociously aggressive totalitarian foes and rivals?

Toward answering this urgent question, it may be helpful to jot down a few points of comparison between democracy's predicament in 1860 and in 1940.

In 1860 American democracy was still relatively youthful, experimental, and untested, eyed with distrust and dislike by the European neighbors, who had long supported monarchy. Today it is our democracy which is mature — its enemies say decrepit — dating from before 1789, and its rivals which are youthful and full of pep and swagger, fascist Italy dating back only to 1922, Nazi Germany to 1933, and Bolshevik Russia to 1917; all more or less united by a common hatred of democracy, and all on the prowl against their neighbors. The chief prowler in Lincoln's time was France, under Emperor Napoleon III, who was as eager to annex Latin America as Hitler is now supposed to be; both of them putting new life into our Monroe Doctrine. Russia was then friendly to the Union, that is the North, and to the capitalist system, but not to democracy. Great Britain, more powerful in the world than she is at this moment, was favoring Southern aristocracy rather than Northern democracy.

In general, however, political and economic thinking seemed steadier in Lincoln's world than in ours. The great explosion of 1789, the French Revolution, was seventy years in the past, and the great war against Napoleon I had been pretty well liquidated since 1815. Imperialism seemed secure; nationalism was rapidly winning its way; and capitalism was hardly challenged. In contrast, our present ideology is feverishly unsettled. The great war of 1914-1918, instead of being liquidated, seems to have been only adjourned; and the great Russian explosion of 1917 had not yet ceased to echo when we were startled again by similar upheavals touched off by Mussolini and Hitler. Imperialism seems to be changing masters; nationalism is deforming itself into a paganized and war-provoking religion; and capitalism begins to look like a fat lamb among hungry wolves of totalitarianism.

Nevertheless, Lincoln's problem was in some respects tougher than today's. It was closer at hand; inside the country, instead of across a couple of oceans. It was less postponable; before Lincoln actually reached the White House, South Carolina and other states had begun to break up the Union, and down in Alabama the sentiment was emblazoned on a banner, "Resistance to Lincoln is Obedience to God." The phrase "If Lincoln is elected" had long been used somewhat as we say "If Hitler invades the Western Hemisphere."

Lincoln had plenty of advice as to what he should do to solve this terrifying problem. The New York Herald, "the most powerful organ in the country for the formation of public opinion," told him flatly to turn the presidency over to somebody else. "A grand opportunity now exists," said its editorial, "for Lincoln to avert impending
ruin, and invest his name with an immortality far more enduring than
would attach to it by his elevation to the Presidency. His withdrawal
at this time from the scene of conflict, and the surrender of his claims
to some national man who would be acceptable to both sections, would
render him the peer of Washington in patriotism. If he persists in his
present position, in the teeth of such results as his election must pro-
duce, he will totter into a dishonored grave, driven there perhaps by
the hand of an assassin, leaving behind him a memory more execrable
than that of Arnold — more despised than that of the traitor Catiline.”
Similar advice from southern newspapers was less politely phrased.
The Richmond Examiner, for instance, resented Virginia’s necessity “to
bend her haughty neck beneath the paw of the Abolition orangoutang
that skulked to Washington the other day from the wilds of Illinois.”
These gentle admonitions may remind some today of occasional remarks
about “that man in the White House” and his possible third term.

Then as now several ways of meeting the appalling problem were
open to the President. He might submit to aggression; but Lincoln
could hardly do that after condemning Buchanan’s rumored surrender
of Fort Sumter with the angry outburst, “If that is true they ought to
hang him!” Not does such submission fit very well with Roosevelt’s
remarks about quarantining aggressors and stabbings in the back.
Indeed, his attitude seems to be more like that of the fiery abolitionist
agitator, William Lloyd Garrison, who when rebuked with, “Mr.
Garrison, you are too excited — you are on fire!” replied, “I have
need to be on fire, for I have icebergs around me to melt!” The “ice-
bergs” today might be the so-called “isolationists,” who, right or wrong,
keep a good deal cooler amid all the fire and fury than the President
thinks they should be.

Debate still goes on about the wisdom of Lincoln in refusing the
middle way of meeting his problem, namely, compromise, instead of
war; and many are inclined to prefer Roosevelt’s policy, up to date,
of avoiding, or at least postponing, war while actively aiding what
seems to most of us the right side by technically neutral means. Such
would probably urge that Lincoln saved democracy the hard way,
just as the lives of many wounded Civil War soldiers were saved the hard
way, that is by amputation of their limbs, whereas today democracy may
perhaps be saved more skillfully, without the costly amputations of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which war necessarily involves.
Others would point out, however, the grave risks run by the war-
avoiding policy, lest it enable the wrong side to triumph.

The question we started with still remains unanswered. If war
comes, or even if it does not, will the President today find it necessary,
as Lincoln did, to lop off some outworn economic institution in order
to save democracy? As we look back upon plantation slavery now, it
is not hard to realize that it needed to be lopped off. But it was
probably as hard to realize that need, and possibility, in 1860, as it
is in 1940 to see just what is wrong, and curable, in our present eco-
nomic system. Is there, perhaps, some truth in the ceaseless jibing at
us by our totalitarian rivals that our so-called democracy is really a
plutocracy? That it is best suited to the exploitation of the stupid
many by the smart few? That we are actually ruled by a little group
of multi-millionaires, through their control of press, radio, public opin-
ion, jobs, the courts, and the police? That the blessings of democracy
come chiefly to a tiny fraction of the population, who allow to the
exploited masses only the crumbs of prosperity, and who have now
stalled their own economic machine by depriving these masses of ade-
quate purchasing power?

Whoever will save democracy today must do something about
questions like these, in addition to checking the depredations of such
obstreperous fellows as Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. Whoever can
solve all these tremendous problems, or even put them on the way
toward a rational solution, will deserve a place beside Lincoln in the
esteem of his fellow citizens, and share with him the splendid title
of "savior of democracy."

III. DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE*

When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for
the peoples to dissolve the political bounds which have separated them
from one another, and to unite the Powers of the earth in the coöpera-
tive and controlling organization to whose benefits the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the intelligence
of mankind requires that they declare the causes which impel them
to this cooperation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happy-
ness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed;
that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will
dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for
light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown,
that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable,
than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed. But when a long train of injustices and calamities, show-
ing invariably the Government's inadequacy, evinces its helplessness
to save them from absolute Ruin, it is their right, it is their duty, to

*This article is undated. There is no evidence that it was published.

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throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Such has been the patient sufferance of the Nations of the world today; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present system of international relations is a history of repeated aggressions and calamities, all having in natural sequence the establishment of a devastating chaos among the nations. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

The present system of international relations has now arrived at the following situation:

In Europe, war seems so close at hand that almost frantic efforts are being made merely to postpone it.

In the Far East, Japan is relying on the imminence of a European war as a safeguard against interference in her ruthless empire building.

All signs point to the early outbreak of a vast international struggle, which few desire but nobody knows how to avert.

The collapse of several illusory supports of international peace, such as the Versailles Treaty, has greatly alarmed the peoples of the world. A terror of uncertainty envelops them like a noxious fog, and they are ready to be led into desperate undertakings, seeking escape from their hideous insecurity and suffering.

Half the world is bent on seizing the possessions of the other half. Italy, Germany, and Japan are educating their youth into mad dogs of patriotism. Great Britain, France, and the United States are preparing to defend, but never to share, their more or less ill-gotten territories and advantages.

Millions in many countries are so near the starvation line, and so far below the comfort line, that the immediate prospect of jobs and good wages, created even by war, entices them like a mirage in a thirsty desert.

War, as the ultimate means for deciding the questions we really care about, has never been honestly abandoned or adequately replaced. It is the logical climax of that ruthless and competitive smartness which nations commonly practice toward each other in lieu of generosity or even of fair dealing.

In earlier stages of this calamitous situation, We, the peace-loving common people of the world, have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms. Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated evasions, postponements, and futilities. A system whose character is thus marked by every act which may reveal inadequacy, is evidently unfit to guide the destiny of enlightened peoples.

Nor have we, in each nation, been wanting in our attentions to our foreign brethren. We have joined them, from time to time, in
attempting legislation to promote a common jurisdiction over us all. We have reminded each other of the circumstances of our common humanity and interests. We have appealed to each other’s native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured each other by the ties of our common kindred, to disavow these narrow nationalisms, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. Yet our traditions and our rulers have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must therefore acquiesce in the necessity to denounce these traditions and these rulers, and hold them as the enemies of Mankind and of Peace.

We, therefore, the peace-loving common people of the world, uniting in earnest consideration of our present emergencies, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, in the Name and by the Authority of all free people everywhere, solemnly publish and declare that these widely scattered peoples are, and of right ought to be, closely united in coöperative and interdependent states; that they are absolved from all exclusive and unlimited allegiance to the states of their present citizenship, and that all such political connection between them and their several states is, and ought to be, totally dissolved, and that, as a close union of coöperative and interdependent states, they have full Power to outlaw War, guarantee Peace, regulate Alliances, unfetter Commerce, and do all other necessary Acts and Things which the several independent and competitive states have shown themselves unable to do for the essential welfare of mankind.

And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.

IV. EXCERPTS FROM AN UNFINISHED PAPER FOR MEMORIAL DAY, 1941*

Today the leading nations of the world are busy again, preparing for the long continuance of Memorial Days; and a vast number of citizens of the United States are in a state of alarm and honest bewilderment as to whether we too should now plunge into the slaughter. Most of us may agree that the whole thing is a tragic and stupid mess.

We are all buried under an avalanche of urgent questions that nobody can answer competently. Should we be isolationists? Should we be interventionists? Or is there some, better, middle ground? Is Hitler, at the moment, invincible? Must he, nevertheless, be crushed?

*This paper contains parts of several speeches, letters to Editors, and other prepared articles. It seems to be a summary of his views prepared by Dr. Lawrence in the spring of 1941, and is, therefore, of particular interest.
Or is there some other way toward making the war less ruinous to us and our hopes? ... If our earlier views about avoiding all war now seem to us unrealistic and futile, does this show that we are being corrupted by propaganda, or rather that we are being enlightened by events?

Neatly formulated answers to such questions do not end our painful doubtings. On the contrary, they often arouse our suspicions. Who are the people who advise us to be isolationists? Lovers of America, no doubt, and haters of war; but the same advice comes to us from the lovers of Hitler and from those who wish to keep America defenseless. Who tell us to be interventionists? Those who seek to end the existing international anarchy, and those who doubt that we can long escape the anti-democratic domination of a victorious Hitler; but we get very similar advice from our own munitioneers and our new imperialists, charmed by the vision of an American super-empire dominant over all other empires.

More than we realize too, our thinking today is filled with fury and short-sightedness. This is partly because war is necessarily furious; partly also because nobody possesses adequate fore-sightedness. Our best hope, it seems to me lies in trying to be as reasonable and as realistic as we can, and in trying to look ahead, beyond the ending of the war. In doing this, no doubt we shall often be misunderstood ... but this should neither surprise nor dismay us. We shall merely be doing our bit, or at least trying to, toward rescuing the war from complete futility.

I find that my own views have changed during the past year about the part that the United States should play in the present war. It jolted me a little to read the other day the following paragraphs which I had written and published in April of 1940: I quote:

"Two rational but sharply conflicting views as to what the United States should do toward ending the present war, seem to be gaining wide support. Stating them here might help to clarify somebody's thinking. One view may be stated somewhat as follows: 'Narrowly considered, our interests are with the Allies, in that both they and we are the privileged possessors of the best parts of the earth; we enjoy a common rulership by the benevolent bourgeoisie; and we are comparatively loyal to the status quo in economics, politics, morality and religion. Therefore, we should heartily praise the Allies and as heartily damn Germany till the necessity for defeating Dictatorship and Naziism shall seem to most of us a sufficient reason for our entrance into the military struggle.' The other view runs thus. 'More broadly considered, the welfare of all peoples, including ourselves and the present belligerents on both sides, would probably be best served by a peace without victory, a strategic retreat of the possessors, and a pacification of all parties concerned, by exhaustion and federation."

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Therefore, we in the United States would better resist the rising tide of propaganda for scapegoatism, and hold out for fundamental reconciliations, economic, political, moral and religious. Certainly not before such reconciliations are clearly attainable, should we consider any military participation in the war."

It was the last sentence especially in this year-old opinion that jolted me most: "no military participation in the war" by us till fundamental reconciliations are "clearly attainable." I have come to doubt gravely the possibility of "fundamental reconciliations" with a victorious Hitler, and also to doubt the substantial checking of these victories until the full strength of the United States is thrown into the war. If that full strength can be actually mobilized only by our declaring, and wholeheartedly entering, war, then, I think, we should no longer stop short of war; and I mean "shooting war," and the sooner the better.

To such a stand as this, the isolationists and many of the undecided will immediately object that we would thus be sticking out our neck in a matter that was fundamentally none of our business . . . . The Western Hemisphere is inevitably part of Hitler's business. Unless he rules it, his basic principle of Nazi domination breaks down. The Germans cannot really be supermen if half the world escapes them and continues to defy them. Hitler's way of life contradicts ours so fundamentally that reconciliation seems impossible . . . .

At about this point we would do well, I think, to consider a myth that is gaining wide credence nowadays, a defeatist myth, carefully nourished by the Nazis; the myth of Hitler's invincibility. Is Hitler really invincible? The Nazi propagandists would like to have us think so. He certainly did get the jump on his antagonists, and he is still going strong. But history is crowded with conquerors that were considered invincible for a long time. By superiority of one sort or another they won brilliant victories, and, lo! they were labelled "invincible." Gusty popular alarm created a myth about them, a defeatist myth, that resistance against them was futile . . . . History strongly suggests that, soon or late, the myth of invincibility explodes in the face of its promoters.

There is another myth that still awaits exploding; the myth that international, military war is permanently inevitable; as permanently inevitable as a lot of other pests of mankind were long supposed to be, such as witchcraft, human slavery, and a long list of now curable diseases and preventable plagues. Though the explosion of this war myth is by no means "just around the corner," the present moment seems to me very opportune for setting a bomb under it. The metaphorical bomb that I have in mind for this useful task of destroying, or at least damaging, the war myth, is the mobilization and purposeful direction of hate — H A T E! Hate directed, not against the boys on the other side of No Man's Land, whom our boys are required to
shoot; but against the real enemy, the causes of war: political causes, economic causes, emotional causes, traditional causes, stupidity causes. If there is some truth in the view that mankind is on the long way up from ferocity to fraternity, we should not fail to utilize his present outbursts of ferocity in a tremendous effort to destroy its causes, the basic causes of war.

In this present war we should make our hate more intelligent! Wars cannot go on without hate. The trouble with most wars has been that the hate was misdirected — was aimed at the wrong things . . . . Needed today is a hatred against the people and the things that made today's war inevitable. Till Hitler and his supporters are stopped, doubtless our fury must be directed chiefly at the Germans; but long before they are crushed into helplessness, it will be time to channel our hate against those causes of war also that happen to come from our side. . . . The permanent enemy of us all is not frenzied Germany so much as it is the greedy or careless willingness of many of us everywhere to make gain out of exploitation, cruelty, and injustice practiced against human beings who happen to be outside our national, racial, or religious group, or our economic class. Now, when we are so deeply stirred by war, right now, is the moment to direct our war hatreds against war itself, and against the narrow nationalisms, the covetous imperialisms, the bigoted racialisms, and the ruthless business competitions, which inevitably invite war all the time. In our present angry mood, we are ripe for demanding of all governments, including our own, any necessary changes and sacrifices toward ending anarchy among nations and poverty within them. This is not a demand for any sudden change in human nature. It is a demand, rather, for certain organizations and restraints which human nature so obviously needs, and which angry common sense among the democracies may now at last insist on applying. Stupid hatred may ruin us all, but intelligent hatred, against the real causes of war, instead of against scapegoats, may save us all from the cursed continuance of the war tradition . . . .

In considering this proposal, or any other, looking toward the gradual or speedy elimination of international, military warfare, we should never forget that Hitler and his followers have no desire to eliminate such warfare. They consider it morally healthful; a bracing tonic; an essential part of their so-called "new order;" the crest of their "wave of the future." Hence to find ourselves fighting a second "war to end war," is by no means absurd. It is a clumsy way; a stupid way; a way that could have been avoided, if the victors of 1918 had been less short-sighted and less greedy; but right now it is the only way left to us. Unless Hitler is stopped and a totalitarian triumph prevented, international, military war will be given a new lease on life; a new respectability; and the prospect of a more peaceful and righteous world order must be postponed for generations, perhaps for centuries. Democracy has bungled badly enough the task of establish-
ing a regime of peace and justice, but it has at least tried. Totalitarianism has no intention of trying.

. . . . . The liberty which we will fight to save from the tyranny of totalitarianism is not the liberty of every citizen to hunt in vain for a job, nor to be undeservedly penniless in his old age. Nor are we all anxious to preserve the liberty of the most aggressive and most ruthless few to gain the exclusive ownership of vast wealth. The liberty we will fight to preserve, or perhaps to attain, includes a real and stabilized opportunity for almost everybody to live productively and with a decent minimum of coercive restraint on each individual's desire to pursue truth and happiness according to his own best judgment.

In viewing the monstrous confusions in the world today, it is hard to know whether to fear the impending darkness or to welcome the approaching dawn. Too little have we considered the unmeasured possibilities for human betterment that lie just below the surface of our present hideous war. If the promise of democracy had not been so outrageously disappointed by its unworthy supporters, the world need not have been menaced by totalitarianism. Probably it is not yet too late for the promise of democracy to be fulfilled, if we are at last awake to the opportunity that comes only in a desperate emergency. Human institutions, like molten steel, can be poured into new molds only at terrific temperatures. Today these temperatures throughout the world are melting down our institutions in the blast furnace of total war. Whether we like it or not, these old institutions must quickly be poured into new molds—worse molds, perhaps; better molds, possibly. The totalitarians have a brand new set of molds, designed to hold humanity in a rigid framework of servile submission, sterile regimentation, and ruthless intolerance. Contradicting all these horrors, the democratic opportunity is to provide different molds, suited to produce institutions for guiding human beings toward citizen liberty, creative individualism, and tolerant cooperativeness.

But how does all this affect you and me, and how may we, each of us, play a worthy part in the new scenes? Does the war affect you as a kind of "black-out" of hope, and a paralysis of purposeful effort? In this scene your part is not to drift along with others toward despair or frantic fury. It is, rather, to react vigorously against both these, for your own sake and for the common good. If you have any reserve power—any religious faith, any philosophic calm, any stub­born courage—use it now. Civilization is not collapsing. It is being poured into new molds, at terrific temperatures. Democracy is not finished. It has grown fat, and a bit soft; probably it needed the sharp challenge of its fanatical rivals; but its services to civilization are still indispensable.

. . . . . I urge you not to take a defeatist or fatalistic attitude toward your present prospects. Such an attitude would not only lessen
your chance to set the times right; it would also destroy your opportunity to achieve a nobility of spirit, without which life itself is of very doubtful value. Nor do you need to believe that the present evil times cannot be set right. The accumulated forces of today are supremely potent, for good no less than for evil. In a broad sense, mankind has triumphed over Nature, and may now utilize, as never before, her vast resources for the betterment of human life. There remains only the difficult, but not impossible, task of preventing a fatally destructive misuse of these powers — by war, by greed, by stupidity. The successful performance of that task is not known to be beyond the reach of your generation — to make a beginning at least. I exhort you, therefore, to give yourselves the benefit of a very reasonable doubt, and to attempt that task hopefully.
THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

By CHARLES SEYMOUR, Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D.
President of Yale University

With Introduction by FRANK E. MORRIS, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy, Connecticut College

DR. MORRIS:

Once in awhile a man or a woman comes into a community and makes a mark there that is indelible. Such an individual is not necessarily a great thinker or a brilliant mind. Creative thought, brilliance of mind,—these may be present to a greater or lesser degree; but by themselves they are not the reason for the deep and lasting impression made on friends and associates. The real reason seems to be a quality or group of qualities characterizing a person rather than a mind. There is a certain quiet sincerity, indicating growth beyond the level of self-seeking and competitive ambition; a genuineness that comes from years of loyalty to higher than personal aims; a generosity of interest in ideas and in other people.

These qualities—sincerity, genuineness, generosity of interest—were, for those of us fortunate enough to know him, outstanding traits in Dr. Henry Wells Lawrence, Professor of History and Government at Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. And they are the reasons why his personal memory will live as long as we live.

Dr. Lawrence was a lovable person, but he was also the embodiment of an ideal, the ideal of the liberal free mind, the mind independent and courageous enough to acknowledge no master save truth. It is this ideal which we wish to honor in the Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectureship, having its auspicious beginning this evening. It is the liberal ideal as we who knew him know was represented in high degree by Henry Lawrence. Time will inexorably bring it about that Dr. Lawrence, the person and friend, will be forgotten; but that which he stood for, that which he served, will not be forgotten. And I believe that his highest wish would be that we should do just what we are doing: establishing a lectureship with the long-time purpose of holding high the ideal he himself followed,—the ideal of liberalism.

It is particularly gratifying that our first lecturer in the series should be on every count precisely suitable to this occasion. Dr. Seymour, President of Yale University, was a friend of Dr. Lawrence and a fellow-student. He is himself an eminent exponent of the liberal ideal. He is a distinguished scholar in the field of history. He was a member of the peace conference at Paris after the first world war. He is at present a member of the Connecticut post-war planning commission. Among some of his more important books bearing on the topic of tonight's lecture are: "The Diplomatic Background of the War," "Woodrow Wilson and the World War," "The Intimate Papers"
of Colonel House,” and “American Diplomacy During the World War.”

The topic of the lecture this evening is “The Problem of International Security: Historical Backgrounds.” It is an honor and a pleasure to present to you our first Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial lecturer, Dr. Charles Seymour.

PRESIDENT SEYMOUR:

It is with a deep sense of privilege that this opportunity comes to me of delivering the first of the lectures in tribute to the memory of Henry Lawrence. I could only wish that it might serve adequately to express the gratitude which those of us feel who worked with him and also played a little in student days in Paris and New Haven thirty-five years ago. Lawrence was slightly my senior and to him I am deeply indebted, not merely for the personal kindness that means so much in the first discouraging stage of graduate study but for the inspiration of his own devotion to serious scholarship and the example he set of the sacrifices necessary to achieve it. I am equally mindful of the rare geniality that informed his scholarship. His dissertation was concerned with institutional history but he never forgot that institutions are merely an expression of human relationships. The interest he took in the past was concerned with actual human beings worthy of personal understanding and not with the dead puppets which some historians cause to dance suspended from arid strings. It was inevitable that, as he wrote history in his later years, his interpretation should have been increasingly in terms of men and women.

It was equally inevitable that he should have intensified his earlier conviction that the past is important to us because of its relevance to the present, and that he became constantly more interested in the application of the lessons of history to contemporary politics, whether in the local, the national, or the international field. The more history he learned the more clearly he understood and brought before his listeners the necessity of international coöperation. We used to talk of the relationship of the historian to contemporary events, and the underlying thought of what I have to say tonight springs from the common conviction we held that public opinion must be provided with an historical foundation so solid that its conclusions will rest not upon emotion but upon knowledge. Indeed my chief interest is to illustrate, by examples from our recent history, what Lawrence once called the high cost of popular ignorance.

I am assuming, as he used to assume, that the nation must evolve a clear policy based primarily upon purely American interests but evolving plans for American security through international coöperation. My personal experience twenty-five years ago, as well as more recent contacts with various boards and committees has left me without illusion as to the pitfalls of post-war planning. There is not merely much futility but even more of danger in the drafting of political blue
prints which set forth a system that is perfect in every respect, save that it demands too much of human nature. But there is equal peril, or greater, in refusing the prerogative given to man, as well as to squirrels—that of looking ahead and preparing for what we may reasonably assume lies before us. If a man cannot live wisely without a basic philosophy, a nation cannot live safely without a studied policy. That policy must be formulated in clear terms and its implications must be analyzed. Above all it must be founded upon fact and not upon theory.

The interest of America, as a nation, in foreign affairs is very recent; inevitably our understanding of the factors that determine world relationships has been superficial. For generations we could afford the luxury of temperamental isolation from events that went on overseas. During the nineteenth century we were freed from all serious preoccupation with foreign affairs, largely by reason of the dominance of the British Fleet in the Atlantic and by a continued and reasonably stable balance of power on the continent of Europe. Even so late as 1914 we watched the tragedy of Sarajevo and the disastrous bankruptcy of the European system much as we would regard scenes in a moving-picture show.

We did not clearly understand that our vital interests were closely menaced by the danger of German control of Europe. Our intervention in the first world war, as we were careful to state, was not based upon our interest; we entered the war rather upon the theory of an idealistic crusade for the rights of free people everywhere, or as a defense against the attack upon our doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Momentarily the nation was persuaded by Wilsonian idealism. But there was little appreciation of the fact that conditions of national security as well as of industrial welfare imposed upon us the necessity of participating actively in world politics and therefore of knowing something about world affairs.

When Wilsonian theories evaporated in the early twenties, and the process was rapid, there developed inevitably a sense of self-congratulation that we were spared the perils and the intrigues characteristic of European diplomacy, not untinged by a consciousness of self-righteousness that we were not as those others are; it was accompanied by a determination that having been once bitten in the World War we would henceforth be doubly shy. We could not even recognize that there was such an international organization as the League of Nations. We were able eagerly to embrace the Kellogg Pact because it was purely negative and because it embodied what was becoming a popular principle of inaction: peace without responsibility. We really believed when we passed the Neutrality Act of 1935 that by emulating the turtle we could keep safe and pure. If war came we would have nothing to do with the dirty business. Our sins were only those of omission; it is true; but we forgot that in the general confession sins of omission are rated as more important than sins of commission. "We
have left undone those things which we ought to have done," comes first.

Our policy during these years was determined by emotion rather than by the interest of the nation. We trusted to intuition, in which some western senators are strong, and we called it wisdom. There were a few instructed and intelligent men, some of them influencing our foreign relations. But as a whole the nation was ignorant and our national policy was inevitably naive. There is a saying that what you don't know won't hurt you. Last spring in a brilliant article Professor Carl Becker pointed out that in those years between wars, "what we didn't know hurt us a lot."

It is a pleasant American custom to contrast favorably our own innocence of international affairs with the experience of the Europeans and to insist upon it as a virtue. Indeed histories have been written of the last Peace Conference around the issue of our simple honesty contending against the wily intrigues of our European associates in the war. We forget that our Lord, while he urges us to be harmless as doves, also adjures us to be wise as serpents. Naïveté can frequently do a lot of harm. And it is a fact that our ignorance of the realities of international relations and our innocent expectations of that Peace Conference gave rise to false hopes the crushing of which brought on a reaction of disillusionment. We committed an initial mistake, which should never be repeated, of underrating the difficulties of peace-making.

Peace does not come with an armistice or even with the signing of a document called a peace treaty. Peace implies a reconciliation of enemies. But in a gathering held on the morrow of a bitter four years struggle like the last war, there was little of the spirit of conciliation, and an assembly of archangels and martyrs would have been impotent to create it. It was hopeless to expect that from that atmosphere of belligerency could proceed decisions that did not take account of the bitter suffering and losses of the victors who were able to impose the terms and would certainly make the defeated pay. In every peace treaty lie the germs of the next war which can only be eliminated by the following generation. Salter quotes the German diplomatist who inverted the old Latin motto "In time of Peace prepare for War" into "Si vis bellum para pacem," — if you want a war call a peace conference.

The difficulties of the peacemakers were intensified by the responsibility thrown upon them of bringing some sort of immediate order out of world chaos. They were expected to produce a plan of permanent peace satisfactory to 30 odd allied states, five enemy states, to say nothing of the neutrals, at the same time that they acted as an executive commission settling the turbulent current affairs of the entire world. At the moment the great war ended a dozen minor wars broke out — Poles and Czechs, Roumanians and Serbs, Austrians and Slovenes, Hungarians and Slovaks. All these wars had to be liquidated. Coal
mines and factories and railroads had to be reestablished. Food and fuel distributed. The war was over but no peace was yet at hand. The same men sat in the morning as the Supreme War Council and in the afternoon as the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

In our simplicity we supposed that these men who were to determine the fate of the world were all-powerful, and as we hoped, for good. — And the illusion was fostered as you watched them in council, those men who had led their peoples to triumph. Clemenceau, the apostle of victory in the darkest days of 1917, presiding in his squat black cut-away and square boots and eternally grey-gloved hands — dry and cruel in his rapier-like wit — it took the recipient seconds to realize he was wounded, so sharp was the blade. Wilson, poised and reassured by the eager devotion of the smaller nationalities seeking awards, with the proper air of a popular professor. Lloyd George and Balfour — at opposite poles of manner — the first on the edge of his chair, enthusiastic and mercurial — incredibly ignorant of continental history and geography but intuitively wise in his judgment of political issues, whether domestic or international; Balfour, with his head on the back of the chair and several yards of leg stretched out in front, apparently indifferent, but with a background of historical and philosophical wisdom that made him the most intellectually distinguished man of the conference; the Italians, Orlando jovial, generous and ineffective; Sonnino with his hook-nose and jutting jaw, avid in his nationalism and generally disliked; the two Japs (we assumed they were always the same two), their eyes on their maps — replying to questions only with a monosyllabic "Yes." As you looked at these men you felt here is the group that democracy has entrusted with the mandate of assuring the new world. "They have the power."

But as debates proceeded it became clear that these men were by no means all-powerful. Had they been as wise as Nestor they were still responsible to the people back home and the wisdom of their decision was still controlled by the popular endorsement. It was the paradox of this war waged in the cause of democracy that the very triumph of democracy gave to a nationalistic public opinion a power to determine policies that sowed the seeds of another war, to save democracy once again. When Lloyd George preached moderation the Northcliffe Press barked at his heels; Clemenceau, to save his premiership was forced to insert the guilt clause in the treaty; Orlando was ousted when he came to Rome without Fiume; the disavowal of Wilson by the Senate was ratified in the election of 1920.

It is not surprising that the peacemakers in view of their difficulties should have produced treaties which were far from perfect and which evoked a storm of critical discontent. The nature of our criticism indicated the wealth of our ignorance. Nobody bothered to read the treaties, but they complained just as much. As Lloyd George remarked, "The Versailles Treaty is the most abused and the least perused of historical documents." People complained loudly of the Balkanization
of Central Europe by the Peace Conference when in fact the Hapsburg
Monarchy had dissolved into the successor nations three months before
the Peace Conference met. We attacked the compromises of the treaties,
without realizing that except for compromises there would have been
no treaties at all. But we lacked the understanding to perceive the
larger weaknesses of the Conference, in part at least imposed by
impatient public opinion: the over-ambitious attempt to constitute a
comprehensive settlement into which all the problems of the world
should be fitted; the relative under-emphasis upon economic as com­
pared with political aspects of peace; the over-emphasis upon the
prevention of war through coercion rather than the removal of the
causes of war; the failure to continue the organs of inter-allied coöp­
eration which were scrapped for new and untried institutions.

Even so, the last Peace Conference did provide the basis for a
long-lasting peace, if the successors to the Conference, statesmen and
people, had possessed the wisdom and the courage to capitalize the
opportunity. The world demanded a period of security and the settle­
ment offered two methods of security. The one was experimental,
finding expression in Wilson's policy of collective security in the League
of Nations. It was based upon the assumption that if the peaceful
powers of the world were perpetually mobilized in a political sense
against any possible aggressor no single state would dare attack the
system. A second method of security was also established, not as
idealistic, but effective enough so long as the Powers cared to main­
tain it. This type of security was based upon the strategic control of
geographical factors, an expression of what today we should call geo­
politics. Clemenceau insisted that the Rhinelands on Germany's western
flank be perpetually disarmed and that a strong Czechoslovak state
control the bastion of Bohemia, a solid bulwark against German
aggression in southeast Europe. While this situation lasted it was
impossible for even a rearmed Germany to take the offensive.

It is needless to rehearse here the course of events that led to the
failure of European security. The League has been criticized because
it lacked teeth. But the failure lay deeper — in the reluctance of the
member states actually to carry out the principles of coercion to which
they had subscribed on paper, a reluctance made clear by British refusal
to reinforce the Covenant by the more specific undertaking, drafted in
the Protocol, to take action to restrain any nation guilty of aggression.
So much was clear long before the League failed in its restraint of
Japan in Manchukuo, or Italy in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the cardinal
aspect of the League, as generally understood, was its emphasis upon
the prevention of war to the neglect of the positive policy of promoting
the interests of the member states, by joint action or compromise. The
League never developed the sense of a common responsibility, which
is the essential basis of any institution and without which any inter­
national organization will lack reality.
This divorce between the theory of the League, as the instrument of the world community, and the actual fact of Geneva existing as a battle ground of national conflict and a mirror of continental anarchy, was bound to prove fatal. Frank Simonds emphasized it in the early thirties. “The League,” he wrote, “can have no power other than that which may be delegated to it by member nations. But no nation has yet consented to any delegation of power. The United States refused to join because of the nightmare of the superstate. The British Parliament rejected the Protocol because of fear that it might put a foreign mortgage upon its fleet and army. France places its right to security and Germany its claim to revision, above all present or prospective League authority.

“As the Covenant of Europe dissolved into quarreling coalitions the League of Nations has degenerated into irreconciliable groups of countries. Today statesmen of all countries go to Geneva to impose national views. And their publics watch them from afar, prepared to dismiss them if they consent to any modification or surrender.”

It is worth noting, however, that despite the League’s failure, already manifest in the early 30’s, Europe still possessed a strategic security which was sufficient to preserve the peace. It failed for the same reason as collective security—the unwillingness of the powers to assume responsibility for decisive action. The great test came in 1936. The League had ceased to count, but the Rhinelands were still disarmed and the Czechs controlled their frontiers, vitally significant in the strategic sense. Encouraged by the Japanese example and the Italians, Hitler threw down the gage. He entered the Rhinelands in force. The time that Clemenceau had foreseen arrived and his gloomy prophecy was fulfilled. British and French refused to take action and within a few weeks the Germans began to build the Siegfried Line. The collapse of European security followed logically and rapidly. Protected upon his western flank, Hitler could now afford to embark upon the annexation of Austria and a year later launch the attack upon Czechoslovakia. Munich awarded him control of the Bohemian bastion. European security had disappeared. He was free to dictate terms and if they were at last refused, to give the signal for another World War.

In this collapse of the European system of security we Americans carry a responsibility which, in our criticisms of the European states, we sometimes forget. How far events might have been different if we had joined the League no man can safely assert. But our abstention from the League was merely a symptom of our whole irresponsible attitude toward international problems during the entire period between the wars. We wanted peace, but we would pay no price, run no risk, to achieve it. Because we asked nothing of the rest of the world we regarded the promotion of national interest by others as a crime. We felt we had made our contribution to peace simply by ourselves abstaining from a disturbance of the peace. This was foolish. And I remem-
ber the historian, Lord Acton, saying: "The wages of sin are payable in another world; the wages of folly are payable down here below."

The culmination of our naivety was achieved in our endorsement of the appeasement policy of Britain and France by the passing of the Neutrality Acts. We thereby announced to them that if they dared to oppose Hitler they would get no help from us; we announced to the people of the world that they could be sure that we would stand aside from any conflict, no matter what its implications; that we would even surrender our traditional claims to the freedom of the seas in defense of which we had previously fought both British and Germans; we also informed Hitler that so far as we were concerned he might proceed on any course he chose without fear of the consequences. We faced the awful results in 1940 when it seemed as though the last bulwark between us and a German-ruled Europe had fallen.

Our folly was the result of our ignorance and the time has come when we, as a nation, must learn the facts of international affairs and learn how to understand them. Back in 1907 Theodore Roosevelt insisted: "We have no choice, we people of the United States, as to whether we shall play a great part in the affairs of the world. That has been determined for us, by fate, by the march of events. We have to play that part. All that we can determine is whether we play it well or ill." If we are to play it well we must learn the rules of the game and the facts which shall determine our action.

Certain of these facts emerge from the history of recent years. Clearly circumstances not of a temporary sort, have developed, which compel us to cooperate actively with the other peace-loving nations. This is not a revolution. It is an evolution resulting from changing conditions of which we rather stupidly became aware at a late date, but which are now and will remain compelling. Our founding fathers sought to insulate us from the European system, but they realized more clearly than some of their successors that the hope might not be realized. Indeed, in the days of Napoleon and the Holy Alliance, such statesmen as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams saw protection from that system only in a close working alliance with the British. Today and henceforth we cannot afford to disregard Europe; our tardy realization of the danger of its control by an aggressive power has already cost the greatest price in blood and treasure of our history. There can be no more Neutrality Acts. We must participate with equal activity in the peaceful organization of the Far East.

Our policy of active participation in world affairs depends upon the close cooperation of the great powers: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and because of her moral significance, China. Actually at the moment, we, the British, and the Soviet Union hold the key to the general security problem. Recognizing that there are many points at which our own interests and those of the British will conflict, we must proceed to isolate these issues and eliminate every possible cause of friction with them. There is no single American
interest so important as the general interest of close collaboration with the British Commonwealth of nations. Any break would be disastrous.

It is equally vital that in concert with the British we develop policies that will assure the friendship and cooperation of Soviet Russia. We must study the wellsprings of Soviet foreign policy so as to understand them and present our own policies in a light that will evoke from Russia a favorable response. This does not mean that we shall yield our independent point of view as to steps to be taken, in the restoration of Europe and the maintenance of her peace. It does recognize as a fact the indisputable strength of Russia and her immediate interest in various European problems which for us are distant, and important chiefly as factors likely to affect world peace.

France and China cannot be excluded from the group of controlling powers. Our own interests are served by the revival of French political strength so that it may be comparable with the cultural position she occupies among the civilized nations. The military potential of China is doubtless questionable; her history, her size, and the aspirations of her leaders compel her recognition.

Today wars arise, directly or indirectly, from clashes among the great powers; the important problem is to find ways of reconciling the great powers to peace with each other and to cooperation in furthering the interests of all nations, small and large. Upon such cooperation must be founded whatever international organization finally results from the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The history of the League of Nations indicates conclusively that the sincere and intimate cooperative efforts of the great powers are basic to success.

There is a further conclusion to be drawn from the history of the past twenty-five years, which is closely relevant to our problem of security. We Americans must learn to escape the untutored emotionalism which characterized the naiveté of our attitude at the close of the last war. We must beware, on the one hand, the excess of optimistic idealism that suggests that if only the proper formula of international organization can be agreed upon, a lasting peace will thereby be secured; we must also beware the blind cynicism of the unregenerate nationalist who insists that safety lies only in regarding every alien state as an inevitable enemy—each for himself and the devil take the hindmost. Both attitudes are unrealistic. We cannot expect suddenly to achieve perfection. The last Peace Settlement was wrecked in this country because of Perfectionists on the one hand and Isolationists on the other. We cannot afford to repeat the disaster. It is worth always remembering the words of Salvador de Madariaga: "Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk in the right direction but we must walk step by step. Our tasks are: to define what is desirable; to define what is possible . . . ; to carry out what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable."