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Counterinsurgency *Redux*? Dutch Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan 2006-2010

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An Honors Thesis Presented to the
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Abstract:

This thesis examines the complex, interdisciplinary nature of counterinsurgency in the 21st century by assessing the whole-of-government, population-centric approach that the Dutch Armed Forces and Government took to combat the Taliban in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010. The Dutch approach resulted in increased security, as well as increased political and economic capacity in the three districts of Uruzgan where they focused their efforts. By the end of Task Force Uruzgan, the Government of Afghanistan had increased its majority control from 0 percent of the population to approximately 60 percent, and the Afghan National Security Forces were in a better position to combat the Taliban after the Dutch withdrew from the province. Overall, the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency made a significant positive impact on the security structure in Uruzgan.

Acknowledgements

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To my parents: thank you for all of the support over the years. You have given me every opportunity in the world and have allowed me to chase my dreams and passions. Thanks for putting up with all of the various running injuries, and especially for listening to my impromptu lectures. I love you both.

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Common Acronyms

3D – Refers to the three tenets of Dutch counterinsurgency (defense, development, diplomacy).

ANA – Afghan National Army

ANP – Afghan National Police

ANSF – Afghan National Security Force(s)

IDEA – Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force(s)

GoA – Government of Afghanistan

TFU – Task Force Uruzgan

Section One: Introduction, Theories, and Background Information

Chapter 1: Introduction

The terrorist attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001 set in motion a series of events that would lead to the “War on Terror” and American-led invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban government that had been supporting al-Qaeda. Thirteen years, billions of dollars, and thousands of lost lives later, the United States military is just now withdrawing from a conflict that will most likely be seen in the years to come as a failure. It is important to note, though, that while the overall mission in Afghanistan may be looked at as unsuccessful, there have been pockets of successful counterinsurgency. These lessons, the result of over a decade of sacrifice, should not be forgotten, as future conflicts will invariably involve non-state challengers to fragile and failing states.

Karl Eikenberry, who was the Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011, notes that, according to the current American counterinsurgency doctrine, success could be achieved if forces focused on protecting the population, increasing government legitimacy, and aligning American strategies with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. To these ends, Eikenberry argues, “COIN failed in Afghanistan.”¹ The Dutch experience in Afghanistan, therefore, comes as a surprise. Looking beyond Afghanistan, their localized success eclipses that of most counterinsurgency campaigns. According to the study published by the RAND Corporation *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, of the 71 counterinsurgency campaigns that were completed between the end of World War II and 2010, only 29 can be considered victories for the counterinsurgency forces.² This adds analytical importance to the strategies and tactics employed in Uruzgan, as they buck the trend of most counterinsurgency campaigns.

Of the limited literature there is on successful counterinsurgency operations, some case studies have situational factors that make generalizations difficult. The best example of this is the Malayan Emergency, often considered a shining example of counterinsurgency done right. John Nagl, author of the book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, uses the British experience in Malaya as one his two cases, the other being the American experience in Vietnam, and examines the success achieved by the British in combating the Communist insurgency.³ Sergio Miller describes the Emergency as a situation where the circumstances were unique, where “[t]he advantages were almost all on the side of the authorities: British-Malay relations were harmonious; governance was good; the judicial system was fair; the police were loyal and competent; and the [Malay] Federation was excited at the prospect of independence.”⁴ There are certainly lessons to be learned from the Malayan Emergency, such as those found by Nagl, “but Malaya as the exemplar for modern counter-insurgency is a dead letter. ... The unique conditions

¹ Karl Eikenberry. "The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs*. (2013): 61.

² Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan. Paul, Christopher. *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013.

³ John Nagl. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005).

⁴ Sergio Miller. "Malaya - the Myth of Hearts and Minds." *Small Wars Journal*. (2012) n.pag.

of the Malayan Emergency are unlikely to be repeated.”⁵ Other case studies that are often examined, for the reasons why they failed or succeeded, include Western responses to colonial uprisings and communist insurrections during the 20th century. Moving forward, scholars will look to the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan for lessons.

Within Afghanistan, the military and government personnel of Denmark have experienced a level of success above and beyond the national norm while operating in Uruzgan province. In Uruzgan, the Dutch implemented an approach to counterinsurgency that focused on providing security to the population and building the political and economic infrastructure that would support development for the Uruzgani people. This population-centric approach comes is derived from lessons learned from operations in their former colonial holdings, as well as fighting in a limited capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to 2006.⁶ The Dutch became involved in the military coalition that struggled against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, operating in the Uruzgan province in south-central Afghanistan. Uruzgan presents a rare analytical opportunity. The province experienced only limited military involvement from the American-led multinational military coalition before the Dutch arrived in 2006. As a result the Dutch were able to work on a relatively blank canvas, shaping the direction of the counterinsurgency as they saw fit as the lead nation in the province until the end of Task Force Uruzgan in August 2010, as the Dutch withdrew as the result of issues in Dutch parliament.

There has been a good amount of information published on Uruzgan, Afghanistan and the counterinsurgency work done by the Dutch Armed Forces. These writings include government reports and internal briefings made public, governmental or non-governmental organization publications that analyze progress, and articles published in academic journals, news reports, and historical narratives. Of the literature written on Uruzgan, Afghanistan and the Dutch military, none is theory-informed. One of the contributions to the literature that this paper makes is to examine this case study through the lens of counterinsurgency theories.

Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006-2010 forms the main case study that this paper will use, and the case study will cover the four-year period of Dutch control. Examining one province over multiple years will result in more confident conclusions based on deeper analysis. This paper will utilize what Stephen Van Evera calls *congruence procedure type 2*, which is when an “investigator makes a number of paired observations of values on the IV [independent variable] and the DV [dependent variable] across a range of circumstances within a case. Then the investigator assesses whether these values covary in accordance with the predictions of the test hypothesis. If they covary, the test is passed. The greater the amplitude of the DV’s covariance with the IV, the greater the theory’s importance.”⁷ Congruence procedure type 2 is especially useful for studying cases of counterinsurgency, as situational factors, such as population dynamics, political systems, or geography are held constant. These situational factors make comparisons across cases of counterinsurgency difficult, as noted above in the discussion of the Malayan Emergency.

⁵ Miller, “Malaya.”

⁶ Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *The Roots of Dutch Counterinsurgency: Balancing and Integrating Military and Civilian Efforts from Aceh to Uruzgan*, *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare*, 119-129.

⁷ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), 61-62.

Many scholars and practitioners put a heavy weight on specific tactics and details of past counterinsurgencies. But what are they looking for? It seems that many are searching for the perfect counterinsurgency strategy applicable regardless of conditions. What should be apparent, but is often not, is that each case exists in its own sphere. States that follow best practices and are learning organizations may still fail depending on situational factors. There are, depending on the model used, some universally applicable strategies – but thinking of these strategies without the local context is inherently flawed.

This thesis explores the complex, interdisciplinary study of counterinsurgency in the 21st century, and makes a contribution to the literature by testing the counterinsurgency best-practices established in the analytical frameworks of David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al.'s study *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies* to see which analytical framework is best able to explain the Dutch experience in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006-2010. The Dutch approach to counterinsurgency involved a whole-of-government approach, in which civilian and military actors worked together to increase security and provide increased political and economic development. With the Dutch military being under-studied, it is important to examine their development-first approach to counterinsurgency, as their total commitment to this philosophy differs from many of the other nations engaged in Afghanistan. The increase in overall stability and security in Uruzgan indicates that the Dutch counterinsurgency methods have value, and further examination may lead to new conclusions about how to implement development-first counterinsurgency. This thesis attempts to bring to light the importance of the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency.

From a high-level, there were several important findings that resulted from the study of the Dutch in Uruzgan, Afghanistan during Task Force Uruzgan. First, in the three districts that the Dutch focused their counterinsurgency efforts on, there were several gains. There was an increase in the security and stability in the districts, allowing the Government of Afghanistan more control and influence on the population. In addition, there were improvements in the economic and political capabilities in these districts. This includes improvements in the agricultural, educational, and low-level political legitimacy across the focus districts. Additionally, the Dutch method of using its normal soldiers to provide security, while using its more highly trained special forces for kinetic actions against the Taliban allowed a greater increase in overall security.

In the sections that follow, this paper will examine the important analytical frameworks of counterinsurgency, setting an analytical base by briefly looking at the work of David Galula and other prominent scholars of counterinsurgency. Then, the paper will transition to the two analytical frameworks that form the basis for analysis of the Uruzgan case study: David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. The next section of the paper will cover the three-part case study concerning the Uruzgan province of Afghanistan, and finally concludes with the best-practices analysis of the case study and conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 2: Counterinsurgency Theories and Frameworks

The theory section of the paper will have four parts. The first part describes the variables, hypotheses, and theories that this paper adopts for the analysis of the Uruzgan case studies. The second part is a literature review that describes some of the most important works on counterinsurgency. This section helps to provide context for the third and fourth parts, which are the analytical frameworks based on the work of David Kilcullen and the authors from the RAND Corporation – Christopher Paul, Colin Clark, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan – respectively.

Research Methodology

Before moving forward in this section, it is important to operationalize several definitions to provide clarity. An independent variable is the causal phenomenon being examined. A dependent variable is what is impacted by changes in the independent variable. These two variables provide the underpinning of laws and hypotheses. A law is “an observed regular relationship between two phenomena,” while a hypothesis is “a conjectured relationship between two phenomena.” This paper focuses on causal hypotheses, in which it is known, or conjectured, respectively, that: *A* causes *B*. A theory is “a causal law... or a casual hypothesis... together with an explanation of the causal law or hypothesis that explicates how *A* causes *B*.” If a theory cannot, in Van Evera’s words, be “arrow diagramed,” meaning an established pattern showing the relationship from independent variable, through intervening variables, to the dependent variable, then it is not actually a theory. This means that when it comes to political science, most things that are termed “theory” are not actually theories, but rather analytical frameworks. These frameworks help to provide structure to how we interpret events, but they cannot really be used to accurately predict events based on a specific set of circumstances. This paper will test hypotheses on best practices in counterinsurgency based on the analytical frameworks of David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. The testing of laws will not occur in this thesis. The hypotheses will be tested in the case study of the Uruzgan province of Afghanistan. This process will be described below.⁸

Within the context of in this paper, the *independent variable* (IV) being tested is the application of best-practice counterinsurgency techniques. A best practice is a strategy or tactic that should, or should not be, implemented, as it is thought that such practices will be beneficial for the counterinsurgency campaign. These best practices will be explicitly identified in chapter two, and then further defined and analyzed in chapter six. Victory is defined by David Galula as “the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population;”⁹ by the authors from the RAND Corporation as “the government stayed in power, the country remained intact, and no major concessions were granted to the insurgent at the end of the conflict;”¹⁰ and by David Kilcullen as

⁸ All citations in this paragraph from: Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 8-15.

⁹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Print. 54.

¹⁰ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 17.

the return of “the parent society to a stable, peaceful mode of interaction – on terms favorable to the government.”¹¹ It is important to note an additional definition of victory that is forwarded by Kilcullen: “In modern counter-insurgency, victory may need to be re-defined as the disarming and reintegration of insurgents into society, combined with popular support for permanent, institutionalised anti-terrorist measures that contain the risk of terrorist cells emerging from the former insurgent movement.”¹² This second definition more readily highlights the inherent difficulty of defeating an insurgency.

Given, though, that this thesis will be examining a period of time during the middle of a counterinsurgency and not the final stages of one, assessing whether or not victory was achieved is both premature and frankly useless from an analytical stand point. Therefore, this thesis will not be assessing *victory*, but rather *stabilization*. Stabilization is the creation of conditions mirroring those of victory, but occurring during the middle of a larger conflict. My definition of stabilization is based on David Kilcullen’s first definition of victory, as: the movement of the province toward a secure, peaceful mode of interaction on terms favorable to the government.

The general hypothesis being tested is as follows:

Increase in Best Practices (IV) → Movement toward Stabilization (DV)

According to this hypothesis, if best practices are followed by a counterinsurgent then the counterinsurgency campaign will eventually be victorious. There are, however, situational factors that can influence the ability of the counterinsurgent to succeed, such as the nature of the counterinsurgent government, the nature of the insurgency, population dynamics – essentially all factors within a given society.¹³

Within the IV, there are two sets of authors, Christopher Paul et al. from the RAND Corporation and David Kilcullen, whose analytical frameworks of counterinsurgency can be used to create best practices. This paper will test the following specific hypotheses, based on their best practices, against the Uruzgan case studies.

Hypothesis 1:

Increase in David Kilcullen’s Best Practices → Movement toward Stabilization

Hypothesis 2:

Increase in Christopher Paul et al.’s Best Practices → Movement toward Stabilization

¹¹ David Kilcullen, “Deiokes and the Taliban Local Governance, Bottom-up State Formation, and the Rule of Law in Counterinsurgency,” in *Counterinsurgency*, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 216.

¹² David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” *Survival*, 48, no. 4 (2006): 123.

¹³ In a related field, Lisa Morje Howard examined United Nations’ Peace Keeping Missions and found that one of the factors that lead to success is that the conditions on the ground are not overly difficult. For more information, see: Lisa Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

The best practices mentioned here will be explicitly noted later in this chapter, after examining background counterinsurgency information, in the two analytical frameworks in question. Detailed descriptions of the best practices can be found in chapter six.

LIMITATION TO THE STUDY

There is something that needs to be clarified about these hypotheses. It should be self-evident that the general hypothesis being tested is, under normal circumstances, usually valid: with almost everything in life, success is more likely when you perform the actions that tend to lead to success. Success in counterinsurgency is not guaranteed, as it is possible for a counterinsurgent to do everything correctly and still lose. Considering this, though, the general hypothesis of this thesis should not trouble the reader. The focus of this paper is not to test and reinforce the analytical underpinnings of the hypothesis, as this is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus here, and what is actually being tested, is which of the two series of best practices best explains observations.

The case study being examined is just a small pocket of good practices in the middle of a larger, multidimensional conflict involving armed forces from all over the world. While the Dutch did see some success in combating the Taliban, in the long run their efforts did not make a considerable impact on the overall status quo in the war. It is important to remember the conversation that was held between American Colonel Harry Summers and Vietnamese Colonel Tu, in which Summers said, “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield,” to which Colonel Tu responded, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”¹⁴ To use a holistic analogy, the Dutch in Uruzgan treated a single injury on a badly wounded patient. Further, the patient was already suffering from an underlying condition that was slowly killing it from within – an ineffective and out of touch central government doing too much in a state without a strong culture of a central authority, low literacy rate, and only the minimal spread of modern technology.¹⁵

The intent of this study is highlight the strategies and tactics of the Dutch counterinsurgency efforts in Uruzgan and provide a method of analysis that can hopefully provide future scholars and practitioners of counterinsurgency an insight into the Dutch experience. This study is not intended to solve the problem described above, in which the relative success of Dutch personnel failed to adequately impact the overall security structure in Afghanistan. That problem lies well beyond the scope of this project. By only examining whether or not the Dutch were able to provide stability, rather than be victorious or succeed, I hope to avoid the deep analytical issue inherent in studying an isolated case that lasts for four years in the middle of a thirteen year long war.

Literature Review

When considering counterinsurgency it is important to define the time period, as technology has a major impact on the ability of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent to

¹⁴ Colonel Harry Summers, “Interview with General Frederick C. Weyand About the American Troops Who Fought in the Vietnam War,” 12 June 2006.

¹⁵ Special thanks to Christopher Paul for providing this analogy to me.

wage war. Generally, writings on counterinsurgency can be broken into two separate time periods. The first set was written after the wars of national independence following World War II, and are referred to as *classical counterinsurgency*. The second set is more contemporary, having been written in the 21st century, and takes into account the impact of modern technology and globalization on the ability to conduct counterinsurgency, and are called *post-classical counterinsurgency*. The two sets of writings, while distinct in time period written, are not necessarily exclusive. The classical counterinsurgency literature is by no means dated and still remains relevant today, especially given how much of the post-classical literature has a basis in the classical literature.

The most prominent author on 20th century counterinsurgency is France's David Galula. Galula, who graduated from the French military academy Saint Cyr in 1939, fought in North Africa, Italy and France during World War II, and then participated in irregular wars in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. In 1964, three years before his death, he published a book titled: *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.¹⁶ The ideas that Galula discusses focus on combating insurgencies in the post-colonial, Cold War world.

Galula's classical counterinsurgency framework is rooted in the lessons of 130 years of French colonial warfare. To begin the book, Galula first describes general ideas about revolutionary wars, and then goes on to write a description of insurgency warfare. The logical reasoning behind the second and third chapters, titled "Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency" and "The Insurgency Doctrine", respectively, is that in order to successfully counter an insurgency, you must understand its nature. It is for this reason that Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and T.E. Lawrence are recommended reading for counterinsurgents; and it is apparent from reading Galula that he had read Mao's treatise "On Guerrilla Warfare."¹⁷

According to Galula, there are two stages of a revolutionary war, the phrase that he uses to describe a conflict between a host government (counterinsurgent) and the challenger (insurgent) – this language helps to show the influence that the French colonial warfare experience had on Galula. "An insurgency is a *protracted struggle* conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order."¹⁸ The first stage is the cold revolutionary war, where the actions of the insurgent are non-violent and (mostly) legal. Combating an insurgency at this juncture mainly includes police-style work of collecting intelligence and infiltrating the organization.

The transition to the hot revolutionary war, the second stage, is when the government needs to involve the military in order to effectively combat the insurgency. Here, Galula describes what he calls the four "laws" of counterinsurgency, although they are not laws as the term is defined above, but rather fundamental principles crucial to success. The four laws are: the support of the population is necessary for successful counterinsurgency; support is gained through an active minority; support is conditional; and that intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.¹⁹ These laws form the backbone of his framework. Galula created an 8-step

¹⁶ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*.

¹⁷ Mao Zedong, and Samuel B. Griffith. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Thousand Oaks, USA: BN, 2007.

¹⁸ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 2.

¹⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 52-54.

process, derived from the laws, that if followed would lead a counterinsurgent force to victory. He acknowledges that a rigid application of the 8 steps in every case study is potentially dangerous, while also claiming that deviating from the order he established “under normal conditions... [will violate] the principles of counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common sense.”²⁰ While not always needing to start at step one, as circumstances may allow the counterinsurgent to start farther down the line, Galula does reemphasize the linear nature of the process.

At the time it was published, the classical theory of counterinsurgency was the dominant paradigm for effectively combating an insurgency. Yet, as David Kilcullen has developed in his work, the world has changed in many ways since they were published. Most counterinsurgents are no longer combating communist insurgencies in post-colonial states, but rather multinational Islamic insurgents. Further, the diffusion of information and communication technology brought on by globalization has had a significant impact on combating insurgencies. There are of course contemporary examples that buck this trend, where the classic model of counterinsurgency is the best fit, such as in Columbia, but for most of today’s world an adjusted approach is needed. This trend will be addressed further in a future section.²¹

Another author who has contributed to the counterinsurgency literature is retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl. Nagl’s 2002 book, titled Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, compares counterinsurgency strategies and tactics of the British in Malaya and the United States in Vietnam. Through the comparison Nagl posits that one of the most critical factors in successful counterinsurgency is organizational learning. According to Nagl, “the key to organizational learning is getting the decision-making authority to allow such innovation, monitor its effectiveness, and then transmit new doctrine with strict requirements that it be followed throughout the organization.”²² Central to an organization’s ability to learn is its culture. The history of an organization determines how it functions: the British military has fought colonial wars that had required innovation, while the modern American military has engaged in mostly conventional wars. Overtime, these histories have contributed to organizational cultures that allow for more or less innovation or success in counterinsurgency. If the counterinsurgent government and military are learning organizations, Nagl believes, the chances of success are increased.²³

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 was written by committee, and focuses both on theoretical examinations of counterinsurgency as well as small-scale tactics. First published on December 15, 2006, and downloaded over 1.5 million times in the first month, Field Manual 3-24 had an incredible impact on both American policy and counterinsurgency strategy. It was designed to prepare the United States for future counterinsurgency campaigns, and to help direct policy change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, the creation of the field manual also demonstrates how the U.S. Army has, at least in some respects, become a learning organization. According to David Betz, “while the new

²⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 56.


²¹ David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 48.4 (2006): 111-130.

²² Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 195.

²³ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 217.

counterinsurgency field manual is thorough, serious, and stands in sharp contrast to the political rhetoric concerning the ‘War on Terror’ of the last few years, it is not without failings, chief among them that it is pervaded by concepts drawn from Maoist-style People Revolutionary Warfare, which is not the sort of insurgency now being faced.”²⁴

One of the most important things to come out of Field Manual 3-24, according to John Nagl, is Figure 5-1, reproduced below:



“Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency”

This chart emphasizes how combat operations are only a minimal part of counterinsurgency, and how success depends on a comprehensive and multidimensional approach.²⁵

BACKGROUND ON DAVID KILCULLEN

David Kilcullen, an Australian soldier-scholar, has written extensively on the modern dynamics of counterinsurgency. Kilcullen reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army and served in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Bougainville, and across the Middle East. Kilcullen came to the United States and became a member of the burgeoning counterinsurgency community, and contributed to the creation of Field Manual 3-24. In 2007, Kilcullen was the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor for General

²⁴ David Betz, "Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People." *Contemporary Security Policy* 28.2 (2007): 225.

²⁵ Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, December 2006) 155.

David Petraeus, the Commander of the Multinational Force –Iraq. Throughout this time, Kilcullen had been busy writing and authored several influential pieces.

Of the articles, essays, and books written by Kilcullen, of which there are many, this paper focuses on a few – the influential pieces that speak directly to combating insurgencies in today’s complex environment. There is no one comprehensive piece detailing Kilcullen’s thoughts on counterinsurgency, in the way that Galula’s ideas are presented; this paper will compile his works into a more workable format.

Published in 2010, Kilcullen’s book *Counterinsurgency* is an annotated collection of his essays and articles. Included in the collection are some, but not all, of Kilcullen’s most influential pieces. The introduction to the book, *Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, discusses the high-level dynamics of counterinsurgency in terms that would be understandable to a novice. One of the most important contributions coming out of the introduction is the inclusion of what he refers to as his “two fundamentals” of counterinsurgency.²⁶ These two fundamentals will be discussed at length as a part of the next section. The second piece in the book, *Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency*, was designed to help company-level counterinsurgents make sense of FM 3-24 and understand how to apply its lessons.²⁷ The third section of the book, *Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*, addresses the challenges that governments and militaries face when trying to assess progress in counterinsurgencies and offers suggestions as to improve intelligence operations. *Deiokes and the Taliban: Local Governance, Bottom-up State Formation, and the Rule of Law in Counterinsurgency* was a lecture given by Kilcullen in 2009, in which the author addresses alternatives to the current top-down approach to state-building utilized by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last, and longest, section of the book *Countering Global Insurgency* provides an alternative framework for viewing the War on Terror –Kilcullen says that treating Al Qa’ida as an insurgency and utilizing advanced counterinsurgency techniques provides a better way to address the threat than an enemy-centric approach.

Kilcullen published his arguably most important contribution to the literature in 2006, titled *Counterinsurgency Redux*. Here, Kilcullen examines the relevance of classical-counterinsurgency frameworks to the modern world, and forwards that, based on field evidence, new developments in counterinsurgency thought must be developed in order to address the dynamics of modern insurgencies. At the end of the paper Kilcullen suggests seven different ways which modern counterinsurgency differs from the past.

One of Kilcullen’s most popular pieces is his book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*. In it, he posits a hypothesis on how al Qa’ida, among other groups, gathers support and resources. Essentially, al Qa’ida moves into a region, and over time embeds itself within and makes alliances with the local population, then exports violence that will (inevitably) provoke a Western overreaction, and in the aftermath of the Western response, harness the emotions of the population in order to gain support for its movement. Kilcullen forwards that there is not much

²⁶ David Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” in *Counterinsurgency*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3.

²⁷ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” in *Counterinsurgency*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29-49.

widespread support for al Qaeda's ideology amongst traditional tribal societies – but these societies will band together and support al Qaeda in the wake of foreign intervention. The hypothesis proposed in this book is not completely relevant to this paper, as this is a tactic of al Qaeda and not the Taliban. But what is relevant, and has now become part of counterinsurgency canon, is that overreaction in the wake of an attack – especially when these reactions result in civilian casualties, is detrimental to the counterinsurgent's cause.²⁸

The following section of the paper will take an in-depth look at David Kilcullen's writing and combine his individual pieces into one coherent framework.

David Kilcullen's Analytical Framework

“... the key is to first diagnose the environment, then design a tailor-made approach to counter the insurgency, and - most critically - have a system for generating continuous, real-time feedback from the environment that allows you to know what effect you are having, and adapt as needed.”²⁹

An insurgency is “a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers.”³⁰ The non-state groups, or insurgents, are an organized movement that challenges the legitimacy of the established political order through political and military means. “[I]nsurgents challenge the state by making it impossible for the government to perform its functions, or by usurping those functions – most commonly, local-level political legitimacy; the rule of law; monopoly on the use of force; taxation; control of movement; and regulation of the economy.”³¹

“The center of gravity of an insurgent movement – the source of power from which it derives its morale, its physical strength, its freedom of action, and its will to act – is its connectivity with the local population in a given area.”³² While it is preferable for the insurgent to have the full, unconditional support of the population, lesser degrees of support, maintained through rule-of-law, force, or fear, are sustainable. Without support – actively, passively, or tacitly given – the insurgency will eventually wither, as the support is necessary for recruits and freedom of movement.³³ If an insurgency has a strong, outside-source of funding (such as foreign donations or the sale of narcotics), then they have a decreased, but not eliminated, reliance on the population. Their connectivity to the population is what makes insurgencies vulnerable. While insurgents are able to withdraw and avoid military confrontation as they choose, the population is easy to find. Insurgents cannot withdraw from a political assault, leaving two options: one, to wait it out, or two, to directly confront the counterinsurgent. Political assaults are the non-military actions, such as the promotion of civil-liberties or free and fair elections, taken by the counterinsurgent to combat the influence of the insurgency. Insurgents must react to political

²⁸ David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.” (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009).

²⁹ David Kilcullen, “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*. 27 January 2007. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency>

³⁰ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency *Redux*.” 2.

³¹ Kilcullen, “Deiokes and the Taliban.” 149.

³² Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.” 7.

³³ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.” 7-8.

assaults on the population or fear that their permanent isolation will result in their movement's failure, and that further allowing these political assaults cede the initiative to the counterinsurgent.

The dominant political authority (the state or an occupying power) combating the insurgency is known as the counterinsurgent. Counterinsurgency "is an umbrella term that describes the complete range of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies. These measures may be political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, and are almost always used in combination."³⁴ Counterinsurgency cannot exist without insurgency, as its definition implies the inherent presence of an insurgency. The main goal "in counterinsurgency is to return the parent society to a stable, peaceful mode of interaction – on terms favorable to the government."³⁵ The second clause in that sentence is the most important, as it is possible for the society to return to peaceful interactions on conditions that are unfavorable to the counterinsurgent. Classical counterinsurgency had been the dominant framework for addressing insurgencies, from the time they were created to present day. While much of what has been written still remains highly relevant, there have been significant changes in the global environment. "But much is new in counter-insurgency *redux*, possibly requiring fundamental reappraisals of conventional wisdom."³⁶

First and foremost, the method of engagement is different in post-classical counterinsurgency. In classical counterinsurgency, only the insurgent is able to initiate a conflict; in post-classical, there have been several examples, most notably Afghanistan and Iraq, where the counterinsurgent was the force that directly initiated the insurgent. Secondly, the goals of the insurgencies differ. It is assumed that insurgencies want to supplant the counterinsurgent and install a new government in their place. "[I]nsurgency today follows state failure and is not directed at taking over a functioning body politic, but at dismembering or scavenging its carcass, or contesting an 'ungoverned space.'... [In some cases] "there is no apparent strategy to seize the instruments of the state. The insurgents seek to expel foreigners, but have little to say about what might replace the national government."³⁷ Insurgents will still utilize tactics of provocation and exhaustion to drive out the counterinsurgent, but "this is a 'resistance' insurgency rather than a 'revolutionary' insurgency. Insurgents want to destroy the... state, not secede from it or supplant it."³⁸ Insurgencies today do not comprise an united front, such as the Viet Minh against the French in the Indochina War, but rather consist of dozens of competing groups – which may in fact be more, rather than less, difficult to defeat.

Third, an important factor in the changing dynamics of modern wars between insurgents and counterinsurgents is globalization. Globalization, including the 24-hour news cycle and the prevalence of cheap communications technology, has changed the dynamic of information between the two forces. Insurgents are able to easily publicize their message to a worldwide audience, attracting moral, financial, and physical support from global backers. The focus in

³⁴ Kilcullen, "Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." 1.

³⁵ David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," in *Counterinsurgency*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 216.

³⁶ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency *Redux*." 1.

³⁷ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency *Redux*," 2-4.

³⁸ Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency *Redux*," 5.

counterinsurgency on producing a single narrative is even more important, as the ease with which insurgents can manipulate information and play to a global audience is exponentially increased in the post-classical era.³⁹ By successfully adopting these new sources of information, insurgents can defeat the counterinsurgents in the court of public opinion, further creating issues of morale in the counterinsurgent's population.⁴⁰ In addition, the Internet has created a virtual sanctuary for insurgents – a relatively safe space where members can gather to discuss strategies and tactics, and push propaganda, while also seeking outside support – that are far beyond the reach of counterinsurgents. “Internet-based financial transfers, training and recruitment, clandestine communication, planning and intelligence capabilities allow insurgents to exploit virtual sanctuary for more than just propaganda. Classical counter-insurgency theory has little to say about such electronic sanctuary.”⁴¹

Finally, the economics of insurgencies have changed, specifically the relationship between the insurgency and the population. The economic relationship between insurgents and the population is exactly the opposite in some modern insurgencies. For example, in Iraq the insurgents' primary funding sources in 2004 were courier infiltration and access to buried caches. The insurgents were wealthier than the population, and routinely paid poverty-stricken locals to conduct attacks for cash. Thus, efforts to isolate the insurgents (intended, based on classical theory, to hurt the guerrillas and protect the population) had precisely the opposite effect, starving and this alienating the population while leaving the insurgents largely unaffected.⁴² In addition to this, globalization has made drug trafficking, foreign donations, corruption and extortion much more effective, allowing insurgent groups to survive with only the tacit approval of the population. One potential response to this concept is for the counterinsurgent to address the outside sources of funding through eradicating the drug trade, reducing government corruption, or tracking financial transactions.

As a result of these changing dynamics in post-classical counterinsurgency warfare, there are seven new basic principles.* These principals are as follows:

1. “In modern counter-insurgency, the side may win which best mobilises and energises its global, regional and local support base – and prevents its adversaries doing likewise.
2. In modern counter-insurgency, the security force ‘area of influence’ may need to include all neighboring countries, and its ‘area of interest’ may need to be global.
3. In modern counter-insurgency, the security force must control a complex ‘conflict ecosystem’ [in which there may be more than one insurgent group] – rather than defeating a single specific insurgent adversary.
4. In modern counter-insurgency, a common diagnosis of the problem, and enablers for collaboration, may matter more than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies.
5. Modern counter-insurgency may be 100% political – comprehensive media coverage making even the most straightforward combat action a ‘political warfare’ engagement.

³⁹ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency *Redux*,” 3.

⁴⁰ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 39.

⁴¹ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency *Redux*,” 3.

⁴² Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency *Redux*,” 9.

* Rather than “basic principles”, Kilcullen refers to these “paradigms.” I chose not to use that term within this context, as what is described are not new paradigms – especially considering the use of the term in: Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

6. In modern counter-insurgency, ‘victory’ may not be final – ‘permanent containment’ may be needed to prevent defeated insurgents transforming into terrorist groups.
7. In modern counter-insurgency, secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness based on unclassified but difficult-to-access information.”⁴³

These new principles are more a matter of high-level strategy rather than tactics. For counterinsurgents on the ground, issues such as “final victory” or overall “area of influence” matter little. Taken aggregately, though, these principles have a large impact on success in a post-classical counterinsurgency environment.

Another important thing for counterinsurgency, both classic and post-classic, involves the mindset of the population. To a certain extent the population’s top priority in a conflict between an insurgent and counterinsurgent is their safety. “[P]eople will do almost anything, and support almost anyone, to reduce that feeling of fear and uncertainty by establishing a permanent presence, through a predictable system of rules and sanctions that allow people to find safety by compliance with a set of guidelines. Even if those guidelines are harsh and oppressive, if people know they can be safe by following a certain set of rules, they will flock to the side that provides the most consistent and predictable set of rules.”⁴⁴ This implies that one of the top goals for counterinsurgents is to establish a full-spectrum, normative system of control over all aspects of the conflict area. A further implication of this mentality is the importance of bottom-up, rather than top-down, state building, as local governments are inherently better at establishing this normative system of control within a conflict area than a central government. Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa show that “bottom up, civil-society-based programs that focus on peace-building, reconciliation, and the connection of legitimate nonstate governance structures to wider state institutions may have a greater chance of success in conflict and postconflict environments than traditional top-down programs that focus on building the national-level institutions of the central state.”⁴⁵

With all of this in mind, there are two fundamentals of successful counterinsurgency. The first is “to understand in detail what drives the conflict in any given area or with any given population group.”⁴⁶ Gathering and analyzing intelligence effectively is critical to the second fundamental. The second fundamental is “to act with respect for local people, putting the wellbeing of noncombatant civilians ahead of any other consideration, even – in fact, especially – ahead of killing the enemy.”⁴⁷ The second fundamental is a cornerstone of “heart and minds” counterinsurgency, but respecting and protecting the population used in conjunction with proper intelligence gathering results in more effective counterinsurgency. These two fundamentals apply equally to classic and post-classic counterinsurgency cases. The following two subsections will analyze these two fundamentals of successful counterinsurgency in detail by combining elements relating to the fundamentals from the various works authored by Kilcullen.

THE FIRST FUNDAMENTAL - INTELLIGENCE

⁴³ Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency *Redux*,” 11-13.

⁴⁴ Kilcullen, “Deiokes and the Taliban,” 151-152.

⁴⁵ Kilcullen, “Deiokes and the Taliban,” 156.

⁴⁶ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 3.

⁴⁷ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 4.

Proper intelligence analysis in counterinsurgency has three components: discovering what you need to know, acquiring information on the ground, and properly assessing progress. There are multiple layers of intelligence – from understanding the conflict area as a whole to ground-level intelligence that identifies insurgent caches or hideouts – which invariably makes gathering and analyzing intelligence a labor and resource intensive task. Additionally, there is a fundamental problem relating to knowledge. The complex nature of counterinsurgency limits the amount of knowledge any one person or organization can have, and “even if we *could* know it fully, our knowledge would be a mere snapshot that would immediately be out of date.”⁴⁸ But, if the counterinsurgent is able to effectively manage their intelligence operations, the task of combating an insurgency and gaining the allegiance of the population is much more attainable.

First, the counterinsurgency must have a clear understanding of the conflict situation in order to have a chance at combating the insurgency. At a higher level, there are three aspects of a conflict that must be understood. The first is the nature of the insurgency. The type of insurgency, whether or not it is seeking to overthrow the state, scavenge the remains of a failed state, or to simply create chaos, impacts the nature of the counterinsurgency response. Secondly, it is critical to acknowledge the nature of the government either conducting the counterinsurgency or being supported by an outside force. Differing structures of government can have different approaches to counterinsurgency, with autocratic governments having more leeway with tactics than democracies. Thirdly, counterinsurgents must learn about the environment the conflict takes place in, such as the geography, political climate, and especially the population dynamics.⁴⁹ Comprehending these three different aspects of the conflict will give the counterinsurgency a better high-level understanding of the nature of the threat facing the government.

Second, there are measures that should be taken at the tactical-level to improve the performance, safety, and effectiveness of the counterinsurgency forces. Counterinsurgents must be experts on their area of operations – knowing everything from ancient grievances to the topography – as this information plays into the population’s collective psyche. Further, only through understanding the full history and social dynamics of an area can a counterinsurgent truly mobilize the population to their cause. To better facilitate the acquisition of this knowledge, counterinsurgents must organize themselves to effectively collect, analyze, and distribute knowledge on a frequent basis. This information, once gathered, should be collected and stored in multiple forms – both in digital and paper copies for redundancy – as it will improve the current operational group’s effectiveness, as well as better prepare the successor group’s ability to succeed. It is important for the counterinsurgents to directly interact and question the population in their area of operations to identify their needs; the most useful, and actionable, information can come directly from those who you are seeking to protect.⁵⁰

The third part of successful intelligence operations is proper assessment. Things that need to be considered when assessing progress are overall trends within the war, the counterinsurgent’s progress against the stated campaign goals, and the performance of

⁴⁸ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 3.

⁴⁹ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 2.

⁵⁰ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 30-36.

individuals and organizations against best practices.⁵¹ One method of assessing progress and analyzing intelligence that has been validated by field experience is the district stabilization approach. This approach has three phases. The first phase involves assessing the area of operations and identifying the main drivers of violent conflict. In the second phase, triage, the counterinsurgent must prioritize the problems currently facing them by examining whether or not the problem is actually creating instability, is currently being exploited by the insurgency, and whether or not the counterinsurgency can make meaningful progress addressing it in a viable timeframe with current resources. Finally, in the audit phase, the counterinsurgent must review all of its activities and determine the effectiveness of past actions and whether or not to redirect future resources to other identified priority stabilization targets.⁵²

An important aspect of the audit phase that must be addressed is the dynamics of metrics. Counterinsurgents must look beyond the typical metrics of enemies killed or total amount of SIGACTs to “surrogate indicators that allow them to detect deeper trends in the environment that may not be directly observable.”⁵³ This will have a two-pronged affect. First, organizations act based on what success is measured against – meaning that if an organizations bases “success” on the amount of money spent, the agents within the organization will be incentivized to spend their entire budget without considering the effectiveness of the spending – and addressing this issue may help generate an organization-wide shift in tactics. Second, analyzing the correct information allows for a better read on whether the current strategy and tactics are effective and can lead to organizational learning and better performance over time.⁵⁴

At its most fundamental level, though, proper intelligence gathering and analysis can help counterinsurgents win the battle of adaptation. “[C]ounterinsurgency is at heart an adaptation battle: a struggle to rapidly develop and learn new techniques and apply them in a fast-moving, high-threat environment, bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in response, and rapidly changing them as the environment shifts.”⁵⁵ Effectiveness is directly correlated to adaptation, as highly effective actions will become obsolete more quickly because the opposing side must counter it or face serious consequences to their strategy. In counterinsurgency, the most dangerous enemy is not necessarily the one with the best weapons, but rather the group that is the most adaptive.⁵⁶ “This means that the adaptational [sic] dynamic (‘survival of the fittest’) also applies to us: we must adapt and evolve faster and better than the [insurgents]... in order to survive. Our armies must be flexible, versatile, and agile, but adaptability goes far beyond the military sphere: out whole approach to counterinsurgency must be characterized by continual innovation.”⁵⁷

With a focus on proper intelligence gathering and analysis, and honest assessments of strategy, tactics, and overall campaign progress, the counterinsurgent will be better prepared to

⁵¹ David Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan” in *Counterinsurgency*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 52.

⁵² Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan,” 55.

⁵³ Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan,” 56.

⁵⁴ Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan,” 55.

⁵⁵ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 2.

⁵⁶ Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” 205.

⁵⁷ Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” 220.

handle the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare. These processes will enable more effective security, reconstruction, and political operations across the theatre.

THE SECOND FUNDAMENTAL – POPULATION CENTRIC TACTICS

As noted above, the second fundamental of successful counterinsurgency is putting the well being of the non-combatant ahead of capturing or killing the enemy. This fundamental is essentially synonymous to the “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency, in which the strategic and tactical focus is not enemy-centric – like in conventional war where killing or capturing the enemy is key – but rather population-centric. A population-centric approach entails a focus on providing security to and addressing the needs of the population, and successful implementation requires strategic and tactical innovation.

It is important to clarify the concept of “hearts and minds,” as even though the concept is a powerful aspect of the current narrative of counterinsurgency, it is easy to misinterpret it. The casual use of the term, especially given the resurgence of counterinsurgency as a topic, has the potential to alter the way the concept is viewed. The “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency does not involve generating good will for the population through bribes in the form of handouts or social programs. Rather, “‘hearts’ means persuading people their best interests are served by your cause; ‘minds’ means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.”⁵⁸ Throughout the Iraq War, it has been claimed that American counterinsurgents have used money, especially impractical big budget items, as a tool to buy loyalty from the population, which has proved ineffective within the context of “hearts and minds.”⁵⁹

“But make no mistake: counterinsurgency is war, and war is inherently violent.”⁶⁰ But when considering killing enemy combatants, it is important to distinguish between the two different types of insurgents. The reconcilables are typically those who are not ideologically committed and joined the insurgency for other reasons, such as a form of income, and could be convinced to lay down their weapons. The irreconcilables are those insurgents who are ideologically committed to the cause and could not be convinced to stop fighting. It is beneficial if the counterinsurgent can manage to separate the two classes of insurgents and only kill those active, irreconcilable combatants where there is no chance to bring them back, as an insurgent that is converted back is much more valuable than one that is dead.⁶¹

⁵⁸ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 37.

⁵⁹ For one account of this, see Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People*, (Metropolitan Books, 2012). In addition, see The United States Army, *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2009) for an example of an Army publication regarding the use of money in counterinsurgency.

⁶⁰ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 4.

⁶¹ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 4-5.

A good counterinsurgent is an armed social worker and is capable of both protecting the population and killing the enemy.⁶² The first priority is providing protection to the population and establishing security. From here, counterinsurgents are able to identify the needs within a community and then mobilize the resources to address these grievances. Priority should be given to providing the population first with its basic needs – food, water, shelter, etc. – and then progressing through Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.⁶³ This, at its most basic level, will allow the counterinsurgent to build networks and mobilize the population against the insurgency. If the counterinsurgent is able to succeed in this process and mobilize the population, then the insurgents will have no choice but to go on the offensive or else risk potentially losing the population for good. The counterinsurgency should focus on its own plans and only confront the enemy when they get in the way. This policy, beyond helping to reduce the number of civilian casualties, has an important psychological effect. The population sees the insurgents as an aggressive, attacking force looking to disrupt the safety and security of the community, and sees the counterinsurgent as defending the collective interests of the community. “If we [the counterinsurgents] want people to partner with us, put their weapons down, and return to unarmed political dialogue rather than work out their issues through violence, then we must make them feel safe enough to do so, and we must convince them that they have more to gain by talking than fighting.”⁶⁴ Getting insurgents to this step is crucial. Every insurgent who is willing to put down their weapon is more valuable than capturing them, and capturing is more valuable than killing them. A converted enemy does not create more insurgents, as many recruits to insurgency groups occur over anger of a loved one being killed. Further, a converted insurgent may start a trend. If other insurgents see that they are treated well and are able to protect their own interests by putting down their weapons that it may lead to an increase in other insurgents following suit.⁶⁵

Inherent in the concept of protecting the population, but not specifically mentioned, is the concept of trust between the counterinsurgents and the population. One of the best ways to develop trust is to learn what grievances the population actually have and then follow through and address the complaints. Starting small and addressing these concerns will show the counterinsurgents commitment to help and begin to develop a trusting relationship. “Trust is a function of reliability. . . . Dependability is key – local people must believe that you will follow through and deliver on promises in a reliable manner. Over time, the predictability and order that you create through dependability makes people feel safer and encourages them to work with you.”⁶⁶ Dependability, in conjunction with moral conduct, creates an atmosphere where victory could be attained. Being a reliable partner, through following through with promises made that address local grievances and protecting the population from insurgent attacks, the “hearts and minds” of the population can be won.

BEST PRACTICES IN DAVID KILCULLEN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY FRAMEWORK

⁶² David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 43.

⁶³ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 43.

⁶⁴ Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 2.

⁶⁵ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 45.

⁶⁶ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles,” 37.

Based on Kilcullen’s fundamentals and his analysis of the dynamics of post-classical counterinsurgency, there are 4 best practices that can be used to assess the strategy and tactics of a counterinsurgency campaign. Some are based on the two fundamentals, while others are derived from what is described above. They are:

- Understand the conflict area, and what drives the conflict at a local level – possess and utilize advanced intelligence operations.
- Willing, and able to, adapt tactics based on circumstances in the area of operation.
- Putting the wellbeing of noncombatants ahead of killing or capturing the enemy – utilizing population-centric tactics.
- Utilize bottom-up state building to increase political, social, and economic capabilities.

These are the best practices that will be used when assessing the hypothesis that an increase in best practices will lead to a movement toward the victory condition.

Christopher Paul et al. ’s Analytical Framework

This section of the paper focuses on the results from the RAND Corporation’s study *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies* by Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grille, and Molly Dunigan.⁶⁷ In this study, the authors examined all of the completed insurgencies between 1944 (the end of World War II) and 2010. In this time period there were 71 different wars between insurgents and counterinsurgents, but the authors of the study eliminated 12 case studies based on a variety of factors, leaving 59 cases.⁶⁸ Historical narratives for all 71 cases were developed. The 59 cases that survived situational elimination were then analyzed to test the importance of 24 different counterinsurgency concepts – such as “hearts and minds,” “clear, hold, build,” and “crush them” – that were derived from the established literature on counterinsurgency. Through this analysis, the authors were able to discover which of these concepts accurately correlated to victory. A scorecard was developed based on these concepts, against which the case studies were scored, to examine trends. The authors sought to learn which approaches to counterinsurgency were most effective, and not just in a limited number of case studies but in as large, and analytically relevant, set of data as possible. This analysis resulted in strong historical conclusions of counterinsurgency tactics rooted in a large-n study of counterinsurgency.

The authors from the RAND Corp. define counterinsurgency as “efforts taken by a government and its security forces (or the security forces of supporting partners or allies) to oppose an insurgency.”⁶⁹ Something that the authors wanted to ensure was clear, though, was that counterinsurgency in and of itself does not presuppose a distinct strategic or tactical approach or theory. Rather, they say that the term simply denotes that “there is an insurgency and

⁶⁷ Rather using the name of each author every time that their study is mentioned, this paper will utilize either “Christopher Paul et al.” or “the authors from the RAND Corporation” to refer to them, with primacy placed on the former rather than the latter.

⁶⁸ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 71.

⁶⁹ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 2.

there is someone who wishes to fight it.”⁷⁰ There are various ways of combating an insurgency, both successfully and unsuccessfully, and that the current connotation of counterinsurgency as exclusively involving population-centric tactics limits the analytical approach to the topic.

As far as insurgencies go, the authors define them as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”⁷¹ The classical approach to counterinsurgency forwards the logic that the population is the insurgent’s most important source of tangible support. While this was certainly the case in many classical and contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns, the authors forward a slightly modified interpretation here. While the population may not be the sole source of the insurgent’s strength, the importance is that they are deriving resources from some source. Therefore, “the insurgents’ continued ability to maintain their tangible support (recruits, weapons and materiel, funding, intelligence, sanctuary) is more important than where that support comes from (the population of an outside actor) in determining the outcome of an insurgency.”⁷² The importance of this conclusion will be examined in depth below.

Another concept that most people believe about insurgencies, that the authors critically examine, is that every insurgency is unique. While true at the ground level, meaning that the domestic conditions where each insurgency takes place are inherently unique, at the level of analysis that the researchers looked these individual differences were irrelevant. These differences “may make it harder or easier to do the things that must be done in order to prevail but... these things remained constant across the cases studied.”⁷³ The specific actions mentioned above will be discussed in detail below.

Generally there are two different approaches to conducting counterinsurgency. The first is enemy-centric. This approach treats counterinsurgency as a conventional conflict, with the main objective being to defeat the enemy.⁷⁴ The authors of the study classify this as the *iron fist* approach to counterinsurgency. The second approach, similar to what would be termed population-centric by other authors, is called *motive-focused* counterinsurgency. Motive-focused counterinsurgency involves addressing not only the concerns and problems that generated the insurgency to begin with – such as an occupying power, the desire for national separatism, or political corruption – but also the sources of the insurgency’s resources. The counterinsurgency can limit the insurgent’s ability to generate resources by going directly after the population or outside actors giving the resources, and by limiting the opportunity of the population to give these resources in the first place.⁷⁵

Taking the previous points into consideration there are two main dichotomies to consider in counterinsurgency. The first is the target of the action: the active insurgents or the sources of insurgent support. The second is the style of actions taken: kinetic military actions or those

⁷⁰ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 3.

⁷¹ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 81.

⁷² Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 6.

⁷³ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 70.

⁷⁴ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 4.

⁷⁵ Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 6.

designed to diminish the motives driving the insurgency. The iron-fist approach typically comprises kinetic actions against active insurgents, while the motive-focused approach involves actions against the insurgent's support base and actions based on diminishing motives.⁷⁶

Both the iron fist and motive-focused approaches to counterinsurgency can lead to success. In the 44 cases where the government took an iron fist approach, the counterinsurgents won 17 times (38%); in motive-focused cases, the counterinsurgent prevailed 11 out of the 15 times (73%). But, as the numbers indicate, the motive-focused approach to counterinsurgency succeeds dramatically more often than the iron fist approach.⁷⁷ Of the cases where the iron fist approach was successful, many involved the counterinsurgent addressing some of the insurgency's motives, although their primary focus was on kinetic actions. In order for a counterinsurgent to be successful, they must be able to strike a balance between the types of targets and the actions used to address those targets.⁷⁸

The authors warn, though, that the scorecard should not be looked to as a source for counterinsurgency theory or tactics. Rather, the scorecard "should be a useful diagnostic tool to assess whether a given COIN strategy within a given context is on the right track and to identify some issues that may not be sufficiently addressed by a given strategy, or short comings in implementation."⁷⁹ In addition to the best-practices comparison, the analysis section of this thesis will use the scorecard to look at the overall effectiveness of the Dutch approach.

The scorecard, in combination with analysis of the 24 core counterinsurgency concepts, leads to very interesting and applicable analysis. The most important factors for counterinsurgent success are:

- Commitment and Motivation
- Tangible Support Reduction
- Flexibility and Adaptability
- At least two of the following: unity of effort, initiative, and intelligence.

"In the 59 core cases, every winning case implemented these four concepts, and no losing case had all four of them (so, together they are prime implicants, perfectly discriminating the cases by outcome)."⁸⁰ *Commitment and Motivation* refers to the level of commitment by the counterinsurgent forces and government to actually defeating the insurgency. All cases in which this factor was lacking (17) were defeats for the counterinsurgents. *Tangible Support Reduction* is the ability of the counterinsurgency to impact the insurgent's ability to access the resources that allow it to function. While in many cases this can be directly correlated to the population, in some contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns the source of support could be narcotics trafficking or outside donations. *Flexibility and Adaptability* refers to how well, or poorly, the counterinsurgency is able to acknowledge and change tactics based on the actions of the

⁷⁶ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 6.

⁷⁷ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 8.

⁷⁸ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 180.

⁷⁹ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 147.

⁸⁰ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 149.

insurgency. In the decisive phase of each counterinsurgency win, the counterinsurgent forces adapted their techniques.⁸¹ Further, the presence of the first two above concepts, *commitment and motivation* and *tangible support reduction*, were also prime implicants. Every successful counterinsurgency campaign had both of these two factors present— campaigns that had only one of the two resulted in counterinsurgency losses.⁸²

At the end of the paper the authors list a series of recommendations that counterinsurgents should follow, all based on their analysis of the case studies. First, is that the counterinsurgent force have enough conventional military superiority that the insurgents were forced to fight as guerrillas. Second is to reduce the insurgent's tangible support. Third is to recognize that source of the insurgency's resources does not necessarily have to come from the population. Fourth, once the counterinsurgent force begins to use good practices they must be prepared to continue these practices for six or more years. Fifth is to avoid the iron fist approach to counterinsurgency and instead focus on the motive-based approach. Finally, the authors propose that counterinsurgents must have the capability to pursue multiple lines of operations simultaneously, as successful counterinsurgency requires input from various organizations operating at the same time.⁸³

BEST PRACTICES FROM CHRISTOPHER PAUL ET AL.

Based on the analysis by Christopher Paul et al., this paper will utilize the following as indicators of best practices:

- Commitment and Motivation
- Tangible Support Reduction
- Flexibility and Adaptability
- The presence of at least two of the following: unity of effort, initiative, and intelligence.

Each section of the case study will be examined to determine whether or not the counterinsurgent forces adequately achieved these goals.

⁸¹ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 187.

⁸² Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 149.

⁸³ Christopher Paul et al., "Paths to Victory," 188-189.

Chapter Three: Afghanistan, Uruzgan, and the Taliban: A History

“Ask those ancient Greek and Macedonian ghosts to reflect upon our situation today, and they might feel strangely at home. The old dictum “*plus ça change, plus c’est la eme chose*” (The more things change, the more they remain the same) ought to be the official motto of Afghanistan.”⁸⁴

Political Map of Afghanistan⁸⁵



This section of the paper contains the introduction to the two parts of the case study that the best practices of David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. will be tested against. Before moving onto the case studies, though, it is important to develop a clear background on Afghanistan. This chapter will examine: the history of Afghanistan, from ancient times to the American War in Afghanistan; the history of the Taliban; information relating to the history, tribal dynamics, and overall demographics in Uruzgan; and the history of the Taliban activity in Uruzgan. This information will place the case studies into context and allow for deeper, more meaningful analysis.

Frank Holt, *Into the Land of Bones*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 15.
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⁸⁵ This map is from the Perry-Castañeda Library at the University of Texas at Austin.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_admin-2009.pdf

HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

What follows is a very brief description of the history of what will become Afghanistan. The purpose of this section is to give the reader a better understanding of how the modern state of Afghanistan formed. This section will highlight the many ethnically and culturally diverse groups that have ruled Afghanistan, and helps to explain why Afghanistan is today such a diverse state.

Based on its location, Afghanistan has been the gateway between Europe and Asia. Throughout its early history what is known today as Afghanistan was conquered by four separate empires: Darius I of Babylonia around 500 B.C.; Alexander the Great of Macedonia in 329 B.C.; Mahmud of Ghazni in the eleventh century; and Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. These four conquerors highlighted the frequency with which Afghanistan was preyed upon by the strongest militaries that the world has seen.

For instance, take the conquest by Alexander the Great, whose experience in Afghanistan offers an eerie comparison to the American War in Afghanistan. At the time of his conquest, the area known today as Afghanistan was called Bactria. "From the perspective of the native peoples, Alexander and his followers represented an intrusive, alien culture offensive to local traditions. . . . Many Persians rejected Alexander's claims of legitimacy as a liberator, they questioned the sincerity of his efforts to respect Persian religion and to promote a true partnership with local princes."⁸⁶ Alexander and his soldiers were able to conquer Bactria, but only after fighting, and losing, many pitched battles against local tribes.⁸⁷ Yet, after the conquest of Bactria, discontent began to arise amongst the Greek and Macedonian soldiers, as the style of war they had been trained to fight – winning major, set piece battles between two or more armies – were not what faced them. After initially conquering the standing armies of Bactria, Alexander's forces faced small roving bands of insurgents. Alexander's soldiers were forced to "juggle awkwardly the jobs of conqueror, peacekeeper, builder, and settler,"⁸⁸ responsibilities that mirror the many roles that modern day counterinsurgents must perform in order to have a chance at success.

It was only until the 1700's that the area known as Afghanistan today was united into a single state. Throughout the seventeenth century several different Arab groups invaded Afghanistan, resulting in the spread of Islam throughout the area. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century the United Kingdom, in an effort to simultaneously protect its interests in India and thwart Russian expansionism, tried to extend its reach into Afghanistan. The Afghani people and the UK soldiers would fight three wars (1838-42, 1878-80, and 1919-21).⁸⁹ At the end of the first Anglo-Afghan War, 4,500 Anglo-Indian troops and their 12,000 camp followers fled from Kabul toward India, as the Afghan leaders had promised to let them go. It became clear that they

⁸⁶ Frank Holt, *Into the Land of Bones*, 14.

⁸⁷ Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), xxv.

⁸⁸ Frank Holt, *Into the Land of Bones*, 20.

⁸⁹ Public Broadcasting System, "A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan." *Public Broadcasting System*, May 4, 2011. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan/> (accessed February 18, 2014).

were not going to follow through, and began picking the helpless soldiers and civilians off.⁹⁰ Following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British supported Amir Abdul Rehman as the new leader of Afghanistan. Known as the “Iron Amir,” Rehman used British resources to crush political opponents and attack non-Pashtun tribes across Afghanistan.⁹¹ After the Third Anglo-Afghan War, Afghanistan was officially recognized as an independent state.⁹²

Afghanistan’s new ruler, Amir Amanullah Khan, immediately began a program of socioeconomic reforms to help make Afghanistan a more modern state. In 1926 Khan declared Afghanistan a monarchy, with himself as its king, which generated public backlash against not only the government but also the reforms, as some of these were contradictory to traditional tribal customs. Anti-government uprisings began to occur across the state, and by 1929 Khan abdicated the throne and left Afghanistan. A new monarch, Zahir Shah, assumed power in 1933; Shah’s rule lasted for forty years, and during this time the state is stable. Afghanistan was official recognized as a state by the United States in 1934.⁹³

In 1953 the pro-Soviet General Mohammed Daoud Khan became prime minister, and brought about further social reforms and looked to communist countries for aid. By 1956 the Afghan and Soviet governments had become friendly, with Krushchev agreeing to give Afghanistan aid. Between 1956 and 1978 the Soviet Union gave Afghanistan USD 1.26 billion in economic aid and USD 1.25 billion in military aid.⁹⁴ In 1973 Daoud organized a *coup d’état*, forced the King, who had been in Rome seeking medical treatment, into exile, declared Afghanistan to be a republic, and began governing the state as president.⁹⁵ Another *coup* occurred just five years later in 1978, with Daoud, his family, and his bodyguards all being massacred. Communists Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal became president and prime minister, respectively. The Afghani state was based on nationalism, socioeconomic justice, and Islamic religious principles. While Afghanistan maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the leaders of the new state declared independence, rejecting direct Soviet involvement in the internal affairs of the Afghan state.⁹⁶

Chaos reigned in Afghanistan when President Taraki was murdered at the order of Hafizullah Amin, one of Taraki’s conspirators. The general population was unsettled. The socioeconomic reforms begun by the new regime in Kabul had upset the conservative Islamic population, which began an armed revolt that same year. In June of 1978 the *mujahedeen* movement was started, and began conducting guerrilla warfare against the government. 1979 was a major year in Afghan history. The American Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs

⁹⁰ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), chap. 24.

⁹¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

⁹² Public Broadcasting System, “A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan.”

⁹³ Public Broadcasting System, “A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan.”

⁹⁴ Rashid, *Taliban*.

⁹⁵ Willem Vogelsang, *The Afghans*, (West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 299.

⁹⁶ Rashid, *Taliban*.

was killed, which results in the United States withdrawing its substantial financial assistance.⁹⁷ Afghanistan was in turmoil, with the weak communist government struggling to fight off the *mujahedeen*. Seeing instability in the communist government, the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan to help support the faltering regime.⁹⁸ According to Stephen Tanner, “[t]he Soviet invasion achieved that rarity in Afghan history: a unifying sense of political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines. That purpose was to repel the Soviets.”⁹⁹

The new president, Hafizullah Amin, was killed during the initial invasion, and the Soviets installed Prime Minister Babrak Karmal as president. After surviving the initial onslaught of the Soviet military, the *mujahedeen* were able to rally and successfully fought both the Soviet and Afghan government forces. Soviet forces originally intended to bolster and support the weak Afghan military, but ended up in open combat against both them and the *mujahedeen*. By 1986, the United State, Britain, and China began providing arms to the *mujahedeen* through the Pakistani government and military. In 1989 the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union signed peace accords at Geneva, while the anti-government guerrillas continued to fight against the still communist president Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. The communist regime in Kabul fell in 1992, and an Islamic state is officially founded and is led by Professor Burhannudin Rabbani as the new president.¹⁰⁰

Meanwhile, back in 1984, Usama Bin Laden made his first documented trip to Afghanistan to see the struggle between the *mujahedeen* and communists first hand. In 1988, al Qa’ida was officially formed in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even after the fall of the communist government and the establishment of an Islamic state Afghanistan is still not at peace. The state had been ravaged by war, drought, and famine for over a decade, as local strongmen continued to exploit the population and fight amongst themselves for resources and power. In 1995 the Taliban, an Islamic militia group, is gaining strength and promises peace and stability through following traditional Islamic principles. The Taliban follows through with the promise, enforcing Islamic law though public punishments and executions. In September 1996, the Taliban become the official government of Afghanistan, ruling as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Throughout this time, al Qa’ida continues to operate from bases established in the state.¹⁰¹

On 11 September 2001 al Qa’ida members highjack four commercial airlines and crash them into the World Trade Center Towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and the fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania due to passenger intervention. The United States demanded that the Taliban extradite Usama Bin Laden to the United States to stand trial for the

⁹⁷ For more information on America’s aid to Afghanistan, please see Nick Cullather. *The Hungry World America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010. And Rajiv Chandrasekaran. *Little America: the War Within the War for Afghanistan*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.

⁹⁸ Public Broadcasting System, “A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan.”

⁹⁹ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Wars against the Taliban*, (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), 243.

¹⁰⁰ Rashid, *Taliban*.

¹⁰¹ Public Broadcasting System, “A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan.”

9/11 attacks, as well as expel al Qaeda from Afghanistan. The Taliban's refusal results in American and British planes bombing al Qaeda and Taliban targets throughout Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. American Special Forces were the first on the ground in Afghanistan and partnered with Northern Alliance troops, which eventually took Kabul on 13 November 2001 as the Taliban retreated from the city. The fall of Kabul was the beginning of the end for official Taliban governance in Afghanistan, and by 7 December 2001 the Taliban is officially considered defeated. It is generally considered that at this time that senior Taliban and al Qaeda leadership fled Afghanistan completely and took refuge in the mountainous border region of neighboring Pakistan. Fifteen days later Hamid Karzai, a royalist and ethnic Pashtun from the Popalzai tribe, is sworn in as the leader of the Afghan Interim Authority, which was the basis of Afghan sovereignty while the process of drafting a constitution and elections were taking place.

To help facilitate the process and provide security, the United Nations, in Security Council Resolution 1386, authorized "the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment."¹⁰² The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operated beyond the original six month time frame established by the United Nations. On 11 August 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took control of ISAF, and in October 2003 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 authorized the expansion of the ISAF beyond Kabul to the rest of Afghanistan.¹⁰³ By October 2006 ISAF had taken complete control of all military operations in Afghanistan, as the American-led international coalition in eastern Afghanistan transferred its authority to ISAF.¹⁰⁴

According to author Seth Jones, there are two main factors that resulted in the insurgency that developed after the initial invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Taliban from power. The first is weak governance, which created an environment that drove the local population to seek out another source of security and stability. The newly created Government of Afghanistan (GoA), riddled with corruption, was unable to provide basic services, and was further undermined by the international forces operating in Afghanistan. The second important factor in the rise of the insurgency was the religious ideology of the insurgent leaders. This ideology will be discussed at length below, but the ideology had a broad appeal. "Afghanistan's insurgency was caused by the synergy of collapsing governance and a virulent religious ideology that seemed to fill the void."¹⁰⁵

History of the Taliban

"We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years."
-Mullah Wakil, aid to Mullah Omar.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1386*. New York. 20 December 2001.

¹⁰³ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1510*. New York. 13 October 2003.

¹⁰⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "History of ISAF." Accessed February 19, 2014. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), xxx.

¹⁰⁶ Rashid, *Taliban*, 43.

The Taliban emerged at the end of 1994 from the chaos that resulted from the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989. The *mujahedeen*, not just content to have defeated the Soviets, continued to struggle against the communist government of President Najibullah in Kabul. At the end of 1994 “the country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals, and bloodshed.”¹⁰⁷ This was particularly hard to swallow for some of the *mujahedeen* fighters who had struggled for over a decade to oust the communists from power. Mulla Hassan is quoted by Author Ahmed Rashid as saying, “whenever we [the founders of the Taliban] got together we would discuss the terrible plight of our people living under these bandits. We were people of the same opinions and we got on with each other very well, so it was easy to come to a decision to do something.”¹⁰⁸ After many lengthy discussions, the various discontented groups established the guiding principles of the Taliban movement, which remain the stated goals of the group even today. These are: to restore peace to Afghanistan, to disarm the population, to enforce Sharia law, and to defend the Islamic character of Afghanistan. The movement’s name was chosen very strategically. A *talib* is a student, with *taliban* being the plural. “By choosing such a name the Taliban... distanced themselves from the party politics of the *mujahedeen* and signaled that they were a movement for cleansing society rather than a party trying to grab power.”¹⁰⁹

Mullah Mohammed Omar was chosen by the founding members to lead the Taliban. “Some Taliban say Omar was chosen as their leader not for his political or military ability, but for his piety and his unswerving belief in Islam. Others say he was chosen by God.”¹¹⁰ Of the founding members of the Taliban, Mullah Omar was the “first amongst equals.”¹¹¹ Omar, who lived in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan during the 1980s, came from an undistinguished family but was raised very religiously. While there are many stories describing how Omar was able to effectively mobilize the population to the Taliban cause, there is one that is considered highly credible. In 1994 a neighbor from the village of Singesar, where Omar was living, came to him and reported that a local warlord had abducted two teenage girls and had brought them back to his base where they were repeatedly raped. Mobilizing a group of 30 men Omar raided the base, freeing the girls and hanging the commander. Omar continued to translate dispute resolution and local problem solving into legitimacy and influence. He only asked of those he helped to support him in his struggle. On 12 October 1994 the Taliban captured the small town of Spin Baldak, an important transportation hub on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Less than a month later on 3 November 1994 the Taliban launched an attack against Kandahar and captured the city with only sporadic fighting, as the commander, Mullah Naquib, is believed to have taken a substantial bribe from the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISS). In the process of capturing the second largest city in Afghanistan, the Taliban acquired substantial military equipment, including tanks, helicopters, and six MIG-21 fighter planes. By December 1994 over 12,000 Afghans and Pakistanis had joined the Taliban in Kandahar.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Rashid, *Taliban*, 21.

¹⁰⁸ Rashid, *Taliban*, 22.

¹⁰⁹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 23.

¹¹⁰ Rashid, *Taliban*, 23.

¹¹¹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 23.

¹¹² Rashid, *Taliban*, 27-29.

Immediately after gaining control of Kandahar the Taliban began implementing the strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the Muslim world. In this interpretation, all men were required to grow long beards; recreational activities, such as television and sporting events, were destroyed or canceled; and the rights of women were severely restricted. In Kandahar Mullah Omar was nominated by the leaders of the Taliban to become *Amir-ul Momineen* – or Commander of the Faithful – a title that would give him the authority to lead the *jihad* and rule over the soon to be renamed Emirate of Afghanistan. On 4 April 1996 Mullah Omar appeared on top of a building in Kandahar draped in the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, removing it from its shrine for the first time in sixty years. In doing this, Omar sought to gain not only more legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghani people but also in the eyes of Muslims across the world.¹¹³

Throughout 1996 the Taliban had been ruthlessly shelling the capital city of Kabul. In addition, on 25 August 1996 the Taliban led a surprise assault on the eastern city of Jalalabad, and by 24 September 1996 they had captured the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Sarobi. Immediately following the capture of Sarobi, a full assault was scheduled against Kabul. Military leaders in Kabul, knowing they couldn't defend against a full assault from all sides, ordered a full withdrawal from the city. The Taliban tortured and finally killed former President Najibullah, who had been hiding in a United Nations compound within the city.¹¹⁴

There would be continued fighting across Afghanistan, with previous government forces continuing to battle against the Taliban, but by the beginning of February 1997 there was only one area still seriously resisting the Taliban. The northern part of Afghanistan had had a high level of autonomy with the Afghan government; the high level of natural resources in the region allowed regional leaders to leverage the central government for autonomy, as the government needed the revenue derived from the resources. The warlords in control of northern Afghanistan were the only ones still resisting the Taliban and would have to be crushed in order to assure the complete conquest of the state. The Taliban arrived in the north and began to disarm the Uzbek and Hazara population, capturing many of the Northern provinces.¹¹⁵ But on 28 May 1997 the Hazara revolted against the Taliban, and by July the Taliban suffered nearly 3,000 casualties and 3,600 men taken prisoner and in addition had been driven back out of the north. Fighting would continue over the following year, as both the Taliban and the northern troops massacred each other, while in the rest of the world looked on in horror.


¹¹³ Rashid, *Taliban*, 42.

¹¹⁴ Rashid, *Taliban*, 47-49.

¹¹⁵ N.B. for the reader: issues of tribal identity will be discussed in an upcoming section.

The Taliban in Uruzgan

Map of Uruzgan Province and Surrounding Provinces¹¹⁶



Uruzgan is one of thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. It is located in central Afghanistan, and borders Kandahar to the south, Zabul and Ghazni to the east, Day Kundi to the north, and Helmand province to the west. The current borders of Uruzgan were created on 28 March 2004, right before the presidential elections. The current borders reflect a change made by President Hamid Karzai, who took a large portion of northern Uruzgan and created the Hazara majority province of Day Kundi.¹¹⁷ According to the Government of Afghanistan, Uruzgan has seven districts: Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, Chora, Chenartu, Char China, Gizab, and Khas Uruzgan.

The Taliban presence in Uruzgan dates back to the anti-Soviet resistance. In particular, the resistance in Uruzgan developed out of local religious networks that were utilized to mobilize the population against the changes made by both the communist Afghan government and the their Soviet supporters. These groups organized themselves locally in *mahaz* or *jebha* (fronts), and operated independently at the beginning. As the war progressed, the *mahaz* were co-opted by the various *mujahedeen* groups based in Pakistan, which provided resources and stability necessary for the conflict to continue. The ideological basis for these groups ranged from socioeconomic, to religious, to simply a desire for power. For the local militant commanders alignment was determined more by personal connections and chance of success, and the arms they were able to provide, rather than ideology. As a result, alliances between local commanders and the *mujahedeen* groups were only temporary, with some commanders entering into alliances with multiple groups at once. The vast number of local commanders also ensured that there was never a highly centralized base of power, with power being dispersed amongst the commanders and their support networks.

The Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan in 1989, and the official communist government was removed from power in 1992. The next two years the state was in chaos, as

¹¹⁶ This map comes from The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 3 and will be used throughout the project.

¹¹⁷ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan (2006-2010)*, (Kabul: TLO, 2010).

mujahedeen leaders fought amongst themselves to secure power and resources. The Taliban took control on Kandahar in 1994 and subsequently moved through Uruzgan with little resistance. The population was so worn-down by the years of instability that the prospect of law and order – even law and order based on a very strict religious code – was more appealing than the lawlessness under the *mujahedeen* leaders. Most of the local resistance leaders were coopted into the Taliban structure, either officially joining the Taliban or entering into an agreement to be left in peace. Even the local leaders that were from the “wrong” tribe were not treated very harshly.

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and toppled the Taliban government the local leaders in Uruzgan were originally hesitant to support Hamid Karzai. As the invasion picked up steam, some of the local commanders and village leaders saw the writing on the wall and finally came to support the Karzai government. Like what happened across Afghanistan, in Uruzgan “under the Karzai regime... former Taliban fighters and marginalized tribes were targeted and mistreated by the pro-government strongmen and their international allies.”¹¹⁸ After the fall of the official Taliban government in December 2001, Uruzgan was one of the first provinces to have resurgence in the Taliban movement. The appointment of many of the corrupt pre-Taliban commanders to positions of power resulted in resentment from a good portion of the population. “According to scholar Antonio Giustozzi, at least 20 of the first group of 32 provincial governors appointed by the Karzai government were militia commanders, warlords or strongmen, while smaller militia commanders populated the ranks of district governors.”¹¹⁹

In early 2002 Jan Mohammad Khan was appointed governor of Uruzgan as a result of tribal connections in the central government. Mohammad Khan had a very close relationship with the Karzai family, and as a result was able to leverage the relationship to have many friends and allies appointed to positions of power. The network established by Mohammad Khan was widely known to utilize fear and violence as a method of control and used their positions of power to target rival political leaders as well as former Taliban commanders who had agreed to lay down their arms and cooperate with the government. This was a part of a cycle of violence common in Afghanistan, as those just coming into power sought to strengthen their position by marginalizing and weakening rivals.

While a part of the general Taliban movement, the Taliban forces operating in Uruzgan have their own unique characteristics. They are a part of the Kandahari Taliban, and overall they receive instructions from the Quetta *shura* in Pakistan, which attempts to direct overall Taliban activities. “This insurgency is a rather unruly collection of local commander networks that alternatively cooperate with, coexist with, and fight each other. ... The Taliban shadow administration in the two provinces is often dominated by local strongmen, who may or may not have formal positions within the insurgency.”¹²⁰ To try and keep some semblance of order, the Taliban shadow administrators use a hierarchical organization system and local inspections to reduce the level of graft and overall corruption. The Taliban administration in Uruzgan has “a provincial governor (*wali*), district governors (*woleswali*), a host of security and military

¹¹⁸ Martine van Bijlert, *The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan*, New American Foundation: Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, September 2010, 1.

¹¹⁹ Martine van Bijlert, *The Battle for Afghanistan*, 8.

¹²⁰ Martine van Bijlert, *The Battle for Afghanistan*, 1.

commanders, a court system linked to the religious networks, and an extensive and rather loose network of groups of fighters that are organized in so-called units (*delgai*) and cells (*otaq*).¹²¹ Most of the positions in this administration are filled by military commanders, reflecting the current status of the Taliban in Uruzgan as still an armed insurgency and not a firmly established competitive government. The Taliban in Uruzgan uses a system of taxation to raise funds, forcing all businesses and farmers to pay a percentage of their earnings. In reality, though, this system of taxation is more closely related to extortion or protection money paid to a local strongman.

In Uruzgan there are three distinct insurgent networks currently operating. The first is in western Uruzgan, and includes the districts of Deh Rawud and Char China and extends into northern Helmand and southern Day Kundi. This network is important because it is a critical route in the drug trade. The second network includes eastern and central Uruzgan and expands into the northern regions Zabul and Kandahar provinces and southwest Ghazni province. This area includes important supply routes to Pakistan. The third network includes eastern Zabul and has links to Pakistan. For the most part, the divide between the three different networks is based on the tribal and geographic characteristics of the networks. What is important to note about the three networks is that there is very little official cooperation between them, with the groups operating in parallel to each other and reporting individually to the Taliban shadow governor.¹²² This has two major implications. First, any counterinsurgent operating in Uruzgan needs to recognize and understand the differences between the networks and needs to approach their intelligence collection and operations to reflect this dynamic. Second, this divide has implications for overall counterinsurgency strategy, as the counterinsurgent must address each of the three networks on their own.

One of the most important things to understand about the Taliban in Uruzgan is the manner of support that the average Taliban soldier receives. According to interviews done by the New America Foundation, “locals described how the commanders received money for ammunition and other expenses, but that *the foot soldiers tended to be fed by the local population*” (emphasis mine).¹²³ This dynamic plays a very important role in how a counterinsurgent goes about fighting the insurgency. As noted in the theory section on page X, David Kilcullen says that the source of support for modern insurgencies does not necessarily rely on the population as exclusively. The reliance of the Taliban soldiers on the population indicates that the Dutch would need to be attentive to this dynamic as one of the key aspects of insurgent support.

Uruzgan – History, Tribes, and Demographics

Uruzgan is one of thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. It is located in central Afghanistan, and borders Kandahar to the south, Zabul and Ghazni to the east, Day Kundi to the north, and Helmand province to the west. The current borders of Uruzgan were created on 28 March 2004, right before the presidential elections. The current borders reflect a change made by President

¹²¹ Martine van Bijlert, *The Battle for Afghanistan*, 12.

¹²² Martine van Bijlert, *The Battle for Afghanistan*.

¹²³ Martine van Bijlert, *The Battle for Afghanistan*, 14.

Hamid Karzai, who took a large portion of northern Uruzgan and created the Hazara majority province of Day Kundi.¹²⁴ Uruzgan has *seven* districts: Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, Chora, Chenartu, Char China, Gizab, and Khas Uruzgan.

The current population and tribal makeup is the result of past demographic policies by Afghan rulers. Uruzgan was once dominated by the Hazara tribe; the Hazara are the result of the Mongol invasion, as the tribe was created by the ancestors of Mongols who married into the local tribes. (Taliban Book). In the 18th and 19th century Afghan kings resettled Pashtuns into Uruzgan which displaced the Hazara. King Ahmad Shah Durrani's goal was to secure his rule, and to do this he needed to weaken the Pashtuns. He therefore resettled much of the Pashtun population across Afghanistan, as this would decentralize their power base and make coordination more difficult. There was internal fighting in Afghanistan, and Iron Amir Rahman thanked the Durrani tribe for supporting him and defeating rebel Hazara and Ghilzai tribes by giving them some of their defeated foes' land. As a result of these policies Uruzgan has a diverse population.¹²⁵

The majority of the population in Uruzgan is part of the two main Pashtun tribes. In general, Pashtuns are descended from Qais, one of the Prophet Mohammed's companions. While they consider themselves Semitic, anthropologists believe the tribe to be of Indo-European origin but have coopted and assimilated other tribes through history. The two main factions are the Durrani and the Ghilzai. The Durrani, formerly known as the Abdali, claim to be descended from Qais' eldest son Sarbanar; the Ghilzai claim to be descended from Qais' second son. Other smaller Pashtun tribes claim to be descended from Qais' third son. As the Durrani and the Ghilzai migrated into Afghanistan, they began to fight each other because of disputes regarding land. (Taliban Book). It is important to note, though, the views that modern Afghans have of tribal competition. According to interviews done by the New America Foundation, most Afghans do not see the conflict between tribes as a long-term, historic battle between tribes for power. Instead, they "describe [the conflict] in terms of a confrontation between oppressors (*zalem*) and the oppressed (*mazalum*)." (BoA, 3). This process is cyclical, as those in power will use their position to strengthen their own base while simultaneously marginalizing their enemies. This dynamic similarly plays out between the various sub-tribes for control and power. The first two charts show a breakdown of both tribal populations in Uruzgan, and act to highlight the wide variety of tribal affiliations in Uruzgan. The second two charts show district-level estimates of the population.

¹²⁴ The Liaison Office, *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*.

¹²⁵ The Liaison Office, *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*.

Overall Tribal Affiliation in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, as of 2009.

Zirak Durrani (Pashtun) 57.5%	Ghilzai (Pashtun) 9%	Panjpai Durrani (Pashtun) 18.5%	Hazara 8.0%
Achekzai 35.0%	Hotak 4%	Khogiani 1.0%	Sayed/Quraish/Tajik 1.0%
Popalzai 10.5%	Tokhi 2.5%	Nurzai 17.5%	
Barakzai 9.0%	Suliman Khail 1.0%	Other Pashtun 6%	
Mohammadzai 1.5%	Andar 1.0%	Babozai 5.0%	
Alkozai 1.5%	Taraki 0.5%	Kakar 0.5%	

Tribal Affiliation in Uruzgan, Afghanistan by district, as of 2009

District	Zirak Durrani	Panjpai Durrani	Ghilzai	Other
Tirin Kot (90,000)	Popalzai (20%) Achekzai (10%) Barakzai (15%) Mohammadzai (5%) Alkozai (2%)	Alizai (2%) Nurzai (1%)	Hotak (20%) Tokhi (10%) Suliman Khail (5%) Other Ghilzai (8%)	Sayed, Quraish, Hazara (2%)
Deh Rawud (78,750)	Popalzai (15%) Achekzai (2%) Barakzai (5%) Alkozai (5%) Mohammadzai (2%)	Nurzai (30%) Khogiani (7%) Alizai (1%) Ishaqzai (1%)		Kakar (2%) Babozai (30%)
Chora (72,000)	Achekzai (71%) Barakzai (26%)			Ghilzai, Sayed (3%)
Chenartu (30,000)	Popalzai (75%) Achekzai (11%) Barakzai (6%) Alkozai (1%)	Nurzai (2%) Ishaqzai (1%)	Taraki (3%) Hotak (1%)	
Char China (84,000)	Achekzai (16%)	Nurzai (70%)		
Gizab (59,000)	Achekzai (78%)		Tokhi (1%)	Hazara (21%)
Khas Uruzgan (80,000)	Achekzai (60%) Barakzai (8%) Popalzai (1%)			Wardak (2%) Non-Pashtun Hazara (27%), Tajik (1%) Sayed (1%)
Total	57.50%	18.50%	9%	Hazara (8%) Other Pashtun (6%) Other (1%)

Uruzgan Population Estimates¹²⁶

District	TLO 2008-2009 Estimate	TLO 2011 Estimate	CSO/UNFPA Estimate 2011	CSO 2012-2013 Estimate
Tirin Kot	90,000	125,000	96,400	99,700
Deh Rawud	78,750	57,400	57,400	59,400
Chora	72,000	53,480	48,000	49,700
Chenartu	30,000	14,000	12,100	12,500
Khas Uruzgan	80,000	53,200	53,200	54,900
Gizab	59,000	63,500	63,500	-
Char China	84,000	55,500	55,500	57,300
Total	493,750	422,080	386,100	333,500

Settled Population of Uruzgan province by Civil Division. Urban, Rural, and Sex 2012-2013¹²⁷

District	Rural			Urban			Rural	And	Urban
	Female	Male	Both Sexes	Female	Male	Both Sexes	Female	Male	Both Sexes
Total	157.1	166.8	323.9	4.7	4.9	9.6	161.8	171.7	333.5
Tirin Kot	44.8	48.6	93.4	3.1	3.2	6.3	47.9	51.8	99.7
Deh Rawud	27.1	29	56.1	1.6	1.7	3.3	28.7	30.7	59.4
Chora	24.3	25.4	49.7	-	-	-	24.3	25.4	49.7
Char China	28.2	29.1	57.3	-	-	-	28.2	29.1	57.3
Khas Uruzgan	26.6	28.3	54.9	-	-	-	26.6	28.3	54.9
Chenratu	6.1	6.4	12.5	-	-	-	6.1	6.4	12.5

When talking about demographics in Afghanistan it is important to note the issues inherent with acquiring accurate information. First, Afghanistan is in a state of war, and there are therefore issues of casualties, refugees, and voluntary migrations as a result of insecurity that can affect population estimates. A second factor is that Uruzgan is highly rural, with some districts having populations spread thinly across them, making an accurate census difficult. When

¹²⁶ The first three columns of data was taken from The Liaison Office's 2010/2011 Uruzgan 18 Months After Assessment. The fourth column comes from the Central Statistics office of the Islamic Government of Afghanistan. I am unable to discern why the district of Gizab was left out of the data. But assuming a population estimate similar to the other three sources puts the CSO 2012-2013 estimate in line with the others.

¹²⁷ This data is provided by the Central Statistics Office of the Islamic Government of Afghanistan.

thinking about population it is better to think of them as estimates compared to completely accurate data. Keeping this in mind, what follows is a series of charts by various organizations detailing their population estimates in Uruzgan. These estimates come from The Liaison Office, an Afghan non-governmental organization, and the Central Statistics Organization (CSO), a part of the Afghan government that is supported by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFP).

Section Two: The Case Study

Preface

This section of the thesis covers the case study against which the two analytical frameworks will be tested. The time period covered in the case study is from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010; this time period corresponds to the beginning of the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan to their withdrawal four years later. This preface to the case study describes the overall Dutch approach to counterinsurgency and its relation to other counterinsurgency strategies, provides a general timeline of events in Uruzgan over the four years of the Dutch mission, and outlines the structure of the case study.

The overall objectives of the Dutch mission were laid out in specific documents created by both the Dutch Armed Forces and the Dutch government. An important document that described the plan was the Uruzgan Campaign Plan (UCP). The latest installment of the UCP came out in 2010, and very accurately describes the Dutch mission. The document described the overall plan for the Dutch in Uruzgan as:

the TFU [Task Force Uruzgan] campaign objective, within the context of the UCP, as a part of ISAF, in partnership with ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces], and in coordination with GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Community, is to contribute to a reliable and effective government that can bring the government and the people closer together, and is able to provide a stable and secure environment and development progress in Uruzgan, in due course, without ISAF support.¹²⁸

In addition, one of the guiding principles of Dutch counterinsurgency in Uruzgan was *reconstruction wherever possible, fighting whenever unavoidable*. While this seems a strange operational philosophy for a military, it makes sense in the context of Dutch society and culture. War is almost considered a taboo word in Dutch society, and as a result the Dutch engagement in Afghanistan was billed not as a military mission associated with the American-led *Operation Enduring Freedom*, but rather as a reconstruction mission. The Dutch military would work extensively with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Development and Aid in their effort to rebuild Uruzgan.¹²⁹ The development-first approach was pushed heavily by the Dutch government as a way to convince Parliament to enter the war, as the organizational culture of the Dutch government is one that shies away from war. In fact, “the military struggled with the discussion about whether it was a mission for fighting or for reconstruction because they faced both challenges and were not allowed to use the term COIN [counterinsurgency].”¹³⁰ The

¹²⁸ Sebastiaan Rietjens, Joseph Sooeters, Jacqueline Heeren-Bogers and Christiaan Davids, “Taking stock: The social construction of effectiveness,” in *Mission Uruzgan*, edited by Robert Beeres et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 282.

¹²⁹ Sebastiaan Rietjens et al, “Taking stock,” 328.


¹³⁰ Jair van der Lijn, *3D ‘The Next Generation’: Lessons learned from Uruzgan for future operations* (The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2011), 34.

Dutch military has primarily been used as a peacekeeping force; it was only until being deployed that their approach to security truly took shape, as it evolved over time and became more cohesive. Once deployed, the military's "security first" approach allowed early gains to be made, facilitating the work done by civilian personnel focused on building political and economic capacity.

The Dutch approach to counterinsurgency is firmly rooted in the population-centric philosophy and follows what is called an *ink spot* approach.¹³¹ The *ink spot* approach is when the counterinsurgents focus their personnel into concentrated areas, typically those with dense populations – in this case the three most populated districts of Chora, Deh Rawud, and Tirin Kot. Once the counterinsurgents have consolidated their gains in these areas they attempt to extend their influence out from these centers into neighboring regions. The reason this is called the *ink spot* approach is that the strategy resembles spots of ink that have splashed onto paper – landing in one area and slowly diffusing out into the surrounding space.

In each of the three focus districts, the Dutch employed a counterinsurgency strategy that centered on three main tenets. These tenets, referred collectively as the 3Ds and the 3D approach to counterinsurgency, are *defense, development, and diplomacy*. The first tenet is defense. The counterinsurgent will only be able to influence the population by clearing the area of insurgents and their political infrastructure and then providing security. The second and third tenets of the Dutch approach are *development* and *diplomacy*. Development refers broadly to the improvement of factors that contribute to an increase in the standard of living in the community. Activities in the development tenet range from the promotion of small businesses through micro-loans to increases in schools or healthcare facilities. Diplomacy refers to building the political capacity of the government, both at the national and the sub-national level. In the case of the Dutch mission, dubbed Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), the political focus is on the provincial and district-level governments. This approach to counterinsurgency is a whole-of-government approach that utilizes both military and civilian personnel to succeed. The overall goal of 3-D counterinsurgency is to create a secure environment in which local and national governments are able to provide basic services to the population.

¹³¹ While the Dutch government, for political reasons, avoids the use of the term counterinsurgency, the approach taken in Uruzgan is for all intents and purposes counterinsurgency and will be referred to as such throughout this thesis.

The Dutch 3D Approach to Counterinsurgency¹³²

“With their approach that sees the provision of security as a precondition for development, which in turn contributes to long-term stability, the Dutch have begun slowly to turn around parts of Uruzgan.”¹³³ This approach bears major resemblance to the *clear-hold-build* philosophy of counterinsurgency. The first stage, *clear*, involves the creation of a secure, physical and psychological environment through kinetic actions designed to clear the area of insurgents as well as dismantling the insurgent infrastructure that undermines the host-nation’s government. Second, *hold* involves the establishment of firm government control of the populace and area. This includes protecting the population, further eliminating insurgent presence, improving essential services, and reestablishing the host nation’s government presence. *Build* corresponds to generating legitimate support from the population through continued security and the development of the social and economic spheres.¹³⁴ For the Dutch, there is a rough correlation between the 3-D approach to counterinsurgency and *clear-hold-build*. The first, defense, corresponds highly with the first two stages of the *clear-hold-build* strategy of counterinsurgency. The second and third tenets correspond to *build*, as development and diplomacy are focused on fostering economic growth and building political capacity, respectively, in Uruzgan. This was not the original intent of the 3D approach, but as security increased it opened the door for greater overall participation and integration of the civilian personnel.¹³⁵

When laid out in this manner the 3D approach seems relatively straightforward. “It is an approach in which the diplomatic, military and development spheres aim for coherence where their fields of activity overlap in their aim to address governance, security and development

¹³² Jair van der Lijn, 3D ‘*The Next Generation*,’ 25.

¹³³ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later: A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009*, (Kabul: TLO, 2010), 11.

¹³⁴ United States Army, *Field Manual 3-24*, 174-178.

¹³⁵ Van der Lijn, 3D ‘*The Next Generation*,’ 12.

issues.”¹³⁶ Yet, amongst military and civilian practitioners in the field, coherence between the three tenets was not as easy as envisioned. There can be overlap between the three tenets which can lead to confusion. For instance, there was a difference of opinion between those individuals involved in the diplomacy sphere and those involved in the government section of the development sphere. These two sets of individuals had differing viewpoints, whether to focus on a top-down or bottom-up approach, and this led to wasted time and resources. There was another, more serious, factor that caused issues during the Dutch mission. On one end of the spectrum the Dutch military generally felt that “‘3D’ is not necessarily COIN [counterinsurgency], but a well implemented COIN strategy is ‘3D’, i.e. not implemented solely or primarily by the military.”¹³⁷ On the other end of spectrum are many of the NGOs and diplomats involved in building sociopolitical and economic capacity. These groups “see the approach as an organising (sic) principle for organisations (sic) aimed at security, good governance and development in order to create a secure enough climate for further development.”¹³⁸ In many cases, these groups see being included as a part of the counterinsurgency operation as detrimental, as they can lose their sense of neutrality as a result. Over the course of the mission, integration and coherence between the three ‘Ds’ increased, allowing for a stronger and more unified approach. One pitfall that should be mentioned is that some members of the Dutch parliament became too involved in micro-level policy, which diplomats and members of the military say impacted overall effectiveness.¹³⁹ Taking both the perception of the overall approach and the realities of the conflict in Uruzgan into consideration, this paper will operate under the definition that 3D is a whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency.

The case study is divided into two chapters. While the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency has three tenets (Defense, Development, and Diplomacy), there is an organizational logic of grouping the tenets into two chapters. These two chapters will contain information on the overall philosophy of the approach, specific examples of tactics, and progress made in the province over the four years. Finally, each section will end with analysis on the overall level of success for each phase. Assessment of the two analytical frameworks will be left until the next chapter.

¹³⁶ Van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’, 11.

¹³⁷ Van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’, 11.

¹³⁸ Van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’, 11.

¹³⁹ Van der Lijn, 3D ‘The Next Generation’, 13.

Chapter Four: Defense

“We’re not here to fight the Taliban. We’re here to make the Taliban irrelevant.”¹⁴⁰
Col. Hans van Griensven

In 2005, prior to the arrival of the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), Uruzgan was one of the most unstable provinces in Afghanistan. According to The Liaison Office (TLO)¹⁴¹, in 2005 the “insecurity was mostly confined to the mountainous districts of Gizab, Khas Uruzgan, and Shahiddi Hassas [Char China]¹⁴²... it has now [in 2006] spread to all districts.”¹⁴³ The situation that the Dutch encountered in Uruzgan, then, was less than ideal. The Dutch approach to the defense of the Afghani people from the Taliban was firmly population centric, with emphasis being exclusively placed on avoiding civilian casualties and killing only those Taliban members or supporters who could not be won back. The Dutch were often noted by Afghans and other members of ISAF as placing too much emphasis on thought and consensus and not enough on kinetic action. This differed with two of the other main militaries in Uruzgan at the time. At the beginning of the Dutch deployment the United States was still generally focusing on an enemy-centric approach to the conflict as *Field Manual 3-24* had yet to be published; the Australian approach was mixed, as they utilized a more enemy-centric approach to combat in addition to a heavy focus on construction and development.¹⁴⁴ In addition to the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency, the Dutch placed a heavy focus on training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to bolster their capabilities and ensure the potential for security after their eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It is important to first discuss the types of legal regimes that formally restrict the actions of armed forces in combat zones. The two legal regimes described below are the formal military restrictions that exist within the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and thus apply to Dutch counterinsurgency in Uruzgan. First is human rights law, which seeks to protect individuals from the arbitrary power of states. The application of this can vary, including but not limited to violence by the state against individuals, withholding resources to endanger individuals, to false and long-term imprisonment and abuse. “With the respect to the use of force, or the detention of individuals, states are prohibited to deprive a person of the right to life (by killing) or his liberty (by detention). Only in very exception situations, and if so, only under strict conditions, may a person be killed or detained.”¹⁴⁵ Standing somewhat in contrast to this is the Law of Armed

¹⁴⁰ C.J. Chivers, “Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan,” *The New York Times*, 6 April 2007.

¹⁴¹ The Liaison Office (TLO) is an Afghan non-governmental organization (NGO) that was created in 2003. The four main focuses of TLO are research, peace-building, justice, and livelihoods of Afghans. For more information, please visit <http://www.tloafghanistan.org/index.php/about-us>

¹⁴² As noted in: The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan (2006-2010)*, (Kabul: TLO, 2010) the name Char China is much more commonly used than Shahiddi Hassas. Char China literally means four streams.

¹⁴³ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan (2006-2010)* (Kabul: TLO, 2010), 40.

¹⁴⁴ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 52-53.

¹⁴⁵ Paul Ducheini and Eric Pouw, “Controlling the use of force: legal regimes,” in *Mission Uruzgan*, edited by Robert Beeres et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 70.

Conflict, which seeks to find a balance between the realities of war and the principle of basic humanitarianism. Under the Law of Armed Conflict, individuals not participating actively in the conflict (civilians and those armed combatants who have laid down their weapons) are protected, but the soldiers are allowed to conduct other wartime actions as long as they keep in mind the first provision. While it can be assumed that all modern militaries take this into consideration, the Dutch earnestly set out to be as judicious as possible about their use of force. The comprehensive regulation of the use of force and the enforcement of these legal regimes when applicable in Afghanistan by the ISAF highlights the importance of legitimizing the use of force by the Afghan government and the international military actors.¹⁴⁶ By adhering to these legal regimes and being attentive to the rule-of-law reinforces the credibility of the Dutch 3-D approach as adhering to population-centric tactics.

The Dutch use of air power in Uruzgan provides strong examples of the adherence to the legal regimes described above. According to Dutch pilots, the rules of engagement (ROE) as originally designed provided clear guidelines for when or when not to fire the aircraft's weapons systems, but were not so limiting as to restrict the use of arms in only the most specific situations. Dutch pilots became aware of a new technique that was established by the Taliban, in which they would force civilians to fire at Dutch soldiers or aircrafts by holding their family hostage. Returning fire in this situation is tricky, as the men firing at the aircrafts are endangering the aircraft but are not part of the insurgency. Understanding this dynamic, the Dutch operators constrained their use of weapons system until they were able to consult with their legal advisors, whom assuaged them of their fears and allowed the pilots to use their best judgment. Still, Dutch pilots hesitated to use kinetic action as a first response, as they found non-lethal means of intimidation to be just as effective in certain circumstances. They found that the mere presence of ISAF aircraft would be enough to scare the enemy away; if that did not work, the pilots can conduct a show of force, in which they circle the area of operations at a high speed, manually increasing their noise output. The final non-lethal intimidation technique to be conducted before opening fire on the enemy is to fire intentional warning shots wide of the targets.¹⁴⁷ The Dutch hesitation to use lethal force unless absolutely certain helped the Dutch Armed Forces to limit the amount of avoidable civilian casualties and restrict the deaths to only the irreconcilable Taliban members. The event described above also highlights the ability of TFU to successfully adapt to the changing tactics of the Taliban.¹⁴⁸

As noted above and more fully developed below, the perception of Dutch soldiers in Uruzgan was mixed. The common sentiment was that "*The Dutch don't fight.*" For Uruzganis in the district of Deh Rawud, this was seen as a positive statement, but in Chora, the sentiment was posed as a question: "*why don't the Dutch fight?*" For those in Deh Rawud, it implies that they have a greater understanding of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, to reconstruct first and fight only

¹⁴⁶ Ducheine and Pouw, "Controlling the use of force: Legal regimes," 67-77.

¹⁴⁷ Guus de Koster, "The use of air power in Uruzgan," in *Mission Uruzgan*, edited by Robert Beeres et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 119-131.

¹⁴⁸ Another interesting thing to consider here is what is called the *McChrystal Directive*, after the Commander of ISAF at the time, General Stanley McChrystal. The directive, issued in July 2009, placed limitations on the use of air power in order to avoid civilian casualties. It was updated further under General Petraeus, who directed that strikes would only be allowed if commanders were certain there were no civilians present. From Guus de Koster, "The use of air power in Uruzgan."

when necessary, as opposed to the view that the Dutch operated differently than the Australian and American forces operating in Uruzgan.¹⁴⁹ This perception comes from the Dutch philosophy of only fighting whenever it is unavoidable. TFU was originally classified as a reconstruction mission, because if it was considered a fighting-first mission TFU would not have been accepted by the Dutch parliament; within Dutch society, fighting is not considered a desirable outcome or characteristic, and therefore the mission had very little domestic support from its beginning. As a result of the Battle of Chora, described below, in which there were substantial Afghan civilian casualties, the popularity of the mission decreased amongst the Dutch population at home.¹⁵⁰

One additional potential explanation for the perception that the Dutch do not fight is that at the beginning of TFU the regular Dutch military forces never left camp. The Dutch *Korps Commandotroepen* (Special Forces), in Uruzgan known as *Task Force Viper* (*Viper*), were vital to the success of the Dutch counterinsurgency as they handled the brunt of the kinetic operations, allowing the rest of TFU to handle basic defense and development projects. Originally, *Task Force Viper* soldiers were the only ones that went beyond the base camps into the valleys and into the distant villages; later on in the deployment, they were the only soldiers to deploy beyond the three districts focused on by the Dutch. *Viper* only operated in Uruzgan for the first two years of TFU, but throughout that time they had more enemy engagements than any other Dutch military unit. The Dutch Special Forces were engaged in Uruzgan from March 2006 until August 2006 to prepare for the arrival of the rest of TFU and then stayed through December 2007. It is not public knowledge why *Viper* was withdrawn at this time, but they returned in a mostly advisory and training role during 2008 for the new Afghan National Army. They left the province in 2008, and then returned again in March 2009 through the end of TFU in August 2010 under the name of *Task Force 55*.¹⁵¹ Of the limited information currently made available about *Task Force 55* it has been published that these Special Forces units captured five tons of ammonium nitrate, a substance critical in the creation of IEDs, over 2000 kilograms of ammunition, ten kilograms of homemade explosives, and over 1,500 small arms.¹⁵² The Australian and American Special Forces worked extensively with their Dutch counterparts to effectively raid Taliban hideouts throughout Uruzgan.¹⁵³

Since the arrival of TFU, security has increased province-wide. In the three districts that the Dutch focused on with their *ink spot* approach, Tirin Kowt, Deh Rawud, and Chora, security greatly increased. As of 2010, the security situation in Uruzgan could be seen as an inverted U-shape. In the districts that were consolidated under government control there is stability, just as the districts that are under Taliban control are stable. The districts that are still being contested by the Taliban and the Afghan and Coalition forces are the most unstable.


¹⁴⁹ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*.

¹⁵⁰ Joeseeph Soeters, Jan van der Meulen, Robert Beeres and Ad Vogelaar, "Epilogue: Looking back and moving on," in *Mission Uruzgan*, edited by Robert Beeres et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 329.

¹⁵¹ Michiel de Weger, "Vipers or tigers? Early Dutch special forces operations in Uruzgan," in *Mission Uruzgan*, edited by Robert Beeres et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012) 133-144.

¹⁵² Shadowspear Online, "Brothers in Arms: An account of a Dutch KCR platoon and a SASR patrol operating," 3 April 2012, <http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/brothers-in-arms-an-account-of-a-dutch-kct-platoon-and-an-sasr-patrol-operating.13812/>

¹⁵³ Michiel de Weger, "Vipers or tigers?," 133-144.



In 2008, there was a general increase in violence across Afghanistan as the Taliban attempted to recover lost territory and local influence with increased instances of guerrilla attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The chart below indicates the overall level of government control in each district of Uruzgan in 2006 and then again in 2010. As the security assessments come directly from the research done by The Liaison Office, I will use their description of the data:

It “is a rough attempt to describe the level of access the government and the insurgency have today [2010] compared to 2006. ... Percentages should be considered as indicative only and there are differences between daytime and night-time control. Furthermore, insurgency influence does not always constitute the physical presence of fighters but the ability of the insurgency to intimidate and summon people.”¹⁵⁴

Following the chart is a district by district assessment of the defense situation in Uruzgan during TFU, as measured by approximate levels of government access as independently measured by TLO.

District	2006	2010	Percentage of the population
Tirin Kot	30-40%	75%	29.6

¹⁵⁴ The Liaison Office, “The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan,” 41.

Deh Rawud	20%	85%	13.6
Chora	20%	45%	12.7
Gizab	0%	50%	15
Char China	2%	2%	13.1
Chenartu	No Data ¹⁵⁵	20-30%	3.3
Khas Uruzgan	30%	15%	12.6

District-Level Security Assessment

The following section examines progress in each of the seven districts of Uruzgan during TFU from 2006 to 2010. As a reminder, the three districts that the Dutch focused their attention on were Deh Rawud, Tirin Kot, and Chora.

DEH RAWUD

Deh Rawud province experienced the greatest transformation during Task Force Uruzgan. Originally at only 20 percent government penetration, by the end of the Dutch engagement Deh Rawud would be the most secure district in the province. In 2007, ISAF and local forces drove the Taliban out from most parts. After driving the Taliban out, there was continued coordination between GoA representatives, ISAF, ANA, ANP, and local militias. This coordination resulted in the long term expulsion of the Taliban from the district. ISAF, ANA, and the ANP have established security across the province that has allowed for a nearly fully functional district-level government. Importantly, there has also been an emphasis in the district on tribal balance, especially in the local *shuras*, which helped to create stability.¹⁵⁶

TIRIN KOT

Tirin Kot had the highest level of government penetration when the Dutch arrived at between 30 and 40 percent, which increased to 75 percent, making it the second most secure district in the province. During the four years of TFU, the Dutch and local forces were able to eliminate or reduce the number of Taliban strongholds across the district. The city of Tirin Kot is the economic center of Uruzgan, and therefore has many of the major roads in the province leading directly to and from it. As a result, road security in the district is a major concern. The *Tirin Kot – Kandahar Highway* has organized protection for general travelers, ISAF supply convoys, and

¹⁵⁵ Chenartu was the only district not to be measured by TLO in 2006. According to descriptions of the district (see below) the GoA was in a position of relative strength in 2006, and that the situation has only decreased since then. Taking this into consideration, an educated estimate of the situation in Chenartu puts the security situation there in the 40-60% range during 2006. Also note that the Taliban considers Chenartu to be a part of Char China, while the GoA considers it to be a separate district.

¹⁵⁶ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 40-41.

government officials every ten days; this protection is organized by Matiullah Khan.¹⁵⁷ On days outside of the organized protection the road can be difficult for those affiliated with the government or international to traverse, as the insurgency sets up ad-hoc checkpoints along the highway. Individuals not affiliated with the government are able to traverse the road generally without trouble. The road from Tirin Kot to Deh Rawud is the safest road in the province and has patrols by the ANA and ANP. Finally, the road to Khas Uruzgan is relatively safe after leaving Tirin Kot, but aside from small pockets of protection outside Chenartu the road can be unsafe. While the number of Taliban in the district has been reduced, they are still quite capable of planting IEDs or launching raids against selected targets.¹⁵⁸

A prominent example of cooperation between the Dutch and Australian Special Forces occurred in Tirin Kowt on 28 April 2006. Both units took positions overlooking the Taliban stronghold in the village of Surkh Murgab which is 15 km north of the Dutch base Camp Holland located in Tirin Kot. The operators were under small-arms fire and attacks from rocket-propelled grenades and the order was given to retreat. As the Australians retreated the Dutch covered them, but during the retreat an Australian vehicle became stuck in mud and attracted the entirety of the Taliban assault. The Dutch operators opened a massive barrage of fire on the Taliban forces, driving them back and allowing for all of the Dutch and Australian forces to successfully retreat.¹⁵⁹

An interesting development that occurred in Tirin Kot as security increased. The Dutch Marines stationed in the city began using mountain bikes to more efficiently patrol. The bikes offer two direct benefits. The first is that they are a practical way of moving faster within more remote areas of the city that are difficult to reach in the armored vehicles typically used on patrol. Secondly, the bikes make the soldiers appear more human and accessible to the population. Afghans have reportedly responded enthusiastically to this new initiative.¹⁶⁰ A similar tactic that is used by the Dutch to increase their accessibility to the local populations is, in the more secure areas, to not wear helmets. This also projects an air of confidence.¹⁶¹

CHORA

Chora fell under the control of the Taliban after two years of fierce fighting during 2006 and 2007. In 2008, thanks to a concerted effort by the Australian army and help from the ANP and Matiullah Khan, the GoA was firmly in control of the center. There were further attempts made by the Australians and ANP to drive the Taliban out of the northern part of the district, but as of 2010 there was no conclusive evidence that indicated the Taliban had been dispersed. There is also currently conflict in the district government, as the current governor, Daoud Khan, was in 2010 competing with his uncle Shah Mohammad over control of the district. The Dutch and

¹⁵⁷ During TFU Matiullah Khan was a local strongman in Uruzgan who would later become the provincial Chief of Police. He will be further examined in the section that focuses on the development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

¹⁵⁸ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 41-45.

¹⁵⁹ Michiel de Weger, "Vipers or Tigers," 137.

¹⁶⁰ *Bicycles in Wartime* on "TYWKIWDBI" Blog. 30 January 2011.
<http://tywkiwdbi.blogspot.com/2011/01/bicycles-in-wartime.html>

¹⁶¹ C.J. Chivers, "Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, 6 April 2007.

Australians have thrown their support behind Khan, which has greatly upset the coalition of Popalzai strongmen in the district.¹⁶² In 2006, the GoA was in control of about 20 percent of the district, fell to near zero after the offensive by the Taliban, and by 2010 had rebounded to 45 percent control. This makes Chora the fourth most controlled district in Uruzgan.¹⁶³

The Battle of Chora and its Implications

Chora was home to the largest Dutch military engagement since the Korean War, where Dutch soldiers and their Afghan allies repelled a large scale assault of an area they had partially cleared. The Battle of Chora began on 10 June 2007 when between 300 to 1,000 Taliban insurgents surrounded the insurgents, leaving the 60 Dutch soldiers and the handful of poorly trained ANSF in the district on their own. The Dutch requested reinforcements from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, but the meager amount of reinforcements sent refused to go to Chora out of concern for their lives. On 16 June, just one day after a suicide bomb killed a Dutch soldier and five Afghan children, the Dutch and Afghan forces came under a sustained and organized attack. The Dutch quickly moved the majority of its 500 soldier Battle Group into the district, and supported the soldiers with Howitzers, Apache Helicopters, and F-16s. In three fierce days of combat, the Taliban were defeated, sustaining over two hundred casualties, while only one additional Dutch soldier was killed, this time do to an accident with a mortar. Between 60 to 70 Afghan civilians died during the fighting, with 15 being captured, tortured, and killed by the Taliban; the remaining 45 to 65 died as a result of Dutch bombardments, which occurred despite warning the population ahead of time of the assaults.¹⁶⁴

The results of the Battle of Chora were that the GoA and the Dutch had successfully repelled the Taliban. Yet, the conduct of the Dutch military was immediately investigated by international groups because of the civilian casualties. ISAF Commander, US General Dan McNeill, claimed that the Dutch use of a Howitzer without a forward controller was a breach in the law of war; the Dutch denied this, saying that the use of modern, advanced Howitzers within a distance of 40km (the range they were in) did not necessitate the need of forward controller. While it was only a rumor and has not been substantiated, the Australian military apparently refused to take part in the battle, as they deemed it too risky for the civilian population. The Dutch commanders in charge of the mission were never prosecuted in the Dutch criminal justice system over their actions.¹⁶⁵

The critique that the Dutch were too heavy-handed was in stark contrast to the earlier reports by, amongst others, the British military that the Dutch were too concerned with their own safety and were cowards. The Dutch firmly refuted these accusations, and other scholars have also joined in to defend the Dutch in this regard. Part of the conflict within the Netherlands on

¹⁶² Remember from the section on Afghan ethnography that the Popalzai are a minority tribe (about 10%) in Afghanistan that wields disproportionate power because President Hamid Karzai is a member. The political importance of the Popalzai tribe will be further examined in the *Diplomacy* section of the case study.

¹⁶³ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 42.

¹⁶⁴ Peter Olsthoorn and Desiree Verweij, "Military ethics and Afghanistan," in *Mission Uruzgan*, ed. Robert Beeres (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 81-85.

¹⁶⁵ Olsthoorn and Verweij, "Military ethics and Afghanistan," 81-85.

this topic revolves around the nature of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, as many in Dutch politics viewed TFU as development first, combat second.¹⁶⁶ This ignores the basic fundamentals of Dutch counterinsurgency, as economic and political development cannot meaningfully occur without security.

GIZAB

At the beginning of 2006, Gizab was completely controlled by the Taliban, with TLO giving the government control over 0 percent of the district. This continued until early 2010, when a group of pro-government Pashtun forces¹⁶⁷ reclaimed the district from the Taliban, driving them away from the main population center. This is particularly important, as this Pashtun force acted independently of the counterinsurgent force, operating without any political, military, or economic assistance. Afterwards, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Dutch, and American soldiers took control of the district center. As of 2010, it could not be determined whether or not there was GoA influence outside of the district center. At the end of TFU, it was estimated that the GoA controlled 50 percent of the district, making it the third most controlled district.¹⁶⁸

CHAR CHINA

For the GoA, the situation in Char China is bleak. The Taliban have effectively been in control of the province since at least 2006, with the TLO scoring the district as being 2 percent controlled by the government. There is only a very small section of the district center that can be considered under government control. According to Haji Naeem, the provincial council member for the GoA from Char China, “if you stand on the roof of the district government building in the centre of Char China and you call out ‘Talib!’ they will pop up and wave back.”¹⁶⁹ During TFU, there has been no reported increase in security or development by Afghan or international forces. Residents of Char China regard the Taliban positively, and “speak highly of the mediating and governing skills of some of the insurgency leaders.”¹⁷⁰

CHENARTU

The Taliban consider Chenartu a small part of Chora, and thus have not had an official shadow government installed in the area. Of all of the districts in Uruzgan, Chenartu was the only one not to be examined in 2006 by TLO, but it is safe to say that, based on their assessment in 2010, the GoA had a relative position of strength in the district as compared to the insurgency. In an educated estimate of the situation in Chenartu, the GoA controlled between 40 and 60 percent of the district. Over the course of TFU, a resident of Chenratu notes, “nothing has changed to the better, instead everything is getting worse day by day.”¹⁷¹ Behind this decrease in GoA strength lays a power struggle between the two Popalzai strongmen in the district. The Chief of Police of the ANP and the District Governor are actively struggling to gain the upper hand in controlling

¹⁶⁶ Olsthoorn and Verweij, “Military ethics and Afghanistan,” 81-85.

¹⁶⁷ While it is true that many Pashtuns support the Taliban, it is not necessarily true that all Pashtuns automatically support them. There is not enough information at the present time to determine what sub-tribe this group of Pashtuns belonged to.

¹⁶⁸ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 42.

¹⁶⁹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 42.

¹⁷⁰ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 42.

¹⁷¹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 43.

the district. While the Chief of Police had the upper hand, the ANP have not been a stable force in the district, with several revolts against the Chief between 2006 and 2010. As a result of this conflict, security and stability have decreased district wide, opening the door for increased Taliban presence and influence. In 2010 the GoA's penetration and influence in the district had decreased to between 20 and 30 percent.

KHAS URUZGAN

Security in Khas Uruzgan has been extremely limited during TFU. In 2006 the total GoA presence in Khas Uruzgan was at 30 percent. By 2010, the district government had lost significant ground to the Taliban, only controlling 15 percent of the district. Residents complain about how all aspects of life in Khas Uruzgan have deteriorated. The GoA presence in the district is limited to the areas surrounding the district center and near the American forward operating base (FOB) Anaconda. Otherwise, Khas Uruzgan is controlled by the Taliban. It is encouraging to note, however, that some Hazara and Pashtun elders are frustrated enough with the current situation to request military and logistical assistance from ANSF and ISAF in order to fight back against the Taliban. At the time of the Dutch withdrawal in 2010, the locals had not yet been armed, although the regional commander of the South based in Kandahar had promised his support.¹⁷²

Afghan Security Forces In Uruzgan

At the beginning of 2006, the state of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in Uruzgan was extremely limited. The Afghan National Army (ANA) had only one *kandak*, the most basic military grouping in the ANA, of six hundred members assigned to Uruzgan. These soldiers were generally poorly trained and poorly armed, and faced an insurgent threat with nearly twice the number of soldiers. The *kandak* was based in Kandahar and was deployed to Uruzgan. In 2010, the *tashkeel*, the officially recognized number of paid positions authorized by the central government, listed 4,781 soldiers dispersed over five *kandaks*, all of which were stationed directly in Uruzgan. Of the 4,781 on the *tashkeel*, there are only ever about 4,000 available, as there will be around 600 on leave and another 200 to 300 soldiers that have gone absent without leave, abandoning their position in the ANA. The 1st *kandak* is stationed in Deh Rawud, Char China, and Khas Uruzgan; the 2nd *kandak* stationed in Chora and parts of Tirin Kot; the 3rd *kandak* is currently split into separate divisions located in all across Chora; the 4th and 5th *kandaks* are deployed to Tirin Kot in Camp Holland, the main Dutch military base outside of Tarin Kot. Not included in this assessment of the ANA is the Special Forces *kandak*. There is a higher overall impression in Uruzgan of the ANA than of the Afghan National Police (ANP), as the ANA is typically better equipped, better trained, and generally more respectful of the rule of law.¹⁷³

In Uruzgan the Australians played a large role in the training of the ANA. For instance, The Second Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF-2) arrived in Uruzgan in 2009 to provide security for the election and train local security forces. The first aspect of the strategy

¹⁷² The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 43-44.

¹⁷³ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 37.

was to mentor the 4th ANA *Kandak* in order to conduct successful counterinsurgency strategy without aid. The MRTF-2 followed a philosophy of respect first, rapport second, and patience in pursuit of the outcome. To accomplish this, they used a combination of bottom up training and top down direction of priorities and deliberate training plans to shape the ANA into a successful counterinsurgency unit. The bottom up aspect of the training involved partnered operations and patrols, in which five to seven Australian soldiers and between ten to twenty-five Afghan soldiers would conduct operations and patrols together. While these operations involved on the spot training, they MRTF-2 demanded success and high levels of competency from their ANA counterparts, challenging them to rise to the occasion and succeed. The top down direction involved the deliberate planning of operations and patrols; once the MRTF-2 was established, the officers of the ANA were brought into these planning missions. Once comfortable with the competency level of the ANA commanders, the MRTF-2 gave primacy to their directive, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the ANA and the Afghan government.¹⁷⁴

Dutch Special Forces from *Task Force Viper* participated in training exercises for the ANA from 2007-2008 as a part of TFU's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team and then again as a part of *Task Force 55* from March 2009 to September 2010. One example of Dutch Special Forces engagement in training ANSF came in May 2007. In the small district of Chenartu the Taliban had been placing significant pressure on the pro-ISAF militia, and there had been several skirmishes between the militia and the Taliban. After *Viper* moved into the area, they made contact with Taliban soldiers and initially drove them out. The operators reached the heart of Chenartu and engaged with local leaders and began teaching the local militias basic marksmanship and other necessary infantry skills. *Viper* soldiers began taking this newly trained militia out on combined training missions, and after a couple of weeks the enemy presence in the valleys surrounding Chenartu dissipated. *Viper* was also a part of another combat and training mission in Mirabad, which lies between Chora and Tarin Kot.¹⁷⁵

The Afghan National Police (ANP) has played an important role in stabilizing certain parts of Uruzgan. Between 2006 and 2010, there has been a steady increase in the amount of ANP forces in the province. The ANP has been able to effectively absorb local tribal militias in Tirin Kot, Chora, and Deh Rawud, turning them into legally sanctioned members of the force. As a reminder, security increased in the three districts they focused on. According to Provincial Police Chief Juma Gul Hemat, the then current number of police officers in the ANP was between 2,000 and 3,000; this number corresponds to the official *tashkeel* number provided by the GoA. The number of recruits would likely have been higher, but the *tashkeel* places an artificial limit on the amount of police officers allowed in Uruzgan. As a result, many new recruits were sent to other provinces that have a dearth of men. An interesting phenomenon was the large influx of Hazara recruits between 2006 and 2010. As a result of Taliban rhetoric and actions, in which the message directed at the Hazara was that they did not belong in Afghanistan and should either leave or die, many men from the Hazara tribe signed up with their local branches of the ANP. They want to prove to other Afghans that they belong, and that they are willing to make a stand and fight back against the Taliban. There have been some issues resulting from this influx of Hazara men. ANP officers are often paired with ISAF troops as they

¹⁷⁴ Col. Peter Connolly, *Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009*, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Papers 2011, Australian Army.

¹⁷⁵ Michiel de Weger, *Vipers or tigers?*, 135-141.

conduct searches in private homes and businesses; if Hazara ANP officers are there when searching the house of a Pashtun family, there can be some tribal tensions and resentment that would not be present otherwise.¹⁷⁶

There have been considerable efforts by TFU to train and mentor the ANP. First, four members of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan were deployed to ANP units to act as advisors. Secondly, the Dutch established a Police Mentoring Program, based out of Camp Holland near Tirin Kot, where new ANP recruits are partnered with senior ANP constabulary forces and international military infantry in order to learn how to operate effectively. As of 2010, there were five Police Mentoring Teams deployed. Third was the American led Focused District Development training program, where an entire district's police officers are taken in and expertly trained. Chora's ANP forces were trained under the American program in 2010, and the overall impression in Chora was positive. The Dutch also initiated other programs, such as building the general police-training academy located in Tirin Kot, ANP regional stations and checkpoints throughout the province, and a provincial prison. These efforts by TFU certainly have made a significant impact on the overall security situation in Uruzgan, but Chief of Police Juma Gul Hemat was disappointed: during a six month period, 940 police officers were trained in Uruzgan, while 2,400 officers were trained in Helmand. While the training has certainly had an impact on the performance of ANP officers, the overall impression of the ANP is still negative, and significantly worse than the ANA. "Their general reputation still revolves around drug addiction, ill-fitting uniforms, bad equipment, bribery, and extortion."¹⁷⁷

One of the most important figures in the security of Uruzgan province is Matiullah Khan. When the war began in 2001 Matiullah was a taxi driver; when TFU began in 2006, Matiullah was an illiterate highway patrol officer. Yet in a few short years he became arguably the most important man in the province. Matiullah, a member of the Popalzai tribe, is the nephew or son-in-law of Jan Mohammed Khan, the brutal and corrupt former governor of Uruzgan. "In little more than two years, Mr. Matiullah... has grown stronger than the government... not only supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, like appointing public employees and doling out government largess."¹⁷⁸ His personal militia, numbering around 2,000 men and called *Kandak Amniante Uruzgan*, cooperates with American Special Forces and provides protection along the vital Khandahar – Tirin Kot Highway, as noted above. Matiullah charges approximately USD 1,200 per large truck and USD 800 per small truck to travel the route. It is estimated that Matiullah earns USD 4.1 million yearly as a result of this business, which he uses to pay the men in his militia. He has negotiated a deal with the Ministry of the Interior to subsidize the salary of 600 of the 1,500 men in the militia who protect the highway, who earn about USD 240 per month, a considerable salary in Uruzgan. Matiullah and his men commonly work with American Special Forces in raids against the Taliban across the entire province.¹⁷⁹

Even though what Matiullah Khan provides is crucial for the security structure in the state, his presence represents an overall troubling trend. A critical aspect of counterinsurgency is

¹⁷⁶ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 34-36.

¹⁷⁷ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 36.

¹⁷⁸ Dexter Filkens, *With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire*, in *New York Times* 5 June 2010.

¹⁷⁹ Dexter Filkens, *With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire*, in *New York Times* 5 June 2010.

building the official state structures – the national security forces and local government in particular – and Matiullah’s militia exists outside that sphere. The presence of his troops undermines the official state structures of the GoA, creating legitimacy issues surrounding the rule of law. Of particular note is that many of the men in the militia are former members of the ANA and ANP who still wear their official state uniforms while serving in the militia. Many leave the ANSF because Matiullah’s militia provides a better and more reliable source of income. The use of militias is just a temporary stop gap though. Major general Nick Carter, the commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, said that “the institutions of the government, in security and military terms, are not yet strong enough to be able to provide security ... But the situation is unsustainable and clearly needs to be resolved.”¹⁸⁰ The long-term goal would be to absorb these private militias into the existing state structure.¹⁸¹ Uruzganis worry that Matiullah is just a parasite taking advantage of the situation and that he will not survive long beyond the international withdrawal. Yet Matiullah said that “Oruzgan (sic) used to be the worst place in Afghanistan, and now it’s the safest ... What should we do? The officials are cowards and thieves.”¹⁸²

Assessment of the Dutch Approach to Defense

Throughout Task Force Uruzgan the Dutch Armed Forces had a high level of success in increasing security in the province. In the three *ink spot* districts, Chora, Deh Rawud, and Tirin Kot, security and government penetration increased notably. While the GoA did not have more than 50 percent penetration in Chora, it is important to remember that throughout 2006 and 2007 the district was home to intense Taliban activity and only through the combined efforts of Dutch, American, Australian, and Afghan forces was the Taliban pushed back. In 2006, the GoA had majority control of about 0 percent of the population according to TLO; in 2010 approximately 60 percent of the population lives in a district where the GoA had a monopoly on the use of force. The Dutch presence in Deh Rawud was the most effective, with the Government of Afghanistan having a near monopoly on the use of power in the district with 85 percent penetration. Tirin Kot, the economic and political center of the province, also experienced increased security with the government controlling 75 percent of the district. One of the most surprising results throughout TFU was the major increase in security in Gizab. The province went from no GoA presence to 50 percent as a result of a spontaneous uprising by anti-Taliban Pashtuns. In the other three districts, Char China, Chenartu, and Khas Uruzgan, the security situation decreased. This is more than likely because the Dutch had little or no presence in these districts.

The Dutch were also highly successful in increasing the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army both saw an increase in the quantity of recruits. The training provided by Dutch, Australian, and American personnel was instrumental in achieving one of the overarching goals of the Dutch mission, which was to build

¹⁸⁰ Dexter Filkens, *With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire*, in *New York Times* 5 June 2010.

¹⁸¹ It should be noted that Matiullah Khan became the Provincial Chief of Police after the Dutch Withdrawal in August 2010, and that most of his militia was absorbed into the official state structure.

¹⁸² Dexter Filkens, *With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire*, in *New York Times* 5 June 2010.

the formal security capacity in Uruzgan so that the ANSF would be capable of continuing on without direct support from outside actors.

The counterinsurgency approach undertaken in Uruzgan emphasized the protection of civilians and limiting the use of kinetic operations unless absolutely necessary. This required the Dutch to adapt both their kinetic and non-kinetic operations in order to assure clarity over the rules of engagement and adjust to the ever-changing tactics of the Taliban.

Chapter Five: Development and Diplomacy

“...But I suppose the patron meant that if you give a man a fish he is hungry again in an hour; if you teach him to catch a fish you do him a good turn.”

-Anne Isabel Ritchie

Development

Development of the area of operations (AOE) is one of the three pillars of Dutch counterinsurgency. For Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), the goal was to “promote stability in Afghanistan and support the authorities’ reconstruction efforts.”¹⁸³ In Uruzgan, an emphasis was placed on building new or improving: basic infrastructure, bridges, schools, mosques, facilities for purifying drinking water, and medical services. Overall, the Dutch had ultimate say in the formulation of policy in regards to development, supplying the funds for nearly every project initiated in the province. While the Dutch organized the overall approach and directed its development, they did not, however, carry out the projects using Dutch personnel. Instead, the Dutch delegated the actual implementation of development projects to other actors, including the United Nations (UN), the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), Afghan and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and to the Australian military. The Dutch also understood that at a fundamental level, “the provision of security and development assistance go hand in hand, with the military providing an enabling environment for civilian development actors and development projects contributing to a more stable and secure environment.”¹⁸⁴

In addition to this, the Dutch utilized an *under the radar* approach to development, delivering small-scale aid to locals through intermediaries to ensure the safety of those receiving aid. This program, referred to as a ‘mini-National Solidarity Programme,’ involved Dutch personnel working with village *shuras*. Each *shura* would create a list of projects that their community wanted or needed, and over the next four months the village would receive installments of USD 1,000 per month. Critical to the success of this program was that the next installment would only be paid if there were noted progress made over the previous month, ensuring accountability. “So far the approach has been successful as communities feel that they have a measure of autonomy and decision-making capacity (and responsibility) in the development process. The program has also benefited the local economy through short-term job creation.”¹⁸⁵ The most important aspect of this project, though, was its ability to deliver development aid to districts that were contested or controlled by the Taliban. This allowed development funds to be spread amongst the entire province. As of 2009, “none of these projects,

¹⁸³ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). *The Netherlands in Afghanistan*. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁸⁴ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 6.

¹⁸⁵ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later: A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009*, (Kabul: TLO, 2010), 12.

which include canal cleaning and reconstruction, water wells and hydro-dynamos, have been targeted by the insurgency.”¹⁸⁶

This study recognizes that there are challenges to quantifying progress when it comes to development, as numbers do not simply provide all of the relevant information. On the whole, though, “residents did report improvements in the key areas of education, health care, agricultural development, and transportation (roads) since 2006, with more services reaching communities.”¹⁸⁷ This section examines various development sectors to determine progress, looks at additional factors in development, and analyzes the methods used by the Dutch to develop Uruzgan.

Development Sectors

This section of the chapter discusses the various development sectors that the Dutch attempted to improve over the course of TFU. It is important to note that the sectors discussed here are by no means an entirely exhaustive list, but for the most part they represent the vast proportion of development efforts.

AGRICULTURE

Over the four years of Dutch involvement in Uruzgan, there have been significant gains made in the agricultural sector. Following the basic patterns of development shown elsewhere, the Dutch instituted projects ranging from large-scale distributions of seeds to small, under the radar micro-credit programs aimed at helping increase agricultural production. On the whole, these projects can be considered a great success.

There are factors concerning agriculture in Uruzgan specifically and Afghanistan generally, which must be addressed before moving on to gains made between 2006 and 2010. The first set involves the overall nature of agriculture in Uruzgan. Subsistence farming is the primary economic activity of most Uruzganis, with a noticeable lack of large-scale agribusiness as seen in more developed states. In addition to this, Uruzgan is not located in a great place for inter-state trade, and the main road out of the province, to Kandahar, is not remotely close to being safe for the consistent distribution of goods. As a result of these conditions, subsistence farming may continue to be the norm.¹⁸⁸ Weather also plays a large role in the ability of farmers to produce, as there can be large variations in the temperature and amount of rainfall. The second involves the dynamics of opium production. The sale of illegal narcotics have been used to finance war efforts throughout history, including both the Viet Minh and France struggling over the vital opium trade in Indochina during the French-Indochina War.¹⁸⁹ In Afghanistan, the production and sale of poppy, which is turned into opium, has been an incredibly valuable resource. For local farmers, the production of poppy in their fields is the most profitable cash-crop available to them. This poses a challenge for counterinsurgents: they must be able to

¹⁸⁶ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 12.

¹⁸⁷ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 6.

¹⁸⁸ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 10.

¹⁸⁹ Fredrik Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam*, (New York: Random House, 2013).

convince the population to follow the rule of law and grow other, less profitable, agriculture. The culture and economics relating to opium production would be a challenge that the Dutch would have to face in order to improve agriculture and combat the insurgency.

In 2006, there was an estimated 9,703 hectares (ha)¹⁹⁰ used for poppy production in Uruzgan; in 2007 production dipped slightly to 9,204 ha, rose in 2008 to 9,939 ha, and slightly decreased in 2009. The decrease in production in 2009 was in response to decreasing opium prices and rising prices of wheat. But in 2010, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released their assessment on opium production in Afghanistan. As a result of a disease that affected the opium crop in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, two major sites of opium production, the overall output of opium in Afghanistan decreased. As a result, prices have increased by 36 per cent to USD 4,900 per hectare (10,000 square meters).¹⁹¹ While it certainly varies, a hectare of opium can, in ideal situations such as those seen in Afghanistan in 2009, produce up to 56 kilograms of the drug.¹⁹² Yury Fedotov, the executive Director of UNODC, says that “in combination with the high price of opium, a low wheat price may also drive farmers back to opium cultivation.”¹⁹³ The high price of opium reinforces the desire of many of Afghans to use the cash crop as a method to increase their wealth. Trying to address opium production is a tricky matter because of the nature of supply in demand. As the counterinsurgents are able to convince the population to move away from poppy production, this lowers the supply and thus raises the price, driving farmers back to producing the drug because of how lucrative it is.

When the Dutch arrived in 2006, the agricultural sector of Uruzgan was in shambles. Irrigation canals were in terrible conditions, there was an over reliance on the production of poppy, and there was a serious dearth of livestock, as most had been killed as a result of combat. In order to combat these insufficiencies and improve the circumstances of Uruzgani farmers, the Dutch directed many varying agricultural programs. One example of an agricultural program used by the Dutch was the distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer to over 32,000 families. The widespread distribution of seeds is indicative of the reliance on subsistence farming, as the amount of individual groups receiving this assistance would have been lower if there were large agribusinesses in Uruzgan.¹⁹⁴ An important aspect of the wheat distribution system was to provide a measure of food security to Uruzganis, as many in the province had been adversely affected by high food prices and draught. In addition, the provision of wheat seeds and fertilizers helps to improve the local capacity for producing agricultural products.¹⁹⁵ The wheat that is produced in Uruzgan is for local consumption. A second program was the distribution of 4,500 chickens to 500 families. Each family received seven hens and two roosters which would facilitate a production of eggs for the family to eat or sell. These chickens were distributed mostly to widows with small children, as they provided a relatively easy source of nutrition and

¹⁹⁰ One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters.

¹⁹¹ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Afghan opium production halves in 2010, according to UNODC annual survey*. 30 September 2010.

¹⁹² United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment 2010*. February 2010.

¹⁹³ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. *Afghan opium production halves in 2010, according to UNODC annual survey*. 30 September 2010.

¹⁹⁴ The Liaison Office, *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*.

¹⁹⁵ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 15.

income. A third program was the distribution of micro-credit to 2,295 members of the Islamic Investment and Finance Cooperatives (IIFCs) in Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud. These small loans helped to facilitate the ability of farmers to purchase seed and equipment for the upcoming growing season.¹⁹⁶ The programs described here focused on lower-level economic development and helping to provide sustainable and legal, sources of revenue for Uruzgani families.

Fourth and maybe most importantly, was the introduction of saffron in Uruzgan. Authorized by the Dutch government, a small Dutch company came to Uruzgan and controlled the entire supply chain of the valuable spice. The company first taught a select group of farmers about the substantial earning potential for producing saffron, and then expanded on the proper techniques for growing a high quality product. Next, the company distributed seeds and other necessary equipment to the farmers. Critically, the Dutch company guaranteed the farmers that they would purchase however much saffron they were able to produce, effectively alleviating doubt and guaranteeing income. There were 500 farmers participating in the program in 2010; for 220 of these farmers 2010 was their first year, indicating a rapid increase in the appeal of legal, high profit cash crop alternatives to poppy. In 2008 production reached 51.5 kg of saffron, in 2008 97.5 kg and in 2010 the company believed that production would be near 200 kg. The goal of the program was to continue to expand saffron production across Uruzgan, as the company was looking to expand cultivation areas by 300 percent by 2015. Since the program's inception, the quality and quantity of saffron has increased after each growing season. The quality of the saffron is still low, with 90 percent being of a second or third order quality, in 2010 10 percent of the saffron was of the highest quality, with this number only expected to increase as the farmers gain experience.¹⁹⁷ For reference, the price of saffron, depending on its quality, can range from \$1,100 to \$11,000 per kilogram.¹⁹⁸

The accomplishments in agriculture over the four years of the Dutch engagement were impressive. Since the Dutch arrived in 2006, "projects have promoted the distribution of improved seeds, fertilizers, saplings, poultry, agricultural training, including gardening training for women in Tirin Kot; construction of roads and dams; cleaning and digging of canals."¹⁹⁹ Each of these activities contributed to positive gains in the agricultural sector. Even with all of the progress, though, farmers still look to opium production as an easy way to maximize profit. Some areas of Uruzgan have complied with the government ban on producing poppy, such as Deh Rawud in May 2010 and in Chora, where the local *shura* agreed to a ban as well. For reference, the population of Deh Rawud and Chora are 78,750 and 72,000, respectively. The majority of Uruzganis survive on subsistence farming, so it is fair to assume that at least 67 percent of the individuals in these two districts were potential opium farmers, meaning there is over 100,000 less potential opium farmers. The high international price and demand for opium still drives production, though. But it seems that the Dutch development programs are working, as "Tirin Kot residents added that poppy cultivation would have been more extensive without the distribution of alternative seeds and saplings."²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 10-11.

¹⁹⁷ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 10.

¹⁹⁸ "The World's Priciest Foods: Saffron. Accessed on 5 March 2014.

http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/fsb/0807/gallery.most_expensive_foods.fsb/4.html

¹⁹⁹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 10.

²⁰⁰ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 12.

HEALTHCARE

During their time in Uruzgan, the Dutch counterinsurgents were able to successfully overhaul and improve the healthcare system in the province. The efforts of the Dutch led to improved facilities, increased numbers of practitioners, and higher overall quality of the healthcare provided to residents of Uruzgan.

There were many different programs that the Dutch directed in Uruzgan. First and foremost, the Dutch, along with other foreign donors, funded two Afghan NGOs, Afghan Health and Development Services (AHDS) and Afghanistan Centre for Training and Development (ACTD). Both of these NGOs played a critical role in the development of the healthcare sector by increasing the technical skills of health care practitioners in Uruzgan. Second, and the area in which there was the most measurable progress, was the increase in health care facilities. As of 2010, there was a Comprehensive Health Center (CHC) and or a Basic Health Center (BHC) in every district but Gizab.²⁰¹ Between 2006 and 2010 there was an overall increase in CHCs and BHCs from nine to seventeen. Also, there was a large increase in the amount of smaller health center across the province; the amount doubled, from one hundred centers to two hundred. Each one of these centers had at least one community health worker, either male or female, who had the ability to treat low-level problems and could always refer up to one of the larger facilities if necessary. There was an overall increase in community health workers from one hundred and thirty to three hundred, with one third of these workers being women. Another significant contribution to the health care sector in Uruzgan was the creation of a midwife school. The midwife school was started to educate and train women to act as certified midwives in their community, and began with a capacity of twelve students. The first class of students graduated in spring 2010.²⁰²

The final and maybe most important development in the health care sector were the improvements that occurred at the Tirin Kot hospital. The hospital, which had prior to 2006 been operating as a district wide hospital, was upgraded to a provincial facility, indicating that it had increased capabilities. These upgraded facilities included, “an outpatient clinic, a blood bank, an operation room, a mortuary, a cholera ward, and a separate women’s ward.”²⁰³ These improvements were seen as important upgrades in the healthcare sector for the entire province, as it provides a higher quality facility that is easier to access for many citizens.²⁰⁴

EDUCATION

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), education is a key to societal development as it reduces poverty and decrease childhood mortality rates; therefore, it makes sense that education would be a primary development sector for the Dutch to focus on. When discussing improvements in the educational sector, especially in a state like Afghanistan,

²⁰¹ The reason why Gizab did not receive a CHC or a BHC was that control of the districts has fluctuated from Uruzgan and Day Kundi. This fluctuation in control has resulted in communication and control issues – as responsibility for the district changes, no one feels that they are responsible for developing the area, and it is left alone.

²⁰² The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 13-15.

²⁰³ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 15.

²⁰⁴ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 15.

and Uruzgan specifically, an increase in the number of schools does not necessarily correlate to an increase in physical buildings. Many schools in Uruzgan exist in private homes or businesses, mosques, in tents, or outside. In fact, only 43% of students in Uruzgan consistently study inside a building. Keeping this in mind, there were still impressive developments in the educational sector during Dutch command of Uruzgan.

Uruzgan, when compared to other provinces across Afghanistan, has very low provincial wide enrollment for children in schools. On average, only twenty percent of school age children actually attend school, which is down from the national average of fifty percent. This picture becomes even bleaker if you exclude the Hazara dominated districts – as the Hazara tribe has a long standing history with education. But as a result of Dutch efforts, the educational sector in Uruzgan is improving.²⁰⁵

In 2006, The Liaison Office (TLO) only knew of thirty four schools in the entire province, with only Tirin Kot, Khas Uruzgan, and Gizab having schools for girls. By 2010, there was a substantial increase, with one hundred and sixty six schools operating, of which seven were *madrassas*²⁰⁶, twenty nine were all-girl schools, and thirteen were co-ed schools. There were an additional ninety-four schools that had been closed, and fifteen that were not yet officially open; in this case, the schools were operational but had not been officially recognized by the GoA.²⁰⁷ In 2010, there were 42,772 total students in the province that attend school regularly, and there is an addition 5,234 students that go occasionally. 19,600 students go to elementary school, 15,200 go to secondary school, and about 18,700 go to high school. Of these numbers, there are approximately 6,800 girls attending school throughout all levels. Another important metric to look at in regards to education is the amount of teachers present in the province. There are no accurate numbers for the amount of teachers prior to 2006, but in 2010 there were 1,126 teachers present in Uruzgan, with 67 of them being women. Teacher training schools also exist in Tirin Kot and Khas Uruzgan, with a total of 425 future teachers enrolled.²⁰⁸

The improvements made in the educational sector were substantial and important. There is still a large portion of the Uruzgani population that remains illiterate and uneducated – perhaps reflecting the history of subsistence agriculture as the leading economic activity in the province, as there is little time for children to attend school because they are needed at home to work. Regardless, there have been positive steps to creating an environment in Uruzgan where educational opportunities take a higher precedent.

²⁰⁵ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 20.

²⁰⁶ It bears noting that, contrary to popular perception, not all *madrassas* produce radical Islamists. *Madrassas* are religious schools dating back to the original *madrassa* established in Egypt in 1005 A.D. by the Fatimid Caliphs in Egypt. At a normal *madrassa* students are taught about the Quran, Hadith (about the life and wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad) and other aspects of Islamic life such as Islamic jurisprudence. The militarized *madrassas* that are well known amongst Americans are those that combine a monolithic interpretation of Islam twisted to a violent political ideology. For more information on this, please see: Moniza Khokhar, “Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (2007): 353-365.

²⁰⁷ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 17.

²⁰⁸ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 20.

GENDER EQUALITY

Uruzgan is one of the most socially conservative provinces in the state. In Afghanistan, it was the only province ““where no women candidates could be found to run for the three reserved female Provincial Council (PC) seats in the 2005 elections’ and that women ‘are deprived of education, health as well as employment opportunities.’”²⁰⁹ Increasing opportunities to women and enabling 48.5 percent of the population of Uruzgan to have access to basic-needs facilities was a crucial aspect of the development policy of the Netherlands.

At the end of the Dutch mission in 2010 conditions for women were much better off than four years previously. Politically, there were two Pashtun women elected to the Provincial Council in 2009: Hilla, an NGO worker from Khas Uruzgan, and Marjana, a member of the Kuchi tribe from Tirin Kot. Hilla was further elected to the *Meshrano Jirga* (upper house of parliament), and in 2010 there was four women running for the *Wolesi Jirga* (lower house of parliament). While this is certainly an improvement since the last election, there is a certain caveat that needs to be considered. “In general, women in Uruzgan have not been participating in political networks and have only acquired political position with outside support. ... Most people interviewed, however, argue that certain [male] leaders support women to improve their image rather than out of concern for the position of women.”²¹⁰ It may not be important one way or the other if this is true; however, women are still becoming involved in politics in Afghanistan regardless of the intent of those pushing them into it, and progress begets future progress regardless of how it began.

There have been other opportunities that have opened up to women over the four year period as well. In addition to the women being trained as midwives, as mentioned in the education section, healthcare in general has become significantly more accessible. In 2010, women accounted for over 40 percent of all visitors to healthcare facilities; in 2004, the last time there was a measure of this metric, women visited healthcare facilities so infrequently that they did not factor into the statistics. There has been an increase in immunization for women from 26 percent to 60 percent, and the use of family planning has risen from 4 percent to nine percent. In the educational sector, there has been an increase in the amount of schools for girls, and in the enrolment of girls into these schools. Consider, though, that “almost all of these girls or mixed schools are in the two districts with Hazara populations,” which have a long standing history and tradition of education.²¹¹ Finally, more and more women are going outside the house by themselves and shopping in the bazaars. This is a large step for many women, as in the conservative parts of Uruzgan many women are not allowed to leave the house without a male relative. There are estimates that about one hundred women per day are seen shopping in the Tirin Kot bazaar.

While far from perfect, there has still been a significant increase in the rights and opportunities afforded to women. As a result of the Dutch development policy, women have more rights than they had previously, and if trends continue they will have further opportunities in the future.

²⁰⁹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 23.

²¹⁰ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 23-24.

²¹¹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 25.

Additional Development Factors

The Dutch approach to development focused on improving the various development spheres described above. In addition, there were other smaller, more focused programs aimed at specific development targets. This section examines these other programs as well as other factors that impacted development.

One negative consequence of the Dutch reconstruction plan involves the presence of corruption in Uruzgan. Graft and corruption has an obviously deleterious effect on development projects – kickbacks and bribes take away from the bottom line and hurt the budget. Beyond this concept of wasted resources, though, the necessity of bribes to complete even the most routine task hurts the overall quality of the work being accomplished. Simply, there is just less money available to complete the project, so often the quality of the materials used is lessened. The typical development plan will involve accepting the bid of a main contractor to finish the project. This contractor will then accept bribes from subcontractors to be included in the project. In order to combat this both the Dutch and the Australians have been relying on direct contracting with local firms rather than through the multiple subcontractors to help mitigate the graft.²¹²

The overall economic progress of the province should also be examined. The increase in security over the four years has led to a large increase in the number of businesses operating with the Tirin Kot bazaar, growth from nine hundred to two thousand. There has also been a corresponding expansion in the bazaars in Chora and Deh Rawud. The increase in development and the migration of families away from unstable districts in Uruzgan has led to an increased demand for housing in Tirin Kot. In the center of the city, for instance, homes are now around four times as expensive in 2010 as in 2006.²¹³ The price of commodities has tripled, as most goods are imported into the region from neighboring Kandahar and Kabul; with roads being generally insecure, the price of goods has risen to reflect the insecurity. Two banks have opened up in the region: the Bank of Kabul in 2009 and Azizi Bank in 2010. There is an issue in Uruzgan, like much of Southern Afghanistan, over the accepted currency. “Dependence on Kandahar City markets leads to reliance on the Pakistani Rupee, the main currency of the province. The Afghan currency, the Afghani, is rarely accepted in stores, and is often exchanged at the same rate as the PKR, despite its higher value. The result is Uruzgan’s economy is more under the influence of Pakistan than oriented toward Afghan markets.”²¹⁴

One of the main consequences of the Dutch reconstruction plan stems from the use of an “ink spot” approach to counterinsurgency. By focusing on the three population centers in Uruzgan the Dutch had effectively abandoned the other districts to the Taliban, at the exception of some of the small scale *under-the-radar* development programs. Across the province there has been no significant increase in the amount of income for individuals and families, even with all of the development programs instituted. In the communities that were barely touched by the development programs, however, there has been no increase in the economic situation.²¹⁵

²¹² The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 9.

²¹³ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 7.

²¹⁴ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 8.

²¹⁵ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 8.

An issue that was confronted the Dutch during TFU had to do with asymmetrical information involving technical knowledge. Dutch personnel were confronted with issues such as: *just how do you build in Afghanistan? What is the impact of the heat, sun, and sand on building materials, and how does this impact construction? And where do you find all of the necessary supplies to construct things to a sufficient quality standard?* These issues were sometimes painful for the Dutch to address, as many of the military officials who were put in charge of construction projects needed to verify information without any background knowledge in any form of engineering.²¹⁶ Further, as the Dutch were new to the area in 2006, some Afghans leveraged the situation for their own benefit, such as unqualified contractors winning bids for projects because the Dutch were unable to verify their capabilities. In order to combat this, the Dutch developed processes to gain a balance of information, including using technical personnel to interview contractors to ascertain their qualifications. In addition, references from past work were critical to the ability of contractors to win bids.²¹⁷ By learning on the job and adapting their processes to match the realities of the mission, TFU was able to better able to foster development.

THE IDEA PROGRAM

The Dutch IDEA-officers who operated in Uruzgan played an important role in stimulating small-scale entrepreneurial development in the province. IDEA stands for the Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities. This unit consisted of reserve officers, whose employment in the private sector gave them experience in creating new businesses. They were deployed in three-month tours in Uruzgan to teach local Afghans how to start businesses. The unit was created in 2000 and is jointly controlled by the Dutch Armed Forces and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers. “The goal of IDEA are to build and develop sustainable local entrepreneurial capacity by advising and training entrepreneurs in post-conflict rebuilding contexts and informing military commanders regarding instruments for private sector development.”²¹⁸ IDEA officers were deployed in Uruzgan starting in 2008, with one officer stationed at Camp Holland in Tirin Kowt and a second in Deh Rawoud.

When IDEA first comes into an area, the first goal is to establish local business development centers (BDC), which function essentially as a chamber of commerce for the local community. BDCs provide basic assistive services for local entrepreneurs, including advice and training and opportunities for them to build social networks within the local business community. Once established and functional, the IDEA officer then finds an NGO to take over operating the BDC to ensure that the center will survive long after the Dutch leaves the area. In Uruzgan this was the Afghan Centre for Training and Development (ACTD). A second part of the IDEA mission is to train entrepreneurs through the *Start and Improve your Business-method*, a method developed by the International Labour Organization. More than 200 Uruzganis were trained

²¹⁶ Julia Wijnmalen, Jasper Kremers and Edwin Dado, “Reconstruction through construction,” in *Mission Uruzgan*, ed. Robert Beeres (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 185.

²¹⁷ Julia Mijmalen, “Reconstruction through construction,” 186.

²¹⁸ Eric-Hans Kramer, Rosa Nelly Trevinyo-Rodriguez and Desiree Verweij, “Stimulating entrepreneurship in Uruzgan: IDEA-officers focusing on private sector development in post-conflict environments,” in *Mission Uruzgan*, ed. Robert Beeres (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 211.

using this method. Additionally members of the ACTD were trained to teach this entrepreneurial program so they would be able to continue training beyond the Dutch withdrawal. Third, the Dutch established a microcredit bank in Camp Holland in Tirin Kot in conjunction with the World Council of Credit Unions and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of TFU the bank had over 1,200 customers and had issued over USD 500,000 in loans to Uruzganis. Finally, IDEA officers acted as advisors to the Dutch military commanders, providing economic and social development plans to assist the overall development of Uruzgan. One example of this occurred in Deh Rawoud, where the IDEA officer recommended the development of a local judicial system in the district, as the rule-of-law is an important aspect of fostering economic activity.²¹⁹

The IDEA officers in Uruzgan had to pay special attention to the local conditions in the province in order to have a hope of success. The only other locations that IDEA officers were deployed to were Bosnia and Baghlan, Afghanistan. Uruzgan differed greatly from both of these locations, as Uruzgan is poorer, lacks any industrial capability, and the primary economic activity is subsistence farming. Some IDEA officers referred to the economic landscape as “biblical.” As a result of these conditions, the typical programs developed by IDEA would not be entirely relevant in Uruzgan. The local traders in Uruzgan, who under normal circumstances would be the primary recipient of the training offered, were actually toward to the top of the economic hierarchy in the province. Therefore, the IDEA officers began to think of the subsistence farmers as the entrepreneurs they should focus on, showering the farmers with entrepreneurial advice rather than advice on how to increase farm production. Culture also played a significant role in the success of the IDEA project. The officers had to be attentive to tribal and ethnic differences, as these played heavily into the success of development projects. If two different craftsmen are contracted to do a job, and the two are from different tribes, especially tribes that are historically at odds, then completing the job becomes exponentially more difficult. Further, the IDEA officers had to accept the presence of power-brokers in the province, as without their assistance (and cut of the money) development would have been hampered.²²⁰

Assessment of the Dutch Approach to Development

The ultimate goal of reconstruction is not just the development of the Uruzgani economy, but on the prospect of sustained development without substantial aid from outsiders in Uruzgan. There has been substantial progress in the development of Uruzgani economic and societal sectors, but the long term sustainability of these programs need to be examined. Will the Afghan government and the Dutch successors be able to continue the progress that has been made already? “The current situation in Uruzgan supports the statement that just providing aid does not increase the level of development in a state. ... The process of development is important. The research area of developmental aid has indicated factors which empower the link between receiving aid (e.g., construction objects) and general development (e.g., reconstruction): sustainability, capacity building, local ownership and the grass roots approach.”²²¹ These concepts are all linked.

²¹⁹ Eric-Hans Kramer et al., “Stimulating entrepreneurship in Uruzgan,” 215.

²²⁰ Eric-Hans Kramer et al., “Stimulating entrepreneurship in Uruzgan,” 216-217.

²²¹ Julia Mijmalen, “Reconstruction through construction,” 190.

Capacity building is the development of the incentives and skills in the local population to continue development long after the end of aid. In order to develop capacity building, local ownership of development projects is vital. The population must be a part of the decision-making process: what is the incentive to continue building schools if the population does not see their value? Considering this, the development plans must be linked to local needs, not the wishes of the development actor. By utilizing a grass roots approach and bringing forward development projects that originally stem from the population, the locals will take ownership of the task and will have the incentive to continue the development in the future.²²²

In Uruzgan, the results of development in this regard are mixed. While income hasn't risen in Uruzgan, the development programs directed by the Dutch in Uruzgan are impressive. They have established a 488 percent increase in the number of schools and a corresponding increase in the number of students regularly attending school, both boys and girls; there has been a significant increase in the availability of healthcare facilities and treatment options for men and women; and there have been positive steps made to move the agricultural sector away from poppy production and toward more profitable, and legal, products. Yet, "residents [of Uruzgan] say the main problem confronting the province is not a lack of development, but the continued weakness of the government. Locals see the development and reconstruction projects as something 'foreigners' do, while the state is largely deemed unresponsive to their needs."²²³ This indicates that the potential for sustained development after the Dutch withdrawal in 2010 to continue is limited. Additionally, after the international withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the prospects look increasingly bleak. If security worsens and the Taliban make a comeback, then the NGOs conducting the development projects will be worse off in the future, sacrificing all of the progress. The population only really sees one government agency as effective: the National Solidarity Programme of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). As of 2010, the organization was directing development programs through local Afghan NGO Afghanistan National Re-Construction Coordination in Deh Rawud, Chora, and in a smaller capacity in Chenartu. MRRD is directly operating in Tirin Kot.²²⁴

²²² Julia Mijmalen, "Reconstruction through construction," 191.

²²³ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 8.

²²⁴ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 8.

Diplomacy

“I don’t see any problem in the policies but the problem is in the implementation of policies. All the policies are written and organized very well, but due to unprofessional and unskilled personnel, lack of resources in offices, and lack of monitoring of provincial and district level, formal and informal institutions by the central government, the policies are not implemented in a good way.”

-Achekzai elder from Tirin Kot

The third pillar of the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency is the focus on diplomacy and politics. Compared to the second and third pillars of *defense* and *development*, the specific focus of *diplomacy* is less straightforward. Diplomacy in the context of Dutch counterinsurgency is the focus on social and political factors that contribute to the establishment and perpetuation of a legitimate, non-Taliban, political authority.

While it is possible to pursue development and defense in a somewhat independent manner and still have some success, the pillar of diplomacy relies upon the success or progress in the other two sectors. There are some factors that can be cleaned up and controlled within the government, such as corruption or nepotism, but in the end what concerns the population the most is security and development, things that in a war torn state are primarily controlled by the government. If the counterinsurgent government is responsible, or at least perceived as responsible, for overseeing increases in security and development in an area, then there will under normal circumstances be increased support for the government. In modern counterinsurgency, almost all acts are political.

The Dutch approach to diplomacy in Uruzgan operated with an understanding of the importance of strengthening the host-nation’s governing ability and penetration. Politics in Afghanistan, though, entail different considerations and dynamics than politics in many other states in the world; the discrepancies between political systems are particularly great when comparing the Afghan political tradition to the Western-liberal democracies from which most of the ISAF member states come from. As noted in chapter three, Afghanistan is a state without a strong history of central government – especially a central government that had any real influence on the life across the state. In addition, Afghanistan, and Uruzgan in particular, has an extremely diverse ethnic and tribal population. While in the United States and other highly developed post-industrial states diversity is celebrated and there are general patterns of inclusiveness, in Afghanistan this is not the case. Ethnic and tribal divisions truly matter in politics, and if the counterinsurgent force ignores this factor they would be in trouble. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the cycle of abuse in local politics is important: whenever a new tribe comes to power, they use their new strength to marginalize their opponents and cement their strength. When this tribe eventually loses their grip on authority the tribe that takes power continues the cycle. The Dutch recognized the nature of local politics, and “based [their approach] on understanding the local balance of power and including marginalized local elites in the Afghan government.”²²⁵

²²⁵ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 1.

An example of the importance of local political dynamics on overall success in the counterinsurgency can be seen through the actions of a Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2007. There were low levels of unrest amongst the population in a multi-tribal area, and the PRT decided to investigate before problems escalated, which could possibly open the door to Taliban influence. After investigating the area, it was clear to the PRT that the friction was generated by the dearth of water for irrigation purposes. The irrigation canals were failing as a result of damage from fighting and a lack of maintenance. Further, the history of the region was characterized by conflicts between the tribes – the origin of the dispute was unclear and lost to history. “The tribal disagreement was both cause and effect of the neglected canal as a fair distribution of water could only be achieved through cooperation between the neighboring tribe.”²²⁶ What originally appeared to be a technical problem was actually a complex inter-tribal dispute whose implications were critical to local stability.

In order to fix the problem, the PRT would have to address both the technical issue of a failing irrigation canal and assuage the inter-tribal conflict. The PRT needed to find a member of the local government to mediate the situation, as the Dutch personnel did not have an in-depth enough knowledge of the local dynamics to accurately address the situation. Also, in this circumstance the Dutch understood that it would be more important for the problem to be addressed by local actors rather than directly through their own actions. The mediator proposed a community-based group that was comprised of members from both tribal groups; this idea was accepted by both tribes and was presented and accepted by the PRT. Once brought together, the tribes were able to work effectively together in order to achieve their overall goal. The PRT provided some of the resources needed for the project, such as shovels, which were provided in a non-overt manner. “In sum, the execution of the repair work on the canal and the agreement regarding the maintenance indirectly brought together different tribes, and (a section of) the local government. The PRT checked the progress of the work, but kept a rather low-profile during the mediation- and the repair-process.” For those involved in the process, it highlighted how the government was actually capable of making a difference in their day-to-day lives.²²⁷

Arguably the most important factor in Afghani politics is the *Karzai connection*. President Hamid Karzai was a prominent Afghan before the fall of the Taliban, and was selected to lead an interim government during the 2002 *loya jirga* (grand assembly). When the first national elections occurred in 2004 Karzai won, and he then won the subsequent election in 2009 for an additional five-year term. President Karzai is a member of the Popalzai tribe, a tribe that constitutes only 10 percent of the total Afghan population. The *Karzai connection* is important because, based on the powers afforded to him by the Afghan Constitution; he has significant powers to appoint government officials ranging from the upper house of parliament to sub-national positions. According to the Center for American Progress, “all roads currently lead back to President Karzai, who directly appoints more than 1,000 government officials throughout the country and many more positions directly.”²²⁸

²²⁶ Wijnmalen et al., *Reconstruction through construction*, 180.

²²⁷ Wijnmalen et al., *Reconstruction through construction*, 180-181.

²²⁸ Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams, *Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Left behind*, Washington DC: Center for American Progress, May 2010, 4.

ISSUES RELATING TO LEGAL AND JUSTICE SECTORS

This section examines the strength, or lack thereof, of the formal justice and legal system in Uruzgan. This includes the place of law in society and the ability of the courts to successfully function. The consistent enforcement of laws at the local level helps to define the overall success of a government.

The formal justice system is highly ineffective in Uruzgan. Prior to the Dutch arrival in 2006, the majority of the official courts suffered from being understaffed, and the staff they did have was more often than not severely undertrained. Before the Dutch arrived in 2006, Jan Mohammad Khan, who was governor of Uruzgan prior to the Dutch arrival, allowed local strongmen to overlook legal procedures in their own personal drive for power and money. While Mohammad Khan was replaced before the Dutch arrived, there was little progress made in improving the justice sector. In 2010, the formal justice sector consisted of one Appeal Court with five judges in Tirin Kot, three Primary Courts, one each in Tirin Kot, Chora and Deh Rawud. There are two judges assigned to the Tirin Kot Primary Court, and one assigned to Chora and Deh Rawud. Unfortunately, two of the five Appeals Court judges refuse to fulfill their duties, only arriving every six months to collect their salary. Of the judges who are present, none have earned a university degree, and most are graduates of *madrassas*, where they learned religion and Islamic jurisprudence rather than the law. Throughout the rest of the province, only about 20 percent of all judges are in place. In fact, Chenartu and Char China have no justice professionals – judges, prosecutors, etc. The inability of the justice sector to flourish in Uruzgan is not solely limited to the professional skills of the judges, but rather the perceived widespread bias and corruption amongst justice professionals. This problem is not exclusive to Uruzgan, but belongs to a larger state-wide trend.²²⁹

The lack of trained justice professionals has resulted in many individuals from the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the National Department of Security (NDS) to take matters into their own hands. While generally well intentioned, these individuals often do not have the requisite knowledge of the rules that they are seeking to enforce. Overall, there is little faith in the justice system, as the ANP and the NDS are still alleged to abuse detainees. As a result of these failings, most judicial issues are handled locally by village elders, community *shuras*, *mullahs*, or by the Taliban. In Uruzgan, there are no official Taliban courts, but rather several Taliban judges who utilize a strong interpretation of *sharia* law. While harsh, the Taliban generally enforce their code of law universally and announce the rules to those under their authority, which provides some level of stability for the population.²³⁰

In January 2010 Matiullah Khan created a tribal council, called the *shura eslahi* (reform council) in which approximately 200 elders from throughout Uruzgan met to work on solving provincial and district-level disputes. Some claim that, rather than being for the good of the province, Matiullah Khan started the *shura eslahi* as a political stunt to raise his importance in the province; the council met each week in Khan's home. As a result of this belief, the level of participation has decreased dramatically, although there have been some positive developments

²²⁹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 37.

²³⁰ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 38.

in conflict mediation. Overall, though, “the relevant state institutions and international organizations had neglected the justice sector in Uruzgan.”²³¹

The inability of the justice sector to function in Uruzgan has greater significance beyond what is readily apparent. Take the following example. Stemming from the general lack of literacy, most Uruzganis place a higher emphasis on the value of the spoken word over written contracts. This means that there is little, if any, record of most business transactions. While written contracts were utilized during Dutch development projects, this lack of documentation became a serious issue when dealing with private property. “There are no official records regarding land ownership, which causes problems when there are plans to construct an object. The Dutch armed forces were often confronted with Afghans who claimed that the land which the forces were using was theirs and they demanded money for it.”²³²

Taking the lack of written contracts and the failures of the justice system into consideration, this represents a much larger political problem for the Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Private property, the laws associated with the protection of it and the application of these laws in court form the backbone of much of today’s society. Joseph Singer, a professor at Harvard Law School, describes property law as the legal relations among people with relation to things. “Property law is not just a mechanism of coordination; it is a quasi-constitutional framework for social life. Property is not merely the law of things. Property is the law of democracy.”²³³ The exclusive ownership of land is “the most destructive and creative cultural force in written history.”²³⁴ According to Andro Linklater, land ownership has “spread an undreamed-of degree of personal freedom and protected it with democratic institutions wherever it has taken hold.”²³⁵ If you accept the above arguments on the importance of private property and its defense in the legal system, then the two trends examined here are troubling. The complete lack of a functional legal system in Uruzgan to enforce state laws effectively precludes the functional ability of the Government of Afghanistan.

Government in Uruzgan

This section of the chapter will examine the varying strengths of the provincial and district-level governments in Uruzgan. The assessment of the provincial government will examine the several governors in Uruzgan; the district-level assessment will examine the presence of GoA officials and look at the reach the officials who are present have. Finally, the section concludes with an overall look at the nature of governance in the province and examines where the true power and authority lies..

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

²³¹ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 39.

²³² Wijnmalen et al., *Reconstruction through construction*, 183.

²³³ Joseph W. Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 *Duke Law Journal* 1287 (2014).

²³⁴ Andro Linklater, *Owning the Earth: The Transforming History of Land Ownership* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 5.

²³⁵ Linklater, *Owning the Earth*, 5-6.

Prior to the arrival of the Dutch, the provincial government had been dominated by Jan Mohammad Khan, a Popalzai strongman who used his position to increase his own personal power by marginalizing others. The Popalzai dominated the provincial government, while the Nurzai, Barakzai, and Achekzai were only minimally represented. This had the effect of driving tribal leaders who had previously supported the GoA toward supporting the Taliban. One of the conditions of the Dutch accepting the mission in Uruzgan was that the GoA would have to remove Jan Mohammad Khan from his position as governor, as his presence had a negative impact on the political and economic developments in the province. Mohammad Khan was removed from office in early 2006, yet he continued to meddle in politics in some ways.²³⁶

In March 2006 Mawlawi Hakim Munib took office as the new governor of Uruzgan. Munib was a former high official in the Taliban Ministry of Border Affairs who had defected back to the GoA after the war began. As a former member of the Taliban, Munib had the special ability to reach out to former Taliban members, hear their complaints, and discuss possible solutions with them. Munib used financial incentives in order to entice current members of the Taliban to the discussion table, where the goal was to have productive dialogue and potentially convince these men to put down their weapons. Unfortunately, Munib's efforts earned him the scorn of the local power brokers, who stood to profit from the status quo. Through their efforts, Munib's policies stagnated, and he resigned in September 2007. Munib was followed by Assadullah Hamdam who attempted to address the tribal and ethnic imbalances in the provincial government. Hamdam had some success in this regard, but still faced significant hurdles in governing the state from the local power brokers. Feeling frustrated by his inability to accomplish his goals, Hamdam attempted to resign twice, but eventually stayed in power. In early 2010 he was forced to resign as a result of allegations he requested kickbacks for road reconstruction contracts. No immediate successor was appointed, and as a result deputy governor Khodai Rahim Khan acted as the provincial governor. There was no apparent move to replace him prior to the Dutch withdrawal.²³⁷

DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS

When the Dutch arrived in 2006 only 20 percent of the district government positions were filled. After four years, there was only a moderate increase up to 30 percent. All of the districts have officially appointed governors and chiefs of police, while most of the other positions (agriculture, public health, education, etc.) were unfilled. Outside of the two main positions, the National Department of Security had representatives in all but the Taliban dominated Char China. It is important to note that many of the district officials do not reside in the districts they govern, instead governing remotely. This has a strong negative effect on the population, as not only do the officials have a worse understanding of the needs of their constituents, but they project an air of weakness for the district, provincial, and national government. By residing away from their constituents, these district officials show that the GoA does not have the ability to protect its own officials.²³⁸

²³⁶ The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 28-29.

²³⁷ The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 28-29.

²³⁸ The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 30-31.

The following district-by-district assessment examines the presence of the reasonably regular functioning of government or non-insurgents informal structures (the *shuras*). The informal structures provide stability in the instances where the official GoA departments are unable to. While helpful, the primacy of these informal structures highlights the impotence of the official state instruments of control. As a reminder, the three districts that the Dutch focused their main attention to were Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot.²³⁹

In Deh Rawud, the government's control increased. In 2007 International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in conjunction with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ousted the Taliban from the district. The quality of GoA governance in the district has grown as a result of increased communication between the district government, the community, and the Dutch-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. In Deh Rawud in 2010 there was an active serving governor, chief of police, general political administrators, and three *shuras*. There was a 29 person development *shura*, a 40 person tribal *shura* that worked to diffuse tribal tensions, and a 73 person *malikan* (village representative) *shura*, which served as the point of contact for international actors in the district.²⁴⁰

Overall, in Chora the GoA's influence and power has grown throughout TFU. During 2006 and 2007 the Taliban had gained control of the majority of the district. After ousting the Taliban structure from the district, the government had the ability to strengthen its position. The district has a governor, a chief of police, a court, and general administrators.²⁴¹

In Tirin Kot the government's control and influence has increased dramatically. The construction of the highway from Tirin Kot to Chora has resulted in increased stability and overall the average quality of life for the people in the district has improved. There is still the threat of Taliban attacks, specifically IEDs. Overall, the government has control in 75 percent of the district.²⁴²

In Gizab the government has made no progress during TFU, and remains completely out of the GoA's control. The Taliban has complete control over the Pashtun areas and operates freely. The Hazara areas are self-governed through a 20-person *shura* that has representatives from each of the six Hazara clans as well as prominent religious figures. In the Hazara area, there is an independent police force, courts, and a jail.²⁴³

The status in Chenartu has remained even. This new district, which was created in the spring of 2008, is controlled by a Popalzai governor and chief of police. The GoA only has control in the northern section of the district, which happens to be dominated by the Popalzai tribe. In addition to the governor and chief of police, the district *shura* is exclusively Popalzai.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later: A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009*, (Kabul: TLO, 2010), 18.

²⁴⁰ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 18-19.

²⁴¹ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 19.

²⁴² The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 44.

²⁴³ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 19.

²⁴⁴ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 19.

In Khas Uruzgan, there is little presence by the GoA. What presence is there is described as corrupt, and has no ability to operate or control events beyond the district center. The district does have a governor, chief of police, a district council, and a two-judge court.²⁴⁵

In Char China the GoA presence has decreased greatly since 2006. In 2010 the GoA only had the ability to influence the community within a radius of five kilometers outside the district center. There are no government decision-making bodies in the district.²⁴⁶

ELECTIONS

The elections that occurred in 2009 had a significant drop-off in voter turnout when compared to the 2004 election. This decrease was approximately fifty percent in Uruzgan. In the national election, in which 23,646 valid votes were cast, Karzai received 61 percent, Ramazan Bashedost got 15 percent, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah received 9 percent. Amid the national election there were widespread claims of meddling by local power brokers in favor of President Karzai, but nothing ever came from the suspicions. There was greater participation in the provincial council elections, with 28,326 valid votes cast. In this election all of the previous members of the provincial council were voted out of power. Still, the Popalzai hold 50 percent of the seats on the council. This is probably the result of having a strong constituency with a high rate of voter turnout, possibly because the Popalzai understand that their power stems from a disproportionate representation in the government. The Achekzai and Barakzai, the largest and fourth largest tribes in Uruzgan, respectively, had no tribe members elected to the provincial council.²⁴⁷

Of the 140,000 voter registration cards that were distributed in Uruzgan only 17 percent and 20 percent of the population turned out to vote in the national and provincial council elections, respectively. There are three possible reasons for the low voter turnout. First, the Taliban stepped up efforts considerably to intimidate the population through violence and the threat of violence in the days, weeks, and months leading up to the election. Secondly, an overall distrust of the government persists in the province, and many felt that the voting process was fraudulent and rigged. Thirdly, in an effort to decrease fraud there were restrictions placed. One such restriction was that male heads of households were no longer able to vote on behalf of females in their families. As a result of these policies the overall number of votes decreased.²⁴⁸

POWER AND AUTHORITY IN URUZGAN

Throughout Afghanistan there has been an overall focus on building a strong central government through a top-down approach which focused on strengthening the government in Kabul. This approach is at opposites with the way that the average Afghan actually interacts with their government: at the provincial and district level. This has resulted in a system where the local-level government structures have been neglected, opening the opportunity for local strongmen to prosper at the expense of their community. Compounding this issue is that the central government was incredibly inefficient and was often bypassed by international actors in an effort

²⁴⁵ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 19.

²⁴⁶ The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later*, 19.

²⁴⁷ The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 32-33.

²⁴⁸ The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 32-33.

to get things accomplished. This entire process can be seen in Uruzgan, as there is a very weak provincial and district government presence throughout the province.²⁴⁹

The lack of strength in the central and local-level government has opened up a political marketplace in Uruzgan where strongmen engage in opportunistic behavior for their own benefit. According to a study by the Clingendael Institute, there were fourteen different actors competing for power in Uruzgan; none of these fourteen men were able to consolidate enough power to have a lasting effect on overall security. These fourteen powerbrokers had the ability to influence the appointment of government officials, impact the distribution of money within the province, and could potentially mobilize militias for security purposes. There are three things that are important about the dynamics of the Uruzgani powerbrokers. First, is that importance and reach is not limited to the size of the individual's tribe. For example, three Zirak Durrani tribes, the Achekzai, Popalzai, and the Barakzai are nearly 55 percent of the population of Uruzgan, yet account for 71 percent of key leadership in the province. Second, is that of the 14 men with the power to influence events in Uruzgan not one works in favor of the Taliban. All fourteen are considered to be pro-government. Finally, all but two of the fourteen powerbrokers are young, which is in contrast to the weakening influence that tribal elders have on the younger generation.²⁵⁰

In an effort to increase the authority of the Afghan government, the Dutch, along with the Australian and American personnel, worked with the Afghan Government's Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) to coordinate programs that focused on developing good governance. There were three programs that the Dutch tried to implement through the IDLG. The first was the Performance Based Governors Fund, in which there was a competition amongst the various provincial governors over certain performance standards, and those governors that did better than their peers were awarded more resources (money) for their province. The second was assigning advisers to the governor as a part of the Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme. Third was establishing training courses for civil servants in province in order to improve their governance capacities. The Liaison Office and the Clingendael Institute interviewed Uruzganis on the effectiveness of these programs. "Respondents considered most of the governance programmes as positive in theory – 'as they are meant to strengthen the government' – but problematic in their implementation and hampered by a lack of monitoring."²⁵¹ Problems that hampered the success of these programs includes a dearth of qualified candidates for public office, a lack of resources to effectively implement the projects, no oversight on the government appointments being truly merit-based, and no oversight or control over the functions of public expenditures and processes. Under the umbrella of the MRRD was the National Solidarity Programme (NSD). The NSD was a popular program amongst Uruzganis, and helped to implement infrastructure, but most importantly focused on "strengthening democratic governance at the village level through the establishment of democratically elected Community Development Councils."²⁵² The NSD was successful in this regard, and was highly regarded by

²⁴⁹ Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *The man who would be king: The Challenges to Strengthening Governance in Uruzgan*, (The Hague, November 2010) 5-7.

²⁵⁰ Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *The man who would be king*, 17-22.

²⁵¹ Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *The man who would be king*, 39.

²⁵² Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *The man who would be king*, 41.

the Afghan population, as it was seen as detached from the international actors in the province.
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Assessment of the Dutch Approach to Diplomacy

Of the three spheres of the Dutch counterinsurgency effort the diplomacy sphere was the one most difficult to judge. Some of the issues that were faced involved structural and cultural components that were simply beyond the scope of a foreign force to influence. The political and social culture of Afghanistan shifts the power in a community away from any sort of formal, top-down authority toward local elders and leaders who are more efficiently able to mediate conflict. In addition, the importance of tribal and ethnic loyalties makes navigating the political landscape difficult.

Considering these challenges, the Dutch approach to developing political capacity did about as well as it could do. Dutch personnel understood the role that cultural, tribal, and ethnicity plays in Afghan society. In most capacities the Dutch sought to build coalitions between diverse groups in order to increase inter-tribal cooperation. Further, the Dutch put an emphasis on building local legitimacy and utilized a bottom-up approach to building local capacity. By engaging community leaders in the decision making process, the Dutch were able to further facilitate development in political capacity.

“A four-year time frame is simply not enough to create a civil servant culture. As elsewhere in Afghanistan, government performance and capacity in Uruzgan has been hampered by four key problems: lack of qualified personnel; lack of physical infrastructure; lack of financial and logistical resources; and lack of oversight and control mechanisms over public expenditures and processes.”²⁵⁴ In order for there to be long-term development of the GoA in Uruzgan the overall political capacity of the population must be increased. Effective government requires effective individuals; there needs to be an emphasis on training programs that develop the skills necessary to be a political leader. Only through increased education, training, and a conscious effort to enforce the merit-based appointment system will politics in Uruzgan truly improve. Without these types of improvements, the government in Uruzgan will remain “a political market place where savvy entrepreneurs dominate a merit-based appointment system.”²⁵⁵

²⁵³ Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *The man who would be king*.

²⁵⁴ The Liaison Office, *Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan*, 27-28.

²⁵⁵ The Liaison Office, *Engagement in Uruzgan*, 27.

Chapter Six: Analysis

This chapter of the thesis examines the overall effectiveness of the Dutch 3D approach to counterinsurgency in Uruzgan. The analysis consists of scoring the presence of the best practices advocated by David Kilcullen in his writings and by Christopher Paul et al. in their study *Paths to Victory*. The best practices for each of the analytic frameworks will be listed and the criteria for scoring their presence will be described. The analysis will occur in three parts: the districts that the Dutch focused on during Task Force Uruzgan; the districts that were not the central focus; and an overall analysis for the success of the campaign in Uruzgan. Each of the three categories described above will be scored based on the following criteria. The narrative description of why each score was awarded will be divided by the following: primacy will be given to the three focus districts, as this will emphasize the impact of the Dutch 3D approach; for the non-focus districts, the narrative will describe how their experience differed from that of the focus district, especially highlighting how some best-practices were still present, while others were not; finally, the overall analysis narrative will describe the impact of the Dutch approach across Uruzgan from 2006 to 2010.

Finally, the two original hypotheses will be again described and then analyzed based on the evidence shown below.

Detailed Descriptions of Best-Practices

This section contains each of the best practices that will be used to analyze the Dutch mission in Uruzgan from 2006-2010. The analysis will be done on a points system. There will be three different possible outcomes: a best practice was implemented, was partially implemented, or was not implemented at all. If the best practice was implemented it would receive a score of “1”; if the best practice was partially implemented it would receive a score of “.5”; and if the best practice is not implemented it would receive a score of “0.” Each best practice has a series of sub-factors that, if present, indicate that a best practice was implemented. For the best practices from Christopher Paul et al. these sub-factors come directly from *Paths to Victory*. The threshold for each of Paul et al.’s best practices come from *Paths to Victory* as well – in their study they determined the necessary amount of sub-factors to indicate the presence of the best practice across the 71 case studies examined. It should be noted, though, that for Paul et al. the sub-factors were judged in a binary fashion, without the presence of an intermediate score indicating the partial presence of a best practice. The methodology in this assessment differed in order to account for greater variability, especially considering the nature of the focus and non-focus districts of the Dutch counterinsurgency experience. For the best practices from David Kilcullen these sub-factors were created for the purpose of this analysis. To the same extent, the threshold for the number of sub-factors necessary to indicate the presence of a best practice was also created for this study based on my knowledge of the subject matter. While this makes these factors slightly less exact than those from Christopher Paul et al, the thresholds were chosen to be relatively consistent with the type of thinking done in *Paths to Victory*.

It should be noted that, as a result of the differing number of best-practices between Kilcullen and Paul et al., that the comparison will be done on a relative rather than absolute scale.

DAVID KILCULLEN'S BEST PRACTICES

In this part, the best practices that come from the work of David Kilcullen will be listed and their sub-factors described. Please note that there is overlap in the definitions of *criticality of intelligence* and *flexibility and adaptability* in both sets of best practices; both sets utilize the definitions and thresholds from Paul et al. For the other two best practices, *population-centric approach* and *bottom-up approach*, the sub-factors were created specifically for this study from Kilcullen's collected work. I chose the threshold for the number of sub-factors needed to indicate the presence of these two best practices based on my knowledge of the subject matter.

Criticality of Intelligence

For counterinsurgents, developing actionable intelligence, whether it is derived, for instance, from the population, informants in the insurgency, or through satellite imagery, is critical to success. Successful counterinsurgency requires the counterinsurgent forces to have a deep understanding of the environment they are operating in. Actionable intelligence is the difference between capturing an insurgent leader and coming up empty handed.²⁵⁶ The presence of this best practice is measured by two factors:

- “Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force’s terms.
- Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.”²⁵⁷

A score of 1 will be awarded if both of these factors are present; a score of .5 will be awarded if one of the two factors are present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if neither of the two factors are present.

Flexibility and Adaptability

Flexibility and adaptability indicate the ability of the government and counterinsurgent forces to change their tactics based on the circumstances. Counterinsurgency involves two sides that struggle against each other, both seeking to utilize new strategies that will give them an advantage against their opponent. In order for the counterinsurgent force to succeed against the insurgency, they must adapt. There is only a single factor for determining the presence of flexibility and adaptability:

²⁵⁶ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 134-135

²⁵⁷ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 134.

- “The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics.”²⁵⁸

If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score awarded in this circumstance as the best practice is binary – the counterinsurgent force can either adapt or not.

Population-Centric Approach

This approach to counterinsurgency focuses on the source of the insurgency’s power and resources – population – by addressing social, political, and economic factors. This is in contrast to the enemy-centric approach which focuses more exclusively on the military destruction of the insurgency. There are four factors that indicate a population-centric approach.

- The counterinsurgent force established security in the area under their control.
- The counterinsurgent force effectively convinced the population their best interests were served by supporting the government.
- The counterinsurgents limited their use of lethal force, to the best of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents.
- The counterinsurgent force identified local issues and acted to resolve them using social, economic, and political measures.

A score of 1 will be awarded if at least three of the four factors are present; a score of .5 will be awarded if two factors are present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if one or none of the factors are present in the case study.

Bottom-up Approach

The bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency places an emphasis on building low level political legitimacy through the rule of law, reducing corruption, and establishing competent local-government institutions. This is in comparison to a top-down approach, in which the emphasis is put on building the legitimacy of a national government. There are three factors that indicate a bottom-up approach.

- The counterinsurgent force focused on building and/or strengthening local government institutions.
- The counterinsurgent force created civil-society based programs that focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and development.
- The counterinsurgent force emphasized the use of official state structures in everyday life.

A score of 1 will be awarded if at least two of the three factors are present; a score of .5 will be awarded if one of the three factors is present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if none of the factors are present in the case study.

²⁵⁸ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 135.

CHRISTOPHER PAUL ET AL.'S BEST PRACTICES

In this part, the best practices that come from Christopher Paul et al.'s Study *Paths to Victory* will be listed and their sub-factors described.

Commitment and Motivation

Simply put, the government and the counterinsurgent force (could be one in the same, or separate) are determined to defeat the insurgency over the long haul. This implies that defeating the insurgency is the top priority of the government and the counterinsurgent force, rather than the increase in personal power and wealth.²⁵⁹ The following factors indicated commitment and motivation to succeed:

- “Insurgent force *not* individually superior to the COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated.
- COIN force or allies did *not* rely on looting for sustainment.
- COIN force and government did *not* have different goals/level of commitment and neither had relatively low levels of commitment.²⁶⁰
- Government did *not* sponsor or protect unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions.
- Government did *not* involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.
- Government type was *not* kleptocracy.
- Elites did *not* have perverse incentives to continue conflict.
- The country was *not* economically dependent on an external actor.”²⁶¹

Of the eight sub-factors for success listed above, four of them were needed to indicate that the government and counterinsurgent force were committed to succeed. If four or more of these factors are present, the best practice will be considered adopted and will receive a score of 1; if one, two, or three of these factors are present the score will be a .5; if none of these factors are present the score will be a 0. Once the government and counterinsurgent force began using best practices, the average insurgency lasts for an additional six more years, indicating the importance of this factor to overall campaign success.

Tangible Support Reduction

The way to defeat an insurgency is through reducing or eliminating the insurgency's sources of support. Insurgencies have certain needs, such as “manpower, funding, materiel, sanctuary,

²⁵⁹ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 128.

²⁶⁰ The wording of this sub-factor is slightly different here than it appears in *Paths to Victory*. The phrase that appears in *Paths to Victory* on page 128 is, “COIN force and government did *not* have different goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment.” After a conversation with Christopher Paul to clarify the second half of that statement, he admitted that what appeared in print was a typo, and he supplied the wording that now appears above.

²⁶¹ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 129.

intelligence, and tolerance.”²⁶² In classical counterinsurgency, these sources tend to be derived from the population. When expanded further, reducing the support system for the insurgency goes beyond simply reducing the resources given to the soldiers by the population, but also diminishing larger sources of income, from sources such as foreign donations, extortion and fraud, and the sale of narcotics. Reducing both the small and large sources of support the counterinsurgent sets the counterinsurgent force up for success.²⁶³ There are ten factors that indicate the presence of tangibly reduced support for the insurgency.

- “The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent.
- Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.
- Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.
- Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources was significantly diminished.
- Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.
- COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent processes.
- COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.
- COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.
- COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.
- COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.”²⁶⁴

If three or more of these factors are present, the best practice will be considered adopted and will receive a score of 1; if one or two of these factors are present the score will be a .5; if none of these factors are present the score will be a 0.

Flexibility and Adaptability

Flexibility and adaptability indicate the ability of the government and counterinsurgent forces to change their tactics based on the circumstances. Counterinsurgency involves two sides that struggle against each other, both seeking to utilize new strategies that will give them an advantage against their opponent. In order for the counterinsurgent force to succeed against the insurgency, they must adapt.²⁶⁵ There is only a single factor for determining the presence of flexibility and adaptability:

- “The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics.”²⁶⁶

If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score awarded in this circumstance as the best practice is binary – the counterinsurgent force can either adapt or not.

Unity of Effort

²⁶² Christopher Paul et al., *Path to Victory*, 131.

²⁶³ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 130-132.

²⁶⁴ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 131-132.

²⁶⁵ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 135-136.

²⁶⁶ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 135.

At its core, unity of effort indicates that the counterinsurgent was able to effectively coordinate the actions of all of the involved actors. This is not an easy task, as modern counterinsurgency tends to have significant involvement from the government's civilian authorities, each of which may have competing visions for implementing policy. There was just a single factor that represented this best practice:

- “Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.”²⁶⁷

If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score for this best practice as it is binary.

Initiative

Initiative is a military concept predicated on the idea of conducting operations first, thereby actively engaging the insurgency on your terms. While the initiative can be seized by blindly attacking insurgent strong points, the initiative is most effectively seized when used in conjunction with reliable intelligence to attack the enemy in strategic locations.²⁶⁸ Initiative is measured by one factor:

- “Fighting... initiated primarily by the COIN forces.”²⁶⁹

If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score awarded for this best practice because it is binary.

Criticality of Intelligence

For counterinsurgents, developing actionable intelligence, whether it is derived, for instance, from the population, informants in the insurgency, or through satellite imagery, is critical to success. Successful counterinsurgency requires the counterinsurgent forces to have a deep understanding of the environment they are operating in. Actionable intelligence is the difference between capturing an insurgent leader and coming up empty handed.²⁷⁰ The presence of this best practice is measured by two factors:

- “Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force’s terms.
- Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.”²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 98-99.

²⁶⁸ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 106-107.

²⁶⁹ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 106.

²⁷⁰ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 134-135.

²⁷¹ Christopher Paul et al, *Paths to Victory*, 134.

A score of 1 will be awarded if both of these factors are present; a score of .5 will be awarded if one of the two factors are present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if neither of the two factors are present.

Best Practice Analysis

This section of the chapter contains the best-practice analysis of the Dutch counterinsurgency efforts in the focus-districts in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010. Each of the best practices will be scored based on the criteria described above; justification for each individual score will be given for each factor. The best-practice analysis will have three parts: analysis of the Dutch in their focus districts (Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot), analysis of the Dutch in the non-focus districts (Khas Uruzgan, Chenartu, Gizab, and Char China), and finally an overall analysis of Dutch counterinsurgency in Uruzgan.

BEST-PRACTICE ANALYSIS FOR THE FOCUS DISTRICTS

The following chart shows the final scores for the overall best-practice analysis of Dutch counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch 3D approach scored well under each analytical framework, receiving a perfect score from the best practices of David Kilcullen and receiving full credit from four of the six best practices and partial credit from the remaining two. Based on this analysis, the Dutch utilized best practices for counterinsurgency in the three focus districts. The narratives that describe how and why each score was given appear below their respective charts.

Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts ²⁷²

David Kilcullen	Score	Christopher Paul et al.	Score
Criticality Intelligence	1	Commitment and Motivation	0.5
Flexibility and Adaptability	1	Tangible Support Reduction	1
Population-Centric Approach	1	Flexibility and Adaptability	1
Bottom-Up Approach	1	Unity of Effort	1
		Initiative	0.5
		Criticality Intelligence	1
Final Score	4/4		5/6

As noted above, as a result the differing number of best practices between Kilcullen and Paul et al. the comparison will be done on a relative rather than absolute scale. The best practices derived from Kilcullen's work were all present; only four of Paul et al.'s best practices were fully present, while the remaining two were only partially present. Therefore, while there is a higher total score for Paul et al. then there is for Kilcullen (5 compared to 4), the Dutch

²⁷² For a complete breakdown of the factors within each best practice see figure 1.1 in the appendix. In addition to this, for a breakdown of these factors amongst the overall province and the focus and non-focus districts see figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. in the appendix.

counterinsurgency received higher relative marks for Kilcullen than for Paul et al. (100 percent to 83.33 percent).

Analysis of David Kilcullen's Best Practices

In these districts the Dutch either fully or partially utilized the best practices emphasized by David Kilcullen in his work. Within the scope of the larger analysis, each of the best practices received the highest score. The following is a factor-by-factor breakdown of each of the best practices.

In criticality of intelligence, each of the two indicating sub-factors was present. The intelligence gathering and analysis processes were able to assist Dutch personnel in their operations. As shown in the Battle of Chora, Dutch intelligence was able to identify the incoming Taliban soldiers, giving the Dutch soldiers and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) the opportunity to prepare for the assault. In addition to this example, Dutch Special Forces were able to operate in the more remote areas of Uruzgan and attack strategic locations based on information obtained and processed by the intelligence personnel.

The Dutch received a full score of 1 for flexibility and adaptability, satisfying the one indicating factor. The Dutch understood the primacy of adaptability in successful counterinsurgency, and an example of this comes from the restricted use of lethal force by their air craft. Recognizing that the Taliban were forcibly coercing non-Taliban men to shoot at Dutch soldiers and ANSF soldiers, the Dutch armed forces utilized warning maneuvers to attempt to scare off these men. It was assumed that they would be more likely to run in the presence of Dutch airpower, cutting down on the number of unnecessary deaths and engendering better good will from the population. A further example of Dutch adaptability involved their engagement with local contractors. In order to reduce graft the Dutch engaged the subcontractors who were implementing the work directly, cutting out the middlemen. Additionally, the Dutch personnel began requiring references to prove that the contractors had the experience they claimed they did.

The Dutch utilized a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in the focus-districts. For this best practice, the Dutch received a full score in all four of the sub-factors. The Dutch limited their use of lethal force in Uruzgan to only those insurgents who were irreconcilable, as the example of the use of airpower above indicates. Further, the Dutch utilized social, economic, and political measures to improve the population's opinion of the government. Dutch personnel were able to effectively increase and provide security in Chora, DehRawud, and Tirin Kot, as evidenced by the overall increase in GoA presence. Importantly, the increase in the number of businesses operating and individuals visiting the major bazaars in the district centers showed the increase in security provided by the GoA. Finally, the population seemed to believe that the counterinsurgents would serve their best interests, as indicated by their pledges to stop the production of poppy – which would decrease the overall revenue for the Taliban.

Finally, the Dutch received full marks in their bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency. Throughout Task Force Uruzgan the Dutch made building local legitimacy and connecting all improvements to the Afghan government a priority. An example of this was the improvements

made in the irrigation canal example described in the Diplomacy section. The Dutch helped to negotiate a solution to the inter-tribal conflict but allowed the Afghan government representatives to handle the implementation and resolution of the solution, increasing their legitimacy and public confidence in their ability. In these three districts, the Dutch emphasized strengthening local economic and governing institutions so that they would be able to continue to exist beyond the eventual Dutch withdrawal.

Based on these factors, the Dutch 3D approach to counterinsurgency in Uruzgan satisfied each of the best practices that are evident in the work of David Kilcullen.

Analysis of Christopher Paul et al. 's Best Practices

In the three focus districts the Dutch either fully or partially utilized the best practices emphasized by Paul et al. in their work. Within the scope of the larger analysis, each of the best practices received a passing score, although it was not unanimous as above. The following is a factor-by-factor breakdown of each of the best practices.

The overall commitment and motivation of the Dutch government, and their Afghan counterparts, received a score of .5, with a cumulative score of 3.5 out of 8 possible points. Of the eight sub-factors examined, two were fully present: the counterinsurgent forces did not rely on looting to sustain themselves, and the government did not sponsor unpopular social, political, or economic policies. Three other factors – the insurgent forces being either more professional or better motivated, the government being corrupt and using personalistic arbitrary rule, and the government being a kleptocracy – were all present in some fashion. Each of these three received a score of .5. When compared to the Dutch soldiers, especially the Special Forces who saw most of the combat, the Taliban were no match; when compared to the under trained and understaffed ANSF in Uruzgan, the Taliban forces were superior. While there were certainly improvements in ANSF quality, they were not yet on par with the Taliban at the time of the Dutch departure. During the Dutch tenure in Uruzgan the political leaders did not rule arbitrarily, but corruption was still wide spread throughout all levels of the provincial political system. Consistent with the corruption in the system, some members of the government engaged in blatant theft of government resources, such as the judges who only turned up every few months to receive a paycheck for a job they had not performed. While not present in the indication factors, it is important to recognize that the Dutch domestic politics severely impacted the efforts of the counterinsurgency effort. It is the general consensus that those involved with Task Force Uruzgan wanted to continue to campaign, while members of Dutch parliament dissented, which eventually led to the withdrawal of Dutch forces in August 2010 and the fall of the Dutch parliament earlier that year.

The Dutch armed forces were able to effectively reduce the overall level of support that the Taliban received, demonstrating the necessary 3 out of 10 reduction sub-factors necessary to receive a full score. The Dutch never made an effort to secure the provincial borders, which allowed the Taliban to enter and exit the province as they pleased, allowing external support resources to enter Uruzgan. The external acquisition of resources from the other Taliban networks across Afghanistan and Pakistan remained unchanged. The Dutch were able to impact Taliban resources in the province to an extent, but the influx of non-Uruzgani resources,

including soldiers, arms, and cash, allowed the Taliban to continue to function. The internal support for the Taliban in Uruzgan was reduced by Dutch efforts to secure and gain control of the three major economic and population centers. By isolating the Taliban from nearly 60 percent of the population, the Dutch were able to reduce the individual Taliban soldier's ability to sustain himself, as they relied on the population for basic supplies. Further, the Dutch were able to reduce the production of opium in sections in Uruzgan, a valuable cash crop and source of income for the Taliban.

The Dutch received a full score of 1 for flexibility and adaptability, satisfying the one indicating factor. The Dutch understood the primacy of adaptability in successful counterinsurgency, and an example of this comes from the restricted use of lethal force by their air craft. Recognizing that the Taliban were forcibly coercing non-Taliban men to shoot at Dutch soldiers and ANSF soldiers, the Dutch armed forces utilized warning maneuvers to attempt to scare off these men. It was assumed that they would be more likely to run in the presence of Dutch airpower, cutting down on the number of unnecessary deaths and engendering better good will from the population. A further example of Dutch adaptability involved their engagement with local contractors. In order to reduce graft the Dutch engaged the subcontractors who were implementing the work directly, cutting out the middlemen. Additionally, the Dutch personnel began requiring references to prove that the contractors had the experience they claimed they did.

While there were issues at the beginning of the deployment, the various ministries involved in Task Force Uruzgan eventually were able to unify their efforts and create a more efficient and capable counterinsurgency campaign. Even at its worst, the involved ministries did not work directly at cross purposes. As a result of this, the Dutch received a score of 1 for unity of effort.

The Dutch only received a score of .5 for their initiative against the Taliban. Dutch Special Forces took the initiative against the Taliban, leaving the safety of the bases to conduct far ranging patrols and raids against Taliban strongholds. On the other hand, the vast majority of Dutch soldiers did not travel far beyond the base and never ventured outside of the district or conducted assaults against insurgent targets. These soldiers were reactionary in nature – while not necessarily a bad thing it did give the insurgency the free hand to operate almost at will outside of the major population centers.

In criticality of intelligence, the Dutch received a score of 1 for each of the two factors. The intelligence gathering and analysis processes were able to assist Dutch personnel in their operations. As shown in the Battle of Chora, Dutch intelligence was able to identify the incoming Taliban soldiers, giving the Dutch soldiers and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) the opportunity to prepare for the assault. In addition to this example, Dutch Special Forces were able to operate in the more remote areas of Uruzgan and attack strategic locations based on information obtained and processed by the intelligence personnel.

Based on the above analysis, the Dutch 3D approach to counterinsurgency received a score of 5 out of 6 best practices from Christopher Paul et al.'s framework.

BEST-PRACTICE ANALYSIS FOR NON-FOCUS DISTRICTS

The following chart shows the final scores for the best-practice analysis of Dutch counterinsurgency in the non-focus districts of Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch 3D approach scored well under each analytical framework, receiving a perfect score from the best practices of David Kilcullen and receiving full credit from four of the six best practices and partial credit from the remaining two. Based on this analysis, the Dutch utilized best practices for counterinsurgency in the three focus districts. The narratives that describe how and why each score was given appear below their respective charts.

Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts

David Kilcullen	Score	Christopher Paul et al.	Score
Criticality Intelligence	1	Commitment and Motivation	0.5
Flexibility and Adaptability	1	Tangible Support Reduction	1
Population-Centric Approach	0	Flexibility and Adaptability	1
Bottom-Up Approach	0	Unity of Effort	1
		Initiative	0.5
		Criticality Intelligence	1
Final Score	2/4		5/6

Of the best practices derived from Kilcullen's work, only two of the four were present; only four of Paul et al.'s best practices were fully present, while the remaining two were only partially present. In this case, Paul et al. scored higher in both absolute (5 compared to 2) and relative (83.33 percent to 50 percent) when compared to the best practices derived from Kilcullen's work. Rather than rehash the details described above for each of the best practices in the focus districts, the analysis of the non-focus districts will examine the differences between the two for Kilcullen and Paul et al.

Analysis of Kilcullen's Best Practices in non-Focus Districts

In the four focus districts the Dutch did not focus their efforts in they only satisfied half of the best practices derived from Kilcullen's work. The breakdown shows the differences in application of the best practices in the non-focus districts.

For criticality of intelligence and flexibility and adaptability the Dutch still received full marks. Even though there was a severely limited focus on Khas Uruzgan, Gizab, Chenartu, and Char China it did not impact either of these two best practices. The Dutch intelligence gathering operations remained intact and effective. Similarly, the lack of presence of the Dutch within these districts does not detract from Dutch personnel's overall adaptability. Their overall approach remained flexible, and whenever Dutch personnel, specifically Special Forces or air support, operated in these districts they continued the flexible approach followed by their fellow comrades.

When it came to a population-centric approach in the non-focus districts the counterinsurgent force did not receive high marks, only satisfying one of the four sub-factors. As there was a highly limited presence of Dutch personnel in these districts, security in the region deteriorated – with the Taliban generally gaining control of increased amounts of territory in these districts. In conjunction with this, the counterinsurgent force was unable to address any local grievances or conflicts. The lack of the two previous sub-factors directly impacted the third, which is that they counterinsurgent force was able to convince the population that their best interest was served by aligning with the government. The only sub-factor that was present in the non-focus districts was the limited use of lethal force, as this factor sub-factor related to the overall Dutch approach to counterinsurgency.

Finally, for the bottom-up approach best practice none of the three sub-factors were present for the non-focus districts. This is primarily the case because of the basically non-existent presence of the counterinsurgency. Simply, the lack of a substantial Dutch presence in these four districts precluded the ability to build political, social, and economic institutions that would contribute to stronger GoA strength.

Analysis of Paul et al.'s Best Practices in non-Focus Districts

The overall scores for the best practices derived from Paul et al.'s work in the non-focus districts are the same as those given for the focus districts. The only difference between the two sets of analysis is that the underlying sub-factor score for commitment and motivation is .5 lower here than in the focus districts, as the insurgent forces were superior to the counterinsurgent force in these districts.

This situation poses a potentially ugly problem analytically. Without any of the other background information from the rest of this study, if someone was to examine these raw scores than the assumption would be that the increases in security that were seen in the focus districts would have occurred as well in the non-focus districts. The scores indicates that the Dutch followed more of Paul et al.'s best practices than those of Kilcullen, although based on the above it is clear that these scores do not provide the best explanations for the observations made in these districts. This situation will be looked at further when examining which of the two sets of best practices best explains observations.

OVERALL BEST-PRACTICE ANALYSIS FOR URUZGAN, AFGHANISTAN

The following chart shows the final scores for the overall best-practice analysis of Dutch counterinsurgency throughout Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch 3D approach scored well under each analytical framework, receiving a perfect score from the best practices of David Kilcullen and receiving full credit from four of the six best practices and partial credit from the remaining two. This is not simply the averaging of the scores that were separately assessed for the focus and non-focus districts, but rather a separate analysis taking the whole province into consideration. Following the chart will be the reasoning behind the best-practice scores taking the focus, non-focus and total provincial picture into consideration.

Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan

David Kilcullen	Score	Christopher Paul et al.	Score
Criticality Intelligence	1	Commitment and Motivation	0.5
Flexibility and Adaptability	1	Tangible Support Reduction	1
Population-Centric Approach	1	Flexibility and Adaptability	1
Bottom-Up Approach	1	Unity of Effort	1
		Initiative	0.5
		Criticality Intelligence	1
Final Score	4/4		5/6

The overall scores for the entire province mirror the scores for the focus districts.

Overall Best-Practice Analysis of David Kilcullen's Best Practices in Uruzgan, Afghanistan

All four of the best practices that come from David Kilcullen's work were present based on the analysis of the case study. Unlike in the focus districts, where every sub-factor was present, for the whole province the results were not unanimous. Two sub-factors that indicated the presence of a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency were only half present. These two sub-factors, increasing security and convincing the population that their best interests are best served by supporting the government, received a grade of .5 mostly because they were only implemented in three of the seven districts in the province. The Dutch were able to increase GoA control to approximately 60 percent of the population, yet for the other 40 percent the Taliban provided security and were the dominant political figure in the area. The assessments for the rest of Kilcullen's best practices were not changed when looking at the province as a whole.

Overall Best-Practice Analysis of Christopher Paul et al.'s Best Practices in Uruzgan, Afghanistan

Interestingly, the over-all scores awarded for Christopher Paul et al.'s best practices were the same all across the board. The sub-factor scores for the overall analysis and the focus-district analysis were identical, while the two differed from non-focus district assessment as noted in that section. Overall, there was not any significant difference amongst the three levels of analysis even though the realities within each level of analysis would indicate otherwise: the almost complete lack of Dutch influence in four districts, and the resulting lack of positive developments within these districts, is not evident in the results. This will have a serious impact on the analytical utility of Paul et al.'s best practices.

Assessment of the Hypotheses

One of the main contributions that this paper makes to the literature on successful counterinsurgency is testing the analytical utility of best practices derived from the work of David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. in their study *Paths to Victory*. In order to test these two sets of best practices, they were to be tested against a central hypothesis, as shown below:

Increase in Best Practices (IV) → Movement toward Stabilization (DV)

Remember, as described in the limitations section of chapter two, this paper makes the assumption that the above hypothesis is true. This assumption is made with the understanding that it is only ever completely true in closed, laboratory like settings which are never actually possible – it is still possible to do all of the right things in both counterinsurgency and in life and still not improve your circumstances. Understanding this limitation, this paper is not seeking to explain the general hypothesis, but only use it as a vehicle for testing the best practices that can be derived from the work of David Kilcullen and Paul et al. These two more specific hypotheses can be seen below:

Hypothesis 1:

Increase in David Kilcullen's Best Practices → Movement toward Stabilization

Hypothesis 2:

Increase in Christopher Paul et al.'s Best Practices → Movement toward Stabilization

Considering this, what follows is an assessment of the two hypotheses in order to understand which of the two sets of best practices was best able to explain observations on the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010. Remember, though, that the hypotheses are not examining success or victory, but rather movement toward stabilization. As defined in the methodology section of chapter two, stabilization is: the movement of the province toward a secure, peaceful mode of interaction on terms favorable to the government.

TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1: DAVID KILCULLEN'S BEST PRACTICES

The best practices from the work of David Kilcullen were able to accurately explain the varying differences in the level of stabilization across the three different levels on analysis.

In the focus districts of Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot, the overall level of government control increased greatly over the course of Task Force Uruzgan. This was as a direct result of the actions taken by the Dutch counterinsurgent personnel, as they utilized a bottom-up, population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in these three districts. Additionally, the Dutch were a flexible force that used its advanced intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities to give its forces the upper hand. Kilcullen's best practices accurately explain the observations in the focus districts – their presence over the four years corresponded to the increased security. This confirms hypothesis 1.

In the non-focus districts of Char China, Chenartu, and Khas Uruzgan, the level of government control either stayed the same or decreased. The fourth non-focus district, Gizab, saw an increase in GoA presence, but as a result of Dutch counterinsurgency efforts – there was an internal revolt by a Pashtun tribe against the Taliban which reclaimed the district center for the GoA. Even considering the improvements in Gizab, the security situation in these districts did not improve as a result of Dutch efforts. Intelligence capabilities and adaptability were present in those Dutch resources that were occasionally expended in these districts, but a bottom-up, population-centric approach to counterinsurgency was never seriously implemented. The assessment of Kilcullen's best practices of the Dutch in the non-focus districts, in which only

two of the four best practices were followed, aligns itself with the results on the ground. This further confirms hypothesis 1.

Finally, across Uruzgan province there was a general increase for the level security and GoA control for the majority of the population. At the end of the Dutch four year engagement in Uruzgan approximately 60 percent of the population lived in areas that could be considered controlled by the GoA. This was large increase, as the GoA did not have majority control of any district when the Dutch arrived. Considering this, the assessment of Kilcullen's best practices mirrors the overall progression of events in Uruzgan: all of the best practices were followed, and security on terms favorable to the government was achieved. This confirms hypothesis 1.

When taken together, the Dutch experience in Uruzgan is almost perfectly explained by the best practices derived from the work of David Kilcullen. In the areas where they were followed, the situation was stabilized on terms favorable to the government; in areas where they were not implemented, the situation was not stabilized on terms favorable to the government. Taking this into consideration I can confidently say the hypothesis 1 explains the situation in Uruzgan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010.

TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2: CHRISTOPHER PAUL ET AL.'S BEST PRACTICES

The success of Paul et al.'s best practices to accurately depict the results of the Dutch engagement throughout Task Force Uruzgan is suspect and requires examination.

For the focus districts, the best practices do a very good job of explaining the success of the Dutch counterinsurgent force. The Dutch military and civilian personnel worked toward a single purpose, utilized advanced intelligence operations, and were adaptable throughout Task Force Uruzgan. They were also able to actively reduce the sources of Taliban support across these three districts. They did not, however, always have the initiative in combating the Taliban, often entering into and retreating from engagements on the Taliban's terms rather than their own. The Dutch personnel and their Afghan counterparts were only partially committed and motivated to win – and it can only assume that had the mission continued this would have led to fuller commitment as the Afghan National Security Forces increased in strength. Having four of the six best practices present in the focus districts, and the other two both being partially present, corresponds to the increased levels of security and stability within Chora, Deh Rawud, and Tirin Kot. This confirms hypothesis 2.

In the non-focus districts, however, Paul et al.'s best practices struggle to explain observations, receiving nearly the same assessment score for both the focus and non-focus districts despite the varying differences between them. There was only a .5 difference under the commitment and motivation best practice that separated the two from being identical. If Paul et al.'s best practices were the only ones used to assess the Uruzgan case study then the general assumption flowing from the hypothesis would be that, based on the numbers, both the focus and non-focus districts would have seen increased security and stability. This, however, was not the case, as there was significant discrepancy in stability between the focus and non-focus districts. This strongly discredits hypothesis 2.

Finally, in the overall assessment of the province the best-practices of Paul et al. relatively reflect the overall progress in the province over the course of Task Force Uruzgan. The score that was awarded for the presence of best practices was almost identical between all three levels of analysis. Even considering this, the large increase in the overall security and stability in Uruzgan is reflected in the general following of Paul et al.'s best practices during the four years of Dutch engagement in Uruzgan.

When taken together, the Dutch experience in Uruzgan is only partially explained by the best practices derived from Paul et al. in *Paths to Victory*. While the best practices do explain the observations of both the focus districts and the overall assessment of the province, they are completely unable to explain what occurred in the non-focus districts. Going beyond this, they actually provide the complete opposite assessment of the facts. As a result of this, I can confidently say that hypothesis 2 is unable to accurately explain the situation in Uruzgan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES

Based on the above analysis of the two hypotheses being tested, the first was better able to explain observations of the case study of the Dutch military and civilians conducting counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010. The hypothesis is reiterated below:

Increase in David Kilcullen's Best Practices → Movement toward Stabilization

Even though the best practices of Paul et al. technically *lost* the explanatory contest to the best practices of David Kilcullen, it in no way diminishes or tarnishes the quality or the importance of the work done by Paul et al. Within this capacity, though, and based on the results of this case study, the best practices of Paul et al. were unable to fully explain observations.

It should be remembered, though, that this was only a single case study, in a single province that occurred during the middle of a fourteen year long war. Further, while faithful to the descriptions and basic guidelines underpinning the scoring for Paul et al.'s best practices, there was a slight change in methodology. In *Paths to Victory*, the scoring was done on a worst-case scenario – if the factor was not implemented across the entirety of the theater being examined then it was not indicated as present. In order to account for greater variability, and especially to take into consideration the nature of the focus and non-focus districts of the Dutch counterinsurgency experience, this analysis did not follow this methodology. This, therefore, could explain the potential issues that Paul et al.'s framework had in explaining observations in Uruzgan.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions

Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States and other Western nations will not be actively seeking to be engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns in the future. The large scale commitments in blood and treasure that have been expanded by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq since the beginning of the 21st century have been massive, especially considering the relative levels of success that have been had in these two states. As a result, counterinsurgency has fallen out of favor, especially in the United States. But as history has shown, conflicts that can be described as contests between insurgents and counterinsurgents have been the most prevalent form of conflict in history, and this trend will more than likely continue into the future. Current examples of areas that are or could in the near future experience the rise of an insurgent force are Mali, Somalia, Yemen, and the Philippines. These cases of instability are especially pressing, considering the tendency of terrorist organizations to use lawless areas for sanctuary. If the United States and its allies want to be better prepared to face the security challenges that await them in the future, the lessons from the past fifteen years must not be forgotten, much like how the lessons of Vietnam were forgotten in the aftermath of that military misadventure.

It is for this reason that the Dutch experience in Uruzgan is so important. Amongst all of the chaos and conflicting strategies that were employed in Afghanistan throughout the thirteen year long war, the Dutch in Task Force Uruzgan represent a pocket of successful practices that should be recognized for the stability that they were able to bring to one of the most heavily Taliban-dominated provinces in all of Afghanistan. Their complete and total commitment to a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy indicates that the general approach that was taken by the United States under General David Petraeus had potential if properly applied. Further, it is also important to realize that population-centric tactics utilized by the Dutch are applicable in situations outside of a counterinsurgency environment. Specifically, it can be argued that there is considerable cross-over between counterinsurgency and United Nations peace keeping operations, and that both communities of scholars and practitioners would benefit from an exchange of ideas.²⁷³

The Dutch experience has shown that a whole-of-government approach using bottom-up, rather than top-down, state-building in conjunction with judicious use of force has the ability to improve conditions in a war-torn area. This comprehensive approach utilized an advanced intelligence system that provided the Dutch military and civilian personnel the opportunity to be flexible and adapt at will to the threat posed to the Government of Afghanistan throughout the four-year engagement in Uruzgan. The inclusion of civilian actors so heavily in the mission in the political and economic sectors of development helped to assuage the difficulties of overly relying on the military for development responsibilities the soldiers were not adequately prepared to address. The Dutch utilized a comprehensive approach that stabilized the majority of Uruzgan

²⁷³ Brigid Pavilonis, William Rose, Andrew Majkut, Nicholar Phillips, *Review – Counterinsurgency* by David Kilcullen, E-International Relations, 26 February 2014.

while limiting the casualties amongst its own personnel as well as those of the population caught in the middle of the conflict. These apparent successes must be kept in perspective –they occurred in during a four-year period in the midst of a larger conflict – but scholars and practitioners alike have a lot to learn from the bravery and sacrifices made by the Dutch military and civilian personnel and their experiences in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010.

Appendix:

Figure 1.1: Best-Practice Analysis Table Template

Christopher Paul et al. Framework	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)			
Insurgent force <i>not</i> individually superior to the COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated.			
COIN force or allies did <i>not</i> rely on looting for sustainment.			
COIN force and government did <i>not</i> have different goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment.			
Government did <i>not</i> sponsor or protect unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions.			
Government did <i>not</i> involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.			
Government type was <i>not</i> kleptocracy.			
Elites did <i>not</i> have perverse incentives to continue conflict.			
The country was <i>not</i> economically dependent on an external actor			
Tangible Support Reduction (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)			
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent.			
Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.			
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.			
Insurgents' ability to replenish resources was significantly diminished.			

Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.			
COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent processes.			
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.			
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.			
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.			
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.			
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)			
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.			
Unity of Effort (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)			
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.			
Initiative (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)			
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force			
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)			
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.			
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.			

David Kilcullen Framework	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)			
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.			
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.			
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)			
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.			
Population Centric Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater than 2, and 0 if the sum is less than 0)			
The COIN force established security in the area under their control.			
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their best interests were served by supporting the government.			
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents.			
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve them using social, economic, and political measures.			
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)			
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening local government institutions.			
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and development.			
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state structures in everyday life.			

Figure 1.2: Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan

Christopher Paul et al. Framework	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3.5	0.5
Insurgent force <i>not</i> individually superior to the COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated.	0.5		
COIN force or allies did <i>not</i> rely on looting for sustainment.	1		
COIN force and government did <i>not</i> have different goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment.	0		
Government did <i>not</i> sponsor or protect unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions.	1		
Government did <i>not</i> involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.	0.5		
Government type was <i>not</i> kleptocracy.	0.5		
Elites did <i>not</i> have perverse incentives to continue conflict.	0		
The country was <i>not</i> economically dependent on an external actor	0		
Tangible Support Reduction (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3	1
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent.	0		
Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.	0		
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.	1		
Insurgents' ability to replenish resources was significantly diminished.	0		

Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.	0		
COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent processes.	1		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.	1		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.	0		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.	0		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.	0		
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.	1		
Unity of Effort (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.	1		
Initiative (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		0.5	0.5
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force	0.5		
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		2	1
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.	1		
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.	1		

Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan

David Kilcullen Framework	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		2	1
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.	1		
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.	1		
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.	1		
Population Centric Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater than 2, and 0 if the sum is less than 0)		3	1
The COIN force established security in the area under their control.	0.5		
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their best interests were served by supporting the government.	0.5		
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents.	1		
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve them using social, economic, and political measures.	1		
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3	1
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening local government institutions.	1		
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and development.	1		
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state structures in everyday life.	1		

Figure 1.3: Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts

Christopher Paul et al. Framework	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3.5	0.5
Insurgent force <i>not</i> individually superior to the COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated.	0.5		
COIN force or allies did <i>not</i> rely on looting for sustainment.	1		
COIN force and government did <i>not</i> have different goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment.	0		
Government did <i>not</i> sponsor or protect unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions.	1		
Government did <i>not</i> involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.	0.5		
Government type was <i>not</i> kleptocracy.	0.5		
Elites did <i>not</i> have perverse incentives to continue conflict.	0		
The country was <i>not</i> economically dependent on an external actor	0		
Tangible Support Reduction (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3	1
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent.	0		
Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.	0		
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.	1		
Insurgents' ability to replenish resources was significantly diminished.	0		
Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.	0		

COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent processes.	1		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.	1		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.	0		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.	0		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.	0		
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.	1		
Unity of Effort (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.	1		
Initiative (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		0.5	0.5
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force	0.5		
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		2	1
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.	1		
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.	1		

Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts

	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
David Kilcullen Framework			
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		2	
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.	1		
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.	1		
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.	1		
Population Centric Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater than 2, and 0 if the sum is less than 0)		4	1
The COIN force established security in the area under their control.	1		
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their best interests were served by supporting the government.	1		
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents.	1		
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve them using social, economic, and political measures.	1		
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3	1
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening local government institutions.	1		
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and development.	1		
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state structures in everyday life.	1		

Figure 1.4: Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts

Christopher Paul et al. Framework	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3	0.5
Insurgent force <i>not</i> individually superior to the COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated.	0		
COIN force or allies did <i>not</i> rely on looting for sustainment.	1		
COIN force and government did <i>not</i> have different goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment.	0		
Government did <i>not</i> sponsor or protect unpopular economic and social arrangements or cultural institutions.	1		
Government did <i>not</i> involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.	0.5		
Government type was <i>not</i> kleptocracy.	0.5		
Elites did <i>not</i> have perverse incentives to continue conflict.	0		
The country was <i>not</i> economically dependent on an external actor	0		
Tangible Support Reduction (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		3	1
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent.	0		
Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.	0		
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.	1		
Insurgents' ability to replenish resources was significantly diminished.	0		

Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.	0		
COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent processes.	1		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.	1		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.	0		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.	0		
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.	0		
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.	1		
Unity of Effort (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.	1		
Initiative (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		0.5	0.5
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force	0.5		
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		2	1
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.	1		
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.	1		

Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts

	Sub-Factor Score	Best Practice Score	Best Practice Present?
David Kilcullen Framework			
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		2	1
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force's terms.	1		
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or operations.	1		
Flexibility and Adaptability (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)		1	1
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations or tactics.	1		
Population Centric Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater than 2, and 0 if the sum is less than 0)		0	0
The COIN force established security in the area under their control.	0		
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their best interests were served by supporting the government.	0		
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents.	1		
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve them using social, economic, and political measures.	0		
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)		0	0
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening local government institutions.	0		
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and development.	0		
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state structures in everyday life.	0		

Figure 2.1:

Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan

David Kilcullen	Score	Christopher Paul et al.	Score
Criticality Intelligence	1	Commitment and Motivation	0.5
Flexibility and Adaptability	1	Tangible Support Reduction	1
Population-Centric Approach	1	Flexibility and Adaptability	1
Bottom-Up Approach	1	Unity of Effort	1
		Initiative	0.5
		Criticality Intelligence	1
Final Score	4/4		5/6

Figure 2.2:

Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts

David Kilcullen	Score	Christopher Paul et al.	Score
Criticality Intelligence	1	Commitment and Motivation	0.5
Flexibility and Adaptability	1	Tangible Support Reduction	1
Population-Centric Approach	1	Flexibility and Adaptability	1
Bottom-Up Approach	1	Unity of Effort	1
		Initiative	0.5
		Criticality Intelligence	1
Final Score	4/4		5/6

Figure 2.3:

Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts

David Kilcullen	Score	Christopher Paul et al.	Score
Criticality Intelligence	1	Commitment and Motivation	0.5
Flexibility and Adaptability	1	Tangible Support Reduction	1
Population-Centric Approach	0	Flexibility and Adaptability	1
Bottom-Up Approach	0	Unity of Effort	1
		Initiative	0.5
		Criticality Intelligence	1
Final Score	2/4		5/6

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