FRENCH PUBLIC POLICIES AND NORTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A THREE PART PART ANALYSIS ON THE MAGHREB IMMIGRANT GROUP AND THEIR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN FRANCE

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FRENCH PUBLIC POLICIES AND NORTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A THREE PART PART ANALYSIS ON THE MAGHREB IMMIGRANT GROUP AND THEIR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN FRANCE

By

Miguel Mendiola

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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS

The North African immigrant group is one of the largest in France, whose presence has helped shape French public policies since the 1960s. For this migrant group, France has been the most popular destination. Also known as Maghreb migrants in France, these migrants have been at the center of political discourse of how French public policies have encouraged or discouraged the political participation of immigrants. One of the major problems that Maghreb immigrants face is not having civic rights, such as voting, due to reasons linking to citizenship. While French citizens from a Maghreb background used their citizenship status to politically participate, those without French citizenship found ways to be active political participants as well. Immigrants in France still find ways to politically participate, such as through their political mobilization granted by the 1981 right to association law. Additionally, those French citizens of Maghreb origin that have been naturalized exercise their right to vote.

This paper raises the following research questions: To what extent have French public policies arisen to promote political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb? Why has France introduced these policies? Have these policies been successful? Why or why not?

Maghreb migrants are primarily Arab and Muslim, and are an ethnic and religious minority in France. This migrant group consists of Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian, Libyan, and Egyptian. However, the focus of this paper will exclude the analysis of Libyan and Egyptian migrants in France. The use of Maghreb in this paper will refer to only Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian migrants in France given that these three countries achieved independence from France in the 20th century. As a matter of fact, French colonialism manifested differently within each country, thus it will be important to look at how each of these Maghreb migrant groups are treated.
differently based on respective French colonial legacies (if any) in each of the countries, particularly in Algeria.

This paper is divided into 3 parts: (1) The first section will focus on the historical context of Maghreb migration waves into France and the setbacks posed by the rise of far-right political parties after the 1960s. Additionally, it will draw attention to the “colonial debt” and how Maghreb migrants are subjected to this French narrative of being unable to integrate into French society; (2) The second section will focus on the political mobilization of Maghreb migrants in the 1980s through the early 2000s by way of the 1981 right to association law, the rise of the Beur movement, and the modifications to French nationality laws (in 1993, 1998, and 2003); (3) The third section will draw from the Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration (RAPFI) report and Trajectoires etOrigins (TEO) survey, two of the most prominent reports on ethnic groups in France. The conclusion will summarize the findings of this research paper as well as address why the political participation of Maghreb migrants in France has only been partially successful.
Part 1: EARLY MIGRATION WAVES FROM NORTH AFRICA

As the formally colonized Maghreb countries achieved independence - Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 and Algeria in 1962 - there began an outflow of migrants to France. The majority of migrants from the Maghreb, after achieving independence, came largely from Algeria during the 1960s-1970s. Maghreb migration waves during the latter part of the twentieth century (after the 1970s) have increased drastically from the rest of the North African region. According to Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) the share of Algerians in 1962 was almost twelve percent while Moroccans and Tunisian formed only one and a tenth percent and one and a half percent respectively. By 1999, the share of these three nationalities was 13.4, 12.1 and 4.7 percent, respectively (Taïeb 1998). As shown in Table 1, the percentage of migrants from North Africa grew significantly from 1962 to 1999. Because French colonialism manifested differently within each Maghreb country, it will be important to look at to what extent this is reflected for Maghreb migrants in France (Chtatou 2019). More specifically, the colonial impact was much more dramatic in Algeria than in either Morocco or Tunisia and this paper will address the extent of the impact of colonization on Maghreb (particularly Algerian) migrants in France during the earlier migration waves in the 1960s and 1970s.

Table 1 Immigrants to France by country of origin, 1962–1999.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>574,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>522,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>201,561</td>
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For immigrants from the Maghreb, France’s nationality law reform after its colonial period proved to help promote political participation among these migrant groups. Nationality is the only path to full political rights in France and with this France attempted to integrate the Maghreb migrants as citizens of the French Republic, yet many barriers in the following years ultimately led to unsuccessful attempts at promoting political participation. Given the impact of decolonization on citizenship laws, Algerian migrants did not seek French citizenship because they believed that it would be a betrayal of their country. Many Algerians also shared the same sentiments of not wanting to become French citizens because they were only temporary workers in France and were not looking to permanently stay in France. The three Maghreb countries were not able to resolve the basic problems created by colonialism, namely economic underdevelopment. As a result, there was an outflow of migrant workers in search of employment in Europe. The total number of North African laborers in France reached one million in 1973, including nearly 800,000 from Algeria (Bennoune 1975: 3-4). Seeking citizenship was not a reality for many of these Algerian migrants as they had planned to return back to Algeria. In the following years, the rise of the National Front party in the following years posed challenges for nationality laws in France, seeking to reduce the number of Maghreb migrants in France. As Bertossi (2010) asserts in his country report on France, the economic crisis, rising unemployment, and increasing success of the National Front made integration into French society difficult. It was not until the 1980s, in which Maghreb migrants were able to benefit from the 1981 right to associate law (which will be addressed in the second part of this research paper) that Maghreb migrants were able to politically mobilize.
After Algeria achieved independence in 1962, France and Algeria signed onto the Evian Accords in which for the first time, France recognized the independence of Algeria (Lyons 2014). Although the Evian Accords had other primary purposes, it included clauses that would allow Algerians in France to become citizens with the right to vote. As opposed to Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria was actually considered part of France. Before 1962, Algerians were allowed the status of French citizens, without the right to vote. Ultimately, the Evian Accords recognized the independence of Algeria and had clauses that would grant them citizenship with the right to vote. More specifically, Algerians were subjected to a unique statute in which they could automatically become French citizens with voting rights if they performed a declaration of acceptance of the French republic. Many Algerians did not exercise this right largely because “to them it represented a betrayal of Algeria.” (Sayad 1999: 335-336). As a result of very few Algerians exercising this right (no more than 60,000 between 1962-1966) France abolished this clause by 1967 and Algerians who wished to become French had to go through the same naturalization process as other immigrant groups. Ultimately, the Evian Accords gave Algerian migrants the opportunity to become French citizens with the right to vote. As Algerians in France were struggling to choose between French and Algerian citizenship, French naturalization policies began to change in the coming years. For Algerian migrants and other migrant groups, it would become much more difficult to become French citizens as the far-right began to rise to power. As a result, the clauses of the Evian Accords were abolished in 1964. In 1964, France implemented the Nekkache-Grandval Accords, which essentially imposed radical terms that undermined the Evian Accords. More specifically, it enabled France to set a quota restriction for Algerian immigrants. The Nekkache-Grandval Accords introduced quotas for Algerians largely due to the rise of bidonvilles (slums) in which many Algerian migrants resided. These
bidonvilles reinforced the hostile French view of Algerians being incapable of integrating into French society because they were poor migrants seeking work that were forced to live in such conditions. This is because the bidonvilles in France were poor neighborhoods established in the outskirts of major cities in France and were established along ethnic lines, with specific settlements for Spanish, Portuguese, Algerian, and other ethnic groups (Paskins 2009: 2-3). As a result, many ethnic groups lived in specific ethnic settlements in these bidonvilles. Additionally, France was very interested in improving conditions for Algerians in the bidonvilles because they served as a hub for Algerians of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the radical political party that helped achieve Algeria’s independence from France. By limiting Algerian migration to France, French public policies were able to tackle the rise of problems in bidonvilles more effectively. However, this posed problems for the other Maghreb migrants, as Moroccans and Tunisians unfortunately fell victim to the prejudices derived from the rise of bidonvilles and the Algerian migrant conflict.

Other reasons that kept Algerian migrants from becoming French citizens stemmed from the recent colonial rule of Algeria. The history of colonization also played a significant role in the extent to which France promoted political participation of Algerians post-colonial rule as Algerians were seen as incapable of becoming French citizens. With the rise of the far-right, Maghreb migrants were perceived a certain way after the 1960s. This became evident in the 1970s as Algerian immigration became synonymous with crime, poverty, racial tension…(Nelson 2021: 134-135). While the Evian Accords granted Algerian migrants the opportunity to become French citizens with voting rights, many chose not to. When the Nekkache-Grandval Accords were introduced two years later, it became much harder for Algerian migrants. Additionally, the impoverished conditions and the presence of the NLF in the
bidonvilles created this specific notion that Algerians were unfit to integrate into French society, which affected Moroccan and Tunisian migrants as well.

Moroccan and Tunisian migration to France was very similar to that of Algerian migration to France. However, one of the key differences between Algerian migration to France and that of Moroccan and Tunisian migration to France after the 1960s is that Algerian migration was significantly larger. Throughout the 1970s, their migration waves to France were largely based on finding work just like that of Algerian migrants in the 1960s. As aforementioned, the share of Moroccan migrants in France grew by one and a half percent in 1962 to almost sixteen percent in 1990 (INSEE). The share of Tunisian migrants grew from one and a fifth percent in 1962 to almost six percent in 1990. The Tunisian migration to France has not been as significant largely due to poor relation ties between Tunisia and France following France’s colonial rule in North Africa. Despite these small percentages of Tunisian migrants in France, they were subjected just as much as Algerians to this notion of being able to integrate into French society.

In 1973, France began implementing stricter restrictions on foreign workers, largely Moroccan workers at that time. As shown in Table 1, the Moroccan migrant population grew to almost seven percent by 1975. French policy goals in 1973 were aimed at imposing stricter immigration control as Moroccan and Tunisian migrants began arriving in large numbers. More specifically, French public policy changed in 1973 when France stopped recruiting foreign workers, seeking only to help integrate legal migrants or high-skilled workers (Guiraudon 2008: 372-373). These policy changes were also introduced as a response to the end of the Glorious Thirty (Les Trente Glorieuses), a thirty year period of economic boom in France between 1945-1975 (Vinen 1996: 111-112). For Moroccan and Tunisian migrants, this meant that they were hit with socio-economic difficulties, largely high unemployment as high-skilled workers
were taking over jobs. Given the policy changes in 1973, illegal North African migrants were often associated with the word sans-papier, which means without papers or documentation (Guiraudon 2008). In 1983, French public policy continued to develop to limit the North African migration to France. In 1983, in order to help limit the arrival of Moroccan migration to France, the French Secretary of the State pushed for stricter limitations and proposed a system of return assistance to get Moroccan migrants back to Morocco (Schuerkens 2005: 12-13). These efforts were seen as part of the far-right agenda (which will be addressed in the second part of this research paper) that sought to address the Moroccan migration to France after 1970. Despite these efforts by the far-right to address the North African migration to France, it should be noted that there was a bilateral agreement between France and Morocco that related to the entry, stay and rights of Moroccans in France. More specifically, France and Morocco signed in 1987 an agreement called “stay and employment,” which in essence guaranteed that after three years of legal residence, Moroccans in France get a 10 year card of permanent residence and also stipulated that family members have open access to the labor market (Guiraudon 2008: 375-376). These bilateral agreements encouraged the naturalization of Moroccan migrants in France, who in the previous years, were faced with many economic challenges of not finding employment as a result of the 1973 policy changes.

Even though the Tunisian migration to France was not large in numbers, in comparison to that of Algerian and Moroccan migration to France, Tunisian migrants were still faced with challenges. Tunisian migrants fell victim to the policy changes that targeted Algerian and Moroccan migrants in France. This is because by the 1980s the North African migrant groups were not addressed individually by French public policy; instead, French public policies after the 1980s addressed the North African migration to France as a whole. The 1964
Nekkache-Grandval Accords set the stage for how French public policy would target North African migrants in France. Even though the Nekkache-Grandval Accords set a quota restriction for Algerian immigrants, it still had an effect on Moroccan and Tunisian migrants. This is because the Nekkache-Grandval Accords were introduced as a response to addressing the problems of the bidonvilles and many Tunisian and Moroccan migrants often resided in these slums when arriving in France. Similarly in 1973, French public policies were introduced to stop recruiting foreign workers as a response to the increase of Moroccan migration to France. Given that many North African migrants arriving to France in 1973 were sans-papier, these policies had an effect on all three of the migrant groups. Ultimately, these French public policies set the stage for Maghreb migrants in the 1980s and beyond.

This paper raises the following research questions: To what extent have French public policies arisen to promote political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb? Why has France introduced these policies? Have these policies been successful? Why or why not? For Algerian migrants, the 1962 Evian Accords granted Algerians the right to become French if they lived in France, were over eighteen, and accepted the values of the French republic. For Algerian migrants, this was an opportunity to become French citizens with the right to vote. The Evian Accords were seen as part of French public policy efforts to promote political participation among immigrants from Algeria. The Evian Accords introduced clauses granting Algerian migrants the right to become French citizens with the right to vote because it was seen as being part of the colonial debt that France had to pay. This is the impact that the former colonization of Algeria had on the clauses introduced in the Evian Accords. France introduced this clause in the Evian Accords because France aimed at integrating Algerian migrants into French society. While the Evian Accords aimed to integrate Algerian migrants as French citizens with the right to vote,
many Algerian migrants did not become French citizens because they were only there temporarily as migrant workers and others saw it as a betrayal of Algeria. Additionally, the 1964 Nekkache-Grandval Accords essentially undermined this Evian Accord clause when it set a quota restriction for Algerian immigrants. As a result of the Nekkache-Grandval Accords, Moroccan and Tunisian migrants in France fell victim to the French policy changes aimed at limiting Maghreb migration to France. While the focus of this research paper is on French public policies, this paper also noted one bilateral agreement between France and Morocco in 1987 seeking to integrate Moroccan migrants into French society. This paper failed to address other bilateral agreements (if any) between France and the other two Maghreb countries that sought to promote the political participation of Maghreb migrants in France. As aforementioned, by the 1980s the three North African migrants were seen as one and the French policies sought to limit their migration to France altogether. Ultimately, French public policies arose to some extent to promote the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb. The success of these public policies was limited to the rise of the far-right and other policy changes in 1973 as a response to the end of the Thirty Glorious Years. The next section will focus on the political mobilization of Maghreb migrants in the 1980s through the early 2000s by way of the 1981 right to association law, the rise of the Beur movement, and the modifications to French nationality laws (in 1993, 1998, and 2003).
Part 2: FRENCH PUBLIC POLICIES, 1980S AND BEYOND

In the 1980s, migrants from the Maghreb pushed for greater inclusion in French society through seeking citizenship and ultimately the right to vote. In 1981, French public policy introduced changes to the law of July, 1, 1901, that granted French citizens the right to associate. More specifically, the law of October, 9, 1981, extended these rights to immigrants, granting them the possibility to exercise the political right to associate. As the changes to this law gave Maghreb migrants the privilege to be recognized legally, it gave way to Beur movement (which means Arab in slang), it saw left wing parties trying to court the votes of French citizens with an immigrant background, and it furthered the anti-immigration discourse of the far right. As a result of how Maghreb migrants were politically mobilizing in the 1980s, the far right pushed for limitations on citizenship pathways in the 1990s through modifications of French nationality law when they rose to power. This section will focus on how the 1981 right to association law led to a series of events in the 1980s and will focus on the modifications of French nationality law (in 1993, 1998, and 2003).

The French model of integration is based on assimilation. This model of integration has been present for many years in France and the impact of this model on Maghreb migrants will be analyzed. This model of integration asserts that it is preferred to assimilate migrants into the society by encouraging their full participation in all aspects of the host society once they become full members of the host society (Murodjon 2012: 13-14). While full political participation is only achieved through naturalization, this section analyzes how the 1981 right to association law gave Maghreb migrants a collective voice and an opportunity to politically mobilize as migrants. The 1981 right to association law was a loophole to the French model of integration because full political participation is only achieved once naturalized, but this law allowed migrants to politically participate without the right to vote. Before the 1981 right to association law, the
political mobilization of North African migrants was limited to the work of the Arab Workers Movement (le Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes), an organization established by North African migrants in the 1970s (Aissaoui 2006: 105-106). As aforementioned, the majority of North African migrants arriving in France were economic migrants seeking employment temporarily. Their focus was not to become French citizens or become political participants in France. Although largely focused on Maghreb migrant rights in the workplace, the presence of the Arab Workers Movement helped for the long-standing tradition of political activism among Maghreb migrants in the 1980s and beyond.

In 1981, French public policy introduced changes to the law of July, 1, 1901, that granted French citizens the right to associate. More specifically, the law of October, 9, 1981, extended these rights to immigrants, granting them the possibility to exercise the political right to associate. The changes to this law put immigrant organizations on an equal basis with those of French citizens.

Source: Legifrance Lois et décrets
Before 1981, Maghreb migrants mobilized in associations, but these associations were not legally recognized by the French government. As shown in the official journal of the French Republic laws, the law extended these immigrant associations political recognition and the opportunity to politically mobilize without the right to vote. These associations had become a network of established intermediaries for immigrant populations that negotiated with trade unions, political parties, and the state at the local and national levels through legal recognition by the French government (Leveau and Wenden 1985: 78-79). Since that time, many of the newly formed associations have been of Maghreb origin. In 1985, there were more than 4,000 associations from which 850 were made up of North African migrants (Schuerkens 2005: 23-24) The mobilization of Maghreb migrants in these associations is significant in explaining how French public policies promoted political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb because this law demonstrated French willingness to give migrants some political rights. As Schuerkens (2005: 28-29) states in her country report on France, "The participation of immigrants in associations is not perceived by the French state as a transition towards full political participation, but as a substitute for full political citizenship... It is argued that participation in such associations provides a real participation in local affairs..." Ultimately, the provisions of France’s law on Association gave Maghreb migrants an opportunity to politically participate without being naturalized.

In addition, the 1981 right to association law gave way to the Beur (Arab) movement, also known as the Marche Des Beurs, in the 1980s. The beur movement was a movement pertaining to North African migrants in France, which mobilized migrant youths from the bidonvilles (Chabanet 2016: 172-173). As Bloul (1998) stated, the Beur movement was one of the most significant movements for Maghreb migrants and French citizens with a Maghreb
background because for the first time in France, they erupted as political actors on the national scene. This meant that even though the Beur movement stood to mobilize Maghreb migrants in France for better living conditions and economic opportunities, it was also being recognized on the national scene by the French government and politicians as Maghreb migrants were beginning to politically mobilize. At the same time, the beur movement also saw the creation of two large associations, SOS Racism and France Plus, two new civic movements with aims at addressing racism, citizenship, and political participation of Maghreb migrants. SOS Racism and France Plus were created at a time where the far right grew to become a national political force.

SOS Racism was an association against racism that became a political party in 1984. SOS Racism also sought to increase the electoral participation and civic awareness among Beurs and to promote their candidatures for political office (Dubet 1987: 43-44). In the regional elections of 1986, for the first time in France, all the great main parties had included on their lists some Maghreb candidates. During the 1986 regional elections, the presidencies of each of France’s 26 regions were at stake. Even though these Maghreb candidates were in no position to be elected, it demonstrated the political power of the beur associations in standing for candidates of Maghreb origin and politically mobilizing for their political rights. Additionally, SOS Racism encouraged French citizens with a Maghreb background to vote. France Plus, also a political party that was formerly an association, was created in 1985. Its aim was to defend the rights of Maghreb migrants by promoting integration in all aspects of French society (Chabanet 2016). Similarly to SOS Racism, France Plus sought to increase the electoral participation of French citizens with a Maghreb background to register on the electoral lists. France Plus had success in the 1989 municipal elections, when France Plus claimed to have fielded over 2,000 Beur candidates. The Beur Movement and the encouragement to include French citizens with a Maghreb background
on electoral lists demonstrates the significance of how French public policies arose to promote the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb. The Beur movement gave Maghreb migrants the opportunity to politically mobilize, without an actual right to vote. Additionally, French citizens with a Maghreb background were on electoral lists in France’s regional and municipal elections. The work of these Maghreb associations was not limited to the 1980s and 1990s. During the 2001 municipal elections in France, several associations organized a referendum on the right to vote for immigrants. Some of these notable associations were Maghreb associations, who while supporting this referendum for immigrants to have the right to vote (which ultimately failed), were also endorsing French citizens of a Maghreb background. In the 2001 municipal elections, almost five percent of the candidates were of Maghreb background. Ultimately, the 1981 right to association law had success in promoting the political participation of Maghreb migrants in France. As seen with SOS Racism, France Plus, and the many Maghreb associations calling for a referendum to extend the right to vote for immigrants, the 1981 right to association law was successful in promoting the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb.

As the 1981 right to association law was encouraging Maghreb migrants to participate in associations and politically mobilize, the far right was growing into a national political force. The far right sought to modify the French nationality law when they rose to power in the 1990s. More specifically, there were three modifications of French nationality law in 1993, 1998, and 2003). As aforementioned, the 1980s was a period where migrants from the Maghreb pushed for greater inclusion in French society through seeking citizenship and ultimately the right to vote. The far right, more specifically the National Front, centered on jus sanguinis as the citizenship determinant when they sought to modify the National Law. Jus Sanguinis nationality laws
determine a child’s citizenship status by that of his or her parents (Fassin and Mazouz 2009: 38-39). For Maghreb migrants in France, this meant that their children would be unable to become French citizens, making a pathway to citizenship for Maghreb immigrants more difficult. Some of the proposals the National Front aimed to adopt were to expel illegal immigrants and give more to the frontier police to refuse entry (Bréchon and Mitra 1992). As shown in Table 1 from part one of this research paper, the Maghreb migration to France was increasing significantly and by 1992, Maghreb migrants represented more than forty percent of the new migrant population in France. This led to the first modification of the French nationality law in 1993, also known as the 1993 Méhaignerie law. The Méhaignerie law introduced changes to access to French nationality from different angles. First it increased the importance of jus sanguinis for foreigners. According to Bertossi (2010: 9-10), the Méhaignerie law also introduced two other clauses, one that facilitated increased surveillance of illegal migration to France (the Law of 10 August 1993) and another that restricted the conditions of entry into the country (the Law of 24 August 1993). Another significant change was that children born in France could only take advantage of double jus soli if - at the moment of their birth - one of their parents had lived in France for five years. Double Jus Soli refers to the place of birth of the parents. For example, if someone who is not a French citizen, has a child in France, the child will automatically become a French citizen (Alem 2022: 16-17). According to this clause, for children born in France, they could only become French citizens if their parents had lived in France for at least five years. The most contested part of Méhaignerie law is that only a single option for getting French citizenship was available: children born in France to foreign parents could declare their will to become French between sixteen and twenty one years of age and have their declaration registered either by a judge, a mayor or a local police officer (Bertossi 2010: 17).
Such changes to the French nationality law were seen as efforts to decrease the number of migrants from the Maghreb region - which was achieved as the number of Maghreb migrants decreased by almost 5%. Ultimately, the far right successfully created challenges for Maghreb migrants seeking citizenship with the changes to the French nationality law in 1993.

After the left’s victory in the 1997 elections, modifications to the French nationality law were introduced. More specifically, the left introduced modifications to the French nationality law in 1998, seeking to reform the most controversial aspects of the changes to the French nationality law in 1993. According to Bertossi (2010: 10-12), some of the changes to the French nationality law in 1998 were: It re-established the principle that children born in France to foreign parents would be deemed French if they still lived in France at the age of eighteen and had remained in France throughout their adolescence; The requirement of five years’ residence at the moment of acquisition would no longer have to be necessarily continuous; The new legislation also made it easier to prove French nationality. Nationality was now listed on the birth certificates and in the family booklets. Those who wished to become French now had greater resources to support their claim. Ultimately, the modifications to the French nationality law in 1998 reformed the most controversial aspect of the changes in 1993 and it made a pathway to citizenship much easier. The 1998 changes to the French nationality law also intended to overcome some of the shortcomings of the previous legislation. When modifications to the French nationality law were made in 1993 by the National Front, children born in France to parents born in Algeria before independence (1962) could take advantage of double jus soli - one of their parents had lived in France for five years, despite that before 1962, Algeria was neither a colony or territory, but fully part of France. In other words, this meant that this provoked serious problems of proof for children born after January 1, 1994. In 1998, the double jus soli rule for
children of Algerian parents was re-established (Bertossi 2010: 10). The modifications to the French nationality law in 1998 served to help Algerian migrants in France to get French citizenship. Although the changes in 1993 and 1998 to the French nationality law only posed problems for one of the Maghreb groups (Algerian migrants), it demonstrates the extent to which French public policies encouraged pathways to citizenship for Algerian migrants and possible future political participation in the future (which will be analyzed in the next section of this research paper).

In 2003, modifications to the French nationality law were introduced again when the right wing returned to power in 2002, attempting to restrict access to the French nationality law again. The far right attempted to restrict foreigners’ access to French visas, as well as their access to French nationality. However, there was not a huge public debate like when the 1993 and 1998 changes were proposed, largely due to the main focus of the 2003 law - adding the requirement of proving sufficient knowledge about the rights and responsibilities of French citizenship - that did not pose major challenges for Maghreb migrants and other migrant groups as much. Additionally, by this time in France, many Maghreb migrants were naturalized. However, the far right still continued to push for more limitations on immigrants in France, even after the 2003 modifications to the French nationality law. In 2004, Minister of Interior Affairs (2004-2007) and Former President of France (2007-2012), Nicolas Sarkozy introduced new legislation affecting migrants in France, calling for the deportation of illegal migrants.

This paper raises the following research questions: To what extent have French public policies arisen to promote political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb? Why has France introduced these policies? Have these policies been successful? Why or why not? This section analyzed the 1981 right to association law and the modifications to the French nationality
law (in 1993, 1998, and 2003). Ultimately, the modifications to the French nationality law posed many challenges for Maghreb migrants and other immigrant groups in the times that the far right was in power. In regards to the research question of this paper, the modifications to the French nationality law helped promote the full integration of Maghreb migrants as French citizens in 1998. At other times, this was not the reality. These modifications sought to limit the pathway to citizenship for Maghreb migrants. More specifically, the changes to the French nationality law for Algerian migrants and their children demonstrated how Algerian migrants were still being addressed between 1993 and 1998 when new limitations were introduced by the National Front. Additionally, the 1981 right to association law helped promote political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb. This is because, for the first time, Maghreb associations were being legally recognized by the French government. The 1981 right to association law also saw the rise of the Beur movement, the rise of SOS Racism and France Plus, and the political mobilization of immigrants from the Maghreb. The next section will draw on whether or not French public policies to promote political participation of Maghreb migrants had any impact on the political participation of those of Maghreb origin who became naturalized.
Part 3: VOTER PARTICIPATION: FRENCH CITIZENS FROM A MAGHREB BACKGROUND

The previous section analyzed the 1981 right to association law and the modification of the French nationality law. While Maghreb migrants began to politically mobilize in associations after 1981, the far right continued to push for reform of the French nationality law. One of the major questions being posed by scholars and the French government is: as Maghreb migrants become naturalized citizens, did they demonstrate any willingness to become political participants in France? In other words, when Maghreb immigrants became French citizens, did they begin to vote in elections? This question relates to the research question that this paper raises because this paper has mainly focused on French public policy and to the extent to which it has promoted political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb. As aforementioned in section two, one of the few ways that French public policy has achieved this has been through the 1981 right to association law; however, now this section will focus on French citizens of Maghreb background and their political participation. The relevance of these two reports is that they provide important information for analyzing the political participation of French citizens from a Maghreb background.

This section will focus on two important data reports that have documented voter participation and preferences in the 21st century. This section uses data from the 2005 Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration (RAPFI) that reported on the politics of French people with an immigrant background. Additionally, it will draw attention to the 2008 l’Enquête Trajectoires et Origines (TEO) survey that focused on descendants of migrants aged 18 to 35 in 2008 and systematically comparing them to the population of the same age with no direct migratory ancestry. This paper will draw from the RAPFI report and the TEO survey because
they have been two of the most prominent reports on ethnic groups in France. More specifically, France is one of those countries that does not keep track of the ethnic information of its citizens, thus these two reports provide important information for analyzing the political participation of Maghreb migrants.

The *Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration* (RAPFI) was documented by Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj in 2005. This report demonstrated that French people of immigrant origin were “French like the others” although they presented certain characteristics, in particular a political positioning more often marked on the left (Jardin 2013: 175-176). Additionally, the RAPFI report concluded that there is a colonial debt in which France has a debt to the former colonies (Brouard and Tiberj 2005: 157-158). This is important because it helps us understand why French public policies have arisen to promote the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb since the 1960s. It also helps explain the impact of decolonization on the arrival of Maghreb migrants and the public policies by France to encourage their political participation, which was addressed in part one of this research paper.

The Trajectories and Origins Survey (2008) measured the political attitudes of young people according to the origin of their parents. As shown in Table 2, 53% of young people with parents of Maghreb origin, stated that they were interested in politics and chose to vote. This is significant because it showed that more than 50% of French citizens of Maghreb background state that they were interested in politics. In comparison to the majority of the population (those who are of French origin), French citizens from a Maghreb background were more likely to be interested in politics and position themselves with the left. Given that this group of young people with parents of Maghreb origin were French citizens, this study helps show that the policies of the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, were successful to some extent. As the far left sought to
reform some of clauses to the French nationality law in the 1990s, many Maghreb migrants began to seek naturalization and become political participants. The efforts of the left in the 1980s and 1990s helps explain why French citizens of Maghreb background were more likely to position themselves with the left (rather than the right).

Table 2: The political attitudes of young people according to the origin of their parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of parents</th>
<th>Percentage of people stating that they are interested in politics</th>
<th>Percentage of people stating that they position themselves with the left (rather than the right)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority population (those who are of French origin)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scope: Young people (18-35 years old) from the majority population or descendants of migrants.

Source: TEO Survey 2008

The Trajectories and Origin Survey (2008) also documented the political participation of young people according to the origin of their parents. As shown in Table 2, 83% of young people, with parents of Maghreb origin, declared that they were registered on the electoral lists. Up until 1997, it was necessary to register on the electoral roll at the municipal offices of their place of residence to be able to vote (Jardin 2013: 185-186). After 1997, individuals who had just been naturalized (on condition that they are over 18) were automatically registered. Of that 83%, many declared that they voted in 2007 (presidential election) and/or in 2008 (municipal election). This is significant because it demonstrates that French citizens from a Maghreb background were strong political participants during elections. More specifically, 88% declared that they had voted in 2007/2008 thus demonstrating that as Maghreb migrants become naturalized citizens, they are able to be active as voters. This is significant because there was also a high turnout for those who
voted, demonstrating the electoral strength of French citizens from a Maghreb background in turning out to vote and being active political participants in French society. In comparison to the majority of the population (those who are of French origin), French citizens from a Maghreb background were less likely to to be registered on the electoral lists and also less likely to have voted in the 2007 (presidential election) and/or in 2008 (municipal elections). However, the political participation of French citizens from a Maghreb background was still very high despite being less active than the majority of the population.

Table 3: Political participation of young people according to the origin of their parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of parents</th>
<th>Percentage of people stating they were registered on the electoral lists</th>
<th>Percentage of people registered on the electoral lists having voted in 2007 (presidential election) and/or in 2008 (municipal elections)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority population (those who are of French origin)</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scope: Young people (18-35 years old) from the majority population or descendants of migrants with French nationality (registration) and being registered (vote)

Source: TEO Survey 2008

Evidently, these two reports demonstrated that French citizens from a Maghreb background were active political participants once naturalized. As French citizens of Maghreb origin became naturalized citizens, they became active participants as their high voter turnout demonstrated in the 2007/2008 elections (as shown in Table 3). Additionally, it helps answer the question posed above: As Maghreb migrants become naturalized citizens, did they demonstrate greater willingness to become political participants in France? To the extent of the research
question of this research paper, French public policies can be credited for the political participation of French citizens from a Maghreb background. This is because the reforms to the French nationality law and the 1981 right to association law, immigrants from the Maghreb were politically mobilizing. Once some of these immigrants from the Maghreb became naturalized, they demonstrated willingness to continue being politically active, as shown in the two reports. To the extent of political mobilization, French public policies can be credited for the political participation of French citizens with a Maghreb background. However one of the downfalls of these 2 reports is that they do not represent the entire population of French citizens from a Maghreb background in France. Additionally, the scope of the TEO survey was on French citizens who were between the ages of 18 and 35. These reports would’ve better served to answer the questions posed above had they included a wider range of French citizens and also included a more thorough breakdown of the French citizens with a Maghreb background into French citizens from an Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian background.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, this paper raised the following research questions: To what extent have French public policies arisen to promote political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb? Why has France introduced these policies? Have these policies been successful? Why or why not? This paper analyzed the extent to which French public policies arose to promote the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb in 3 parts. (1) The first section focused on the historical context of Maghreb migration waves into France and the setbacks posed by the rise of the far-right political parties after the 1960s. (2) The second section focused on the politicization of Maghreb migrants through the 1981 right to association law, the
rise of the Beur movement, and the modifications of the French nationality law (in 1993, 1998, and 2003). (3) The third section analyzed the RAPFI report and TEO survey, two of the most prominent reports on ethnic groups in France.

To sum up the findings of this research paper, part one concluded that while French public policies were introduced to encourage the naturalization of Algerian migrants through the Evian Accords, many chose not to because they were only in France as temporary workers. Additionally, Moroccan and Tunisian migrants in France fell victim to the French policy changes aimed at limiting Maghreb migration to France once the far right rose to power in the 1980s. Thus, French public policies in the 1960s and 1970s to promote the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb were limited to the clauses in the 1962 Evian Accords, which only had an effect on Algerian immigrants rather than the other two migrant groups. Its success was limited to the rise of the far-right and other policy changes in 1973 as a response to the end of the Thirty Glorious Years. In part two, French public policies promoted the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb when, for the first time, Maghreb associations were being legally recognized by the French government. Immigrants in France cannot vote unless naturalized, so the 1981 right to association law gave them the opportunity to politically mobilize, without the right to vote. However, in the 1990s, the far right began to push for reforms of the French nationality law, as a response to the increase of Maghreb migration to France. These modifications posed challenges for Maghreb migrants and other immigrant groups. However, the 1998 reforms to the French nationality law by the left helped promote the integration of Maghreb migrants. Ultimately, while French public policies were limited to the success of the 1981 right to association law, Maghreb migrants were beginning to politically mobilize for the first time ever. In part three, French public policies can be credited for the
political participation of French citizens from a Maghreb background. The TEO survey and RAPFI report demonstrated that once naturalized, Maghreb migrants were able to become politically active. It would be important for French public policies to encourage the naturalization among immigrants from the Maghreb as these findings concluded that they want to become politically active.

Given its focus on Maghreb immigrants only, this paper failed to draw on the political participation and mobilization of other immigrant groups in France. More specifically, it failed to draw on the Asian immigrant population in France, the Chinese immigrant population in particular. Immigrants from China and the rest of Asia are subjected to this notion of being unfit to fully integrate into French society, similarly to Maghreb migrants in France. This is because Chinese migration to France grew in the latter part of the twentieth century and they too were addressed by French public policies. It would be crucial to analyze to what extent did ethnic groups mobilize together in pushing for political mobilization and the extent to which France encouraged it.

Additionally, this paper failed to draw on other aspects of full integration into French society. Social integration in France for Maghreb migrants has been much more difficult. As Murodjon (2012: 25-26) puts it, “there are a number of reasons for the inefficiency of complete integration of Maghreb migrants in France…the rapid increase of Maghreb migration boosts xenophobia, racism and discrimination, causing tensions between migrants and local community, leading to calls for a radical overhaul of the migration policy.” One example is the headscarf issue. One major setback for Maghreb migrants is the headscarf issue. It all started in 1989 when 3 Muslim schoolgirls were denied access to a classroom for wearing a headscarf. In 2004, a law was introduced banning religious symbols in public education. In September 2010, the French
parliament passed a law banning full face veils for women in France, justifying the passing of the bill with the basic logic of laïcité (Chabanet 2016). In 2021, the French government pushed for extending the policies of laïcité, banning Muslim women (less than 18 years old) from wearing a hijab in public school. This is problematic because it demonstrates that social integration is evidently not a successful policy towards many Maghreb migrants who identify as Muslim. According to Haoues Seniguer (2009) “La laïcité peut supprimer plus de libertés qu'elle n'en protège.” In English it states that: secularism essentially suppresses more freedoms in France than its aim to protect. Maghreb migrants are largely discouraged from integration into French society when they are posed with social setbacks (Schain 2010). Anti-immigrant rhetoric also gave way to stereotypes on Muslims and Maghreb migrants. Some of the most harmful and used stereotypes were that Maghreb migrants were uneducated, unskilled, and a burden on French society, thus helping promote negative attitudes towards the Maghreb population among the French society. In the most recent presidential election, anti-immigration rhetoric was excited when Marine Le Pen - French far-right National Rally party leader - stated that if elected president in the 2022 election, she will call a referendum proposing drastic limits on immigration (Caulcutt 2021). This referendum demonstrates the presence of the right-wing and how their push for policies and referendum ultimately make the political integration of immigrants from the Maghreb less successful. Ultimately, the integration of Maghreb migrants in France has not been as successful due to concerns about the role of assimilation and integration policies in France. This is because they highlight that political integration cannot be achieved when other aspects of integration in France are difficult as well. On the other hand, for Maghreb migrants who became naturalized, French public policies can be credited for their success in promoting the political participation of French citizens from a Maghreb background (as shown in part three
of this research paper). Economic integration is also a problem for Maghreb migrants in France. As shown in part of this research paper, French public policies aimed at Maghreb migrants after the end of the Thirty Glorious Years demonstrated the kind of issues they dealt with. Over time, the economic success of Maghreb migrants in France has been limited as well. It would be important to address the social and economic integration of Maghreb migrants in France and analyze how it has helped French public policies in encouraging or discouraging the political participation among immigrants from the Maghreb.

Ultimately, this paper argued that while French public policies to promote the political participation of immigrants from the Maghreb have been present, the rise of the right-wing parties and anti-immigrant rhetoric, the failure to be able to integrate in other aspects of society, and the modifications to the citizenship laws in the 1990s posed major challenges to the extent of their political participation. While the political participation of immigrants from the Maghreb has only been partially successful, French public policies should draw attention to the RAPFI report and the TEO survey, as they demonstrated the extent to which French citizens of Maghreb origin politically participate once naturalized.
Bibliography


