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HELICON

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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Helicon is a student run academic Journal designed to enhance the academic environment of Connecticut College. Conceived one year ago, in the Spring of 1978, The Journal has been one full year in the planning. The Editors are proud to present five articles which we believe represent some of the College's finest written work by students. The publication of this Journal is based on a desire to establish an outlet for outstanding written work by Connecticut College students, to provide motivation for scholarship outside of the classroom, and to strengthen the academic bonds which exist in this Liberal Arts community. The staff of Helicon wishes to extend its deepest gratitude to the many people whose contributions made this Journal possible, and to express our hope that Helicon will become a lasting academic tradition at Connecticut College.

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Evan Stone

T. S. Eliot and Thomas Mann: The Decline of Western Civilization

Contemporary Western civilization, traumatized by two world wars of 'self-annihilation', gives little aid to its inhabitants who continually search for life's meaning. Is Western civilization terminally ill? Is this sickness embodied in the very fabric of western society? Or is this disease curable? In this paper, Evan Stone examines T.S. Eliot and Thomas Mann's response to contemporary civilization's malaise.

Europe's trauma in the twentieth century has led to the pessimistic and oft-repeated claim that Western Civilization is 'sick.' Indeed, the spectacle of two wars of self-annihilation seems to be testimony to this fact. The works of T.S. Eliot and Thomas Mann reflect Europe's self-conscious examination of its 'sickness,' with "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" (1917), "Gerontion" (1920), and "The Wasteland" (1923) representing Eliot's 'diagnosis,' while Mann gives his 'diagnosis' in "Death in Venice" (1911). Yet, along with this 'sickness,' and its corresponding cultural despair, there is a conviction that Europe can be 'cured.' Eliot offers a solution in his religious works, *After Strange Gods* (1934) and *The Idea of a Christian Society* (1940). Mann's 'cure' can be found in *Past Masters* (1933), a collection of his essays. By examining and comparing these works, one can gain insight into the image that Western Civilization has of itself.

*

In an essay entitled "Sleep, Sweet Sleep," Thomas Mann states:

I conceive that all individual existence is to be interpreted as a supra-sensual act of the will, a resolve to concentrate, limit and take shape, to assemble out of nothingness, to renounce freedom and infinity and all slumbering in spaceless and timeless night...¹

According to Mann, humanity creates form from the "timeless night"; it constructs a symbolic framework which gives order and coherence to ex

perience. There is no pre-formed reality which exists exclusive of humanity. Rather, the forms which comprise ordered experience are a result of man's "act of will." Mankind's concepts, symbols and morality all fall under the broad heading of 'form.' Indeed, the word is synonymous with 'civilization.'

In discussing Mann's vision of civilization, one must necessarily examine the thesis presented in Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). Mann was greatly influenced by the ideas put forth in this work and states that Nietzsche's philosophy "was of . . . basic importance to me personally in the shaping of my own mind, and has left . . . [an] indelible imprint on it."²

Nietzsche sees civilization as arising out of chaotic, infinite nature. Mankind's primal existence in nature is unfettered by morality or any other ordered form. The formless world, best symbolized by an exotic, lush jungle, teems with bestiality, fecundity and fatality. Nietzsche calls this world "Dionysian," in honor of the Greek god of wine and celebration. Nietzsche envisions orgiastic, Dionysian revelry:

In nearly every instance the centre of these festivals lay in extravagant sexual licentiousness, the waves of which overwhelmed all family life and its venerable traditions; the very wildest beasts of nature were let loose here, including that . . . mixture of lust and cruelty which has always seemed to me the genuine 'witches' draught' . . . ³

Yet, through his will, man transforms chaos into civilization and gives coherence to experience. He

creates morality and artwork, and develops a sense of aesthetic beauty. Nietzsche believes that the world of form, with its constructed moral and aesthetic ideals, is based on appearances. He delegates this realm to Apollo, Greek god of light. Nietzsche further asserts that the unfettered Dionysian world is "reality," while the Apollonian domain, which relies on man-made forms and symbols, is just an "illusion":

This . . . acquiescence in the dream-experience has . . . been embodied by the Greeks in their Apollo . . . the god of all shaping energies . . . the 'shining one,' the deity of light . . . His eye must be 'sunlike,' according to his origin; even when it is angry and looks displeased, the sacredness of his beauteous appearance is still there.⁴

Civilization is perpetually at odds with the Dionysian element from which it arose. Nietzsche gives his interpretation of the Ancient Greek dilemma:

. . . the Greeks were . . . guarded against the feverish agitation of these festivals by the figure of Apollo, himself rising here in full pride, who could not have held out the Gorgan's head to a more dangerous power than this grotesquely uncouth Dionysian.⁵

Thomas Mann views the artist as an Apollonian upholder of form:

The morality of the artist consists in this

'gathering,' this power of egoistic concentration, this will to form, to limit, to shape, to embody; to give up the freedom of the infinite . . . ⁶

These words could easily have been spoken by Gustave Aschenbach, the protagonist of Mann's "Death in Venice." Mann explains that Aschenbach "renounces sympathy with the abyss."⁷ Going one step further, Aschenbach's "young days never knew the sweet idleness and the *laissez aller* that belong to youth."⁸ In simple terms, "Aschenbach was not pleasure loving."⁹ Aschenbach is a formal man; he is the symbol of structured Apollonian civilization. In "Death in Venice," his struggle is not merely the crisis of a single man, but is the essential crisis of all civilizations, as they have all necessarily risen from "the abyss." His fall represents civilization's reversion to a barbaric past and, in light of the Nazis' eventual accession to power, is a frightening portent of things to come.

Aschenbach, although quite famous, is a man bored with the regularity of his daily routine. He feels a desire to travel. Yet, Aschenbach is not conscious of the great irrational drive which exists within himself, a Dionysian drive which will smash his rationalist world of forms into nothingness. In imagining the following scene, Aschenbach shows himself to be restless for a taste of the exotic:

He beheld a landscape, a tropical marshland beneath a reeking sky, steaming, monstrous, rank—a kind of primeval wilderness world of islands, morasses, and alluvial channels . . . There were trees, mis-shapen as a dream . . . he felt his heart

throb with terror, yet with a longing inexplicable.¹⁰

Aschenbach travels to Venice, and it is here that he beholds Tadzio, whom he first admires for his aesthetic beauty: "His face recalled the noblest moment in Greek sculpture."¹¹ There can be no better example of form than Greek sculpture and, in view of Aschenbach's later fall, this precisely captures the point which Mann is attempting to make: Inherent in all form is the possibility of chaos. The chaos which opposes form is by no means antithetical to life. Rather, the very opposite is true. Chaos, like the jungle described above, is the realm of unrestrained bestiality and boundless fertility. Yet the jungle is also a place of fatality. Tadzio, the very essence of beauty, becomes Aschenbach's "horror" (the key word from Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*) and death. At first, viewing the Polish boy, Aschenbach's "heart was stirred, it felt a father's kindness . . ." Yet, Aschenbach's "kindness" degenerates into a lust and eventually he stalks wildly through Venice after his prey, his face pathetically made up to look younger. In seeking release in formless, primordial chaos, Aschenbach seeks a world without morality. He seeks death.

Mann, the master of the leitmotif, has several important symbols which run through "Death in Venice." The figure of Death appears repeatedly, always wearing the tell-tale straw hat. Initially, Death is incarnated in the "bold and domineering"¹³ stranger that Aschenbach sees on a walk through Munich. The ticket-seller, with his "bony yellow fingers,"¹⁴ the gondolier, with his gondola shaped like a coffin, the nauseous old man on-board ship, and the musician, with "a strong smell of

carbolic,"¹⁵ all represent Death. Tadzio watches from the balcony as the musician plays. They represent the two synonymous powers which beckon Aschenbach: fecundity and fatality.

Mann uses the city of Venice itself to symbolize the exotic lure of the chaotic life. The beautiful city has an ugly secret, a plague of cholera. Beauty lures the traveller to stay in Venice, while cholera kills him off: "The horizon looked close and prosaic. When Aschenbach opened his window he thought he smelt the stagnant odour of the lagoon."¹⁶ To remain in Venice means the collapse of form. Aschenbach attempts to leave the city, an act which can be seen as his last "supra-sensual act of the will." The attempt ends in failure; Aschenbach is unable to halt his descent into the abyss. He is wracked by agony as he tries to flee:

. . . the tale of his journey across the lagoon was a tale of woe, a passage through the very valley of regrets . . . The traveller gazed - and his bosom was torn. The atmosphere of the city, the faintly rotten scent of swamp and sea, which had driven him to leave - in what deep, tender, almost painful draughts he breathed it in! How was it he had not known, had not thought, how much his heart was set upon it all! What this morning had been slight regret, some little doubt of his own wisdom, turned now to grief, to actual wretchedness, a mental agony so sharp that it repeatedly brought tears to his eyes, while he questioned himself how he could have forseen it.¹⁷

Aschenbach's surprise at this powerful inner

turmoil parallels the Apollonian perception of Dionysus in *The Birth of Tragedy*:

With what astonishment must the Apollonian Greek have beheld him! With an astonishment which was all the greater the more it was mingled with the shuddering suspicion that all this was in reality not so very foreign to him, yea, that, like unto a veil, his Apollonian consciousness only hid this Dionysian world from his view.¹⁸

*

Mann's most powerful symbol, one which Eliot also uses, is the ocean. In his essay, "Sleep, Sweet Sleep," Mann states: "Infinity . . . the sea . . . old as my love of sleep is my love of the sea."¹⁹ (*the punctuation is Mann's*) Once again, Aschenbach echoes Mann. The author describes his protagonist: "His love of the ocean had profound sources . . . [it was] opposed to his art and perhaps for that very reason a lure, for the unorganised, the immeasurable, the eternal - in short, for nothingness."²⁰ The ocean, more than anything else, is the symbol of the blankness from which civilization arose. Indeed, it is not merely a symbol, for science claims that life originated in the ocean. The ocean is timeless, existing regardless of morals or lust. It is "the element."²¹

Before continuing with Mann, one must look at Eliot, as the subject of ocean-as-symbol is a "ground" for comparing the two writers. In "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," the protagonists' monologue ends by the sea-shore. This obviously

parallels Aschenbach, who dies as he watches Tadzio standing on a sand-bar. Before attempting to make a statement on Eliot's version of the sea, one must first compare the characters of Aschenbach and Prufrock, as this is useful in contrasting Eliot's and Mann's view of Western Civilization.

Both Prufrock and Aschenbach are urban men; they exist within the framework of social etiquette and afternoon tea. At the outset of "Death in Venice," Mann states that "Aschenbach had sought the open soon after tea."²² This is comparable to Prufrock's situation:

For I have known them all already,
known them all—Have known the
evenings, mornings, afternoons, I have
measured out my life with coffee spoons.²³

Indeed, society has been structured to a stifling degree. Prufrock is an indecisive character, whose agonies are magnified by a painful awareness of this indecision. Prufrock's awareness of his own paralysis does not help him overcome it. Rather, he wallows in it all the more. One cannot dismiss Prufrock as a mere inept fool, as he appears to be Eliot's prototype of modern man. If Prufrock is a 'hero,' then he is a hero of the weak. Yet, Prufrock's ordeal would not be alien to Aschenbach, as the latter writes of a "heroism born of weakness. And, after all, what kind could be truer to the spirit of the times? Gustave Aschenbach was the poet-spokesman of all those who labour at the edge of exhaustion."²⁴ Of all the figures in literature and history, St. Sebastian, pierced by arrows, is the most accurate representation of an Aschenbach hero.

Prufrock is unable to communicate with women; he is unable to break free of the formality which governs his life. He hesitates at the edge of a freer, sensual world:

Is it perfume from a dress
That makes me so digress?
And should I then presume?
And how should I begin?²⁵

Prufrock, unable to cope with present failures, tries to put the crucial moment into the future:

And indeed there will be time²⁶
Time for you and time for me,
And time for a hundred indecisions
And for a hundred visions and revisions,
Before the taking of toast and tea.²⁷

Yet, Prufrock must eventually face the challenge of confronting his lady-friend:

Should I, after tea and cakes and ices,
Have the strength to force the moment to
its crisis?²⁸

The reader knows that Prufrock has failed when the tense of the poem changes: "And would it have been worth it after all . . ." ²⁹

Prufrock is doomed never to cross the border which stands before him. Meanwhile, Aschenbach, crossing all borders, slides into the abyss. Nevertheless, Aschenbach's descent takes place in a manner of stages. He experiences some Prufrock-like moments before making his final plunge. Aschenbach's embarrassing hesitancy, although

temporary, can be seen when he shies away from patting Tadzio on the head: "'Too late! Too late!' he thought as he went by. But was it too late?"³⁰ These words could have been spoken by Prufrock himself.

Yet Aschenbach is different from Prufrock. Eliot uses a fruit motif to suggest Prufrock's speculation on sexual adventures: "Do I dare to eat a peach?"³¹ Aschenbach, on the other hand, is not so reserved:

His head burned, his body was wet with clammy sweat, he was plagued by intolerable thirst. He looked about for refreshment, of whatever sort, and found a little fruit-shop where he bought some strawberries. They were overripe and soft; he ate them as he went.³²

Aschenbach soon dies, no doubt poisoned by the diseased, overripe strawberries, symbol of Dionysian fecundity and death. Aschenbach, unlike Prufrock, has tasted that which is forbidden. Is that the only difference between the two characters? Is Aschenbach only a Prufrock who has stepped over the line? Hardly. An affirmative answer to these questions would imply that the world views expressed in "Death in Venice" and "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" were the same, since both characters were being measured by the same means. Yet, Eliot's view is far different from Mann's. Hence, although both characters are symbols of a spiritual decline, as well as sharing several characteristics already mentioned, they exist in differently conceived structures.

The forms in Mann's world signify a moral striving for 'higher things.' Aschenbach is

described as a great moralist, bettering humanity with his works. The quest for the higher forms, as in the Greek cosmos, is what guides man in his pact with Apollo. Beauty, reason, virtue and truth stand as Plato's Good. Aschenbach speaks as Socrates:

For beauty, my Phaedrus, beauty alone, is lovely and visible at once. For, mark you, it is the sole aspect of the spiritual which we can perceive through our senses, or bear so to perceive. Else what should become of us if the divine, if reason and virtue and truth, were to speak to us through the senses? Should we not perish and be consumed by love, as Semele aforetime was by Zeus? So beauty, then, is the beauty-lover's way to the spirit . . . ³³

The admiration of Tadzio's beautiful form is a way of achieving higher spirituality. Of course, inherent in these forms, is possible annihilation in the dark abyss. This is Mann's central point. Form is *essential* to civilization but, no matter how high-minded its conception, is weak. Is this also Eliot's view?

Prufrock, like Aschenbach, represents a highly structured world. Yet, whereas Aschenbach is a highly respected man of letters, Prufrock is a vacillating nonentity, the typical 'little man.' If both Aschenbach and Prufrock are prototypic men, then the world-views of their creators are clearly different. Whereas Mann sees the forms of modern civilization as essential but weak, Eliot sees the current forms as non-essential and inimical to mankind's growth. The specter of Prufrock's dead city symbolizes civilization's failure:

Let us go, through certain half-deserted
streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap
hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster
shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious
argument
Of insidious intent.³⁴

Further, in Eliot's "Gerontion," the narrator says:

I was neither at the hot gates
Nor fought in the warm rain.³⁵

This is a reference to the Battle of Thermopylae (Greek for "hot gates"), in 480 B.C., when the Greeks defended their civilization against Persian encroachment.³⁶ In fighting for their civilization, the Greeks were defending that very beauty, the form of virtue and truth, which Socrates described to Phaedrus. Thermopylae had a meaning. Yet, Gerontion says that he has not fought, although the poem was written in 1920, only two years after the end of World War One. Eliot's point is that even if one has fought in the Great War, it is a meaningless act. World War One, unlike Thermopylae, was a hollow struggle; there were no substantive forms to defend. Gerontion says "My house is a decayed house."³⁷

Eliot is critical of modern society's materialism. Unfortunately his aversion to materialism is intertwined with a powerful anti-Semitism. Eliot makes the dangerous association of capitalism and Judaism:

And the Jew squats on the window sill,
the owner,
Spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled
in London.³⁸

Further, Eliot is disdainful of "Hakagawa, bowing among the Titians."³⁹ Hakagawa is a materialist, unable to comprehend or appreciate aesthetic beauty. Behind the confusion of Eliot's ugly racial remarks is a deep rooted distrust of modernity. Eliot's modern man is caught in a world of crass material forms. Like Prufrock, he is trapped in a profane world. Indeed, even if Prufrock had succeeded in asking the "overwhelming question,"⁴⁰ would this be any guarantee that his life would be more fruitful?

Would it have been worth while,
After the sunsets and the dooryards and
the sprinkled streets,
After the novels, after the teacups, after
the skirts that
trail along the floor-⁴¹

Prufrock's world is sterile. This is in contrast to Aschenbach, who could lose himself in Dionysian, death-like sexual abandon. Yet, Eliot equates skirts on the floor, a sexual symbol, with the banality of novels and teacups. There is no Dionysian release in Eliot's world. Even sex is mechanistic and hollow. There is no suggestion of fertility in Eliot's women. Rather, there is an air of sickness. Gerontion says:

The woman keeps the kitchen, makes tea,
Sneezes at evening, poking the peevish
gutter.⁴²

Obviously, Eliot's greatest work on Western Civilization's sterility is "The Waste Land." Although the complexities of this poem are seemingly infinite, one can still focus on a few salient points. Firstly, the section entitled "A Game of Chess" is dominated by a conversation in a lower class bar. The conversation centers around physical ugliness, a dislike of sex, and abortion:

You ought to be ashamed, I said, to look
so antique,
(And her only thirty-one).
I can't help it, she said, pulling a long
face,
It's them pills I took to bring it off she
said.
(She's had five already, and nearly died of
young George)
The chemist said it would be all right, but
I've never been the same.⁴³

One of the crucial lines in the poem follows shortly thereafter: "What you get married for if you don't want children?"⁴⁴ A diseased civilization is questioning the value of its own propagation. There is no chaotic fecundity in Eliot's world of fatality. Even death is barren:

What is that sound high in the air
Murmur of maternal lamentation
Who are those hooded hordes swarming
Over endless plains, stumbling in cracked
earth
Ringed by flat horizon only
What is the city over the mountains
Cracks and reforms and bursts in the
violet air

Falling towers
Jerusalem Athens Alexandria
Vienna London
Unreal.⁴⁵

At this point one can return to the seaside where Prufrock stands at the end of his narrative. The ocean which Aschenbach gazed into represented primal formlessness, but it is now clear that Eliot's sea represents something entirely different. On one hand, the sea may represent Prufrock's repressed adventurous side, but a more general meaning may also be extracted. In a world which is a "heap of broken images,"⁴⁶ the sea embodies a oneness, or unity. Prufrock says:

Shall I part my hair behind? Do I dare to
eat a peach?
I shall wear white flannel trousers, and
walk upon the beach,
I have heard the mermaids singing, each
to each.
I do not think they will sing to me.⁴⁷

The mermaids will not sing for Prufrock, yet they sang for Odysseus. When one compares this to Gerontion, who did not fight at Thermopylae in the "warm rain," it appears that Eliot, while critical of modern civilization, is not critical of all civilizations. He upholds the symbolic structure of Ancient Greece. His idyllic view is in sharp contrast to the turmoil which Nietzsche describes in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

In order for a civilization to be vital and productive, like Eliot's Ancient Greece, its concepts and morals must likewise be vital. The problem with Western Civilization, it would appear, is that it

subscribes to the wrong forms. Further, can 'wrong forms' be considered forms at all? How did civilization arrive at such a state? How can it be cured? Eliot's proposed remedy for the West is that it adopt the 'correct' morality. Eliot desires a unified cultural whole and he believes that Christianity is the answer. For the West to be rid of its malady, it must mold itself into a Christian society. In *The Idea of a Christian Society*, Eliot states:

The Community of Christians is . . . composed of both clergy and laity, of the more conscious and intellectually developed of both. It will be their identify of belief and aspiration, their background of a common system of education and a common culture, which will enable them to influence and be influenced by each other, and collectively to form the conscious mind . . . ⁴⁸

Eliot, unlike Mann, believes that there are certain forms which are predetermined and exist exclusive of mankind's structural "act of the will." Such is the case of Christian morality, Eliot's foundation of a healthy civilization. Eliot views the modern, un-Christian world as the abyss. The forms (morals) are materialistic and incoherent. Hence, chaos reigns. Indeed, when one says that Western Civilization has the wrong forms, one is still being too generous. According to Eliot, the West has no form at all.

The views of Mann and Eliot clearly diverge. To Mann, the modern world, the equivalent of form, combats formlessness. However, Eliot's modern civilization is formless itself, a "heap of broken im-

ages." Chaos is all that exists prior to Mann's civilization. Yet, prior to Eliot's modern world, the one true set of forms exist. Not only are the views of these men divergent, they are opposites.

*

Eliot's exhortation for a single holy order carries an ominous tone. In *After Strange Gods* he states:

What is still more important [than similar cultural backgrounds] is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free thinking Jews undesirable.⁴⁹

In view of the "final solution," which was inaugurated less than ten years after this utterance was put forth, such words carry a frightening connotation. Eliot, with his conservative program for a cultural community, finds individualism and Liberalism distasteful. Modern society's task is to

concentrate, not to dissipate, to renew our association with traditional wisdom; to re-establish a vital connexion between the individual and the race; the struggle, in a word, against Liberalism.⁵⁰

In his essay entitled "Freud's Position in the History of Western Thought," Thomas Mann comments on such conservatism by stating "that indeed reformations by their very nature have little to do with progress, since they tend to re-establish the old and the oldest in an extremely conservative

sense . . ."⁵¹ Mann differentiates between reaction and revolution "according as it faces to the past or to the future."⁵² One can see Eliot's backward-looking vision in "The Wasteland." Using the recurrent water imagery, Eliot describes the present Thames:

The river sweats
Oil and tar.⁵³

This pollution is quickly contrasted to the clean Thames which Queen Elizabeth I traverses in her barge.⁵⁴ Eliot finds the past a beckoning prospect. Does Eliot fall under Mann's description of a reactionary?

Backwards, is the cry: back into the night, the sacred primitive, the fore-known, the life bearing: backwards into the romantical, prehistorical mother-womb. That is the language of reaction. . . the will is present to 'force back our feeling into the great old ways of looking at man and the world'; always the idea of the sacred past and the fruitfulness of death is set over against the . . . idealistic optimism of the daylight cult of Apollo.⁵⁵

Before attributing these words to Eliot, it must be stated that Mann's Aschenbach is the ultimate form of reactionary; he quests for the Dionysian "motherwomb" of death. Yet, can Eliot's conservative, backwards-looking quest for a Christian Society be compared to Aschenbach's romantic predilection for death? After all, in prescribing Christianity, Eliot advocates a highly structured set of forms, while Aschenbach seeks the formless. How can both be classified as reactionaries?

Aschenbach makes the transition from modernity to the abyss in a matter of days. His degeneration takes place in a series of stages, although by the time of his "stranger god" dream, his fall is absolute. His morality has been stamped out. Yet, it is possible to quest for the past without completely immersing oneself in primordial chaos. Eliot's longing for the past does not extend to the mistiness of pre-history. Rather, his Christian Society was first conceived less than two thousand years ago. Aschenbach's reaction is absolute, while Eliot's is relative. Perhaps Eliot's ultimate inner desire was to descend into the formless, but this involves psychological speculation not verified in his Christian writings.

Gerontion speaks:

In the juvenescence of the year
Came Christ the tiger.⁵⁶

Yet man fails to heed the word:

After such knowledge what forgiveness?
Think now
History has many cunning passages,
contrived corridors
And issues, deceives with whispering
ambitions,
Guides us by vanities.⁵⁷

But Christ is eternal. Again, "the tiger springs in the new year."⁵⁸ Mankind, in the "cunning passages" of history, has made a wrong turn and hence, created the world of a Prufrock. According to Eliot, the lack of unity or sense of community can be traced to Liberal Renaissance Humanism, which engenders individualism.

However, Mann is a Humanist. He cannot be satisfied with looking backwards for an answer. But, unlike Eliot, he cannot offer any general 'cure' for Western Civilization. Whatever a civilization's achievement, Dionysian night will always linger in the background. Yet, Mann is no defeatist. He believes in the "revolutionary principle," which accounts for progress and the forward movement of time. Hence, it acknowledges history. Eliot's timeless solution of "Christ the tiger" denies the importance of history and its "cunning passages." In his essays, Mann puts forth his view:

The revolutionary principle is simply the will towards the future, which Novalis called 'the really better world.' It is the principle of consciousness and recognition, leading to higher levels; the will and urge to destroy - by means of lifting them into consciousness - all the premature apparent harmonies and pseudo-perfections of life, that rest upon uncertain and morally inadequate awareness; and by analysis, by psychology, through phases of solution which, from the point of view of cultural unity, must be designated as anarchy, but in which there is no pause and no retreat, no restoration, no tenable standing ground, to break a path to free and genuine unity of existence, secured by conscious possession, to the culture of men developed to complete-consciousness. The name of revolution belongs only to the will that leads futurewards by the path of consciousness and resolution. This is what youth must be told today. No teaching or incitement to the great 'Back, back!' no zeal for the

past for its own sake, can write the word upon its banner save for the open end of confusion. By which I do not mean that the revolutionary will know nothing of the past or of the deeps. The contrary should be asserted. It must and will know much of them, be very thoroughly at home therein; if only these dark precincts do not allure it for their own sake, if only it does not make common cause with them to preserve the pseudo-religious and the sham-traditional, in short, out of reactionary instinct; but instead presses on as a liberator and enlightener . . .⁵⁹

In summation, there is quite a difference in the views of Mann and Eliot. Mann sees civilization in a perpetual war with itself; its constructed morality opposes the great abyss from which life arises and perishes. Eliot sees modern civilization as an abyss in itself, lacking coherent and unifying Christian forms. To Eliot, there is nothing worse than the non-Christian society of his day. He writes, in 1939, "If you will not have God (and he is a jealous God) you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin."⁶⁰ Yet, the colossal catastrophe of the World Wars makes this a hollow statement. Indeed, if there is a danger to civilization, it is the specter of hysterical reaction, which denies history. Such is the legacy of Fascism, the absolute reaction to modern civilization. Such a reaction produced the Holocaust, man's deepest plunge into the abyss. The Fascist solution and Eliot's answer are both backwards-looking. However, Fascism is an absolute reaction, whereas Eliot's 'cure' is only relative. Both reactions emanate from the self-doubt which plagues Western Civilization.

NOTES

¹Thomas Mann, *Past Masters*, p. 274.

²*Ibid*, p. 141.

³Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, p.

30.

⁴*Ibid*, p. 24.

⁵*Ibid*, p. 30.

⁶Mann, p. 274.

⁷Thomas Mann, *Death in Venice and Seven Other Stories*, p. 13.

⁸*Ibid*, p. 9.

⁹*Ibid*, p. 51.

¹⁰*Ibid*, p. 6.

¹¹*Ibid*, p. 25.

¹²*Ibid*, p. 34.

¹³*Ibid*, p. 5.

¹⁴*Ibid*, p. 16.

¹⁵*Ibid*, p. 60.

¹⁶*Ibid*, p. 28.

¹⁷*Ibid*, p. 37-38.

¹⁸Nietzsche, p. 32-33.

¹⁹Mann, *Past Masters*, p. 273.

²⁰Mann, *Death in Venice and Seven Other Stories*, p. 31.

²¹*Ibid*, p. 33.

²²*Ibid*, p. 3.

²³T.S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950*, p. 5.

²⁴Mann, *Death in Venice and Seven Other Stories*, p. 12.

²⁵Eliot, p. 5.

²⁶*Ibid*, p. 4.

²⁷*Ibid*, p. 4.

²⁸*Ibid*, p. 6.

²⁹*Ibid*, p. 6.

³⁰Mann, *Death in Venice and Seven Other Stories*, p. 47.

³¹Eliot, p. 7.

³²Mann, *Death in Venice and Seven Other Stories*, p. 71.

³³*Ibid*, p. 45.

³⁴Eliot, p. 3.

³⁵*Ibid*, p. 21.

³⁶Elizabeth Drew, *T.S. Eliot: The Design of His Poetry*, p. 30.

³⁷Eliot, p. 21.

³⁸*Ibid*, p. 21.

³⁹*Ibid*, p. 22.

⁴⁰*Ibid*, p. 3.

⁴¹*Ibid*, p. 6.

⁴²*Ibid*, p. 21.

⁴³*Ibid*, p. 42.

⁴⁴*Ibid*, p. 42.

⁴⁵*Ibid*, p. 48.

⁴⁶*Ibid*, p. 38.

⁴⁷*Ibid*, p. 7.

⁴⁸T.S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, p. 43.

⁴⁹T.S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods*, p. 19-20.

⁵⁰*Ibid*, p. 48.

⁵¹Mann, *Past Masters*, p. 171.

⁵²*Ibid*, p. 179.

⁵³Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950*, p. 45.

⁵⁴*Ibid*, p. 45.

⁵⁵Mann, *Past Masters*, p. 173-174.

⁵⁶Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950*, p. 21.

⁵⁷*Ibid*, p. 22.

⁵⁸*Ibid*, p. 22.

⁵⁹Mann, *Past Masters*, p. 178-179.

⁶⁰Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, p. 64.

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Noah Sorkin

Adam Smith: An Historical Misconception

Major economic theories developed throughout history still influence contemporary economic policy. The character of the American economy continues to feel the impact of the basic tenets put forth by such minds as John Maynard Keynes, Alfred Marshall, and Karl Marx. To misunderstand the thoughts of past economists is to risk ignorance of the forces which steer our financial world. In the following essay, Noah Sorkin examines the implications of the contemporary misinterpretation of the ideas developed by the Father of Economics, Adam Smith.

It is very often the desire of contemporary scholars to trace the origins of the various social sciences back to particular historical figures. Thus we tend to attribute modern sociology to the thoughts of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, while no less a giant than Sigmund Freud receives posthumous credit for the field of psychology. Indeed, for any one of the many disciplines which comprise the bulk of the social sciences we might look back through time in an effort to discover the roots of these fields in the minds and work of particular men. By so doing, we lend to the various disciplines a sort of temporal continuity which enables us to follow the growth and development of social thought through the years.

In general, the foundations laid down by these past scholars have been correctly understood by generations of future social scientists. This is not to say that these foundations have remained sacred and unaltered; certainly, years of debate, ex-

permentation, upheaval and discovery have wrought significant changes in each of the social sciences as they were first developed by earlier scholars. Yet regardless of the reaction with which they may presently meet, the famous theories of such men as Darwin, Boas, Durkheim, Marx, Freud, and Malinowski are understood in a clear manner. It is thus no little surprise that when we focus on the field of economics, and, in particular, on the figure to whom this vast discipline's foundation is attributed, understanding falls by the wayside; modern man has misinterpreted Adam Smith.

There is a certain element of sadness to this misinterpretation; Smith's 1776 masterpiece *The Wealth of Nations*, the volume responsible for beginning the science of economics, took over eight years of hard work and study to complete. Indeed, one might validly say that Smith's life is bound up in this book. Thus the thought that the essence of his work would, in the future, be misconstrued by so many parties is certainly frustrating. Yet the importance of the misconceptions concerning Smith's thoughts and writing greatly transcends the level of one man's efforts and energy spent in vain, for these very misconceptions have played an enormous role in the formation of American economic thought since the middle of the nineteenth century.

In order to best analyze the misconceptions concerning Adam Smith, as well as the implications which these misconceptions hold for present-day economic thought, we must be familiar with Smith's major theories. What, then, was Adam Smith trying to do? What exactly was his main thrust in writing *The Wealth of Nations*? Only after we have tackled these questions can we proceed to examine how this

man has fallen victim to the mistaken interpretation of so many economists, businessmen and scholars.

Adam Smith, while writing his monumental treatise on finance and society in the latter half of the eighteenth century, was primarily concerned with one fundamental question: What are the forces which hold society together? The very weight of such a question may at first make such a speculation seem impossible to answer if not ludicrous to ask. After all, the concept of society itself is a very complex and intricate one, and there are a virtual multitude of forces which, one might reasonably conclude, "hold society together"; laws, customs, authoritarian rule, spiritual beliefs and ethnic similarities to name just a few. Yet as one reviews the writing of Adam Smith it becomes clear what Smith had in mind when he wrote of these forces which bind a group of people into a recognizable society. For upon observing the society in which he lived, Smith realized that each individual member in that society had a very specific role to play, that each individual partook of some occupation which not only sustained his own existence in that society, but, more importantly, helped to sustain the existence of the society itself. To pose the problem in somewhat simpler terms, consider for a moment the man who sells shoes. Every day this man is involved in transactions between himself and his customers in which he gives up a pair of shoes in return for a cash payment. Just as Adam Smith did, we might consider this man to be a sole economic actor, while we might think of the customers in his shop as representing society itself. Although such a transaction may seem simple enough on the surface,

Smith emphasized the vital role that such dealings play in the survival of society; without the cash payment, our shoe salesman would be unable to purchase the products he needs for his own well-being, such as food, shelter and clothing. Even further than this, however, if our shoe salesman is unable to buy these products Smith reasoned that *another* economic actor, perhaps the man who sells food, would similarly be denied of needed cash payments for *his* goods. As is clearly evident, Smith saw in this process a chain reaction in which the economic misfortune of one member of society soon mushroomed into the economic misfortune of the entire society. It was truly the genius of Adam Smith to see that all economic actors are somehow intricately bound together, that in some way the actions of the shoe salesman do in fact effect the actions of the grocer. And it is here that we first begin to ascertain the task which Smith set before himself, and to understand Smith's notion of "forces which hold society together." For although Smith observed the chaos of society, the hustle and bustle of the market places, the confusion amidst the shops where consumers crowded around counters seeking bargains, and the mad scrambling of factory workers hovering about assembly lines, he sensed a certain order and logic which underlay the surface hysteria of society. It was this order which Smith strove to explain and define.

Smith began by noting that members of society act solely out of self-interest. The tailor and the cobbler do not work their respective crafts so as to bring joy and comfort to the bulk of society. Instead, these actors labor in an effort to sustain themselves, to ensure their own material well-being.

This may seem very evident to us, but for Smith it brought to the forefront the fundamental question to which *The Wealth of Nations* is directed: "How is it possible for a community in which everyone is busily following his own self-interest not to fly apart from sheer centrifugal force?"¹ Here we see that Adam Smith was concerned with a topic at the very core of social structure and survival: what is it that ensures the completion of those tasks so essential to society? Why is a policeman a policeman and not a school teacher? Why does the merchant choose to sell gloves and not hats? And how can the consumer be so sure that the neighborhood store will be supplied with desired goods? After all, if man is free in a society to follow the whims of his mind, if he is not constrained by *some higher power* or authority to act in a specified way, there must be some real, albeit intangible, force which guides him in choosing to be a policeman, or sell gloves, or walk to the neighborhood store confident of being able to purchase the needed products.

Obviously, Smith recognized and acknowledged what we so freely term the "profit motive." Yet he did much more than simply state the fact that people, in an economy which is structured around independent economic actors seeking wealth and luxury, will act in a manner most conducive to earning money. Adam Smith unraveled the laws of a fantastic device: the market; the economic institution which, thought Smith, allows society to exist. For, as Robert Heilbroner has written in his chapter on Smith, "...self-interest is only half the picture. It drives men to action. Something else must prevent the pushing of profit-hungry individuals from holding society up to exorbitant ransom: a com-

munity activated only by self-interest would be a community of ruthless profiteers."²

Smith labeled this "regulator" of the profit-hungry individual "competition"; that character of the market which ensures that there will be just the right amount of policemen on the force, gloves on the merchants' shelves and supplies in the neighborhood store. *The Wealth of Nations* is a veritable blueprint of the economic forces which serve to cement all the actions of the individuals in a society into an organized and efficient whole. Through his analysis of such economic ingredients as price and cost, supply and demand, profit and loss, Smith developed the famous concept of the "invisible hand"; that intangible economic force which, according to Adam Smith, allows society to survive and flourish. A simple theoretical explanation suffices to understand Smith's reasoning.

In order to continue living, a man needs food. To purchase this food, since we assume that no one will supply it free of charge, the man must have money, and the only way of acquiring this money is to exchange a good or service for a cash payment. Suppose our individual economic actor decides to sell wood. Further, assume, as is almost always the case, that other individuals are also selling wood in order to purchase food. If the first man should attempt to sell lumber at a higher price than his competitors he will certainly starve, for no one will be willing to pay more than is necessary for any product. If our man should charge less than his competitors, they will then go hungry for all consumers will flock with their purses to the first man. As Smith reasoned, however, the other sellers will quickly lower their prices in an effort to retain customers.

It might at first seem as if we have uncovered a situation to be characterized by anything except "logic and order." Yet Adam Smith predicted that the end result of this shifting of prices in the lumber market would be one described by modern economists as "equilibrium"—each individual seller charging the same price for his product. And it is here that one discerns the "logic and order" bound up in the operation of the invisible hand. For this marvelous force does not merely ensure that all sellers of wood will have money to buy food. This economic force also ensures that society will have *exactly* the quantity of wood which it desires. If consumers should suddenly change their preference from wood to stone, our man will quickly begin to feel the pangs of hunger as his sales slacken. In order to eat he will leave the lumber business and enter the market for stone. As he does this, more stone will be offered for sale, and the desires of the consumers will have been satisfied. If, on the other hand, consumers should begin to demand more and more wood, those who had originally been selling stone will know hunger and lose little time in moving into the market for lumber. Once again the invisible hand was provided for the satisfaction of society's needs.

Although we have so far been able to examine Adam Smith's work through the use of an elementary model, there is a certain subtle implication to the *Wealth of Nations* which not only must be acknowledged, but which further reveals itself to be the core of our examination concerning the great misconception of Adam Smith. Smith had uncovered a machine; a contraption which is fueled by the market forces of supply and demand, steered by

the "invisible hand" of self-interest, and regulated by the phenomenon of competition. Yet once in operation Smith realized that his machine could very easily fall victim to the pressures of society. In other words, if the economy was not left free of outside encroachment, if external forces were somehow able to tamper with the inner workings of the economic structure, Smith believed that the ability of the market to keep society alive would be lost. Thus, the government should not interfere with the workings of the market, should not adopt policies which might tend to restrain the free movement of the "invisible hand," nor should businessmen be permitted to enjoy such anti-competitive practices as monopolies. Indeed anything which prevented competition from prevailing in the market was thought by Smith to be a hazard. For without competition, there could be no invisible hand, no force to guide the actions of self-interested individuals in a manner most conducive to society as a whole.

And so here we are. Adam Smith did *not* advocate capitalism, that brand of economic action where accumulation reigns supreme as each entrepreneur strives to "kill-off" his competitors. Adam Smith *did* advocate competition, a situation where all economic actors are equal in the market.

Yet how do we today perceive of Adam Smith? What has the "Father of economics" come to represent in the minds of so many economists, scholars and businessmen? Perhaps no other concept of economic and social philosophy is more closely associated with the figure of Adam Smith than that of "laissez-faire," the absolutist doctrine of a free-market system with no government intervention whatsoever. For the misconception of Adam Smith

has been the use of this historical mind in *support* of not a *competitive* market system, but one thoroughly unrestrained, one in which the "invisible hand" so cherished by Smith is swept under the surge of capitalist entrepreneurs who strive to *abolish* competition.

These are, no doubt, strong words; and yet any examination of American economic philosophy, even the briefest of such examinations, bears out the fact that an economy free of government intervention, free of anti-trust laws, and trade regulations, has been sought after by those in the financial community for years. Businessmen have long dreamed of an economy where "freedom" is equated to the right of doing business as one sees fit. Yet, and here is the essential point, the American economy, for over a century, has tended towards a monopoly existence. Large corporations buy out smaller corporations, market power becomes concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people, and the "invisible hand" becomes impotent to effect the economy.

It is certainly not meant to be argued here that we should attempt to structure the American economy around the dictates of the eighteenth century world from which Adam Smith arose. Yet those who would use the thoughts of Smith in praise of an economy where there is no restraint on individual economic actors have misconceived a fundamental tenet of his work. For Smith *would* want restraint in the form of anti-trust laws and trade regulations to the extent that the competitive nature of the market was threatened by the "free-wheeling" tactics of businessmen and entrepreneurs. Indeed Adam Smith would heartily

welcome any government regulations which strove to maintain the competitive nature of the economy.

It is somewhat ironic that Adam Smith, the champion of competition, should be used as a rallying cry for "laissez-faire" economics, for "laissez-faire" is synonymous with monopoly. It is certainly one of the greatest misconceptions of economic philosophy, for the mind of Adam Smith and the concept of "laissez-faire" are at very opposite ends of a wide spectrum of social and economic thought.

NOTES

¹Robert Heilbroner, *The Wordly Philosophers*, (New York: Clarion Press, 1967) p. 50.

²*Ibid.*, Heilbroner, p. 52

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Andrew Rodwin

Progressive Nationalism And Its Occurance In Rhodesia

Since the end of World War II, the nations of Southern Africa have been receiving increased attention from observers of the world's political systems. Established regimes are beginning to falter as the oppressed majority quests for freedom. In order to understand the contemporary disruptive influences in this turbulent area it is necessary to comprehend several basic premises behind the nationalist-movements. Andrew Rodwin examines various economic, political and social factors in Rhodesia, applicable to the entire scope of the African quest for independence.

HYPOTHESIS

A society, although unique in itself, can be analyzed in part by looking at the ethnic elements of which it is composed. England and France, for example, are societies dominated by the descendants of such Germanic and Scandinavian tribes as the Franks, Normans, and Saxons. The English and French whose roots lie in these tribes comprise overwhelming majorities in their respective countries. A number of small, largely assimilated minorities accept the cultural standards of the white Germanic descendants. Recognition of this is a key to understanding the politics of England and France.

By contrast, a different ethnic configuration which some societies have consists of an elite ruling minority ethnic group dominating an oppressed majority ethnic group. Obvious examples of such a society are the white "settler" societies of southern Africa, manifestations of nineteenth century colonialism. (Many of these societies have now succumbed to majority will in the form of African majority governments, but conspicuous examples of ruling white minorities remain.)

There are general characteristics endemic to the type of society of which the southern African countries are examples. There, the majority is saddled with inferior economic opportunities allotted them by the elite minority -- an inferiority that will extend to a political impotence imposed to enforce submission to such conditions. It is natural for the majority group -- oppressed -- to remain dissatisfied with the burdens suffered under such a system. Isolated incidents of rebellion may be staged. If the minority is well-entrenched, these incidents will be ineffective, and the oppressed ma-

majority will remain basically helpless, though disgruntled.

Eventually, some mix of factors will combine to provoke a majority movement, which will be both continuous and organized. Such a movement may be called nationalism.

That nationalism has continuity and organization distinguishes it from earlier temporary, local insurrections. The nationalist movement makes its demands on the ruling minority over time and through broad organization, rather than periodically and only through small interest groups like trade unions. Although at the outset the movement may be highly emotional, it will, from its beginning, make specific political demands on the ruling minority.

Whether such demands will be met is crucial, and depends on the structure of government in the society concerned. There is a British colonial dimension and a local white dimension in settler governments in southern Africa, and a tension between the two. The British are largely concerned with establishing representative governments in their former colonies peacefully, and with accommodating world and Commonwealth opinion about the character of the governments established. Local white settlers, by contrast, are determined to keep government in "civilized" hands -- meaning their own -- in order to guarantee that the society will be Western in nature and that Europeans can maintain a high standard of living. These aims will tend, by definition, to be at odds.

Societies in which the balance of power tips toward local whites, as it did in Southern Rhodesia, will then be minimally accommodative to African

demands. Conversely, when Britain maintains sufficient control in a colony or protectorate, as it did in Nyasaland, white government is forced to be more lenient and accomodative, compelled by relatively liberal Britain.

If nationalist demands are met with substantive accomodation, the movement will seek satisfaction of further demands leading to the movement's eventual goal. Such goals may change over time, but ultimately goals must be satisfied at some point. In other words, it is useless to hope that nationalism will fade into obscurity when ignored, as if it were a fad.

At the earliest point in African nationalism --when the movement is first articulated -- it is likely that the movement will aim at making African opportunities equal to those of Europeans, economically and politically at a relatively gradual pace.

If the nationalists' demands are not met with substantive accomodation, the goals and ideology of the movement will shift. If, for example, Africans express a demand for integration in public places that is not substantively met, or is even greeted with harsh security measures, majority rule and "one man - one vote" are likely to replace integration as a goal.

Similarly, ideology is likely, after a number of frustrations, to become radical. Democratic socialism or communism may replace liberal democracy as the nationalist ideology. In addition, the spirit of compromise in the nationalist movement will further diminish. The more intense and uncompromising nationalist leaders will find their support growing.

In sum, frustration of demands reshapes the political complexion of the oppressed majority. Nationalist leaders will articulate this reshaping in their changing goals and ideologies. The pattern of demands, frustration, and shift will repeat, until the nationalists' demands are met. If not met, the movement will simply become more violent, until it commits itself to armed revolution.

This simple model is complicated by the pattern of dissension that will grow within the movement. As a function of continually frustrated political expression and demands, the nationalist movement faces the hazard of splintering, as different elements in the majority shift ideology and goals at different rates. Predictably, the rural peasant farmers, conservative by nature, favor moderation and are slow to shift, while the city residents, often young, shift at a more rapid pace, gestating an intelligentsia that will lead the way to radicalism.

The leaders themselves are a variable bearing influence on dissension. There is a tension in nationalist leadership between simple expression of the political temperature of the oppressed majority, like a thermometer, and inflammation of political feeling, like gasoline. Those who tend towards the former may not provide initiative and fail to stay in the lead. Those who tend towards the latter may jeopardize their power base. The most effective leader leads the majority and yet remains in tune with it.

Apparently, dissension results when a) an urban/rural schism in the society prevents uniform shifts, b) some leaders ride the tide of nationalism by shifting and some don't, c) leaders allow personal ambition and conflicting personalities to sharpen

schisms, and d) tribalism or some other potentially explosive division asserts itself.

Intra-nationalist squabbles evolve, in a sense, along with inter-nationalist squabbles. Violence between African and African is often worse than violence between African and white. Violence is in fact bred as the spirit of liberal compromise fades, rhetoric becomes thicker, ideology more demanding, personal ambitions keener, communication more difficult and less desired, and violence more of a historical precedent. After years of battle, the ethics of means are ignored in the drive to ends.

Summing up, this hypothesis suggests that 1) the nationalist movement becomes more "radical" when its present demands and goals are not met with substantive accommodation and 2) the nationalist movement will splinter in the face of continued frustration caused by the ruling white minority and/or the ruling colonial power.

CASE STUDY

Southern Rhodesia is a pluralistic society, consisting, in 1961, of 2,225,000 blacks, and 180,000 whites. A nationalist movement began here in 1955 and assumed broad proportions by 1957 with the revitalization of the old African Nationalist Congress. Whether or not the research hypothesis is borne out depends on whether or not the nationalist movement shifted policies, goals, and ideologies as a result of white failure to generate meaningful accommodation in the years following 1955.

Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November, 1965 was a dramatic move by the white minority both in the

scope of the country's history and in the context of the hypothesis, as its extremism solidified the alienation of the nationalists that had been building up. In declaring independence unilaterally, white Rhodesia handed the nationalists a brash *fait accompli*. UDI is a striking example -- a microcosm -- of the way racial tensions in Rhodesia were treated.

The period between 1955 and 1965 is therefore convenient to study.

EARLY HISTORY

Although a number of external factors brought about the rise of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, the motivation for the nationalist movement reaches back to earlier stages in the country's history. At no point in Rhodesia's history did Africans fully accept white rule. "The attitude of protest had been there for years; there had been movements of defiance; but each time people had lapsed back into acquiescence to the settler regime ...¹ which misled white settlers into believing that Africans would not seriously resist domination.

In 1890, a group of white settlers of British origin living in South Africa went north into the African interior under the "aegis" of Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC). The Europeans occupied what is now Rhodesia in the next decade. Considerable resistance was encountered from the two tribal groups in the area, the Shona and the Matabele, culminating in serious rebellions in 1893 and 1896. This resistance was crushed by the Europeans, simply, with the "superior organization and technology"² that Europe used to subdue the African and Asian worlds.

From 1890-1923, Rhodesia was administered by the BSAC. "In opting against direct administration, Britain effectively conceded local autonomy to the new settlers."³ Because the ends of the BSAC were purely financial while the settlers' stake in Rhodesia was more personal -- Rhodesia was their home -- tension mounted between the BSAC and the settlers with respect to policy aims.

When the BSAC decided to bail out of Rhodesia around 1920, Britain was left with the problem of governing Rhodesia. Solution of this problem was deferred to the settlers in a referendum in 1922. The settlers chose responsible government, as opposed to amalgamation with South Africa. White Rhodesia's fierce sense of independence today stems in part from its early drive for autonomy.

As a colony, Rhodesia was subject to colonial office rule. Britain sent a governor to Rhodesia to act as a representative and to reserve for Britain legislation pertaining to native affairs, technically a British prerogative. In practice, though, the reserve clause was rarely used. An understanding developed between Britain and Rhodesia that Britain would not invoke the reserve clause, but would work out informal compromises when objections rose to Rhodesian legislation. Britain voiced few such objections, and those arrangements became a tradition. Local white rule was comprehensive from the inception of responsible government through Federation to UDI, which cut off even the theoretical possibility of British intervention by peaceful means.

WHITES

Although whites in Rhodesia are not com-

pletely homogeneous, most, in the period before UDI, were of British origin, and professed a pride in what they referred to as their civilized, British way of life, and seemed to have a vague national character.

Geographically, Rhodesia was vast, open country for those coming from Britain. Whites who lived there shared the traits that a frontier fosters: individualism, self-reliance, restlessness with the tedium and determinacy of highly socialized life, and a corollary reverence of larger-than-life folk heroes exaggeratedly rugged and strong.⁴

Another factor in white national character was isolation. Rhodesian whites were not only isolated from the rest of the world, prior to 1965, but were largely isolated from native Africans because of segregation and separate development.⁵ Consequently, Rhodesians both resented foreign interference and were fundamentally ignorant of African ways. Xenophobic, whites were contemptuous of an African culture that they did not understand, that seemed simply barbaric. Because of their ignorance, whites feared any type of African presence other than a servile one. With fear comes reaction, both in security legislation and in the violence of white reprisals to African demonstrations.

Garfield Todd, the relatively liberal Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia ousted in 1957, once suggested that whites were becoming a race of "fear-ridden neurotics." Whites tended to see the Africans simply as a threat to the civilized way of life that was the European status quo.

Reformist elements did exist within white ranks though. Garfield Todd, though paternalistic, be-

lieved in reform and eventual majority rule. Whitehead, his successor as Prime Minister, instituted occasional reforms too, although with less conviction. But in both cases, especially with Whitehead, reform came too little and too late. Whitehead, for example, promised Africans two or three seats in the all-white Parliament (before Britain forced the offer to be increased to fifteen). "The feebleness of this measure," commented one writer at the time, "is pathetic in the light of recent events."⁶

The problem with the reforms of Todd and Whitehead was that they were usually coupled with the tightening of security legislation. This meant that African demands were met not only "too little and too late," but were countered by harsh security measures that not only reacted to but anticipated agitation.

Security was simply no small matter in Rhodesia. The organization of society; extensive army and police reserves, to puppetlike chiefs, to land distribution pass laws, to ghettoized black townships, and rigid legislation was a broad security network unsparing in harshness. One item, the Law and Order Maintenance Bill was

possibly the toughest security law in the British Commonwealth of Nations. It violates all known freedoms, gives the police excessive powers, and curtails the discretion of the judges. Sir Robert Tredgold, [former] Federal Chief Justice resigned over this bill . . . calling it "evil and a threat to the rule of law."⁷

The whites established, in the heart of undeveloped Africa, what they often called the last

bastion of the Western ideal. The average standard of living in white Southern Rhodesia was higher than that of any country in Western Europe, and poverty among whites was almost unknown.⁸ The economic arrangement provided for whites an island of affluence in an ocean of poverty.

"The coexistence of two economies -- a relatively modern European market economy and a depressed African subsistence economy -- is the pattern of Rhodesia's race structure."⁹ The purpose of all white policies was to maintain that structure, (at African expense).

AREAS OF DISCRIMINATION

In the Rhodesian type of pluralistic society, the ruling minority allocates most of the society's limited resources to itself. The Land Amendment Act set early guidelines for the distribution of land, reserving separate areas for Europeans and Africans. In 1961 for example, 20,895,000 acres were set aside for 2,250,000 Africans' purchase or ownership, while 48,065,000 could be owned by the 180,000 Europeans¹⁰ (that is, for the white "settlers.") This meant that there were only about ten acres of land per African while there were over 250 acres for every European. Ironically, only 8% of Europeans were farmers, cultivating only 1,100,000 acres. Consequently, many native areas were "becoming outstanding" as areas of "considerable population pressure and resource deterioration,"¹¹ and "African preoccupation with the pattern of land distribution (became) intensive and almost fanatical."¹²

Also, the Government spent about twelve times as much on white education as on African education

in 1965.¹³ This discrepancy in expense makes the fact that 85% of African children were enrolled in school in 1960,¹⁴ an achievement only on paper. The double-standard educational policy accomplished two things for the whites: 1) it reserved limited funds for education of white children and 2) it kept the quality of African education poor. As education is correlated with demands on the political system, radicalism of ideology, and effectiveness of organization of an oppressed group, improving educational opportunities for Africans would not have served short-run white interests.

Concerning employment, the average annual wage earned by Africans in 1963 was £ 114. Non-Africans, averaged £ 1217. The minimum wage per month was £ 5 below the bare subsistence level defined by statisticians. Unskilled jobs were set aside for Africans. Skilled jobs were held by Europeans. Both legislation and understandings between companies and unions assured this. Where white unions were concerned, Southern Rhodesia was a welfare state; but because of the Industrial Conciliation Act, this was not the case for African workers, who were not allowed to join or organize unions. At this point African workers were not even considered employees. When they were finally allowed to form unions, these were kept separate from white unions. Because of this, and because of discriminatory voting regulations in unions, African labor never developed any political clout.

Finally, Africans were ultimately discriminated against by franchise requirements. Although couched in non-discriminatory language, the effect of franchise requirements both in the pre-1961 and in the 1961 constitutions was to silence the African

political voice. In the 1961 constitution for example, a complex system of franchise requirements; African citizens could qualify as 'lower-roll' voters through any of six avenues in which various property, age, and educational requirements were combined to be just out of reach of most of the country's over two million Africans. In an unofficial plebiscite held by the NDP, over 99% of Africans rejected the 1961 constitution, primarily for this reason.

Of course, the whole fabric of society discriminated against Africans; land, education, employment, and the franchise were but a few instances. All rewards were routed to the whites, who controlled political power, to the relative deprivation of Africans. This is a situation with which the Africans were never satisfied.

FEDERATION, PARTNERSHIP, AND LIBERALISM

In 1954, Britain combined the colony of Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring British protectorates of North Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form the Central African Federation. Federating these territories accomplished a number of objectives.

One such objective was the desire to tie together the Federation countries economically, as, federated, they comprised an integrated economic unit. Southern Rhodesian whites, economically driven, would provide the terrain and manpower for secondary industry, with the wealth of copper being mined in Northern Rhodesia serving as the complementary primary industry for the Federation.¹⁵

A second design was also of major importance, concerned racial harmony. Although Southern Rhodesian whites were vastly outnumbered by Africans, the percentages of whites in Northern Rhodesia was even smaller, and in Nyasaland miniscule. This, coupled with other factors, promoted a strong African nationalism in the two protectorates. White settlers in the three territories hoped that by tying Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to a Southern Rhodesia with an entrenched, if small, white elite that nationalism in the protectorates would be defused and thus the institution of majority governments there would be prevented.

Conversely, Britain hoped to ameliorate the extreme racial injustice in Southern Rhodesia in this indirect manner. Although Joshua Nkomo, a leading African nationalist since the early 1950's, and other nationalist leaders campaigned against Federation, for "most of the hitherto oppressed Southern Rhodesian Africans, the prospect of federation . . . seemed full of promise."¹⁶

The official racial policy of the Federation was "partnership." Partnership was never formally defined, so what politicians meant by it depended on whether they targeted remarks for a British, white, or African audience. The most specific observation that can be made about partnership is that it was supposed to be the moderate alternative between the principles of separate development and African domination.¹⁷

In practice, partnership led to a modest effort to remove minor examples of social discrimination, without jeopardizing the advantages discrimination gave to the artificially imposed economic affluence

for whites.¹⁸ Therefore, such issues as land, education, and the franchise -- crucial to maintenance of white superiority--were usually exempt from meaningful reform.

Coupled with minor reforms was a token allocation of two African MPs to represent the Africans in each of the three federation states in Federal Parliament. Finally, if partnership could make possible "some improvement in the economic position of the African"¹⁹ the appeal of nationalism to Africans might be lessened.

These concessions had no impact on African thought, except to convince Africans that partnership offered them nothing. "The Africans in all three territories feared and distrusted the portent of continued white domination which the federation represented."²⁰ Partnership meant for Africans what Lord Malvern, first Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, admitted with vivid candor it meant: that Africans were the horse and Europeans the rider.

Partnership at its finest, which was seen in theory rather than practice, coincided with the intent of the liberal movement which preceded, and was cut short by, nationalism. The liberals generally believed that the Federation ought to become a multi-racial society with gradual but substantive accommodations made to African demands, with majority rule as the eventual end. Moral Rearmament, David Stirling's Capricorn Society, and the Inter-Racial Association were examples of liberal groups run jointly by white liberals and pre-nationalist Africans. These groups believed in genuine partnership, rather than the superficial one Federation officials spoke of with such magnanimity. "Had there

been any implementation, during the first years, of those persuasive policies on which the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was predicated, the early failures of Congress and Convention might have led to the permanent demise of African nationalism."²¹ There was a time when the liberal movement, had its principles been adopted by the Federation, might have led to a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia. But, "by 1955 a stage had been reached when Africans had begun to regard the government as their own."²²

Why did the liberal movement fail? "The most powerful reason is that it provoked no response of encouragement from the broad range of government officials or white politicians."²³ A major blow to the movement was the defeat in Parliament in 1954 of a bill outlawing public discrimination.²⁴ It was true that liberal pressure groups had no parliamentary representation, and appealed to those who were already liberal.²⁵ The liberal movement was not dynamic.

Liberalism had waned by 1957. A final blow was delivered to it when Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd was ousted in the following year. Todd, paternalistic, wanted to take the Africans "by the scruff of the neck and [say] 'come with us into the twentieth century.'" Many Africans "believed his government was in some sense theirs."²⁶ When Todd was finally beaten in a ballot for the Prime Ministership, essentially because he had not reflected increasingly hard-line white opinion in his government, "the few African delegates in the hall could only see dust settling on their hopes."²⁷

At that point, Nathan Shamuyarira, later to be a leading nationalist concluded.

The European body politic laid before our eyes, bare and unmasked like a cold corpse--unfriendly, uncooperative, and unresponsive; in retrospect we would see that the friendliness was only to lull us; the cooperation was conditional on the maintenance of white political domination and economic privilege; and response was only to marginal pin-pricks that did not cut the roots of white control in every sphere of the State.²⁸

The stage was set for the rise of nationalism.

NATIONALISM

"There were African tribal organizations before European settlement and resistance movements of many sorts from 1890 to 1950"²⁹ in Southern Rhodesia. But these movements lacked the factors of continuity and organization, and therefore hadn't much in common with nationalism. It is also true that they were not widely supported because the rural population had not been politicized, mainly because the government curtailed political activity.

A combination of external and internal factors sparked the spread of the nationalist movement. Africans who had served in the military had been exposed to the modern world during World War II, bearing personal witness to the lives and battles of people overseas. Expectations also rose too when African intellectuals visited countries in Africa that had established majority governments (Rhodesia was in fact at the heart of a continent that, piece by piece, was throwing off the yoke of European rule; in the nineteen-fifties there was constitutional prog-

ress in Kenya and Nyasaland, Congo and Nigeria were on the verge of independence, and DeGaulle agreed in principle to self-government for French West Africa and Equatorial Africa.)³⁰ And vital nationalistic movements were growing rapidly in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Also, Rhodesia itself was modernizing, as was the rest of the world, and modernization leads to better education and rising expectations.

Finally, the liberal movement had met with no success. This failure provoked a shift in the goals and ideology of African liberals. The shift was from the gradualism of liberalism to a nationalism which advocated more immediate change.

Although the nationalist movement has no birthday, for the sake of convenience it can be said that the movement began in Harare in 1955 with the formation of the City Youth League.³¹ The League consisted of a group of young urban blacks of intellectual orientation; it is natural that nationalism began in the progressive urban setting, rather than back on the farms.

Nationalists told Africans to forget the old liberal multi-racial ideal. "Do not hang on the backs of European organizations like babies. Rely now on yourselves," suggested James Chikerema, a nationalist leader.

The League's first objective was to challenge a rival African leader, Charles Mzingeli. Mzingeli had "handled the authorities roughly,"³² but was basically liberal in orientation, and wanted to work with the Government.³³ Since African support was limited, the League felt it should not be wasted on Mzingeli. Dissension made for a rivalry which led to the earliest violence and intimidation. At this stage, though, violence was relatively mild.

It was the short-sightedness of Mzingeli's objectives of which the League disapproved. Mzingeli and the liberals wanted to pressure the government into granting such relief as better township lighting and better roads. But by 1956 and 1957, the nationalists were thinking more about the franchise and "the fundamental laws which created the official and the parliament."³⁴

An example of a project the League considered worthy was the organization, in August, 1956, of a bus boycott to protest an increase in bus fares which poor urban workers could not easily afford. The boycott continued for three days. "Burning of food stalls, wrecking of bus shelters, stoning, widespread looting, and even raping followed."³⁵ These incidents of violence constituted reprisals against those Africans who had refused participation in the boycott. From this point on, violence and intimidation were charges whites made incessantly against the African nationalists.

In August 1957, the CYL reformed the old African National Congress (ANC), which had been banned in 1953 after the excesses of the Mau-Mau problem in Kenya. The move was tactical, as opposed to ideological (as Todd, fairly lenient had not forced a shift in ideology) to combine the "ideas and vitality"³⁶ of the CYL with the experience and position of the old Congress. The CYL sought a nationalist party incorporating rural Africans with the young urban intelligentsia. Joshua Nkomo, a well-known former president of Congress was chosen to head the new ANC, primarily to give the party a "national figure at the head."³⁷

Nkomo was a moderate. As ANC president, he called simply for "a society of equals." Similarly, an

excerpt from the party's statement of "Principles, Policy, and Programme" sounds liberal in tone, emphasizing integration and partnership:

Its aim is the national unity of all the inhabitants of the country in true partnership, regardless of race, color, or creed. It stands for a completely integrated society: equality of opportunity in every sphere; and the social, economic, and political advancement of all. It regards these objectives as the essential foundation of that partnership between people of all races, without which there can be no peaceful progress in this country.

But while such societies as Capricorn had been conservative in their attitude towards African enfranchisement, ANC was uncategorically not. ANC demanded, boldly, "full participation of African people in government."³⁸

The effectiveness of ANC was admitted by Whitehead. He spoke of "the growing tendency of the movement to incite people in rural as well as urban areas to defy the law." Civil disobedience and violence distinguished ANC from the more passive liberal movement. Yet, "even this Congress was hardly militant; most of its battles were fought in the courtrooms rather than in the streets. In short, the party was a moderate movement with some rabid spokesmen."³⁹

Penetration into rural areas constitutes the main achievement of ANC. Even in the late 1950's, the rural peasantry comprised the backbone of the African population. By concerning itself with the problems of rural Africans, the ANC garnered rural

support, a strategy with which the liberals had not concerned themselves.

Edgar Whitehead was led to ban the party when rioting in nearby Nyasaland culminated in the Nyasaland Emergency in early 1959. Five hundred party officials were arrested, and the legislature passed a series of oppressive measures (Unlawful Organizations Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act) to curtail nationalist agitation.

The harsh white reaction was, ironically, directed against a political party that, though responsible for limited violence, clearly had not generated in Southern Rhodesia circumstances that paralleled those of the Nyasaland Emergency, even remotely. Justifying his actions in a speech which brazenly admitted government indifference to civil liberties, Whitehead declared,

It is a very ancient tradition of the British people that governments should defer action against subversive movements until rioting or bloodshed has occurred. My government does not subscribe to this tradition. It had become evident that if these people had been allowed to continue indefinitely in their courses, disorder and probably bloodshed would be the inevitable result.

In retrospect, it is clear that the banned ANC furthered the relatively aggressive strategy pushed by the CYL; ANC "signalled a change in attitudes by openly attacking the white establishment and what it stood for, and destroying the white concepts and values which had been emulated by so many missionary-educated Africans for so many years."⁴⁰

In January of 1960, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed. With the banning of ANC, the momentum of the nationalist movement had been temporarily frustrated. That the new NDP would be more radical in its demands, and that it would be more concerned with chopping off discrimination at the roots rather than pruning away specific manifestations, was predictable. And, in fact,

The NDP decided to lay greater emphasis than the ANC had ever done on constitutional and political development, and put a lower priority on attacking the Land Apportionment Act, the Land Husbandry Act and other discriminatory laws. It shifted the emphasis from a plea for fair treatment and humanity, to an outright demand for self-rule.⁴¹

Wrote Leonard Takawira, a nationalist leader, in the most prominent journal in the Federation, the *Central African Examiner*, "We are no longer asking Europeans to rule us well. We now want to rule ourselves."

Replacing Michael Mawema, Joshua Nkomo soon became the leader of NDP. The new Nkomo was more radical and forthright than before,⁴² while still adhering to a promise to keep his supporters "on the path of non-violence."⁴³

In so doing Nkomo was out of step with the rest of the leading crest of the nationalist wave. Generally, "African moderates [were] having a hard battle to summon enough support to meet changing white opinion halfway. Many African politicians [had] moved steadily left, and [despite the example of

Kaunda and Nkomo] were gradually abandoning moderation."⁴⁴

Consequently, events were often shaped by Nkomo's younger and more radical lieutenants.⁴⁵

Tactically then, the NDP was prone to violence. With the NDP came "the beginning of physical resistance to white settler rule."⁴⁶ 1961 can be said to have been a period of "subversive-infiltration" by the nationalists.⁴⁷ If the NDP could create an environment of tension in Rhodesia, it was believed, the appeal to Britain to interfere in Rhodesian government would sound all the more urgent.⁴⁸

There was extensive rioting in Rhodesia in 1960. Thirty thousand Africans demonstrated in Salisbury when NDP leaders were arbitrarily arrested. The demonstration dissipated into sporadic rioting after Government officials refused to meet with the demonstrators. Violence spread to most urban centers in Rhodesia and continued until 1961, bringing

strikes accompanied by violence in Que Que and Gatooma; a most destructive riot following the rejection of European security men from an African meeting; and, worst of all, a riot in Salisbury in October which almost amounted to a pitched battle between rioters and which arose merely out of an accident involving a European motorist and an African cyclist.⁴⁹

NDP responded to these disturbances by asking Britain to "suspend the constitution and impose a 'democratic order.'"⁵⁰ Britain, exercising the caution and ambivalence characteristic of a colonial

power dealing with colonies, sent the Monckton Commission, a committee of dignitaries and experts, to the Federation to investigate. Although the Commission described African hatred of Federation as almost "pathological," it urged that the Federation should be maintained, provided that sweeping reforms were instituted.

Whitehead had gone to London in April of 1960 to arrange a private agreement with Britain to remove the reserve clause from the new 1961 constitution then under consideration. In response to an NDP appeal, Whitehead's request was deferred until a constitutional conference to be held after the Monckton Commission completed its report on Federation. But NDP walked out of the conference after the Commission reported that it supported Federation, although its support was of a highly qualified kind. The Commission, too, was highly critical of those Federation practices to which the nationalists objected.

The conference proposed a constitution with a franchise divided into two rolls -- an upper (white) and a lower (African). The African roll, with lower franchise requirements, would elect fifteen representatives out of a total of sixty-five. This did not seem like much of a concession, as whites would still have an overwhelming majority in Parliament. Yet, conservative sources predicted that with an African population increasingly able to meet the educational (as opposed to income) requirements that there would be a majority African electorate in fifteen to thirty years.⁵¹ Still such a timetable was too sluggish for the nationalists. Although Nkomo originally accepted the compromise, he recanted under pressure from the many radical lieutenants

representing the radical Salisbury branches of the party. Had Nkomo not recanted, it is very likely that a serious schism would have rent the NDP in two. As the matter was resolved, Nkomo's decision to recant, and to urge African voters to boycott the referendum was extremely popular, and healed the rupture in the party. And while Rhodesian voters --overwhelmingly white -- favored the new constitution by a 2 to 1 margin, an unofficial NDP plebiscite showed that Africans were overwhelmingly against it.

By rejecting the constitution, the nationalists spurned the principle of gradual progress toward complete political power at a later date; "the chance was deliberately missed because the nationalists [were] no longer interested in anything but taking over."⁵²

The new "new Nkomo" quipped that he preferred not to swim with whites in pools but in parliament, a metaphor reflecting a desire for political strength rather than piecemeal reform. With such an attitude, Nkomo was consistent with party opinion. Further, Nkomo rejected the principles of non- and multi-raciality in favor of African rule, implying that in the event of a majority government, whites would get no special representation as an ethnic group. The changes in Nkomo's convictions can be seen as an attempt to flow with the shifting tide of nationalism or as one leader's personal ideological shift in the face of frustrated demands, or as a combination of both.

Although no specific charges were levied against it, NDP was banned in 1961. As with the ANC, NDP was banned because of the anxiety whites felt in an environment whose tension and

violence were swelling. The whites reacted, anticipating a level of violence that had still to forthcome. Said Prime Minister Whitehead, in explanation of the government's ban,

The position had been reached when my professional advisors felt it necessary to apply for warrants to search the premises of the NDP. . . It appeared clear that certain leaders had contemplated activities likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of good order and inconsistent with party politics.⁵³

Ten days after NDP was banned, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union was formed (ZAPU) --Zimbabwe is the African name for Rhodesia -- but, one writer concluded, "its goals, organization, and activities were indistinguishable from the NDP's."⁵⁴ If there is no shift reflected in ZAPU policy it is because a ten day period is too short to digest the frustration the nationalists suffered, and to reformulate goals and ideology.

Another writer concluded that ZAPU's aims were in fact wider than those of the NDP. But ZAPU's constitution, although perhaps more dogmatic and belligerent than that of the NDP, touched on the traditional themes of one man - one vote and pan-Africanism. The constitution's aims included the following:

To establish the policy of one man - one vote as the basis of government in this country. To unite the African people so that they liberate themselves from all forms of imperialism and colonialism.

A gradual change came over ZAPU, as a need to turn to violent means was recognized. One nationalist admitted that the decision to make extensive use of arms and foreign-trained saboteurs in Rhodesia is traceable back to 1962.⁵⁵ In fact, "a main feature of ZAPU's short life was a growing conviction among Africans that their struggle would have to involve bloodshed and violence"⁵⁶ because "It became the common view even among normally moderate Africans that it was impossible to reason with Europeans."⁵⁷

The Government listed seventeen incidents of violence during a six-month period in which it believed ZAPU was concerned. During the twelve months of 1962 there were 38 petrol bomb attacks, 10 attacks on schools, 9 attacks on churches, and 24 cases in which telephone wires were cut, or roads or railways blocked.⁵⁸

After a large-scale outbreak of sabotage in September, 1962, the Government banned ZAPU, as it had the earlier parties.

In December of that year, Whitehead and the relatively moderate United Federal Party (UFP) were beaten by the reactionary Rhodesian Front in a general election. If Whitehead was guilty of reforming too little and too late, the Rhodesian Front was guilty of an absolute failure to reform. In fact, RF's espoused racial policy, called Community Development, was nothing other than "a mask for the policy of separate development," a former UFP minister complained.

The nationalists boycotted this election in an attempt to "crystallize the issue"⁵⁹ and force Britain to perceive the gravity of the political situation in Rhodesia. The nationalists, ironically, hoped

the RF would win, in order to force Britain's diplomatic hand in the face of what would be considered, the nationalists believed, tantamount to a catastrophe. But Britain did not interfere in any substantive way with the accession of the RF to political power. Britain's failure to do so, rather than the fact of RF victory, amounted to yet another frustration suffered by the nationalists.

At this point, the dormant cleavage in the nationalist movement, between moderate rural peasants represented by Nkomo and the radical urban intelligentsia, was aggravated and the party ruptured. It was Nkomo's wish to establish a government-in-exile in nearby Dar-es-Salaam, and campaign for the liberation of Zimbabwe by appealing to the international community.

Objecting to self-imposed exile, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and other lieutenants of Nkomo formed a new political party -- the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Not to be outdone, Nkomo formed an underground party, calling it the People's Caretaker Council (PCC). At this point, "the struggle was simply for leadership, the formation of a new party being played down because it confuse[d] the leadership issue. The split ha[d] not assumed a clear radical-versus-conservative pattern as might have been expected."⁶⁰

Initially after their break, Nkomo and Sithole vied for the support of the African masses, who were less progressive than the urban radicals. This is why any ideological basis of the split was muted. Unfortunately for Sithole, the "average" Africans supported Nkomo because they were "afraid a change of leadership [would] lead to tougher policies resulting in violence, [and they] feared reciprocal

police action."⁶¹ By contrast, the more educated and radical nationalists swung to Sithole and Nkomo, as might be expected.

Although this "initial split can be put down to personality and policy difference," later conflicts between Nkomo and Sithole "assumed ideological ... dimensions."⁶²

Sithole eventually said of ZANU's political orientation:

African politics in Zimbabwe, as well as elsewhere in European-ruled Africa, began as "reformist politics," but now we have entered the phase of "take-over politics," as it is impossible for the present white minority to rule Zimbabwe for the benefit of the voteless African majority.⁶³

ZANU's objectives were confrontation and self-liberation. Confrontation meant "armed physical conflict."⁶⁴ While liberation meant that the struggle for freedom would take place inside Rhodesia by Zimbabweans themselves. This policy conflicted with Nkomo's, who, before 1965, favored the cultivation of foreign support with accompanying pressure on Britain, and, in turn, the RF government. Nkomo's policy was consistent with his earlier policy as leader of NDP.

A new element -- the element of socialism -- was included in ZANU's policy statement. Rhodesian nationalist parties had not expressed a socialistic philosophy before.

Ironically, despite the putative moderation of the PCC, violent skirmishing erupted between it and ZANU. 1964 saw "the worst political violence

in years.''⁶⁵ As the spirit of compromise had vanished and pent-up frustration exploded in brutality, the nationalists could only resolve dissension with violence, much more so than the CYL had with Mzingeli and others back in 1955.

The RF government, in response to the ever-threatening spectre of African rule combined with the paranoid fear that Britain would act as an accomplice to the Africans in ousting whites from political power, declared independence unilaterally in November, 1965. This action dramatically frustrated nationalist aspirations, as it meant that Britain was no longer a big brother to which the Africans could complain (even if Britain was innocuous as a political ally).

CONCLUSION

Political events in Rhodesia, from the rise of nationalism in 1955 to UDI in 1965, indicate that the nationalist movement did develop an increasingly radical ideology as a reaction to the indigenous white community's continuing failure to meet demands with substantive accomodation. The related hypothesis, that the movement will splinter and engage in internal violence, is also borne out by historical evidence, as by 1965, for example, ZANU and the PCC were on either side of a serious schism in the nationalist movement.

These political patterns perhaps extend to pluralistic societies in general. In such societies, elite minorities who continually curb and frustrate the demands of an oppressed majority represented by an organized, broad-based movement succeed only in goading the majority into increasingly belligerent action. Tightening security measures

merely postpones inevitable consequences. The longer and more completely the majority movement is frustrated, the more radical and violent they will become, and the more radical their political constitutions will tend to be once majority rule is achieved. Further, violence -- as opposed to compromise -- will become the traditional way of resolving disputes. From this perspective, the political neurosis and instability of a contemporary Africa emerging from a century of racial oppression is not surprising.

Although a country like Iran does not fit the specifications of a "white settler" society, it and other developing countries with mass movements may share these dynamics. The evidence that to compromise "too little and too late" with such movements only succeeds in goading them into extremism is convincing. But whether or not this is true for Iran, it is clear that a country like Rhodesia ought to be understood in the context of these dynamics. Today, over 13 years, after UDI, it is apparent that majority rule is inevitable, and in fact Prime Minister Ian Smith seems sincere in his attempt to bring about such rule, though in a qualified form. Yet the African people have become so politically divided that it is improbable that any African leaders could form a government without encountering serious violence from their dissenting brethren. Leaders ranging from the Bishop Muzorewa to the Marxist Mugabe are competing for power, and some, like Mugabe and Nkomo, command dedicated guerilla armies. It is plain that unless some consensus is achieved, whether naturally -- as after the American Revolution, or forcibly -- as after the Russian Revolution, Rhodesia will continue to suffer from vicious civil wars.

NOTES

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³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 58.

³¹*Ibid.*, Preface

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³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 42, 43.

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³⁷*Ibid.*

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Anthony Bowe

French Communism: Modified Marxism?

Today, several European nations face serious challenges to their established political systems. While increasingly vociferous attacks emerge from outside the political establishment in Spain and Italy, by the actions of the Basque separatists and The Red Brigade, major internal struggles are occurring in several countries. The questioned fate of Yugoslavia after Tito, the most recent collapse of the labor government in Britain and important electoral issues pervasive in French politics have made Europe a hotbed of political interest. While studying in Europe, Anthony Bowe encountered this political climate and returned to the United States with many strong impressions of these political activities. It is within this context that the author examines the activities of the French Communist Party and questions the sincerity of their platforms.

The political heritage of many Western European nations is being challenged by a seemingly radical political alternative--a democratized form of communism. This communism is rooted in traditional Marxist-Leninist thought, yet reflects attempts at incorporating democratic principles to achieve electoral viability. This moderation of what is generally considered to be rigid dogma raises the question of to what extent basic communist tenets can be revised and still remain distinctly communist. Currently, these questions must be addressed by many Western European nations but especially so by France.

The French communist party's position typifies this ideological dualism. Torn between Muscovian orthodox interpretation and 'Eurocommunist' revisionism, France, (oft-cited as Europe's political laboratory), has once again become the center of political change and innovation. Attempts to explain and understand the French Communist Party (PCF) have led to many incongruous and contradictory conclusions. One columnist writes: "...the PCF is a pillar of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and fidelity to the Kremlin."¹ Conversely, the French party has been accused of being "not only not revolutionary, but frankly conservative."² It is more likely that the true nature of French communism lies somewhere between these two extreme positions. Any analysis of current PCF activity is complicated by the fact that many question the authenticity of the PCF's drift towards a more moderate stance, and launch accusations of opportunism and deceit. Perhaps Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the PCF advances the most appropriate comments: "Our road to socialism is a French road. France to-

day is neither Russia in 1917 nor Czechoslovakia in 1948."³

A brief history of the PCF is essential to an understanding of its present alignment and substance. The roots of Marxism run as deeply in France as in any European state. However, a more contemporary analysis should begin in 1920 with the creation of the French Section of the Communist International. Here a strong relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was established. The party patterned itself directly after the Bolshevik model, both structurally (with party purges and a politburo), and ideologically. Consequently, the party was purely revolutionary and directly allied with Lenin and Stalin.

After a brief period of apparent independence in the mid-1930s, the French Section elected to endorse the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This move was domestic political suicide. It was not until the Germans invaded the Soviet Union that the French Party, renamed the PCF in 1943, joined resistance forces. Their belated but formidable role in the resistance earned the communists a spot in the cabinet of de Gaulle's provisional government. Cold War pressure soon brought an end to the PCF's active participation in the government. The Party then reassumed its pre-war character of proletarian internationalism, and Soviet tutelage. During this period the PCF earned its reputation as the Soviet Union's most loyal supporter in Western Europe. The Party remained devoted to Stalin and committed to ideological orthodoxy. But, Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the 1956 Party Congress brought change to the communist movement in France as well as to the rest of Europe.

Krushchev's speech is one of the hallmarks of communist development throughout the world. The result of the Party Congress was the birth of the doctrines of peaceful revolution and peaceful coexistence. Marxist-Leninist doctrine stresses the need for violent revolt against the exploiting class, but on rare occasions Lenin referred to the possibility of peaceful transformation. It was this concept which Krushchev espoused in 1956. The impact of this doctrine on communist parties striving for power in western liberal democracies should not be overestimated. It made communist attempts at gaining power within a bourgeois, capitalist society plausible and legitimate. Communist parties ceased to be revolutionary organizations and became true electoral entities. The political viability of Marxism-Leninism increased with the rejection of violent overthrow as the only road to socialism. In short, Krushchev's move gave birth to the liberalization, of communism. What the Soviet leadership may not have considered was the fragmentation of the world movement that would occur as a result of the development of democratized western communism.

The French, however, were slow to take advantage of Krushchev's initiative. While the Italian Communist Party immediately declared the concept of polycentrism, the French "decided to adopt the most cautious approach of all the western parties."⁴ Although the French eventually accepted the doctrine of peaceful revolution, they consistently rejected the Italian position of polycentrism. Maurice Thorez, a prominent PCF member for over thirty years until his death in 1963, was instrumental in the Party's denial of polycentrism and worked for the international growth of the Party. In fact, the PCF was to be a vanguard of Soviet interests into

the 1960's: According to Ronald Tiersky, "The French acted vigorously to limit the fragmentation of the international movement built around the CPSU."⁵

However, the 1960s saw gradual but significant change for the PCF. The Krushchev initiative of 1956 and the realization of the futility of waiting for an appropriate revolutionary climate in a liberal capitalist society were the stimuli for the independent development of European communist parties. An equally important cause of change in the PCF was their interaction with socialist elements in France. The French communists were consistently moving toward the center with hopes of achieving unity with the socialists. Although the PCF had wider electoral support than the socialists, it was the PCF that continually amended its position to achieve compatibility. Several attempts at alliance had ended in failure, notably in 1934 and 1947. These failures were primarily due to communist intractability on plainly unacceptable points of revolutionary doctrine. The 20th Party Congress signalled an end to the orthodoxy which made communist compromise impossible.

With the doctrine of a peaceful transition to socialism, the PCF was free to maneuver in a typically political manner. Political alliance with the socialists could be excused as a necessary tactic in assuring the passage to socialism, although the immediate consequence may be perceived as a distortion of Marxist-Leninist principle. The implication that interaction with the socialists is mere political expediency prompts questioning of the communist's sincerity. As Secretary General Waldeck Rochet stated in 1966, "The position and desire of the French Communist Party are clear: all

activity is oriented to the goal of creating conditions favorable to a peaceful passage to socialism."⁶

The PCF also cites their overriding concern for the French proletariat as a motivation for the alliance. By working with the socialists, and subsequently gaining political power, it is possible to improve the status of the proletariat while working toward actualization of the communist state. In fact, some French communists assert that the PCF is not driven by the desire for political control, but rather by its devotion to the worker. Finally, the success of Enrico Berlinguer in Italy may have encouraged the French to moderate their program and ally with the socialists.

Whatever the reasons, the PCF and socialists continually strengthened their relationship throughout the 1960s. In 1959, the PCF expressed its willingness to ally with other "democratic" parties to achieve socialism, but other parties considered the communist attachment to such a concept as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to be an electoral liability. Furthermore, other parties had no notion of what communist behavior might be once they attained power. Previously articulated communist doctrine described only a single party transition to socialism. It is apparent that the socialists had little desire to ally with the PCF when the communists espoused platform contained inherent betrayal. Accordingly, in 1964 the PCF stated that they had rejected "the idea that the existence of a single party is an obligatory condition of the passage to socialism."⁷ This statement represented a major step in the democratization of the PCF and also in its integration into French politics.

In 1965 the PCF and the socialists, (then known as DGBS,) concluded an electoral alliance. The relationship has been called an alliance from the top, in that it was negotiated by the parties' leaders and represented no accord between the lower echelons of party organization. No common platform was issued with the declaration of electoral unity. In that same year Francois Mitterand opposed Charles de Gaulle in the presidential election. With PCF and DGBS support, Mitterand was able to stand alone against de Gaulle in the second round of balloting. Although the united left lost the election, it had strong support. The election was particularly meaningful for the communists. As Tiersky commented, "After 1965, the 'Communist problem' was once again of immediate consequence in the highest stakes in French politics."⁸ The PCF support for Mitterand was highly significant for yet another reason: the CPSU has supported de Gaulle and censured the PCF for plain disobedience. (Radical change seemed to have overcome the Party.)

Following the 1965 election, the PCF began to demand that a common program be written to back up the electoral alliance. The DGBS was reluctant to comply for fear it would only outline differences and create friction. Their hesitation lasted through the 1967 general elections. Prior to these elections the PCF and the DGBS agreed to a policy of second ballot withdrawal in which the party receiving more votes in a district would be awarded the support of the other party in the second ballot. Under this scheme the alliance proved successful. Once assembled, PCF and DGBS factions voted as a legislative coalition.

On February 24, 1968, The Common Declaration of the DGBS and the PCF was issued. The dif-

ferences and similarities between the two parties were delineated. Both parties agreed to work toward an 'authentic and modern' democracy through constitutional change. In the realm of economics, both parties favored a lower retirement age and a more efficient employment policy, but disagreed on the issue of nationalization. The communists proposed a rapid nationalization of all industry, a far more radical proposal than espoused by the socialists. Similarly, in the area of foreign policy the two parties were divided, the communists staunchly opposing the European Economic Community, the socialists favoring it. The document intentionally avoided questions of Marxist-Leninist socialism and revolution; for these issues, basic to communist ideology, were unresolved, and remain so today.

In 1968, the strength of the alliance waned due to rioting, general strikes, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The 1969 presidential elections also undermined PCF-DGBS solidarity, as the parties ran separate candidates on the first ballot. The PCF demonstrated its strength by capturing 21% of the vote. The 1969 elections brought collapse to the DGBS and the subsequent formation of the Socialist Party of France under the leadership of Francois Mitterrand. The Socialists wanted to secure an alliance with the PCF. The result was a common legislative program, negotiated in anticipation of the 1973 elections. The program was, according to Kenneth Libbey, "the most far reaching step the parties had taken since the split of 1920."⁹ The PCF managed to pressure the Socialists into incorporating extensive nationalization. It was hoped that a definitive platform would insure electoral triumph. While the common program has remained

intact to this day, the alliance has not been victorious.

The extensive cooperation and agreement between the French Communists and Socialists makes it difficult to differentiate between the two parties. In fact, Emille Talbot comments, "What we are presented with is a program of reform that is hardly distinguishable from that of many non-communist socialist parties."¹⁰ However, there is a basic difference. Henry Canacas, Communist mayor of a Paris suburb, claims, "our socialist comrades want to go slowly. We don't believe in any concessions to the exploiting class."¹¹ The difference is one of attitude, not clearly reflected in policy statements and platforms. The socialist *prefers* a democratic transition. The communist has consistently *had to* modify his position to maintain political solvency. How much can truly be left behind during continual ideological revision?

Revision of Marxist-Leninist ideology is pervasive among West European Communist Parties. As parties like the PCF shift more towards the center it is necessary for them to adjust their reverence toward communist doctrine in light of that change. Accordingly, much distortion and manipulation of basic communist theory has occurred at the hands of European communists. The result is a more politically viable and electorally manageable platform. Certain issues have come to the forefront in the PCF in the last twenty years of development. Most essential to the communist adaptation was the decision to operate for change within a capitalist democracy. Previous interpretation of Marxist doctrine caused the communists to operate as revolutionaries on the periphery of organized politics. But as noted earlier, Lenin's cita-

tion of rare instances of peaceful revolution as described by Krushchev at the 1956 Party Congress made possible the legitimate development of the PCF.

Should the country refuse to give the parties of the majority (PCF and Socialists) a vote of confidence, they would withdraw from the government and take up the cause in opposition.¹³

Until 1971, the communists had stated that they would not give up power if voted out of office, but instead would remain and defend socialism. Mayor

The move into organized politics presented many other problems created by the conflict between ideological purity and political reality. Libbey suggests, "The PCF is an example of a party with a strongly orthodox ideological background which has had to accomodate itself to a hostile political environment."¹² Because orthodox doctrine proclaims the necessity of a single party to lead the way toward socialism, the PCF found itself in a difficult position. Consequently, the PCF first rejected the requirement of a single party transition to socialism, and later recognized multi-party politics once socialism was achieved. The PCF has cited the existence of more than one party in some East European communist countries as a precedent for their recognition of post-transition multi-party politics. They have expressed the need for rural representation in addition to their representation of the urban working class.

The final step in the PCF's integration into the 'legitimate' political arena was expressed in the following statement made in 1971:

Canacas now asserts that, of course, the communists would relinquish power if voted out, but does not envisage that eventuality. Canacas believes that the voters will become enamoured with the PCF once communist reforms are initiated.¹⁴

Another symbolic change in ideological content was the rejection of the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" as part of the platform. Although Lenin and Stalin had revised its meaning, the PCF decided to drop the term altogether. In 1964, the moderate wing of the Party suggested abandoning the term as no longer useful. But at that time Assistant Secretary Georges Marchais rejected the proposal vehemently. Eight years later in August, 1972, Marchais said, "We no longer employ that expression (Dictatorship of the Proletariat) because as a result of fascism, the word dictatorship evokes a regime which excludes democracy and liberty."¹⁵ Marchais did not, however, claim that the concept had been abandoned. In 1976, Marchais reiterated the Party's rejection of the term, and also rejected the concept. The Party had determined that the peaceful transition to socialism did not include a proletarian dictatorship. Some Party members became distraught at what they considered to be a bastardization of Marxist-Leninist theory. A splinter group, made up primarily of students, expressed dissatisfaction with the PCF and proclaimed Mao to be the paragon of modern communism. The *New Yorker* commented, "Who would have thought that the powerful French Communist Party would not be treated by French intellectual youth as *passe*."¹⁶

The changed appearance of the PCF is not accepted as genuine by all observers. The most ada-

mant of disbelievers assert that the entire communist movement in Europe is controlled by the CPSU. They suggest that every opportunistic change in platform or even denunciation of Soviet activity is authorized in Moscow before implementation. Such far reaching allegations are probably more the result of Cold War hangovers than rational investigation. Yet many believe that the communists have altered their appearance only to gain power and will revert to orthodoxy and Soviet companionship once they achieve that goal. Analysis of two exemplary incidents, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and French reaction, and the May riots in 1968, tend to support such a belief.

On August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union supported by other Warsaw Pact signees invaded Czechoslovakia. The invasion marked the ultimate frustration of Alexander Dubcek's 'communism with a human face.' The reactions of European communist parties were watched very closely as barometers of the extent to which change had really taken place in the various parties. Such an obvious violation of sovereignty in reaction to a liberalization of communist doctrine would have a direct bearing on the reforming western parties. Condemnations of the Soviet action were issued by all the European party chiefs. But, while the other communist parties remained in opposition to the Soviets, the French party began to temper their initial criticisms. Three days after the invasion, the PCF issued a statement recognizing coercion as a tool of negotiation. On August 26, the Party expressed their satisfaction with the 'normalization' of relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which involved the removal of Dubcek and the installation of a puppet regime. Critics of the

PCF assert that the Party's objection to the Soviet action was minimal and that their conduct reflects a continual subservience to Soviet internationalism.

However, PCF conduct during the 1968 May riots indicates a high degree of restraint and respect for legal order. One observer called the PCF a "model of moderation."¹⁷ The spring of 1968 suffered several months of social turmoil, culminating in May with student riots in Paris and a general strike. Rather than attempt to capitalize on the chaotic circumstances, the communists assisted the government in efforts to keep certain vital services functioning. While Mitterrand called for de Gaulle's resignation, the PCF quietly cooperated with the government during a potentially revolutionary period. This is considered by some as proof of the PCF's desire to work within democracy.

Although the external appearance of the PCF may be one of liberal reform, the internal structure is strictly disciplined and ordered. At party congresses, dissension is not tolerated. The expulsion of Roger Garaudy from the PCF in 1970 for publicly criticizing accepted PCF policy is indicative of internal rigidity. The decision making process is far from democratic. Important decisions are made by the leadership without consulting lower party echelons. If current internal party procedure is a foreshadowing of future conduct when in political power, the future of democracy in France may be threatened.

The personal character of PCF party leader Georges Marchais is the center of substantial debate. *The Economist* refers to Marchais as a Stalinist, whose courteous public political dealings mask his true nature: "Marchais is conducting himself with the utmost delicacy," states one

reporter.¹⁸ Marchais authored a book about the French communist movement entitled *Le Defi Democratique*. A reviewer of that book stated the following:

Marchais is quite adept at...eliminating all related information that might tend to weaken his thesis. (His) second major weakness is his uncritical admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Union.¹⁹

Furthermore, Marchais' cavalier attitude to the plight of Soviet dissidents leads one to question the status of the political outcast in a communist France. Regardless of some unattractive evidence, Marchais preaches democracy and political freedom.

The 1978 general elections proved to be a disappointment for the PCF and the French left. In the months prior to the elections, the PCF-Socialist alliance began to deteriorate. The French left entered the first round of the March, 1978 elections deeply divided, yet managed to come within one percent of the governing coalition if the PCF and Socialist tallies were combined. With the possibility of gaining control of the government in mind, the Socialists and the communists renegotiated their joint policy of second ballot withdrawal, to be implemented in the run-off elections. Their hopes for success proved clearly illusory. French voters apparently looked with disfavor on the opportunistic mid-election reunion between the Socialists and the PCF. Another factor in the left's defeat may have been President Giscard d'Estaing's alarmed appeal to French voters that they abandon the leftist coalition. The elections yielded the governing coalition a strong majority and sent the left into disarray.

Although the PCF and the Socialists still claim to be allied, such an assertion is more the result of political convenience than true reflection. The alliance has deteriorated since the surprising and frustrating defeat of 1978. While party leaders still pledge allegiance, lower echelons of the two parties have found it increasingly difficult to cooperate. Disagreement over taxation and an appropriation among local office holders has resulted in dismissals and resignations. This antagonism between the Socialist and PCF lower levels has caused some to assert that the relationship is unworkable.

Turbulence within the alliance since early 1978 has been accompanied by considerable dissent from within the parties themselves. Some members of the Socialist Party have suggested that further efforts toward a viable alliance with the PCF are futile, and that the Socialists should look to the right for potential allies. As might be expected, the left wing of the Party advocates a bolstering of the PCF friendship. In the PCF, dissent has been more noticable, partially because of Marchais' efforts to silence any criticism. Calls for both ideological purity and further compromise couched in criticism of the Party leadership is heard from both wings of the Party. Little has been decided concerning direction within the two parties, but it is certain that the PCF and the Socialists will prepare for the Presidential elections of 1981.

The PCF is at a sensitive stage in its development. For almost two decades the PCF has polled approximately 20% of the vote. These figures indicate that the French far-left is constant in its composition, and that PCF membership is in a state of near stagnation. If this is true, then communist hopes for governmental control must continue to

hinge on an electoral coalition. In any event, political forecasters do not predict a decline in support for the PCF, and readily acknowledge the potential for expansion.

What is in store for France should the communists come to power? There is no consensus on the matter. James Burnham of the *National Review* writes, "It is ridiculous to suppose that a monolithic totalitarian party could inaugurate and preserve a pluralist democratic society."²⁰ Burnham goes on to express his fear that if in power, the communist parties of West Europe would ally with Moscow. He scoffs at the notion of reformed communism or 'Euro-communism': "You can stop being a communist, but you can not alter what it means to be a communist."²¹ Burnham's assertions, unfortunately, are reminiscent of the irrational approach to communism which has plagued so much of western commentary since World War Two. By suggesting that one "can not alter what it means to be a communist," Burnham implies that communism is incapable of the development and adjustment that political philosophies constantly undergo. Just as the concept 'liberal' has a much different connotation today than it did one hundred years ago, communism should be recognized as an evolving and adapting ideology. Fears that the PCF wishes to gain power and become another Soviet satellite also seem unfounded. Unlike the Warsaw Pact nations the French communists, should they come to power, will have accomplished this feat through electoral victory. It is difficult to imagine the communists relinquishing their hard won control to Moscow. Harder yet to accept is the possibility that the French people will peacefully surrender their sovereignty to a foreign power.

Emille Talbot of *Commonweal* asserts in reference to the PCF, "It would seem that this Communist Party's respect for legality is genuine."²² The Communist Party of France has indeed undergone a change. The Party doctrine has been matured and adapted to fit the modern, industrial, egalitarian state that is France. Surely, there is much to question in this change, but it is doubtful that the PCF is pursuing a massive campaign of deceit. Whatever their intentions, "the French Communist Party at the present time seems quite capable of at least initiating unquestionably radical change in French society."²³

NOTES

¹James Burnham, *National Review*, 5 March, 1976, pp. 207.

²Ronald Tiersky, *French Communism, 1920-1972* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 265.

³"New Communism--or is it?", *Time*, 107, No. 7, 16 Feb. 1976, pp. 25.

⁴Tiersky, pp. 287.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 285.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 271.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 277. PCF Resolution Politique.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 244.

⁹Kenneth R. Libbey, "The French Communist in the 1960s: an Ideological Profile," *Journal of Contemporary History*, January, 1976, pp. 162.

¹⁰Emille Talbot, *Commonweal*, 23 August 1974, C, No. 19, pp. 444.

¹¹Angus Deming, "Bourgeois Communism; Mayor Canacas of Sarcelles," *Newsweek*, 8 March 1976, pp. 49.

¹²Libbey, pp. 145.

¹³Libbey, pp. 160.

¹⁴Deming, pp. 49.

¹⁵Tiersky, pp. 295, n. 53.

¹⁶Genet, "A Letter from Paris," *The New Yorker*, 11 February, 1967, pp. 124.

¹⁷Talbot, pp. 444.

¹⁸"A Nice Safe Communist," *Newsweek*, 19 February 1973.

¹⁹Talbot, pp. 448.

²⁰James Burnham, "International Party?", *National Review*, 30 April, 1976.

²¹Burnham, 5 March, 1976, pp. 207.

²²Talbot, pp. 448.

²³Tiersky, pp. 304.

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Susan Denney

The Theme of Moral
Reckoning In Gunther
Grass' *Cat And Mouse*
And The Clown And Billiards
At Half Past Nine
By Heinrich Boll

The fall of National Socialism in 1945 marked the beginning of the German predicament. This predicament is the problem of dealing with guilt associated with German support for or complacency towards Nazism. This burden of guilt is still felt by Germans who had no direct participation in the second world war. The question is how can the German people have a strong, proud sense of National identity while still in the shadow of the Nazi horrors. In this article, Susan Denney discusses Gunther Grass' and Heinrich Boll's notion that one must learn how to live in the present unfettered by guilt, but must not disassociate oneself from the past.

During the period of Nazi domination in Germany, all aspects of the German culture which did not promote the National Socialist ideology were systematically suppressed. The result was the creation of a German identity which was virtually synonymous with Nazism--a self-image which most post-war Germans have found heinous. As Golo Mann notes in *The History of Germany Since 1789*, the Nazi infused culture was one "Of which the Germans had reason to be profoundly ashamed."¹ The only way to resolve the guilt which arose from a Nazi definition of the German people was to review the Nazi period and restructure the concept of the German national identity.

The redevelopment of the German culture was particularly problematic for German writers. Because Hitler had allowed publication and distribution only of material which was unmistakably pro-Nazi propaganda, German writers had been prevented from developing a contemporary literature which was at once characteristically German yet distinct from Nazism. Consequently, when they began to write again after the war, German writers needed to first develop an acceptable literary style for their work. Furthermore, as individual Germans, the post-war writers also needed to redefine the Nazi-tainted national identity and, in doing so, to become reconciled to their immediate past.

In an essay on *Modern German Literature*, Malcolm Pasley assesses the effect of the search for a positive national identity on post-war literature.

A major feature of post-war German literature...has been the preoccupation with the theme of moral responsibility and guilt in relation to Germany's immediate national past...the weight of conscious or unconscious guilt-feelings made itself felt even where complicity in evil deeds was not the overt issue of the work. No writer could avoid a reckoning with the past...even if he chose...to shunt the burden of guilt on to others.²

The theme of guilt, or more generally, moral reckoning, is evident in at least three post-war German works: *Cat and Mouse* by Gunter Grass, and *Billiards at Half-Past Nine* and *The Clown* by Heinrich Boll. Both Grass and Boll address the disruptive effects of post-war guilt and offer their characters as examples of how guilt can be resolved. Furthermore, through reflection, both authors engage in a moral reckoning of their own.

Heini Pilenz, the narrator of Gunter Grass' novella, *Cat and Mouse*, is writing to clear his "gloomy conscience" which has been "driving (him) to do underpaid social work in a settlement house" since the war instead of accomplishing more with his life. Specifically, the guilt to which Pilenz alludes stems from the betrayal of his friend, Joachim Mahlke, and from his complicity in Mahlke's death at the end of the war. As Pilenz's relationship to Mahlke exists only for the duration of the war in Danzig (where the action takes place), it could be said more generally, that Pilenz's guilt stems from his behavior during the war.

Joachim Mahlke's outstanding characteristic is an enormous Adam's apple which Pilenz refers to as Mahlke's "mouse." The Adam's apple, and,

therefore, the mouse, are features which serve to differentiate Joachim Mahlke from everyone else. Overall, Pilenz paints a picture of Mahlke as unique among his peers and this uniqueness leads Pilenz to equate Mahlke himself with the mouse.

Mahlke is not a mouse until he learns to swim (and in doing so, becomes outstanding) after the onset of the war in Danzig. Pilenz tells us, "When shortly after the outbreak of the war Joachim Mahlke turned fourteen, he could neither swim nor ride a bicycle; there was nothing striking about his appearance and he lacked the Adam's apple that was later to lure the cat." Thus, it is only under the circumstances of the war that Mahlke, the individualist, becomes a mouse-vulnerable at every moment to attack by the more powerful, conformist, cat.

In the initial episode of the novella, Pilenz encourages a cat to pounce on the sleeping (and therefore innocent and defenseless) Mahlke's mouse, an act which is representative of Pilenz's final betrayal of Mahlke. In both the initial and final episodes, Pilenz is not necessarily the sole cause of Mahlke's victimization and death, but he is clearly guilty of complicity in these acts. His sin, therefore, is not the sin of being the aggressor cat, but of calling Mahlke's "mouse to the attention of this cat and of all cats."

Pilenz writes the story of Cat and Mouse because, in his words, "what began with cat and mouse torments me today." His aim is to free himself from the guilt which has prevented him from leading a productive life, and the method he chooses to relieve his guilt is confession. After writing the story, Pilenz can finally admit that, with or without sufficient reason, he set the cat(s) onto

Mahlke--an action which he regrets but can not allow to torment him any longer.

With Pilenz as an example then, Grass advocates coming to terms with post-war guilt through confession. By his use of the cat/mouse polarity, Grass defines good and evil; a process which serves the same function for him that confession serves for Pilenz. Both authors and characters, through their writing, attempt to specify that which was evil about the Nazis. In his own moral reckoning, Grass concludes that the evil inherent in Nazism was the conformity which operated to suppress individualism, and not participation in war crimes; an idea which is also expressed in the novels of Heinrich Boll.

In *Billiards at Half-Past Nine*, Boll creates a polarity of good and evil which is similar to Grass' device of the cat and mouse. Every character in *Billiards* is referred to either as a lamb, or as one who has partaken of the host of the beast; a distinction which exists in contemporary society as well as in Nazi society.

The action in *Billiards* unfolds in a series of inner monologues voiced by three generations of the Faehmel family on September 6, 1958. The bulk of the novel deals with the early part of the day in which the three main characters (Heinrich Faehmel; his wife, Johanna; and their son, Robert) prepare for a celebration of Heinrich's birthday. All of the characters reflect continually on their lives and, in doing so, divorce themselves from the reality of the present day: Robert while playing his habitual billiards, Heinrich by contemplating his previous failures, and Johanna by retreating to the asylum. It is only at the birthday celebration that all characters return to the present day reality.

By perpetually living in the past, the members of the Faehmel family have become alienated from each other. Heinrich particularly is unable to communicate with his son and wife because of the guilt he feels for having failed to "feed his lambs" despite, or perhaps because of, his success in life. When he instructs his secretary to spit on "his monument" for all the people whom he could not help, Heinrich is condemning his successful life because it did not enable him to save all the lambs who perished during the war.

Of all the characters in the novel, Johanna is the most important in that she serves the function of a prophet. Johanna is aware that the family members are living in the past: "They try to forget themselves in building things, its like opium," and it is she who is also responsible for their return to the present. The method Johanna advocates for recovery from the guilt of the past is action. She implores Heinrich to stop dwelling in the past: "don't ask your grandchildren to spit on your statue, simply make sure you never get one," and the spell of the past is irrevocably broken when she finally takes action by shooting an ex-Nazi minister during the birthday party. After this act, the family is reunited and the novel draws to a close. Through Johanna then, Boll asserts that it is necessary to act in the present rather than to dwell in the past to get over the burden of guilt arising from the war.

Throughout *Billiards* Boll continually draws parallels between the contemporary society and that of the National Socialists. Several of the [contemporary] dignitaries were prominent Nazis, and Jochen, the hotel clerk, warns, "watch out; sometimes I think: *they did win after all.*" Furthermore, Boll uses the same motifs in describing the

Nazi and contemporary societies. Johanna refers to Nazi Germany as "a world where just raising your hand once may cost you your life" and later she warns Heinrich [against the contemporary society] "Don't you see they'd kill you for less than a gesture."

In drawing the parallels and in defining his characters as lambs versus those who have partaken of the host of the beast, Boll redefines conventional notions of good and evil. Not all Nazis were evil, and not all members of the contemporary society are good simply because they no longer espouse the Nazi ideology. Because Boll does not define evil as synonymous with Nazism, evil is not something which he believes existed only in the past, but is something which is still common in the contemporary world. Similarly, good is not an attribute restricted to those who actively fought the National Socialists but is represented by principled individuals who, like Heinrich, "are trying to follow idealistic and Christian principles in everything they think and do."³ The theme of good and evil expressed as a conflict between principled individualists and opportunistic conformists is more strongly stated in Boll's later work, *The Clown*.

The action in *The Clown*, like that in *Billiards*, takes place in one day. After a disastrous performance, Hans Schnier, a clown, returns to his apartment where he reflects on his life; primarily on his relationship to and recent separation from his girlfriend, Marie.

The emphasis of Schnier's reflections is on the closely knit society of Marie's Catholic friends toward which he is particularly antagonistic. The purpose of the group is not so much to develop an appreciation for Catholicism as it is to elicit

conformity from its members. Years before, when Zupfner, one of the leaders of the group, had asked Schnier to become a member, Schnier had replied that he was not a Catholic. Zupfner responded by laughing and said, "We sing--and I bet you like to sing." And, Schnier emphasizes, Zupfner and the Catholic circle act as a unit; not one member will break from conformity to help him locate Marie, even though they all know where she is.

But it is not only the Catholics that Schnier accuses of mindless complicity, society in general is guilty of the same lack of adherence to principle. In speaking of the writer Schnitzler, who has risen to prominence in contemporary society on the basis of his false claim to have resisted the Nazis, Schnier says, "A hypocrite like that doesn't even have to tell lies to be always on the right side of the fence." Schnitzler doesn't have to tell lies because society defines good and evil arbitrarily without determining the true worth of an individual. Schnier's mother, who is highly respected in society gives speeches in America in the same tone of voice with which she sent Schnier's sister off to promote the war effort. Similarly, Herbert Kalick, the once avid Nazi supporter, is awarded the Federal Cross of Merit, even though he has not changed in any respect.

Schnier is an individualist who is persecuted for his refusal to conform in a society which demands conformity. It is because he refused to conform to the expectation that he participate in a formal marriage ceremony that Schnier lost Marie. His choice of profession and lifestyle, because they are unconventional, lead Schnier's family to abandon him. When Schnier resists his father's attempts to coerce him into taking lessons from a famous

teacher, his father rescinds a previous offer of financial support.

Despite Schnier's often offensive behavior, he must be admired for his uncompromising consistency. By depicting Schnier as a hero, Boll implies that strict adherence to principle, regardless of the consequences, is good, whereas mindless conformity is evil in its consequent suppression of individualism. According to Wilhelm Schwarz, in *Heinrich Boll, Teller of Tales*.

This ideal is confronted in Boll's work with the desperate or the chauvinistic Germany of the twentieth century. Man has to make a choice between unconditional adherence to his chosen ideal on the one hand...and an unworthy opportunism and conformance on the other...There is no possibility of compromise.⁴

And so, at the end of *The Clown*, Schnier sets out to beg in the railroad station--an action which will certainly ruin his career, but which is the only solution to his predicament which is consistent with his principle of individualism.

Heinrich Boll's contempt for the conformist is reiterated in a semi-autobiographical piece published in *Saturday Review* (May 3, 1975). Referring to the post-war period, Boll states, "I resented the opportunism of others who suddenly behaved as if they were not Germans" because "it no longer served any purpose, in Germany or elsewhere, to be German."⁵ This emphasis on the unprincipled opportunism of the conformist is the basis of Boll's proposition that good and evil are qualities which exist equally in the contemporary and National Socialist societies.

Both Boll in *The Clown* and *Billiards at Half-Past Nine* and Grass in *Cat and Mouse* offer examples of how to resolve guilt arising from the war. Grass's narrator must confess his sins to escape the guilt which has plagued his life. Similarly, the Faehmels must concentrate on their present lives in order to regain family unity. Finally, Schnier must abide by his principles in order to avoid a life of dissatisfaction and guilt.

Through their works, Grass and Boll also engage in their own moral reckoning. By re-evaluating conventional notions of the evil of Nazism, both authors arrive at the conclusion that evil is an attribute which is neither peculiar to nor necessarily characteristic of the German people. Both Grass and Boll are attempting to bolster the Nazi-tainted German identity through careful reflection on the immediate past.

The theme of moral reckoning in Grass and Boll is specific to guilt arising from the stigmatic German national identity. Clearly, the Germans are not the only people who have had to combat a negative national or ethnic identity, but few groups of people in modern history have been so widely or vehemently stereotyped as evil solely on the basis of their nationality. While Grass and Boll refute the stereotype that all Germans are inherently evil, they imply that guilt and the compulsion for its resolution *are* uniquely characteristic of the German people.

NOTES

¹Golo Mann, *The History of Germany Since 1789* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 527.

²Malcolm Pasley, "Modern German Literature" in *Germany*, Malcolm Pasley, ed. (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1972), p. 604.

³Wilhelm Schwartz, *Heinrich Boll, Teller of Tales* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1969), p. 93.

⁴Schwartz, p. 100-101.

⁵Heinrich Boll, "Hymn to a New Homeland," *Saturday Review*, May 3, 1975, p. 13.

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