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(Review) Kaspar von Greyerz, Religion und Kultur, 1500–1800

Marc R. Forster
Connecticut College, mrfor@conncoll.edu

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Kaspar von Greyerz, *Religion und Kultur, 1500–1800*
Religion und Kultur: Europa, 1500–1800  by Kaspar von Greyerz
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Book Reviews


Although The Crisis of Reason is a part of a projected multivolume Yale Intellectual History of the West, its author, the well-known British historian J. W. Burrow (who is also one of the editors of the series), prefaces his work by disclaiming any intention to produce a comprehensive survey of intellectual life in Europe, much less the “West,” between the 1848 revolutions and World War I. His aim, more modest but still ambitious enough, is to provide a selective, even “impressionistic,” reconstruction of the “conversations” among northern European intellectuals (British, German, French, and selectively invited Russians) that were considered significant by the educated reader-ships of the period. Such conversations are not viewed as rigorously exclusive limiting and enabling discourses, of either a linguistic or disciplinary nature, but as relatively porous, overlapping “circles” organized around certain themes and topics and associated with each other through intellectual transfers and analogues. Although Burrow rejects the possibility of reconstructing an overall cultural or temporal coherence as we eavesdrop with his guidance on these past conversations, he certainly suggests that we will discern in them the formation of that tradition of modernism which continues to define the intellectual conversations of the present in the “West.” Despite the destructive, revolutionary ambitions of postmodernism, he concludes, we remain entangled in mere glosses and variations of the modernism, and the ongoing “crisis of reason” with which it seems to be synonymous, that we have inherited from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Although Burrow begins his first chapter with an account of the emergence of a new consciousness of historical change that led each generation of European intellectuals to imagine its worlds and its projects as distinct from those of their fathers, he organizes his study thematically rather than chronologically. Each of the six central chapters is centered around a problem-oriented conversational circle as it evolves through four or five topical and temporal stages over the course of the whole period. The participation of many intellectuals in more than one conversational circle and the overlaps among the circles produced by ideational transfers and analogues produce some repetition in Burrow’s accounts. This, however, is not necessarily a fault in a work that surveys a wide array of thinkers whose names are no longer familiar and that makes an admirable effort to recognize nuance and complexity in individual arguments.

The first two chapters reconstruct conversational circles centered around the project conventionally referred to as scientific positivism, that is, the search for a uniform, objective order in nature and culture by means of a reductionist scientific method through which the apparently chaotic flux of empirical phenomena is brought into focus as a coherent systematic, impersonal pattern of relations among analytically identifiable physical objects and processes. In Burrow’s account the impetus of this conversation as it relates to the phenomena of nature seems to move from a fatalistic, passive conception of scientific theory as a disenchanted, transparent reproduction of impersonal

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laws to a more activist and self-limiting notion of science as the creation of adaptive, pragmatic, or even transformative fictions and models imposed on a phenomenal world that ultimately evades the desire for total rational coherence. Burrow finds the "stories" of the positivist project somewhat paradoxical, as the pursuit of a demystified, impersonal order creates its own fantasies of totalizing coherence that eventually collapse under the weight of their own contradictions into a new pattern of demystifying critique (see pp. 66–67). One might imagine that the following chapter on development of a science of culture would evolve according to the same pattern—from the discoveries of the laws of social evolution in Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer to Max Weber’s interpretive fictions or ideal types, but Burrow chooses to conclude this conversational circle in the company of social Darwinists, race theorists, and eugenicists. The social activism of some of these theorists suggests vague parallels to the previous chapter, but the decision to end with Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau, whose major work was published at the beginning rather than the end of Burrow’s temporal frame, is odd and somewhat confusing.

The third chapter, entitled “Community and Modernity,” refocuses the conversation among social theorists around problems of content rather than method—on the disintegration and potential reconstruction of the social bond in the context of expanding market relations, the growth of a bureaucratic welfare state, and the construction of national identities. This is certainly one of the more interesting chapters of the book, with especially incisive sections on corporate social theory and on the remythologization of the conception of community. What is missing here most noticeably—particularly in the differentiated accounts of the conversations about national identity in Britain, France, and Germany—is closer attention to imperial and colonial projects and their connections to the internal self-construction of both national communities and the common identity of the “West.”

In chapters 4 and 5, Burrow moves from conversations about the social bond to the analysis of selfhood and self-identity. Some of his most interesting stories (and creative entanglements and juxtapositions of what seem at first to be unlikely participatory elements in the same conversations) are found in these chapters. Nonetheless, the attempt to divide the conversation about the disintegration of the autonomous ego, which Burrow describes as the search for an “elusive” identity, center, or ground for the emancipated self, and the conversation about the possibilities of self-conscious construction of identity, especially in the sphere of aesthetics, seem particularly artificial. The major conversation about sexual and gender identity is inserted awkwardly and cryptically into a subsection called “Character” in the chapter on the “elusive” self. Otto Weininger, whose Sex and Character had such an enormous impact all across Europe in setting the terms for the discussion of gender, sex, and race, is not mentioned at all. The logic both of the division of the chapters on the self and of the sequence of topical subsections within these chapters is often difficult to follow. Juxtaposing Weber’s and Thomas Mann’s conceptions of scientific and aesthetic vocations as a chosen life-form with a representation of self-definition through criminal deed in Dostoyevsky’s literary character Raskolnikov, and intimating that the latter has some relation to the terrorist acts leading to world war in 1914, might be described as brilliantly suggestive—but they are hardly reconstructions of historical conversations, and they leave the reader either puzzling over what meanings the author might attach to such associations or trying to work out a set of associations of his own.

Although Burrow eschews any claim to a coherent overview or totalizing narrative for the textual materials he considers, the prologue and epilogue to the book do suggest...
an implicit general story within which he has inserted and organized his individual
accounts. The prologue sets the stage for Burrow’s conversational reconstructions with
a swift overview of a number of responses to the failure of various revolutionary
projects of 1848 that suggest a general “Disillusionment of the Intellectuals.” Disillusio-
nment with what? Although the various parts of this prologue are not easy to inte-
grate, the claim seems to be that 1848 marked a decisive turning point in an already
evolving disintegration of faith in an imminent and immanent epochal cultural trans-
formation that would create an integration of autonomous selfhood, communal soli-
darity, and religious or mythical meaning in the wake of the destructive and emanci-
patory processes of the previous century. The intellectual conversations of the second
half of the nineteenth century are, accordingly, seen as attempts to come to terms with
the growing recognition that historical experience could not sustain a belief in historical
redemption. This process builds to a climax in Burrow’s sixth chapter in a discussion
of the problem of transcendence of historical existence after the death of the old gods;
it culminates in the epilogue’s account of the problematic oscillation among participants
of the modernist avant-garde between surrender to the unstructured, irrational, sheer
flux of experience and escape into self-consciously, artificially constructed order. This
polarization of meaningless experience and artificial order, Burrow suggests, is still
with us. The incarnate divinity of objectively meaningful experience, based on a secure
metaphysical ground and articulated in an overarching narrative coherence for individ-
ual identities, remains beyond our grasp.

It is impossible to do justice in a short summary to the complex, sometimes brilliant,
and often cryptic individual reconstructions, paraphrases, and analyses that come to-
gether in this story of the intellectual formation of modernism as the general intellectual
context for conversational circles in the “West” during the twentieth century. One
should, however, note the absence of three dimensions in this story which are related
to aspects of that arrogantly and falsely named postmodernism which Burrow clearly
sees as a series of variants of the modernist project. Most striking, since he is a scholar
known to be a student of historiography and historical philosophy, is that Burrow does
not treat the issue of historicism and its various permutations as an organizing center
of intellectual conversation in its own right. Moreover, discussions of identity construc-
ton on both the individual and collective levels leave aside the pervasive nineteenth-
century obsessions with both gender relations and imperial/colonial relations that have
been rediscovered and reanimated in the last twenty years. Burrow’s detachment from
what he seems to consider an excessive present-consciousness in such (new historicist,
postcolonial, and feminist) conversational circles among self-styled postmodern intel-
lectuals has closed off his own historical reconstructions to important elements in the
conversations of the past, and thus it has diminished the possibilities for a creative
conversational encounter between past and present.

JOHN E. TOEWS

University of Washington


Kaspar von Greyerz’s survey of religion in early modern Europe aims to expose a
broad German-speaking audience to the latest developments in religious history. Von
Greyerz emphasizes developments in religiosity, popular religion, and unofficial religion and stresses the ways in which anthropological and sociological methods have broadened the study of religion. He states explicitly that he is committed to historical anthropology and a “newer history of mentalities” (p. 17) and, accordingly, draws extensively on local studies and “microhistories.” The result is a study that emphasizes the dynamic nature of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish experience while openly downplaying theology, institutions, and politics. This is a refreshing perspective from an established German scholar.

Von Greyerz is well placed to produce a study that transcends the concerns both of historians writing in German and of historians of Germany. He has an American Ph.D.; has taught and worked in England, Germany, and Switzerland; and has published extensively in both German and English. This volume is based on an impressively wide reading in German, English, and French and will certainly bring new perspectives to an educated reading public. Von Greyerz moves easily from, for example, a discussion of pietism in Germany to an analysis of Puritanism in England, and from a discussion of developments within Catholicism in Germany to a survey of religion in France.

At the same time, this volume demonstrates many of the strengths of German historical scholarship. The methodological and theoretical discussion in the introduction goes far beyond what most English-speaking authors would produce in such a survey volume. Von Greyerz presents valuable definitions and brief but illuminating discussions of important concepts—such as religion, culture, and the ever-problematic Volk (people)—as well as key pairings such as religion/magic and religion/science. Von Greyerz’s discussion of all these issues is informed and nuanced, and he emphasizes that such a scholarly overview must engage large-scale structures and broad developments, even as it draws on microhistorical studies for its basic information.

Religion und Kultur is organized thematically in three parts. The first part is entitled “Upheaval and Renewal” and focuses on the impact of the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Here the German obsession with the “confessionalization thesis,” which emphasizes the close cooperation of church and state in promoting and enforcing religious loyalty, is analyzed and critiqued. On the one hand, von Greyerz expresses skepticism about the vast claims made for this thesis. The eminent historian Heinz Schilling, for example, contends that confessionalization should “expand on and modify, if not completely replace, the theory of civilizing, as developed by Norbert Elias” (p. 67). Von Greyerz sensibly points out that when confessionalization is viewed “from the perspective of daily piety and the religious practice of the common people, one comes to a differentiated interpretation of the confessionalizing process, which is more in tune with the experiences of the affected groups of people” (pp. 67–68). On the other hand, von Greyerz concedes the value of grand interpretations: “large Fragenkomplexe [clusters of questions; he explicitly mentions the theories of Elias and Max Weber along with confessionalization] must and should continue to concern us” (p. 66).

This first part of the book also emphasizes the variety of responses to the crisis of the Reformation in Protestant and Catholic Europe. While the diversity of Protestantism is well known, Catholicism was also far from monolithic. Von Greyerz compares, for example, the development of a fairly austere and royalist Catholicism in France with the baroque Catholicism of Italy and southern Germany. He also argues that the Catholic renewal initiated in the late sixteenth century by the Council of Trent ran out of steam after several decades in much of Europe, an important corrective to the traditional focus of church historians on Tridentine reform.
The diversity of the religious experience in Europe is further emphasized by a discussion of the important “sectarian” or “radical” movements that challenged the increasingly bureaucratized established churches. Von Greyerz examines pietism, Jansenism, Puritanism, and Methodism, all of which sought alternatives to established churches and attracted large numbers of followers. Obviously, studies of official churches cannot encompass the range of religious experiences in this period.

The second part of the book is entitled “The Integrated, the Expelled, the Chosen.” Here von Greyerz examines the role of religion in the community and the family, highlighting the central role of religion in all aspects of everyday life. Von Greyerz is careful not to romanticize communities, pointing, for example, to the witch-hunts and to the Jewish experience to demonstrate how badly religious communities could treat those considered outsiders. Nevertheless, religion for most people was a series of collective rituals closely linked to the rhythms of agricultural life. Catholicism, with its pilgrimages, cults of saints, and use of sacramentals to bless people, livestock, and fields, was somewhat better adapted to this world. Protestants also expected God to intervene in daily life, and they even turned Luther into a kind of saint. Von Greyerz, following the lead of the late Bob Scribner, emphasizes the continuum that ran from officially sanctioned religious practices all the way to illegal magical rites, performed in secret on the edges of public life. Even educated Europeans, although less fearful of imminent agricultural catastrophe, frequently turned to astrology and various other magical practices in an effort to control aspects of their world.

Part 3 of the book analyzes the “fragmentation” of religiosity in the eighteenth century. Von Greyerz engages another theme, secularization, which has concerned German scholars since the days of Max Weber. The emphasis here is on the privatization of religion, especially after 1750, rather than the collapse of Christianity, or déchristianisation as it is known in French historiography. While not denying the importance of the Enlightenment in challenging the place of religion in Europe, here again von Greyerz highlights the different paces and styles of secularization and privatization in France, Germany, and England.

This is a dense and carefully written book. Like any such survey, it reflects the author’s interests and expertise. The focus is certainly on Germany, England, and France, with only occasional excursions to Italy and Spain, and none to Eastern Europe. The discussion of Jewish history is not very original. Not surprisingly, given the German-speaking audience, issues such as confessionalization and the Weber thesis, which especially concern historians in the German-speaking world, get special attention. Generally, though, von Greyerz has made important and intelligent choices in an effort to maintain coherence, and the book will be of interest to a wide range of scholars. Most importantly, Religion und Kultur should bring anthropological and sociological perspectives on the history of religion to a broad German-speaking audience. Perhaps English and French-speaking scholars will find less that is novel or surprising about these approaches, but they are only slowly working their way into the mainstream of German scholarship. This book is an indication of the progress that is being made in the study of early modern religion in the land of the Reformation.

Marc R. Forster

Connecticut College


The history of modern slavery, especially in the Americas, cannot be understood without a knowledge of that institution as it flourished in Europe and Africa before and after Columbus. To be sure, the subject has not been ignored. Quite apart from recent work on Africans’ historical enslaving of Africans, a substantial literature exists on medieval and early modern slaving in southern Europe, in the Atlantic Ocean, and in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, inaccessible as this work often is to anglophones. Steven Epstein means to provide that English-language audience with an overview of medieval Italian slavery, insignificant as has been “the Italian contribution to slavery in global terms” (p. 196). The work of Alessandro Stella, coming to us from this author’s research perch in Andalusia, provides another type of overview of preabolition slavery in southern Spain and Portugal.

According to Epstein, the subject of his book is how the language of Italian slavery began and endured. The stated purposes of the work are, first, to explain how slavery and racism changed over time, especially as regards color and ethnicity; second, to show that the old language of slavery still affects the way today’s Italians think about race; and, third, to place American slavery in a broader context. Ultimately, this is meant as a book for Americans. Epstein introduces his work with a fascinating description of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Italian thought on slavery and race. He then proceeds in chapter 1 to study “The Language of Slavery”; in chapter 2, “The Language of the Law”; in chapter 3, “The Human Behavior of Slavery”; and in chapter 4, what he calls “The Language of the Great Economy”—that is, exchange discourse. A short conclusion introduces the reader to a mosaic in Rome showing Jesus probably freeing a white and a black slave, then restates the book’s premises.

This work is not without merit. Epstein can be subtle and is always engaged. He has read widely and exploits a variety of mainly Genoese and Palermitan sources. He recognizes that slavery needs to be studied together with poverty as subsets of social dependence. And he does not hesitate to follow recent American historiography and raise questions about the costs and savings involved in slavery. Epstein provides many facts about slaves in Italy: the kinds of names the slaveholders gave them; that Christians could not enslave Christians in Siena; the sentiments of Christians enslaved abroad begging for help from relatives back home; and the predominance of female slaves in Italy. He is enlightening on how slaving contracts became increasingly complex from 1160 into the fourteenth century. And, in his third chapter, “The Human [as against animal?] Behavior of Slavery,” the author devotes fleeting paragraphs to slavers’ descriptions of slave bodies, to the law regarding slave flight, to wet-nursing, and finally to the defense of slavery from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas to Bartolomeo Spatafora. (Obviously, Epstein examines slavery largely through the lens of the slave owners.)

Yet, as a whole, the work is mediocre. Though the author’s dustcover advertises it as “the first history of Italian slavery ever published,” it is not a history at all. The work adds little to Italianists’ knowledge and is the opposite of systematic: it is characterized instead by shotgun attention to many subjects, the sum of which is not greater
than the individual parts, leaving the general reader unable to gain any sequential and overall sense of the topic. Perhaps most lamentable, this unfocused book does not achieve its stated purposes. Certainly, Epstein notes that slavery rose again in the central Middle Ages and then slowly declined in the modern age, as is generally known. But anyone reading this book to discover, as advertised, how the language of Italian slavery changed will be disappointed. For while the author does show race entering the slavery discourse essentially at the time of the institution’s medieval revival, not once does he address shifts in the meaning of words in that discourse. In this book on words, the author (fleetingly) cites just two Latin dictionaries (of the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, respectively) and nowhere a single Italian one, historical or otherwise. The subject matter mentioned in the book’s subtitle—color and ethnicity—also receives only glancing attention. Finally, the book is badly organized. As noted, Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’s defenses of slavery are located not in a chapter about thought but in one supposedly about behavior, and at the end of the work rather than at its beginning. The discussion of modern Italians’ attitudes toward slavery and race recurs at the end of chapter 1 after being featured in the introduction, with Epstein consigning authors of the early twentieth century to the introduction, and those of the mid-nineteenth century to later pages.

Thus I doubt that this book will satisfy many American or Italian readers. A historian in a hurry, Epstein here took on too large a subject for the intellectual capital he was willing to invest. Early on, the author opines that “the study of medieval and modern slavery must reach forward to connect with modern slavery, or else we are left with fragmentary scholarship that means nothing” (p. 18). Not only is this statement senseless (how does “the study of . . . modern slavery . . . connect with modern slavery”?); it is also absurdly emblematic of haste. Obviously, if it is to be understood, medieval slavery must look to its past (language is nothing if not the past), and not to its yet wordless future.

Alessandro Stella’s outstanding Histoires d’esclaves (Slave histories) is a book rooted in two different methodologies, the narrative and the serial. The former consists in the compiling of life experiences narrated by slaves and ex-slaves themselves, through the mediation of a notary. Before various types of mainly ecclesiastical courts across southern Iberia, Moors and black Africans, Bosnians and even subcontinental Indians, intent on gaining some judicial end—the effectuation of a promised liberation or marriage, an end to torture, assurance of the testamentary passage of property, whatever—recounted their amazingly varied life stories, irreducible, the author insists, to one uniform description (p. 28). Stella assembles these sometimes fragmentary accounts into narrative wholes, liberally citing his subjects’ firsthand language, and places these “microhistories” at the head of chapters that correspond to central biographical events in the slaves’ or ex-slaves’ lives. One learns how and when these persons were enslaved (usually, it seems, as children) and by what route they reached Iberia (for example, via Africa to the Americas, whence to the subcontinent, thence to Andalusia), what different persons had owned them and the treatment they experienced while enslaved, what their statuses were in Europe as they were at once excluded from Iberian social structures (marriage, for instance) and integrated into them (for example, black regiments and confraternities), how these slaves and ex-slaves built affective bonds in friendships and marriages of an often transcendent complexity, what their strategies were to achieve freedom, and, finally, the special life dynamics of those of mixed-race status. At the end, the author asks what happened to the “disappeared Africans” one might have expected to find in today’s mostly Caucasian Iberia.

Beneath this seductive and rich biographical detail, however, there is another work,
a quantitative study of slave and ex-slave experiences as they emerge from the same curial and demographic sources. I say “beneath” advisedly. For by beginning each chapter with the vivid experiences of some six or seven persons who in their depositions refer in turn to an expansive community of friends and relatives usually of similar ethnicity, the author easily convinces us that the abstract numeric in the quantitative effort that follows in each chapter rests upon the sentiently human rather than the other way around. And, indeed, in the telling, many of these slaves emerge as powerful persons, a point Stella drives home with an index of named slaves. In this way Stella achieves what was one of his primary goals, making this overview of slave life in southern Iberia before the abolitions readable by a broad public.

The work has a great deal to offer the professional historian as well. First, Stella paraphrases the results of much recent Iberian article and dissertation literature not widely known abroad; obviously, there has been an awakening among young historians anxious to plumb the history of homeland slavery. When combined with the author’s own extensive research in curial archives, this results in a work that is fresh and consequent—and one that is relevant to students of American slavery, who can, for instance, view the fates of women and children who went to Iberia as the flip side of their more muscular brothers, husbands, and fathers who were shipped to the New World.

Not at all negligible in terms of its contribution to social production, this population of slaves and ex-slaves, Stella finds, could amount in the early modern period to 10 percent or more of urban populations in southern Iberia. Those among them who appealed to ecclesiastical courts were—and this is an important finding of the work—a quite mobile social group, even if, leaving behind a limited progeny, they have not reproduced themselves in modern Spain or Portugal and even if, as Stella cautions, most slaves left “not even a mass in their memory” (p. 42). The majority of the slaves and ex-slaves who did take legal action were also persons of limited means, but they obviously struggled to find love and friendships, to marry, possibly to own their hovel, and to leave a little something, if only a scrap of clothing, to survivors. The reader is fortunate indeed to be an heir of such treasured stories.

Significantly, among a wealth of authoritative determinations—age at marriage, the occupations of all those friends and relatives witnessing judicial acts, proportions of slave to free marriages, et cetera, et cetera—the author concludes that the slave trade into the Iberian peninsula rarely involved adults but, rather, usually children and adolescents; indeed, the average age of sale of a slave in Valencia and Seville, including of course all those mature slaves being resold, was only twenty years. The obvious preference for adult males across the Atlantic does not exhaust the significance of this fact, because, as recent research in medieval work records and on the overseas exportation of children in postabolition European and American societies makes increasingly apparent, slavery once viewed through the lens of age can appear but one form of the still more fundamental historic exploitation of children down to and including our own day.

Spread unresolved across the whole of this impressive work, as over the work of Steven Epstein, lies the problem of the moral contortions that allowed slave owners—including, of course, former slaves as well as so-called men of God—to own slaves. And there still are books to be written on the linguistic dynamics of slavish subservience through which many societies are still ordered. But, for now, we are fortunate indeed to have a study of the structure, clarity, and humanity of Alessandro Stella’s.

Richard C. Trexler
State University of New York at Binghamton
Allan Mitchell’s book has taken up a doubly challenging task, for railways were probably the single most important economic innovation of the nineteenth century, and the Franco-German rivalry was also a key element of nineteenth-century European political history. I think it fair to say that Mitchell’s main concern is with the latter. That is, he uses railway history mainly as a device for focusing attention on a number of national political differences. The book does not ignore economic history, but its center of gravity is clearly political history. I make this point because my review, written by an economic historian, may not do justice to the author’s own stated aims.

Reduced to its barest essentials, Mitchell’s thesis is that neither the French nor the German polity succeeded in effectively centralizing state control over their railway systems before 1914. His explanation? In France a strong liberal political tradition prevented the state from forcing the principal private railway companies to do its bidding, whereas in Germany it was the strength of political particularism that kept power over the railways in the hands of the individual German states. Much of the book concentrates on describing how this worked, and it offers interesting and convincing documentation of both forms of centripetalism. Taken by itself, however, the argument contradicts Mitchell’s notion of a “great train race.” He therefore needs and draws on another factor, a historical event: the strategic role played by railways in Germany’s defeat of France in the war of 1870–71. This then becomes an important motivating force in the author’s account of the railway policy of both countries in the years that followed. It forms, in a sense, the backbone of “the great train race.”

The book’s periodization fits the author’s thesis. The first and second periods, 1815–70 and 1870–90, are basically defined by the foundation of the German Reich and the Third French Republic, both fruits of the war of 1870–71. In the first period, entitled “Launching the Railway Age,” we observe France falling behind Germany in railway development; it is this deficit that explains the French defeat and marks the transition to the second period, which the author labels, significantly, “The Signals Are Set.” This is to suggest, if I read Mitchell correctly, that in this period the French polity became much more aware of the military and foreign-policy implications of railways. If that is true, the failure of nationalization of railways in France and the continued autonomy enjoyed by the private companies offer strong support for Mitchell’s argument stressing the ongoing weight of France’s liberal political tradition. The third period, however, poses a puzzle. Covering the years 1890–1914 and entitled “Internal and International Tensions,” it offers no new perspective on “the great train race.” It hardly prepares us for the author’s conclusion, namely, that by August of 1914 the French state could fall back on a railway system that was sufficiently developed to meet the military challenge posed by its German counterpart.

“The Great Train Race” is primarily, but not solely, a political history. Inevitably, given the nature of its topic, it ventures into the field of economic history as well. It has much to say, for example, on “the role of the state” in economic development, a standard topic of German and French economic historians. Mitchell’s comparative approach offers a useful corrective to strictly national assessments. Thus, emphases on the state’s restraint of private initiatives in the early stages of German railway development are qualified by comparative consideration of railway history in France, where the centralized state had more leverage vis-à-vis regional economic interests than did the individual German states. Readers should note, however, that Germany’s better
performance in early railway development is not attributable to more centralized state intervention, but to its lesser effectiveness. Readers should also note that this argument has less force when applied to the Franco-Prussian comparison, since Prussia alone was a supraregional state like France, though smaller. Indeed, for the 1815–70 period, a Franco-Prussian comparison might have been more suitable than the Franco-German one Mitchell offers. For France, we are given a coherent account of the development of the major companies, which helps us to better understand and appreciate the connections between private enterprise, liberalism, and state policy. For Prussia, such a description is missing—and it is missing because the author’s agenda forces him to see German railways primarily in the light of their contribution to interregional integration and to unification.

The point may be generalized. The book touches on many of the standard questions economic historians have raised about French and German railways, including their contribution to national economic development, as manifested, for example, in their role as a “leading sector.” The author’s interpretation, however, is oriented toward Machtpolitik; he tends to see French and German railways as national resources, as organizational systems crucial to those nations’ political power, rather than as private financial investments in systems that supplied that important intermediate good, transportation. This leads him to overstate German economic superiority. I think it likely that France may have done better relative to Germany in terms of economic welfare than his account suggests. The statistics he presents (e.g., on total track mileage, freight volumes, or shipping tonnage) reflect, among other things, France’s relatively slow population and industrial growth, but not its changing economic welfare—which would be better captured by real per capita income, a statistic missing here. The author’s views on the timing of railway and national economic growth also reflect his concern with Franco-German rivalry. Like many German economic historians, he criticizes the notion of a “great depression” of the German economy from the mid-seventies to the mid-nineties; but in interpreting it as a period of “preparation” for a “take-off”—which he assigns to the 1890–1914 period—he goes beyond anything the literature has suggested. In contrast, he accepts the controversial notion of a “long stagnation” of the French economy in the seventies and eighties; and though he acknowledges more rapid growth in the 1890–1914 period, he sees France as falling further behind Germany. Once again, however, the data and facts presented fail to do justice to the strength of the French economic position. Repeated references to the north-south European transit trade are a case in point. However important it may have seemed politically, as an index of international competitiveness it was surely not a decisive source of French or German railway revenues.

To sum up: The Great Train Race is a well-researched book, full of useful comparative insights into French and German railway development, and doubtless an important contribution to the history of Franco-German rivalry before World War One. It would have benefited from a more selective use of the economic historiography and, in particular, of the distinction between changes in sheer economic size and in economic welfare. Nevertheless, it may be recommended to economic historians as a study which shows, in well-balanced comparative perspective, the great importance of their field for understanding political history.

RICHARD TILLY

University of Münster
Stefano Bartolini’s hugely impressive study compares a wide variety of macrofactors influencing the development of left-wing organizations in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland between 1880 and 1980. Among those factors extensively discussed are: the impact of industrialization and urbanization; organizational structure; ideology; national and social contexts, such as the level of cultural homogeneity (measured largely by religious and linguistic divisions as well as literacy rates); the impact of war; the role of the peasantry; the historical development of the franchise; electoral politics; the integration of the working class into wider society; state repression; alliances with other political/social organizations; and access to executive responsibility. Identifying the left largely with a set of ideas/ideologies and political/social organizations, Bartolini analyzes Social Democracy, Communism, and a variety of third way socialisms. Drawing on Stein Rokkan’s concept of cleavage, Bartolini puts the rise and decline of the class cleavage into the center of his analysis. It is striking that Bartolini nowhere problematizes the centrality of class in his story. His book is entirely free of any poststructuralist doubts about the master narrative of class. In fact, at one point Bartolini claims that “the development of the class conflict in the middle of the nineteenth century was natural” (p. 562). Of course, there are good reasons not to share a poststructuralist platform, and many authors have attempted to defend class in the light of the poststructuralist onslaught. But in a work of this caliber, one would have expected at least some consideration of the issue. Nevertheless, the outcome of Bartolini’s endeavor is a stunning wealth of comparative insights which shed new light on individual national movements and provide a broad framework for future comparative work on West European labor movements. The study is particularly rich in the presentation of carefully prepared comparative data (26 pages of data appendixes plus 141 figures and tables in the main text), which will prove invaluable for future comparativist scholars.

Sadly, the scholarly sophistication and intellectual rigor of Bartolini’s work is not matched by an ability to write in accessible language. The work is burdened with scientist jargon which makes reading the book a painful task. While I am admittedly a historian and not a political scientist, I feel utterly exhausted after plowing through page after page of “cognitive stratification,” “over-time containment” (p. 192), “corporate-electoral cross linkage” (p. 245), “corporate-channel organizational consolidation” (p. 295), “configurational and format factors” (p. 381), “institutional integration syndrome” (p. 408), and “agrarian-structure problem pressure” (p. 469).

Perhaps more importantly, Bartolini makes no effort to relate his own work to the considerable body of comparative labor studies already in existence. For example, one finds no reference at all to the seminal work of Donald Sassoon, whose work has a similar scope. Geoff Eley’s important work on the European left as well as a whole string of landmark case studies, such as the ones by Sheri Berman and Katharina Keller, also do not feature in Bartolini’s work. The absence of the latter might have something to do with the express rejection of case-centered comparisons in favor of large-scale comparisons (pp. 2–3). However, I do not find his argument entirely convincing. The two types of comparisons seem to fulfill different, but useful, functions. If one asks the big questions and looks to establish a general comparative framework, as Bartolini does, then a macro-comparison clearly makes sense. If, however, one wants to falsify
particular national explanations, or if one wants to criticize the existing typology of labor movements, then a case-study approach might yield important insights.

As Bartolini expressly criticizes my own case-study comparison of the British and German labor movements (p. 70), it might be appropriate to respond briefly. Despite his unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, my book does provide a comparative framework in chapter one, and there is no selective treatment of sources. Instead, an in-depth case-study comparison, including a good deal of primary archival research, has enabled me to single out the many shortcomings of any comparative framework that relies on a dichotomous construction of the British versus the Continental experience. (Incidentally, this is a construction which is also criticized by Bartolini at several places in his book: see, for example, pp. 246–47, 325, 407.) My own study, however, does not primarily rely on an analysis of ideology, as Bartolini implies. Rather, I have argued that “high ideology,” party programs, theoretical debates, and so on were relatively unimportant for the vast majority of party members and supporters. By contrast, Bartolini’s work starts from perceived ideological differences. This leads him to differentiate between orthodox Marxism (the German model), moderate trade unionism (the British model), and an eclectic mix of Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism (the French model). I have argued elsewhere that I find such typologies entirely unhelpful in understanding differences and similarities between European labor movements (Stefan Berger, *The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900–1921* [Oxford, 1999], and “European Labour Movements and the European Working Class in Comparative Perspective,” in *The Force of Labour*, ed. Stefan Berger and David Broughton, pp. 245–62).

Surprisingly, Bartolini, after going through the motions of comparative modelbuilding, refuses to commit himself to a “final general typology.” His argument that there are ultimately too many factors involved and that any change in the primary classification dimension of these factors will lead to a different typology (p. 571) is nothing short of a cop-out—particularly in view of the fact that, throughout the book, Bartolini is solely concerned to group the left into ideal types, relate experiences, and come up with similar and different cases. Ultimately, it seems to me, referring in particular to table 10.2, that Bartolini’s analysis would broadly support a differentiation into four types of left: (1) France and Italy; (2) Scandinavia; (3) Austria, Finland, and Germany; (4) Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Ireland.

Occasionally, Bartolini’s judgments seem open to debate. Thus, for example, he calls the governmental record of the British Labour Party “modest” (p. 372) and goes on to argue that only the Scandinavian socialists were able to mold their respective societies to a significant extent (p. 391). However, a comparative approach in particular would surely have to emphasize that, although Labour only governed Britain for brief periods in the twentieth century, few Labour governments in Europe were able to shape their societies to such an extent as the 1945–50 Labour government in Britain. It also seems unfair to rule out the Austrian Socialists after 1945 on the basis that their achievements were part of a coalition strategy. Surely, coalitionism does not equal limited impact. Furthermore, Bartolini writes that “Liberalism as an organised political expression of the urban and/or rural middle class and bourgeoisie was nonexistent in Germany and Austria” (p. 436). For Germany at least, almost two decades of intensive research into the German middle classes has conclusively demonstrated the opposite. That German socialists found it difficult, for a variety of reasons, to forge links with organized liberalism is surely a different matter.

In a work of such magnitude, it says something for the familiarity of the author with the great diversity of national contexts if a reviewer can only find one basic mistake.
The first Labour cabinet in Britain did not only last for fourteen days (p. 359): the 1924 MacDonald cabinet lasted from January to November. Furthermore, the 1923 election did not return just 59 Liberals but 158, enough to ensure a majority for the Labour government, provided that the Liberals wanted to maintain it. Overall, and despite the criticisms voiced above, Bartolini’s work is a major landmark in comparative labor studies which will stand as a tribute to its author for a very long time. It is a must for anyone interested in comparative labor history.

University of Glamorgan

Stefan Berger

Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West.

By Susan Buck-Morss.


One of the fairy tales of our present day is the idea that societies are changing faster than ever before. For all the technological innovation and social displacement at the end of the twentieth century, there has been startlingly little recent political experimentation or utopian daydreaming. Social mechanics appear to have slowed down dramatically, in marked contrast to the ambitious political projects that accompanied the beginning of the century. Indeed, the visualization of motion, which so fascinates observers of technology and seers of globalization today, is itself a historical artifact belonging to an insistently ideological age in which the markers of transformation included not simply material things or faster connections but political longings and social desires. To be sure, many critics have welcomed the passing of grandiose utopian impulses which ended up leading to Stalinism or Nazism; in Burkean fashion, they correlate modest political ambition with humane political practice. Susan Buck-Morss strenuously resists this antiutopian tendency and constructs an alternative history of the twentieth century from which she wants to recover “the dreamworlds of modernity,” the desire for “social arrangements that transcend existing forms” (p. xi) and particularly those “mass-utopian projects” that sought a correspondence between a “good society” and “material happiness” (p. ix). This dreamworld is extremely important to understand because it is closely connected with catastrophe: “the dream of mass sovereignty has led to world wars of nationalism and to revolutionary terror. The dream of industrial abundance has enabled the construction of global systems that exploit both human labor and natural environments. The dream of culture for the masses has created a panoply of phantasmagoric effects that aestheticize the violence of modernity and anaesthetize its victims” (p. xi). At the same time, the leftover ruins of the dreamworlds of the 1920s and 1930s serve Buck-Morss as prompts to think more critically about the present and its possibilities. This history is nothing less than a self-conscious elaboration of Walter Benjamin’s historical method, which was to undermine self-evident conclusions with evidence of alternative beginnings. The innovative form of the book, which includes hypertext, fragments, and an autobiographical exposition of the production of the text itself, imaginatively enables the work of recovery and resistance.

Unfortunately, the stimulating preface is not a faithful guide to the book. Instead of exploring the ways in which “the historical experiment of socialism” is in fact “deeply rooted in the Western modernizing tradition” (p. xii) and how both the United States
and the Soviet Union were profoundly shaped by self-consciously mass democratic movements, Buck-Morss begins her argument with an analysis of sovereignty, state power, and political imagination. Utopian politics are introduced only by way of the fierce power structures that mangle them. Despite the interesting things she has to say about the geopolitical imagination of the nation-state and the temporal imaginary of the class state, Buck-Morss will madden most readers with the blunt parallels she draws between East and West. Surely there is a better way to overturn complacencies about the so-called victors of the Cold War than to lovingly attend to the hysterical language of U.S. Attorney General Palmer in the 1920s and then turn to the Soviet Union and conclude about its abstractly tallied “record” of “overt violence” that it “is hardly more heartening” (p. 4). Far more useful would have been an analysis of the dreamworlds themselves, including sidebar comparisons with the United States, where, for example, visitors to the General Motors exhibit at the 1939 New York World’s Fair were handed a button reading “I Have Seen the Future.” An incisive discussion of the Russian avant-garde in the 1920s allows Buck-Morss to show resistance to the Communist Party’s transformation of the “revolutionary rupture” into a “permanent present” (p. 71), but keeps her from analyzing more closely how citizens actively collaborated with the Soviet system to remake themselves and their society. To be sure, Buck-Morss argues brilliantly that aesthetic experience can “teach us something new about our world” and “shock us out of moral complacency and political resignation” (p. 62), yet in the meantime she has lost the democratic mass that is her avowed subject. In the end her high-cultural approach makes it harder for readers to plausibly reconstruct for themselves the desires and dreams of “past experience” (p. 68). Toward the end of the book, the utopian potential becomes a thinner and thinner reed. The “collective desires” (p. 209) she wants to rescue are hard to recognize in the simply individual bodily resistance with which she confronts military discipline and state hegemony. For Buck-Morss, the (unsubstantiated) claim that the body “vomits voluntarily at mass executions, loses eliminatory control during the terror of battle,” or “succumbs to feelings of erotic love for individuals who belong to the category of the enemy” is the trace of utopian revolt (p. 255). Yet, wasn’t it precisely collective desires in the twentieth century that considerably reworked the body and disciplined and fashioned its somatic responses? Ultimately, the dreamworlds of modernity, recovered in the essentialized corporeality of the single individual, seem pretty flimsy.

They seem pretty flimsy because, in some way, Buck-Morss does not take seriously the collective desires she wants to reinsert into the story of the present. She strenuously protects utopia from the monopolistic power of the state and the party. “There is no reason to believe that these utopian hopes caused history to go wrong,” she writes, “and every reason, based on evidence of the abuses of power that propelled history forward, to believe the opposite” (p. 68). But the very transcendence of “existing forms” (p. xi) also created powerful subjects who believed in their own founding myths and who therefore exerted new sorts of power. One of the markers of the possibility of transformation was the evidence of violence: the shattered worlds of custom and tradition; the impress of the machine; and the totality of war itself. Mass movements, utopian possibility, and the knowledge of violence are perhaps more related than Buck-Morss allows; they cannot be tidily separated from one another with phrases like “abuses of power” (p. 68); Benjamin himself refers to the blasting work of the “destructive character.” For a history of utopia, the example of Nazism is as pertinent as Bolshevism: both ideas exerted enormous social appeal, both fashioned alternative and
very consequential worlds, and both self-consciously sought to interrupt the seemingly progressive continuum of history. There is nothing about mass movements or utopian potentials that is necessarily progressive. What the ruins of the utopias of the 1920s and 1930s do indicate, however, is the evidence of political combustion, and that is why they remain so frightening and so enchanting.

PETER FRITZSCHE
University of Illinois


This is a very long book, almost 1,300 pages, with an ambitious agenda. It aims to survey the development of the British Isles from the end of the last Ice Age to the present, taking account of all the archipelago’s nations and cultures. Readers may recognize here the influence of the New British History, but the volume is more than that. It focuses not only on familiar “British” themes like the rise and fall of Britishness, or state formation and its interaction with identities; it also addresses a perceived crisis in the modern British state and public perceptions of that crisis.

The author is a professional historian but has no special expertise in British history. He “presents a very personal view of history” (p. xxii), essaying this general synthesis by assembling the facts from standard accounts and reference works and relying on specialist readers for advice on particular chapters. Norman Davies hopes thereby to bridge the gap between narrowly focused, quasi-scientific, academic history and more wide-ranging popular histories. Altogether, there are ten chapters, plus a long introduction, with 101 illustrations, 20 maps, and 23 tables, backed by a wide-ranging set of sixty-three appendixes with yet more maps and tables, dynastic trees, and even political songs. Each chapter is split into three sections, with an opening “snapshot” of a particular episode meant to establish the context of the chapter’s main theme(s) and a historiographical conclusion linking each period of history with later perceptions of its significance. Lengthy quotations from primary sources also offer a flavor of each period.

How far does performance match ambition? Davies offers here a sustained narrative, written in a witty, lively style, and a clear argument, notwithstanding some complex analyses of developments. The chronological balance seems about right. Developments to the Union of the Crowns (1603) are treated in seven chapters and 529 pages; later events, in three chapters and 529 pages (the later chapters are longer and subdivided). The first two chapters, to A.D. 43, seemed rather indulgent, but thereafter the author tackles effectively and at a brisk pace the problems of combining developments in different countries into a single narrative. The focus of the earlier chapters is high politics but with regular excursions to address such topics as the development of the English language or the impact of the Reformation. The author’s desire “to be as precise as possible about nomenclature” (p. xlii) perhaps explains the preference for French and Celtic forms early on, but there are many inconsistencies: “Shane O’Neill” (p. 482), for instance, never used the English spelling. The last part is much more rounded, including sections on literature, sport, and demography. Some of the details are unreliable: for instance, British Railways ran out of steam in 1968, not during the 1970s (p. 946). For me, however, the survey combined an informative and engaging, frequently thought-provoking, account of some unfamiliar aspects of British history along with some fresh insights into territory which was more familiar.
In regard to the four historic peoples, the author’s main concern is to expose the inconsistencies in traditional English nationalist accounts. He shows how English historians have appropriated a Romano-Celtic past, discounted the Viking-Danish invasions, predated the emergence of an English national community, and marginalized England’s Continental ties. Inevitably some parts are better than others: the century or so after 1369 gets short shrift, but there is a good account of Tudor centralization. The unconventional periodization from 795 to 1603 generally works well, although “The Englished Isles, 1326 to 1603” initially saw the retreat of English influence, even if the English language gained ground against French.

The Celtic nations fare rather less well—partly, it seems, because of the narrower range of secondary literature consulted. There is a sustained discussion of lowland Scotland but little on the old Gaelic world. Irish influences in early medieval times are well described, but overreliance on Moody and Martin’s Course of Irish History accounts for the odd remarks about fifteenth-century parliamentary home rule and entrenched resistance to the Henrician Reformation. How on earth Davies decided that De Valera’s antitreaty faction won the Irish civil war (p. 905) is a mystery. Wales disappears for long stretches between 1283 and 1536 and again after the Union. Yet the Welsh language gets three songs in the appendixes, so emphasizing Wales’s modern choral tradition, whereas Gaelic gets just the one verse—from the Irish national anthem. More fundamentally, the remarks (pp. 380–81) about the emergence by the fourteenth century of national identities among the four historic peoples are misleading. There were English in Ireland and Wales who were not part of the “community of the realm,” and a century later the “Irish” still included those Gaedhil living in Scotland, at a time when the bard of the last “lord of the Isles” (dominus insularum/Rí Innsı´ Gall—styles which underline the ambiguities of the book’s title) was extolling his claim to be high king of Ireland (Ardr Ri na hÉireann). Only under the impact of the Reformation did national identities begin to acquire their more modern, geographical connotations.

Essentially, however, the author’s purpose is to discuss the role of the four nations in the British state, not to treat of their internal histories. The final section offers a particularly powerful analysis of the problems of the modern British state—not a nation-state, but torn in the aftermath of empire between the European Union and the United States, the feelings of national decline, the crisis of identity, even the inability of government to distinguish between concepts of citizenship and nationality. This section is thematic rather than chronological, and it is also present-centered: there is no sustained discussion here, for instance, about Britain during World War II. Finally, the author offers five general propositions about the present state of the British Isles, the nature of the British and Irish states, nations and identities, and “the strategic choices that loom ahead,” on the basis of the “long-running trends” (p. 1039) identified earlier in the volume.

In this kind of present-centered history there is, of course, a danger of seeming to select the facts to suit a political agenda. Yet Davies offers a very fair analysis of present problems and the range of options available, and he states quite candidly his belief that “the United Kingdom was established to serve the interests of Empire” and that its breakup is now imminent because “the loss of Empire has destroyed its raison d’être” (p. 1053). This is an unconventional but valuable book which raises important questions about the development—and future—of the British state.

STEVEN G. ELLIS

National University of Ireland, Galway

Some men are born great; some achieve greatness; some have greatness thrust upon them. Cardinal Reginald Pole experienced all three fates. He was born great, a member of the English aristocracy and a cousin to Henry VIII. He became a major ecclesiastical figure, internationally respected for his piety and erudition, who came within a single vote of being elected pope. And the greatest office Pole would ever attain, the archbishopric of Canterbury, was thrust upon him; it was an honor he tried to decline. Yet despite his obvious importance both in the Catholic Reformation and in Tudor England, Pole has not received the detailed study that he deserves; the last complete biography of him was published over fifty years ago.

It is not difficult to perceive the reasons for this relative neglect. Like an octopus, Pole has hidden behind a cloud of ink. He was a prolific author and an energetic letter writer whose surviving correspondence numbers more than two thousand items. Records from English, Italian, and other archives flow into this already massive reservoir of verbiage, swelling it to prodigious proportions. The formidable linguistic, paleographic, and codicological challenges presented by this material have understandably discouraged investigation and analysis. Pole was also rooted in two distinct cultures, English and Italian, and this has created additional barriers; Pole’s biographer must be fluent in at least three languages—English, Italian, and Latin—and be expert as well in both early modern English and early modern Italian history. Significantly, recent work on Pole by accomplished scholars such as Dermot Fenlon and R. H. Pogson has tended to focus exclusively on the English or Italian episodes of Pole’s career.

Thomas Mayer is ideally qualified to overcome such obstacles. This biography is the capstone of a lifetime of research on Pole. Recent fruits of Mayer’s research include a study of Pole’s manuscripts and an edition of Pole’s correspondence. Mayer has also recently published a collection of his articles on Pole that readers of this biography should consult since, presumably in response to constraints of space, Mayer has not repeated their contents in his life of the cardinal. As his previously published writings demonstrate, Mayer is an authority on both English and Italian history. One of the great achievements of his present book is that it places Pole firmly in the context of the different cultures he inhabited. Mayer’s versatility goes beyond this; he handles intellectual, cultural, ecclesiastical, and political matters with equal dexterity. If the chapter on Pole’s nachleben is, at least to this reviewer, the strongest in the book, then the chapter entitled “Reconstructing the English Church,” a balanced assessment of Pole’s legatine administration, is very nearly as good. And Mayer’s subtle readings of the sources, especially his appreciation of Pole’s rhetorical skill in self-fashioning his image through his writings, yields a rich harvest of new insights even from familiar materials.

But the many virtues of Mayer’s book come at a price: heavy demands are made on its readers. In his introduction, Mayer insists that his book “is not the definitive life of Reginald Pole” (p. 11). In fact, Mayer’s book comes closer to being definitive than it does to being a conventional life of its subject. Mayer begins with an extended discussion of Pole’s first important work De unitate, pitching the reader into the deep end of the pool before supplying any background on Pole’s earlier life. Mayer is also reticent on the personal details of Pole’s life. He says little about Pole’s relationships with his family, although the cardinal seems to have had a lively sense of kinship; his generosity to his great-nephew, the third earl of Huntingdon, is all the more striking because the two men were at nearly opposite ends of the religious spectrum. Mayer
also says little about Pole’s all-important personal relationship with Mary Tudor. Surprisingly, Mayer’s persuasively argued thesis that Pole was a homosexual who was, in all but name, married to his long-time companion Alvise Priuli, is relegated to the end of the book. And there are curious gaps in Mayer’s account of Pole’s life; for example, virtually nothing is said about Pole’s first great administrative responsibility, his governorship of the Patrimonium Petri, the largest of the Papal States, from 1541 to 1547.

Mayer is also reticent on the context of events; because Pole’s life is of interest to many scholars (including myself) who cannot match Mayer’s knowledge of both England and Italy, this can be frustrating. A minor example: when he comments that the earl of Wiltshire was “sensitive to the smallest sign of resistance” (p. 57) to Henry VIII’s divorce from Catherine of Aragon, it would have been convenient if Mayer had mentioned that Wiltshire was Anne Boleyn’s father. Simon Renard is mentioned several times by Mayer, but he never bothers to explain that Renard was the Imperial ambassador and, more important, one of Mary’s most trusted advisors. Even more important, Mayer never explains the complexities of an issue crucial to Pole and his plans for the English church: the restoration of ecclesiastical property appropriated in the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI. And there are other topics—such as Pole’s use, or relative neglect, of printed propaganda—on which one wishes that Mayer had said more beyond desultory passages, however stimulating.

Nevertheless, it is a sign of the fundamental merit of a book when a reviewer’s criticisms are largely of what it does not say. Apart from reservations about Mayer’s minimizing (at least in my opinion) Pole’s role in the persecution of English Protestants, I cannot fault anything he does say. Mayer’s book is a large one and yet the reader wants more—a tribute to both the interest Pole arouses and the insights Mayer offers. Pole suffered strokes of severe misfortune, among them the election of his nemesis, Paul IV, to the pontificate and his own sudden death, which may have cost him the crown of martyrdom he craved. But whatever ill luck the cardinal experienced, he has been truly fortunate in his biographer.

THOMAS S. FREEMAN

University of Sheffield


From its early days, the history of the English family attracted scholars eager to connect apparent changes in the nature of the family with England’s economic transformation or “modernization.” Richard Grassby’s book on the “business family” (a stand-alone sequel to his earlier work, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England [Cambridge, 1995]) seeks to provide both solid data and new analysis regarding the connection between capitalism and the early modern English family. Grassby’s conclusion that “the family made a positive contribution to economic growth, that it was an independent and not simply a dependent variable” (p. 416), puts the study of the family at the very center of the social and economic history of the era. This is a valuable service to the field of family history, but, in return, scholars will have to rise to the challenge of reading a book that can only be described as relentlessly empirical, a work
that deliberately prioritizes description over analysis. In the end, this work is well worth the effort primarily because of the tremendous amount of archival material that it brings to bear on so many of the fundamental questions of family history.

After a brief introduction, “Models and Myths,” the book examines the character of the nuclear family and the relative importance of kin and community connections to businessmen. The preface and introductory chapter are highly opinionated, and the more general reader will need to look elsewhere for the historiographic context (see, e.g., Keith Wrightson, “The Family in Early Modern England,” in Hanoverian Britain and Empire: Essays in Memory of Philip Lawson, ed. Stephen Taylor et al. [Rochester, N.Y., 1998], pp. 1–22). It is characteristic of the book as a whole that Grassby dismisses rather than effectively engages those whom he condemns as producers of “pretentious rubbish” on the history of the family (p. xviii). But it is also entirely typical of this book that the polemic against model building and the “virus” of cultural theory is followed by a very useful and candid discussion of the nature and limits of the source materials, which are described further in the appendices.

Grassby uses his relational database of 28,000 London businessmen from 1580 to 1740, along with diaries, collections of correspondence, prescriptive literature, and even Restoration drama, to assess the nature of businessmen’s marriages in regard to choice of spouse, marital relations, and widowhood. Marriages were generally endogamous and locally centered, with a clear priority on the financial interests of all parties. Cultural norms relating to marital behavior are portrayed as continuously shifting and clearly subordinate to individual agency, specific context, and (infinitely diverse) personality. There is a strong demographic component to the book, and Grassby examines mortality rates of children and adults and remarriages of widowers and widows. There is a wealth of comparative statistics available from existing secondary literature, though these are listed rather than integrated into the analysis.

The business family that emerges in part 2 of the book is generally loving and supportive of its members in all stages of the life cycle, and Grassby’s depiction of parent-child relations is subtle and sensitive, giving considerable attention to gender. Although the business family was small, it often included three generations; the discussion of the importance of grandparents here usefully corrects historians’ tendency to overemphasize the nuclear family. In this era of high mortality, family formation was a “serial process,” and the business family is presented as a “dynamic hybrid and a set of relationships that varied with mortality, remarriage and the life cycle” (pp. 187–88). Again, Grassby emphasizes the infinite variety of relationships and experiences, and he dismisses the changes that occurred in public debates as largely irrelevant to family experience.

The chapter entitled “Kin and Community” makes excellent use of evidence from wills and correspondence. There was no formal English kinship system, and businessmen’s wives and children always took priority over the extended family, but “the kinship universe was . . . huge, and families managed to maintain contact with a wide range of kin over great distances” (p. 263). Civic life, which Grassby depicts as a rival to the family, was vitally important to businessmen and is explored in some depth. But by the end of the seventeenth century, men’s participation in guild affairs was declining, and women went from being marginal to invisible in civic life. Furthermore, the nuclear family, buoyed by the support of a flexible yet dependable kin network, became more important even than the “rival institutions” of church and state.

The final section of the book demonstrates that “in preindustrial England the family was a necessary, if not a sufficient, business institution” (p. 311). It should be noted that it is really only in this last section that Grassby pays much attention to the broader
English-speaking world. In both England and its outposts, families were essential in providing apprenticeships, capital, and networks of contacts. Still, apprenticeship often occurred outside of the family; family relationships could be troublesome, and recruitment of nonrelatives was essential to the survival of family businesses. Although Grassby’s point of view is most often that of the businessman, he does explore women’s lives, showing that wives brought both capital and extended kin contacts to the family business. Wives were deeply involved in family businesses, often attending to widespread business concerns for their peripatetic husbands. Widows were especially important as lenders and landladies within the business community. This leads Grassby to puzzle over the question of why so few widows were businesswomen. Because he perceives of the market as a “neutral arena” (p. 340), the author concludes that widows’ unwillingness to serve in managerial capacities was based more on personal preference than gender discrimination. This conclusion sits rather oddly in a book that has revealed women to be disadvantaged at every turn in the business world.

Grassby concludes that, rather than becoming “modern” in the seventeenth century, the business family was “a hybrid structure in a hybrid society that sustained both a market and a moral economy” (p. 392). No single model (such as patriarchy) can explain such a structure because, “like the society in which they moved, [families] were not rational structures conforming to rules, but chaotic and infinitely diverse aggregations of individuals in motion” (p. 389). Although family businesses faced unique problems and challenges in this period, they were able to rely on their enduring strengths and intrinsic flexibility to play a crucial role in economic development. “In the early modern period kinship and capitalism complemented and reinforced each other; their relationship was not antagonistic but symbiotic” (p. 417).

This conclusion would be more convincing if the author made a greater effort to assess change over time throughout the book. Broad differences between period 1 (1580–1659) and period 2 (1660–1740) and among four different cohorts are displayed in some tables, but they are rarely examined in any depth in the text. The qualitative evidence is never organized into these periods, so there is a fundamental disjunction between the two types of evidence. Dates and context are missing from both text and footnotes for many citations. The reader has to wonder if broader patterns would have emerged if a diachronic analysis had been attempted in a more systematic fashion. Moreover, each chapter is chopped into short sections that provide data and many examples but that generally lack substantive summaries. Not even Grassby’s lively and very readable prose can entirely compensate for the effect of this style of presentation. The larger questions and greater relevance of his interests, which are so clear in his introduction and conclusion, are sometimes submerged beneath the vast weight of his evidence.

Susannah Ottaway

Carleton College


“A change seemed to have come over the climate of England. Rain fell frequently, but only in fitful gusts, which were no sooner over than they began again. The sun shone, of course, but it was so girt about with clouds and the air was so saturated with water,
that its beams were discoloured and purples, oranges, and reds of a dull sort took the
place of the more positive landscapes of the eighteenth century. . . . Thus, stealthily,
and imperceptibly, none marking the exact day or hour of the change, the constitution
of England was altered and nobody knew it. Everywhere the effects were felt.” Thus
Virginia Woolf chronicles the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century
in her fictional biography-cum-novel Orlando, simultaneously a cultural history of
England from Elizabethan times to the 1920s. Woolf anticipates in this passage the
dark, damp, Dickensian climate that would be precipitated by the effects of increasing
industrialization, playfully performing here the characteristically English gesture of
imagining history as a function of the weather. This historiographical quirk belongs to
one of the numerous topics Vladimir Jankovic subjects to inspection in his thoroughly
documented, learned, and careful book Reading the Skies: A Cultural History of English
Weather, 1650–1820.

Jankovic charts the shifts in the study of weather in England over the course of 170
years, raising questions about its intersection with social and political commentary as
well as analyzing its relationship to the changing nature of scientific inquiry. He dis-
cerns in the late seventeenth century the rise of what he calls a “meteoric tradition”
that owes much to the writings of Francis Bacon. This meteoric tradition placed em-
phasis on reportage of uncommon meteorologic occurrences, but—contrary to classical
meteorology—the early modern Baconian science would do away with “antiquities,
citations, and eloquence, and with the old natural histories, whose material on the
‘wanton freaks of nature’ could be a pleasant recreation but valueless for the advance
of knowledge” (pp. 44–45). Grand meteorological events were considered valuable
because nature was deemed therein to speak more clearly. Hence, seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century naturalists were wont to report exceptional weather. The early Phil-
osophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London record “Extraordinary Tides
in the West Isles of Scotland.” “Hail Stones of Unusual Size.” “Surprising Effects of
a Terrible Clap of Thunder,” and other such unusual phenomena.

The affinity that unusual meteorological occurrences had with the popular wonder-
tradition gave rise to tensions between secular and religious uses of the weather. Reports
of storms, earthquakes, fireballs, waterspouts, flying dragons, and northern lights were
interpreted as warnings and disasters of an emblematic nature, divine signs appropriated
for the purposes of moral and ideological instruction. Jankovic closely examines how
the homiletic exploitation of two particular events, the storm of 1703 and the northern
lights of 1716, exerted effects on political argument; these cases underline the gap
between the rational secular endeavors of natural historians and a populace that “con-
tinued to live in an emblematic environment and an anthropocentric culture of weather”
(p. 77).

Jankovic subtly analyzes a development in the eighteenth-century study of weather
that emerges but also slightly deviates from the central meteoric tradition. He explores
the rising role in meteorology of provincial naturalists, mainly Anglican clergymen
and members of the gentry. The work of these chorographers, as the etymology of the
term suggests, placed emphasis on local place in the observation and theorization of
weather, giving rise to such regional notions as Cornish storms, Yorkshire echoes, the
salubrity of Norfolk’s air. The autochthonous nature of their enterprise paralleled the
transfer of national identity from loyalty to the monarch to loyalty to the land. Unique
natural events conferred local identity and contributed to a sense of regional history
and culture. From an intellectual-sociological perspective, the country parson had be-
come, by the early eighteenth century, the representative of a new class of natural
historian who seemed to fulfill the roles of both naturalist and historian. The provincial/
 cosmopolitan, rural/urban divide this created would tilt in favor of metropolitan me-
teorology toward the end of the century.
Owing to a variety of reasons, including the rise of practical agrometeorology and a new bias toward the chemical investigation of the atmosphere, both the meteoric tradition and the chorographic impulse would be displaced by the end of the eighteenth century. Statistical analyses supplanted descriptions and causal explanations of meteors. Among the early nineteenth-century contributions to the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society are listed “Abstract of a Register of the Barometer, Thermometer, and Rain at Lyndon, in Rutland, for the Year 1798,” “On the Effect of Westerly Winds in Raising the Level of the British Channel,” “Observations on the Temperature of the Ocean and Atmosphere, and the Density of Sea Water, Made during a Voyage to Ceylon.” The localities erstwhile in themselves so important to chorographers now took on the status of coordinates within a more comprehensive grid. The guild system of metropolitan chemists further ensured the removal of the study of weather from disparate country settings to urban laboratories. Meteorology became by the early nineteenth century a centralized undertaking.

Through impressive erudition and meticulous research, spanning primary authors from Aristotle to Daniel Defoe to the naturalist William Borlase, Jankovic manages to construct a rich and compelling narrative on the history of British meteorology. Furthermore, through the prism of meteorology, he comments on scientific, political, and social as well as intellectual historical developments. Yet, the wealth of detail that is one of the chief strengths of Jankovic’s book is also a weakness. The documents cited and possible angles suggested can seem overwhelming at times. One wishes that Jankovic could have subsumed more of the detail under fewer and more powerfully asserted conceptual categories, in a more clearly articulated historical narrative that would allow the reader to digest his key points more effectively as well as ruminate on their implications in other contexts. Jankovic also sometimes mixes his methodological metaphors. His case study of the northern lights of 1716 employs such terms as “perlocutionary,” “deconstruction,” and “self-fashioning” without attention to their provenance in different traditions of literary analysis and hence, strictly speaking, to their fundamental inconsistency.

On the whole, Jankovic has written a book that will be of interest to intellectual historians as well as historians of science, early modern Britain, and the eighteenth century. His analysis of the georgic tradition will also be useful to literary critics working on the eighteenth century and the pastoral genre. One looks forward to what insights he would have to offer on the effects of industrialization and the expansion of empire on the study of English weather in the nineteenth century.

*Yale University*


**Francophilia in English Society, 1748–1815.** By Robin Eagles.
Pp. x + 229. $69.95.

Locked in a curious though quite important embrace were eighteenth-century France and England. Although these countries had fought frequently during the past centuries and had clearly pursued different constitutional paths since the 1600s, each remained
ambivalent in its view of the other. On the French side, Albion seemed a perfidious military enemy who, at least in French propaganda, refused to fight fair. Relying on naval might, England often wreaked havoc but then retreated to its island fortress. According to this same logic, even in peace, England did not observe the rules of navigation and tilted matters to its own advantage. Further, its power seemed fundamentally illusory, resting as it did on mercantile interests. Finally, some French commentators believed that the greater involvement of the English population in elections and a closer reliance on public opinion indicated a disastrous lack of order.

Nevertheless, England’s political system fascinated the French, especially as elites accepted Enlightenment thinking. The educated in France began to see their rival as embodying some of their new principles. Occasionally waves of outright Anglophilia utterly overshadowed the older tradition of hostility. Only with the outbreak of war during the Revolution did the French return England to a place of enmity.

Likewise the English both loathed and admired things French. Of course, the inimical political and military relationship infected all areas. Critics cast the French as weak as the latter failed to keep pace with the British in empire building. Yet the elite continued to value French luxuries and manners, and the European grand tour involved significant time in France. Much of the English court continued to speak French as the language of refinement. And the philosophes were well received in England.

Recent historical works have argued that, despite such ambivalence about France, the development of English identity depended on its separation from France. In the eighteenth century, hostility overshadowed empathy. And, indeed, scholars have long agreed that once the Revolution had become radicalized, popular opinion became Francophobic. Robin Eagles’s *Francophilia in English Society, 1748–1815* and Stuart Andrews’s *The British Periodical and the French Revolution, 1789–1799* share a contrary viewpoint, attempting to prove that interest in and sympathy for France were far stronger than had been supposed.

Although Eagles accepts that the Revolution thoroughly soured the English view of the French, his main focus on the prerevolutionary period establishes that the cosmopolitan English nobility maintained a positive and influential view of France that resonated even among the middling classes. To argue this point, Eagles contends that although the political cartoonists satirized the French they still relied on French models for inspiration. The novel, usually identified with England, depended a great deal on French predecessors. Other art forms, posits Eagles, owed still more. Eagles also disputes Jeremy Black’s conclusion that foreign relations deteriorated between the two countries during the eighteenth century. Eagles argues that such contentions are overstated and ignore the real rapprochement between the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 and the beginning of French involvement in 1778 in the American Revolution. He also emphasizes that the English—merchants as well as aristocrats—traveled and lived in France quite happily. Such experiences, claims Eagles, raised the English public perception of their neighbor. The concluding chapter demonstrates that the nobility felt an affinity for French models. Eagles insists that for this elite “France retained an alchemical superiority which English imitation could never rival” (p. 167). For this reason and others, the author contends that France was not a negative mirror image used to construct a positive view of England.

Even without questioning the precise findings presented in *Francophilia in England*, some readers might wonder if, in fact, the author has made his general point. Although elites indisputably held the views ascribed to them, the relative weight of their positive views is never established. France might have been chic, but in matters of identity only the negative opinions may have really mattered. Second, the book implies but does not show how the views of the nobility might have inflected others’ opinions.
Nonetheless, Eagles provides an interesting work that also takes up a number of other important subjects, including the permeability of national borders and style and fashion in eighteenth-century England. More readers would benefit from this work if it were not such challenging reading. Prior knowledge of the period is required, as unexplained terms abound. Sentences are overlong; transitions and introductions are seldom provided.

Stuart Andrews’s book continues Eagles’s theme by showing the continuing popularity of France even into the Revolution. In this case the focus is solely on ideas. Other scholars, including Eagles for the most part, have insisted that Burke’s hostility to France and its Revolution carried the day; Andrews turns to the periodical press to dispute this consensus view. Andrews’s close reading of a large number of newspapers shows that, from the first, journalists contested Burke’s negative view. Surprisingly, while other studies indicate that public opinion after the Terror strongly turned against France, Andrews argues the latter found defenders. Themes struck by both Burke’s acolytes and his detractors continued to be popular. Indeed, in the late 1790s, *The Analytical* inclined toward the French revolutionary religion of theophilanthropny and attacked British nationalism. Opposed to this paper was *The Anti-Jacobin*, which claimed its rival was the “purveyor of ‘irreligious trash’” (p. 165). In sum, Andrews concludes that the ambivalence toward the French Revolution found in the press reveals the same attitude in public opinion. In the end, England’s resistance to the Revolution was not based on ideology and consensus, but on longstanding hostility to France as a competing power and the relative authority of church and king, two institutions that fostered anti-French sentiment. But what then was the impact of France’s defenders in the press? Here the author provides no answers.

Although this book benefits from intensive research and certainly is provocative regarding the state of English public opinion, some readers will ask for more. The analysis relies upon a series of descriptions of news and analysis, which requires the reader’s full attention to divine its themes. Furthermore, this same mode of presentation seems to ignore the sophisticated scholarship on the press in England and during the eighteenth century generally. The author fails to employ quantitative content analysis or to investigate the backgrounds of the personnel or the efforts of the government at control or manipulation. This book, like that of Eagles, would attract a larger audience with more attention to larger issues. These books do chart the English view of France and suggest questions about the role played by other national images in domestic politics. Eagles even describes an interest in the development of the national image. This more general question fits the current interest in historiography that emphasizes studying nation-states in an international context and understanding how societies construct their own identities. Unfortunately, while the authors’ works suggest these larger points, they leave it to others to relate their studies to such questions.

*George Mason University*


Britain’s nineteenth-century critics like to point out a contradiction in its liberal professions. It was strong in support of European peoples emerging from subjection into political freedom but made an exception for the people at its own backdoor, its Irish
subjects. Britain might help the Greeks against the Turks, or the Italians against their
Austrian or Bourbon rulers, but it governed Ireland with a mixture of exasperated
concession and open coercion. Ireland had the unfortunate role of exposing the hollow-
ness of British liberalism. During the famine it was liberal economic theory that pro-
vided the rationale for allowing the many thousands who could not emigrate to starve,
and in the 1870s it was the liberal government of Gladstone that departed from eco-
nomic orthodoxy and religious pluralism by passing the land acts and disestablishing
the Protestant church.

John Stuart Mill is often taken to be the most lucid exponent of Victorian liberalism,
but on the Irish issue he came to agree with its critics. In a notorious pamphlet, *England
and Ireland*, published in 1868, he wrote ironically: “In any Continental complications,
the sympathies of England would be with Liberalism; while those of Ireland are sure
to be on the same side as the Pope—that is, on the side opposed to modern civilization
and progress, and to the freedom of all except Catholic populations held in subjection
by non-Catholic rulers” (pp. 169–70). At least by the end of his life, Mill had come
to believe that England owed Ireland redress, and in this he contrasts sharply with
liberals such as Robert Lowe, and later H. S. Maine and A. V. Dicey, who thought
orthodox liberalism had been fatally compromised by Gladstone’s policy. Mill sup-
ported Gladstone, and though Mill died in 1873, before the home rule controversy, he
was at the end of his life praised by Irish nationalists. How he reached this position is
the subject of Bruce L. Kinzer’s excellent book.

As a young man, Mill followed his father and Bentham in thinking the Irish problem
merely an extreme example of aristocratic rule. Even the issue of Catholic emancipa-
tion, which dominated his early manhood, was an aristocratic device to obscure the
real issue. “It is not the power of the Protestant over the Catholic, which has made
Ireland what she is: it is the power of the rich over the poor” (p. 18). The real signif-
icance of Daniel O’Connell’s power, the creation of popular Catholic nationalism,
seems to have passed Mill by. With some liberal Tories, he favored the state payment
of Catholic priests not, as the Tories did, to strengthen the Union but on the Malthusian
grounds that priests with regular salaries would not need the fees obtained from per-
forming early marriages—unions that encouraged population growth. After 1834,
O’Connell saw that he gained more for his countrymen by supporting the Whig gov-
ernment of Melbourne than by joining its radical critics; but by the time the Whigs
fell, Mill was disillusioned with political activism and had turned to writing his *System
of Logic* (1843).

One might expect the Irish famine to have made its mark on Mill’s next great book,
*Principles of Political Economy*, published in 1848, but Kinzer shows how Mill liked
to keep political polemic out of his scientific treatises. Classical political economy was
against the smallholding peasants. They were vulnerable, inefficient from their inability
to exploit the division of labor or make economies of scale, and their tendency to divide
a property among heirs was retrograde and encouraged overpopulation. Kinzer credits
W. T. Thornton with Mill’s conversion to the view that, on the contrary, the peasant
who owned his own land practiced restraint, and a defense of “peasant proprietorship”
appears in the *Principles*. But Mill’s solution to the famine was not stated there, but
in forty-three anonymous leaders in the *Morning Chronicle* between October 1846 and
January 1847. In these he advocated not only that the peasant be granted fixity of tenure
but also that the government buy the 1.5 million acres of cultivable wasteland in Ireland
and distribute it to those who “would undertake to bring their lots into cultivation with
the smallest amount of pecuniary assistance” (p. 63). Nothing less, he thought, neither
soup kitchens nor emigration, would regenerate Ireland and salvage England’s honor.
Kinzer contrasts Mill’s attitude with that of the chief architect of the government’s scheme of relief. Charles Trevelyan thought the potato blight a divine visitation, removing at a stroke a mass of objectionable practices whose reform was “beyond the unassisted powers of man” (p. 83) and freeing Ireland to follow the English model of progressive agriculture. Mill thought that Ireland’s case was more like India’s: vigorous intervention was required, for the famine had made Ireland “once more a tabula rasa, on which we might have inscribed what we pleased” (p. 48).

This taste for what Kinzer calls “convulsive transfigurations” did not preclude a pragmatic approach to less urgent issues. In his study of Ireland’s land question, Mill struck up a friendship with J. E. Cairns—and Cairns, thinking that Mill’s return to Parliament in 1865 made him an important ally in the establishment of Ireland’s university system, sought his help in resisting the Catholic Church’s drive to influence, even control, the nondenominational queen’s colleges. But Mill, despite his anticlericalism, followed Gladstone’s view that, just as most parents in England preferred a religious, denominational education for their children, so Irish parents should be granted the same sort of facility—and Cairns was disappointed. The breach was not permanent, however. The Fenian outrages excited Mill again, this time to write England and Ireland, a work that was to make him a favorite authority with nationalists on land reform. Kinzer patiently shows, however, that the inspiration for Gladstone’s land legislation was not Mill but a former Indian official, George Campbell, whose work The Irish Land was based (as Mill’s was not) on a firsthand study of Irish practice north and south.

There is not space in a short review to do justice to the riches in this book. Kinzer’s work with the team that, under Jack Robson, produced the Collected Works of Mill has given him an enviable mastery of Mill’s own writings. But he is not uncritical of Mill’s tendency to oscillate between realistic analysis and explosions of high-minded righteousness. He has also mastered the extraordinarily complex literature on the history of nineteenth-century Ireland, without which Mill’s contribution could hardly be understood in context. So, for instance, his fourth chapter—on the Irish university question—becomes both a close study of Mill’s grappling with a practical political issue and a contribution to the history of Irish universities. Kinzer himself writes always with a cool precision, avoiding hasty inferences or facile generalizations. This is a superb study of an aspect of Mill’s work where economic theory and politics mingle.

W. E. S. Thomas

Christ Church College, University of Oxford


There are many complaints today from British politicians and citizens that whereas Britain complies with European Union rules and regulations, its partners inside the EU do not. The British press also objects that whereas Britain wishes to create a true free market within Europe, French and German politicians, ever wary of “Anglo-Saxon” devotion to real competition, are slow to relinquish nontariff barriers that protect their own goods and services. Perhaps it was ever thus. According to Peter T. Marsh, even in the nineteenth century Britain’s insistence on sticking to the rules—or, better, the
ideology of pure free trade—lost it the economic leadership of Europe and forced it to depend on distinctly second-best imperial markets as outlets for its goods.

Marsh’s account of Britain’s participation in the commercial treaty system of Europe between 1860 and 1892 is not the first to cover this ground. For example, my London School of Economics colleague Anthony Howe, in his *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846–1896* (Oxford, 1997), devoted two chapters to the subject, while the Canadian scholar Jack Gaston has covered much the same area in article form (“Trade and the Late Victorian Foreign Office,” *International History Review* 4 [1982]: 317–38, and “The Free Trade Diplomacy Debate and the Victorian European Common Market Initiative,” *Canadian Journal of History* 22 [1987]: 59–82). Still, Marsh is the first to devote an entire book to the subject and thus provides a more substantial narrative as well as a fresh perspective.

His main points can be summarized as follows. By sticking to the principles of free trade so dogmatically and reducing tariffs so quickly and so effectively after 1860, the British, who were embarrassed by keeping any tariff that looked like a protectionist rather than a revenue-enhancing measure, left themselves with nothing to bargain with in subsequent negotiations. Worse still, the remaining tariffs proved so necessary for revenue raising that they could not be used as bargaining instruments either. Finally, there was the problem of the “most-favoured-nation clause.” Its unconditional application to international trade came to be regarded as the most valuable and most durable achievement of the nineteenth-century treaty structure. Yet this provision of the 1860s treaties did not, it became clear, work in a neutral fashion. Leo von Caprivi, the German chancellor who reshaped the European tariff structure in 1892, used it to give Germany an advantage over its more free-trading rivals. The result was that “less than 20 percent of the exports from Britain to the major consuming countries with a two-tier maximum and minimum tariff benefited from the most-favoured-nation treatment to which Britain was entitled” (p. 208).

Thus the paradox remained: “Tariff-reducing treaties could not be made without tariffs” (p. 1). Once the treaty structure of the 1860s, spearheaded by the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, was abandoned by the French, European tariff barriers marginalized British commercial influence. The British could have taken the opportunity to retaliate, of course, but since to British minds this would simply have meant dearer food, dearer goods, and more expensive raw materials, such a strategy was never feasible. Indeed, Joseph Chamberlain’s plans for imperial preference and “tariff reform” would later only serve to lose elections for the Tory party.

In some respects, though, Marsh’s book is rather odd. Although it is an account of British commercial diplomacy, it fails to use the private papers of Richard Cobden, William Gladstone, Sir Robert Morier, Sir Louis Mallet, Sir Charles Dilke, and the earl of Derby—in short, many of the major figures involved in that diplomacy. Equally strange in a work that purports to be as much about Europe as Britain, it fails to use any Continental European archives and relies instead on the reports of British diplomats such as J. A. Crowe. These are good at demonstrating the paradox, already mentioned, that Britain, although extremely well informed about Continental commercial diplomacy, was powerless to do much about it. Yet it would be fascinating to see the other side of the coin—for example, the schadenfreude with which this was no doubt reported in Berlin.

There are yet other oddities about the book. The archives of Bradford’s chamber of commerce are well exploited to show the influence of worsted and woolen manufacturers. But why neglect other chambers of commerce? Marsh also claims that Sir Jacob Behrens was the most important influence on British commercial policy for fifty years
but fails to discuss the claims of various provincial rivals (Sir Joseph Lee of Manchester, for example).

Finally, the greatest oddity of the book perhaps is Marsh’s failure to spell out unambiguously how and when Britain should have changed its policy. If free trade should have been exchanged for protection, to what extent should this have taken place, and against whom and at what stage should Britain have retaliated? Some counterfactual speculation might have bolstered Marsh’s critique of British policy. Nonetheless, his book must be given a welcome for raising important questions about British Continental commercial diplomacy at a time when it is once again under critical scrutiny.

ALAN SKED
London School of Economics


In an era when “transnationalism” is all the rage, relatively few historians have either the methodological apparatus or the archival capability to deliver satisfying historical accounts of multinational phenomena. Peter Hoffenberg’s An Empire on Display is an example of the opportunity that the British empire offers scholars to undertake analyses that move beyond the framework of the nation-state, even as they demonstrate its indispensability. This study, which examines a variety of imperial and colonial exhibitions from midcentury to the First World War, insists not simply on the performative power of spectacle to constitute “Britishness” itself but also on its capacity to create and sustain a transnational imperial public sphere. Focusing on India and Australia as the chief colonial sites from which the raw materials for such imperial—and imperializing—spectacles were extracted, Hoffenberg argues that exhibitions were “the core of a participatory system” (p. xiv) whose cultural processes created nothing less than the Victorian public itself (p. 3).

The book is divided into eight chapters, the first four of which lay out the cast of characters and the changing structural conditions—social, political, and economic—that made the rise of the exhibition possible as a paradigmatic expression of Victorian cultural values. Although the book opens with the claim that exhibitions must be read as texts that reveal cultural processes in the making (pp. xv, xviii), the first half of Hoffenberg’s study is a rather conventional history of imperial and colonial bureaucracies, with particular emphasis on the “political economy of imperial federation” (pp. 99–128) that undergirded the development of state-sponsored projects across the nineteenth century. Scholarship on material culture, cultural production, and the aesthetic imagination in the Victorian period must take account of the Great Exhibition of 1851. It was, if not the mother of all exhibitions, the crucial point of departure for much of what followed, as Jeffrey Auerbach’s recent The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display (New Haven, Conn., 1999) has demonstrated—though Hoffenberg appears not to have read Auerbach’s work. Happily, he does not allow the Crystal Palace to dominate his narrative, which weaves discussions of metropolitan, Australian, and Indian contributions to, and debates about, the exhibitionary impulse skillfully throughout the book. What results is a nicely balanced account of what roles each of these differently colonial “possessions” (the federation of Australia occurred in 1901, while Indian
independence, of course, came after the end of the Second World War) played in shaping Britons’ visions of empire and helping to guarantee that such visions would be circulated back through the discourses and practices of colonial nationalism.

What may surprise readers is how little cultural analysis occurs in the second part of the book, where chapters like “Terrae Nullius? Australia and India at Overseas Exhibitions” and “The Imperial Pilgrims’ Progress: Ceremonies, Tourism, and Epic Theater at the Exhibition” would seem ripe for such an approach. Hoffenberg continues in a social history mode, anatomizing in great—if rather one-dimensional—detail the ways in which “Australianness” and “Indianness” in all their complexity were represented to the center by exhibition wallahs, both official and unofficial. Among the strongest sections of the latter half of the book are those that seek to give some ethnographic thickness to epiphenomena like the display of machines and especially of imperial and colonial labor in metropolitan exhibitions. Equally compelling is Hoffenberg’s discussion of how “national time” was staged through the representation of Indian artifacts—performances that reconsolidated the very imperial historicity that helped to justify British supremacy in the Raj. Such displays are especially important because they occurred at precisely the historical moment when colonial nationalism was emerging in the form of the Indian National Congress in India, making the context of such metropolitan visions (even with their subaltern collaborators, like T. N. Mukharji) more complex than perhaps Hoffenberg allows. Indeed, the larger political landscapes of Britain, India, and Australia—both separately and together, in the context of what Mrinalini Sinha calls “imperial social formation” (Colonial Masculinity [Manchester, 1995])—are not much in evidence here. This means that the question of what impact exhibitions had (in a quotidian, rather than an episodic, sense) on geopolitics writ large for this period remains largely unanswered. Hoffenberg ends a number of chapters by alluding to the enduring impact of nineteenth-century exhibitions on the twentieth-century British Commonwealth, but this, like his claim that they helped create colonial civil society, is asserted rather than proved.

Scholars who are familiar with the fields of material culture, cultural imperialism, and performance theory will find some of Hoffenberg’s analysis simplistic and almost belated in terms of the sophistication those literatures have attained in the last decade. “Artifacts, do, after all, have political meanings and uses, some of which might even be contradictory,” for example, seems pedestrian, if only compared to the interpretive possibilities offered by the evidence he himself has unearthed (p. 165). Historians interested in imperial culture and its transnational implications will find in this study a thorough and competent examination of a topic whose archival challenges alone might have daunted a less determined historian. Of particular use are the three substantial appendixes, which detail the major exhibitions, their commissioners, and government expenditures from 1851 to 1914. In terms of the questions raised by the new imperial studies, this book does a great service by grounding cultural material in the context of political economy, even if the cultural analysis of that material is underdeveloped. Though Hoffenberg seems torn between emphasizing the political contests set in motion by imperial and colonial display, on the one hand, and the pull of the “master narrative” (p. 30) of Britain’s imperial destiny, on the other, his book leaves no doubt that exhibitions were a primary technology of imperial modernity in Britain and beyond.

ANTOINETTE BURTON

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Accounts of the formation of the Irish state are often embroiled in retrospective idealization and demonization; relevant sources remain underutilized though the release of archives, a quieter political context, and the development of the Irish historical profession have enriched the literature in recent years. Now Michael Laffan has produced this study, the product of twenty years’ work, which incisively charts events obscured by impressionistic vagueness and ideological selectivity. His command of manuscript sources will amaze anyone familiar with the undercatalogued and underfunded National Library of Ireland; many well-chosen quotations pithily and often humorously capture the issues at stake. Laffan’s focus is on the political rather than the military side of the Anglo-Irish conflict. His central themes are tension between political and military leaders and disputes over how far Sinn Fein could settle for less than a fully sovereign republic, both coming to a head in the 1922–23 civil war between supporters and opponents of the dominion settlement granted by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921.

Tensions between purists and compromisers were visible in the first Sinn Fein party founded by Arthur Griffith in 1904. Griffith argued that the Irish Parliamentary Party led by John Redmond failed by trusting a Westminster system stacked against Ireland. Griffith advocated abstention from Westminster, nonrecognition of the British administration, and a parallel government supported by passive resistance. Griffith’s advocacy of dual monarchy on the Austro-Hungarian model as an intermediate step to full republican separatism was criticized by Sinn Feiners associated with the physical-force Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). As in later divisions, this had much to do with personalities. Griffith was more journalist than politician, and his autocratic and obsessive leadership contributed to his party’s near collapse.

The tension between military and political leadership emerged in 1913–14 when nationalists responded to Unionist threats of armed resistance to Home Rule by forming the Irish Volunteers, despite Redmond’s reluctance. Redmond’s assertion of control over the Volunteers was resisted by their separatist-inclined leadership, who declared that military movements were “above politics.” When Redmond supported the British war effort in 1914 the Volunteers split between a Redmondite majority and a minority informally dubbed “Sinn Feiners.” An IRB clique within the minority repeated the pattern of disputed control by planning the 1916 Easter Rising without the knowledge of their nominal leader, Eoin MacNeill.

Laffan charts in compelling detail how, after the Rising, activists using the Sinn Fein title successfully opposed the Irish Party in by-elections. Their embryonic organizations snowballed into the “second” Sinn Fein party, led by Eamon de Valera, which routed the Redmondites at the 1918 general election, establishing its own parliament (Dail) and republican government. Laffan shows this was not predetermined. At several points chance and British repression undermined Redmondism. The political activists were racked by eccentric personal and ideological disputes. Many Volunteers, who regrouped after the Rising, disliked political involvement; had Sinn Fein been less electorally successful it might have reverted to militarism or disintegrated.

Sinn Fein developed elaborate (and largely inoperative) constitutional structures to prevent “machining” by “politicians.” There were about 1,300 branches (based on
Catholic parishes). Volunteers were younger and poorer than political activists and formed a subculture dominated by unmarried men. After 1918 the party lacked immediate objectives. Many civil functions were annexed by the Dail government, and many branches lapsed. The underground government was surprisingly effective, but its successful fund-raising did not benefit the cash-strapped party, since it self-consciously insulated the administration from the jobbery associated with prewar local authorities and many Sinn Fein branches.

Meanwhile, local Volunteers attacked crown forces, realizing reprisals would encourage radicalization. Violence (much of it opportunistic) and repression forced the political apparatus deeper into hibernation. The passivity of the Dail encouraged military contempt for “politicians” (“an organization of old women,” p. 281), reflecting Sinn Fein’s self-image as a redemptive elite, which Laffan explores in fascinating detail. After the Anglo-Irish truce of July 1921, party activity revived, while guerrillas basked in general recognition that the British made concessions to force that they denied to constitutionalism. Some feared a permanent class of condottieri (p. 303).

Nemesis came when large sections of the party and the military organization, led by de Valera, refused to accept the Dail’s ratification of the treaty. Treatyite control of party officer boards was stalemated by republican club-packing at branch level; in the election of June 1922 much of the electorate voted for third-party protreaty candidates, associating both wings of Sinn Fein with self-destructive infighting. During the ensuing civil war the victorious treatyites abandoned Sinn Fein to form Cumann na nGaedheal. While most Republicans disliked the Sinn Fein title, de Valera persuaded them to claim continuity with the older organization. In ensuing decades successive fragments (beginning with de Valera’s Fianna Fail in 1926) followed the constitutional path, leaving handfuls of zealots wedded to revolutionary elitism.

Laffan belongs to the historiographic tradition that celebrates the success of the Irish state in establishing a stable if socially repressive democracy, avoiding anarchy and dictatorship. The strengths of this tradition are shown in his dissection of radical writers who retrospectively equate intransigent nationalism with class-consciousness and uncritically celebrate land rioters who were often inspired by local feuds and attacked fellow smallholders. Its downside is reluctance to take nonmainstream attitudes seriously. Laffan’s picture of a naturally moderate Irish nationalist community radicalized by outside events needs qualification. Redmond’s party was weaker and more factionalized, and the Liberals under H. H. Asquith were more openly ambivalent about Home Rule than Laffan realizes; this, as much as Unionist resistance, stimulated the Volunteers and Sinn Fein. The nationalist images that Laffan traces in Sinn Fein rhetoric—of British criminal degeneracy and the Irish people as simultaneously noble, pious Celts and fatally corruptible—have a long historical pedigree and were widespread among Redmondite activists; this shared discourse helped to produce the massive defections charted by Laffan from the old to the new party. The extent to which Sinn Fein had explicitly rejected dominion status when put forward by conservative groups in 1918–19 is also ignored. Nevertheless this formidable work of scholarship takes its subject to a new level. It is an instant classic.

PATRICK MAUME

Queen’s University, Belfast

“The sentimentality of ruins, especially Rome’s, is the clearest sign of the awakening of former times: and in excavations this longing was satisfied.” Nietzsche’s focus on the extraordinary emotional charge awaiting detonation in the broken bits of Roman antiquity lies close to the heart of this beautiful book. For no account of what the Renaissance did to the rest of Europe can avoid the explosive encounter of early moderns with the remains of the city—the same encounter that drove travelers returning to Hungary, Poland, Germany, England, as well as France, to begin recasting the cultural and political landscapes of their nations, a process that would continue, though called different things at different times in these different places, through the nineteenth century. How ruins managed to catalyze such complex feelings has fascinated many scholars both before and after Nietzsche.

Margaret M. McGowan sticks closely to the story of how the Renaissance came to France. She explains that although “this is a book about the transmission of visions of Rome into late Renaissance French culture, it is also about perception, about the impediments which the individual viewer placed in the way of seeing clearly” (p. 2). It is not a comprehensive story of the Renaissance in France, however. Readers who expect a full account of the cultural activities of François I or of the making of Fontainebleau will be disappointed. Instead, McGowan offers a study of the media of transmission through which Frenchmen encountered Rome, and of the specific tropes of Rome that animate the work of some of the most important French literary figures of the second half of the sixteenth century. These two lines of inquiry are separated into two parts. Part 1 looks at the travel books that were read, the objects that migrated, and the opinions of leading cultural arbiters. (Though many of these are cited in contemporary translations, there is no explicit discussion of literary translation as a key component of this movement.)

No European gentleman of the time, possessor of a decent education, could see Rome through innocent eyes: too much basic schooling was conducted by way of Caesar, Cicero, and Quintilian. Coming to Rome, each young man would have had before his eyes both the living, ruined city and, as if transposed upon it, the city of his reading. The more advanced the education the thicker and deeper were the layers of that imagined city.

Today, a traveler can buy a picture book in which reconstructions of the ancient city on transparent paper can be flipped over photographs of the ruins. McGowan reminds us that this is no new phenomenon. The antiquaries who studied the broken bits of the city were also the ones who imagined what it would have looked like whole. Her discussion of the link between ruins, reconstruction, and imagination, and how they were held together by “conjecture,” not only makes sense of the connection between Pirro Ligorio and Étienne Du Pérac but also sheds light on the line that runs from Ligorio to Giambattista Piranesi and—in one of the book’s especially interesting asides—the practice of philologists, like Joseph Scaliger, whose business was also reconstruction and whose methods also included conjecture. Specialists might have hoped for some new light to be shed on the French expatriate community in Rome, and on the relations between some of its members, like the engraver Du Pérac, and the Roman antiquaries so extensively described by McGowan.

The importance of imagination for erudition and the role of ruins as the prompt for the use of imagination provide the pivot between the two parts of the book. As McGowan explains, “The incomplete and open character of ruins invites participation
from the observer who seeks to recognize, and perhaps define, the whole structures of which the ruins now represent only a part.”

The discussion of the poetry of Petrarch—French, of course, only in a roundabout sort of way—and of Joachim Du Bellay, which begins part 2, makes perfectly clear that, once one acknowledges the centrality of imagination to antiquarian pursuits, it is to poetry first and foremost that one must turn. In this chapter McGowan most successfully captures the relationship of Rome to France, with all its ambiguities. The discussion of Robert Garnier’s Roman plays also illuminates something of the way in which Rome invaded the French psyche in the second half of the sixteenth century. But the chapter on Montaigne reduces Rome to a metaphor for a writing style that privileges the fragmentary, and the chapter on triumphal entries proves what it presumes—the growing influence of Rome in France and the inevitable Frenchification of Romanitas. If the first part of the book closely resembles a work of cultural history, such as the late Francis Haskell’s History and Its Images (strangely not cited), the second looks more like the work of a historian of literature. These case studies of individual writers tend to dissipate some of the intellectual energy on display in the book’s opening half.

Not so long ago Fernand Braudel wrote an extraordinarily provocative book whose importance has still not registered on most early modernists: Out of Italy (Paris, 1991; in Italian, the language in which it was originally published, the title was La seconda rinasciment). His argument was that modern European history has unfolded under this sign. The French story, which happens earlier than most (where it occurred even earlier, as in Hungary, too little has survived for much full-scale argument), is a kind of test case for this key European phenomenon. In recent years, Nicole Dacos has examined the Flemish artistic migration to Rome in the 1530s and its impact on painting in the north, and Thomas Da Costa Kaufmann has commented at length on the impact of Italian architects and engineers in Eastern and Central Europe. That French national identity, as expressed in art, architecture, literature, politics, philosophy, and music, was also articulated through its dialogue with Rome makes McGowan’s theme essential for anyone interested in modern European history. For French historians in particular, understanding exactly how this happened holds the key to making sense of the “classicism” of Louis XIV and all that followed from it.

PETER N. MILLER

Bard Graduate Center, New York


In Molière’s 1662 Critique of the School for Women, a character praises theatergoers in the parterre for the way they judge, “which is to let oneself be struck by things, and to have no blind preventatives, nor any affected complaisance, nor any ridiculous scruples.” The implied criticism targeted the boxes, where fashion governed opinion as much as dress. The theater parterre—the open pit in front of the stage where spectators wandered about during performances—was a motley crowd of commoners and aristocrats, sometimes drunk and often boisterous, always ready to shout insults or approval toward the performers and each other. Even as Molière celebrated the parterre’s
independence from received opinion, others called them animals—“half-man, half-goat, and all beast,” as one wrote; a “many-headed monster,” according to another.

Jeffrey S. Ravel has brought this slice of the theater to life in *The Contested Parterre*, an original and at times exuberant account of French political culture in the century before the French Revolution. Both perspectives—the parterre as unbiased judge, the parterre as untamed beast—receive ample support in his treatment. When spectators in 1770 caught sight of the sixteen officers and thirty-eight riflemen posted along the streets leading to the Opéra or passed troublemakers from earlier performances shackled in manacles and iron collars outside the entrance, they must have known what was in store. Reports of disorder were legion, as pandemonium swept across the floor in waves of pushing and shoving. The place was steamy and foul smelling. In addition to the usual whistling and hooting, spectators occasionally showed their disapproval by hauling down their pants in front of the stage. (“The creation of this fecal deposit,” Ravel rather archly writes, “signified the audience’s unwillingness to follow the normal rules of exchange governing the spectator-spectacle relationship” [p. 44].) Pickpockets enjoyed open season in the overcrowded floor, and in this all-male enclave there seemed to have been a fair amount of exploratory groping too.

Can such a raucous group tell us anything systematic about politics in absolutist France? Ravel makes a convincing case that in its social heterogeneity, with men thrust together pell-mell without the orderly divisions of the boxes up above, the parterre constituted a spontaneous, genuinely participatory public. The royal guards’ struggle to contain the parterre was therefore about more than preserving the peace. It was also about preserving the political sanctity of “the Opera house, which belongs to the King,” as one arrest citation from the 1720s reads (p. 159). The same rhetoric also justified the heavily armed presence in the other two theaters, the Comédie-Française and the Théâtre-Italien. In his classic account of spectacle as statecraft under Louis XIV, *Music in the Service of the King* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973), Robert Isherwood emphasized the reproduction of royal authority in elaborate stage allegories. Ravel implicitly questions just how effective such spectacles really were and, beyond the pointed allegories explicitly intended to display royal power, how effective the court was in enforcing its more subtle forms of power through etiquette and opinion. More often than not, public intervention emanating from the parterre meant that the theaters in Paris did not reproduce the authority of Versailles. In the eighteenth century, those sympathetic to the parterre—particularly after new edicts from Versailles granted guards the authority to arrest spectators—approvingly described its members as “frondeur,” “republican,” and “patriotic.” Ravel writes, “The theater, and the parterre in general, provided fodder for those who wished to imagine alternatives to absolutist culture” (p. 9).

Such a claim rests on two assumptions: that despite the parterre’s disruptiveness it could also be critically engaged and that the disruption itself was implicitly political. Ravel acknowledges that standing for hours on end weakened one’s ability to concentrate. But he also cites the acute commentary written by critics who watched from the parterre and the extraordinary way spectators there could control whether a premiere failed or succeeded. His chapter on the open-air fair theaters, which performed broad farces from the commedia dell’arte tradition, details how “the parterre [became] an actor,” to cite the words of a commissioner assigned to monitor performances in 1712: prohibited from declaiming by the royal theaters’ monopoly on the spoken word on any stage in France, the fair theaters for a time wrote dialogue and songs on long scrolls, which audiences called out or sang as the actors carried on in silence.

Ravel builds on this moment to look at other examples of substantial audience participation, singling out the 1724 premiere of Voltaire’s *Marianne* in particular. At the
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tragedy’s climax, when the doomed queen lifts a cup of poison to her lips, one wag provoked a torrent of raucous laughter that stopped the show and abruptly ended the run by crying out, “La Reine boit!” Ravel reads both political and aesthetic defiance in this mocking reference to the Feast of Kings, when the carnival “king” drinks as the others call out “Le Roi boit!” Whether one wishes to go as far as Ravel does in saying that at such moments the parterre “considered itself an equal participant in the production of meaning on the Paris stage” or that audiences “insisted on the right to shape the meanings of plays created by the King’s players,” his account does describe an increasingly outspoken and arguably oppositional public voice in the waning years of the Old Regime (p. 126). His horrific account of a debacle in the theater of Angers—royal guards charged the parterre with bayonets, shot one spectator at close range, and held pistols to the heads of others—lends support to his view that political tensions could play themselves out inside the theater. By the late 1780s, observers explicitly equated the parterre with the will of the people; it was, wrote Henri Meister in the Correspondance littéraire, “the nation which serves as a prelude to the Estates-General” (p. 188).

This is a meticulously researched and fluently written history of an improbable set of political actors. Ravel combs Parisian and provincial archives to map the precise social complexion of spectators, and he scours police and press records to reconstruct the feel of theaters during performances. The conclusions of this broad study point to important modifications in what has been the reigning view of the public sphere in French historiography over the past decade and a half. In contrast to scholars who date the emergence of the public sphere from the 1770s, Ravel shows that references to the parterre as a critical public long predate the last third of the eighteenth century; he argues that its responses constituted a political voice as focused and potentially threatening as the social critiques that appeared in print decades later.

The Contested Parterre complicates and enriches the Habermas-inspired view that newspapers, reading societies, and trial briefs were the principal vehicles of a critically engaged public on the eve of the Revolution. “The ‘enlightened’ public was not composed uniquely of reader-citizens,” Ravel writes in his afterword, “and the revolutionaries at the end of the century did not merely envision a disembodied entity when they spoke of the nation” (p. 227). Ravel provides ample reason for us to rethink who made up this “enlightened” public and, in the process, restores to that entity its flesh and blood.

James H. Johnson


In the 1650s Paris was already a large city with some 450,000 inhabitants; perhaps 100,000 of these were potential borrowers and lenders. Such a large population could hardly have organized its asset transactions without some form of financial intermediation: it is this intermediation, chiefly the role of the Paris notaries, which is the main focus of this important but difficult study. The authors contend, and seek to demonstrate, that notaries “stood at the center of a financial system that provided the key ingredient to match borrowers and lenders: information.” Notaries thus made possible
numerous financial transactions that would not otherwise have taken place in a large
city such as Paris. They helped overcome, but could not completely resolve, the “seg-
mentation of credit markets” (p. 151). The crisis of John Law’s system in 1720 was “a
juncture between two financial systems in Paris, that of the seventeenth century based
on personal connections and that of the eighteenth century dominated by long-term
notarized credit” (p. 276).

Life annuities (rentes viagères) were the fastest-growing type of government debt in
France in the eighteenth century (Fig. 2.6) and most of them were marketed by the
notaries. The eighteenth century also saw a boom in private credit, most of which was
accounted for by the rise of the obligation; whereas obligations had amounted to less
than 5 percent of all outstanding debts as late as 1742, they constituted half the stock
of the Paris credit market by the time of the Revolution (Fig. 2.3 and p. 47). The
institutional changes of the Revolution and the Empire, above all the creation of the
hypothèques, “a system of registering liens and real estate transactions,” undermined
the role of the notaries: it “made public the sort of information that notaries kept to
themselves in the eighteenth century” (p. 229). The notaries were unable to compete
with the rise of the Crédit Foncier de France, so that they progressively abandoned
their own credit brokerage to other financial intermediaries; it is with this change that
the authors end their account of two centuries in the history of the Paris credit market.

What general conclusions emerge for the nonspecialist reader? There are in essence
three sets of conclusions, which concern respectively the crown, the private sector, and
the relationship between the two (the testing of the “crowding out” thesis and alternative
hypotheses). The first involves the extent of royal borrowing, as recorded in the sources
utilized by the authors. The enormous debt issue in 1713–14 was a consolidation by
Nicolas Desmaretz, who attempted to turn all the government’s debt into 4 percent
perpetual annuities. Measured in real terms, the public debt had reached per capita
levels that were unprecedented by the end of the reign of Louis XIV, and levels that
would not be attained again until the Revolution. The collapse of Law’s system brought
in its wake “the harshest default that France would witness until 1797,” amounting to
1.5 billion livres (pp. 69, 87). Thereafter, measured in livres of constant silver value,
the state’s total debt fell some 10 percent between 1715 and 1789; but while this was
taking place, long-term debt rose at the expense of borrowing via short-term loans and
the sale of offices (pp. 98, 105). In 1788, the king could have balanced the budget by
repudiating the foreign debt completely and reducing interest rates on the domestic
debt to 6 percent. Nine years later, the state defaulted on two-thirds of its debt, a loss
of 2.6 billion livres to the government’s creditors (pp. 197, 200).

The study’s second set of conclusions involves the private sector. On the whole,
although state’s defaults were serious, the most damaging actions for the private
markets before 1726 “were the monarchy’s currency manipulations . . . [for] parties to
long-term private credit contracts had no way to escape the effects of currency manip-
ulation” (p. 57). Inflation was the second great enemy, not least because of the failure
of the decentralized credit market to aggregate information under rapid inflation (p.
206): between 1789 and 1795, inflation wiped out over 99 percent of the currency’s
value, costing lenders in the private market 1.67 billion livres, as the stock of private
debt dropped to nearly zero (p. 200). The currency was stabilized in 1796. Outright
repayment of loans was the wisest course of action for those who waited until 1795 to
do so. For borrowers, properly anticipating the stabilization was critical. Thereafter,
borrowers preferred long-term loans, while lenders wanted the opposite. No satisfactory
solution to the mismatch emerged in Paris until the 1850s.

Finally, the study illuminates the relationship between the government’s demand for
credit and the private market. Hoffman and his colleagues argue that royal borrowing did not crowd out private borrowers in the reign of Louis XIV. Rather, they contend, the effect was positive: financiers borrowed money from private individuals in order to lend to the crown. Since there was spectacular growth in the private credit market in the eighteenth century, any version of the “crowding out” thesis is rejected in this study. Economic recovery and a long period of currency stability played their part; but the rest of the growth in the private market in the eighteenth century was explained by the spread of the obligation and the capacity of the Parisian notaries to respond to the new market opportunities (p. 113). Had Law succeeded, notaries would have been forced out of marketing the public debt in the 1720s. Instead, successive government defaults “gave them unparalleled access to information about investors” (p. 297). Whereas in other historical accounts Law’s system is held to have “blocked financial growth in France by ruling out the sort of banking system that existed in England,” Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal argue instead that it “ushered in a long period of expansion and financial innovation in the Parisian credit market,” allowing the notaries to take on the role of credit brokers (p. 95). Debt transactions were based on “shared knowledge about the availability of a lender’s funds, for example, or about the soundness of a borrower’s collateral. Allocation therefore depended on information flows between the lenders and borrowers” (p. 9). In that sense, the Parisian credit was relatively accurately priced: one wonders if Well-Priced Markets might not have been a more accurate (if less resonant) title to describe the phenomenon of eighteenth-century growth depicted in this valuable, but sometimes abstruse, study.

RICHARD BONNEY

University of Leicester


Recent histories of shopping, tourism, and concert going have taught us a great deal about the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie’s efforts to transform itself into a modern leisure class that set the standards of taste for the rest of French society. In Amy Trubek’s Haute Cuisine: How the French Invented the Culinary Profession, we can now observe the nineteenth-century French bourgeois consumer à table. Trubek explores the origins of haute cuisine in the ancien régime and its transformation in the market society of the postrevolutionary era, contrasting the noble patrons of the ancien régime who ate in the privacy of their homes with bourgeois diners of the nineteenth century who conspicuously displayed their taste for fine food in the new public spaces of the commercial city. Haute Cuisine is about more, however, than the bourgeois consumer’s pursuit of cultural status. It also provides the perspective of haute cuisine’s producers, recounting the efforts of chefs both to exploit the market and to protect themselves from its vagaries by arrogating professional status.

Trubek’s point of departure is to ask why French haute cuisine epitomized fine dining throughout the nineteenth century. Part of its cachet, of course, stemmed from the dominance of French taste in the ancien régime. From at least the reign of Louis XIV, the French court established taste codes throughout Europe in everything from decorating, fashion, and high art to manners and cuisine. But why did this reputation persist in the nineteenth century, once the Revolution destroyed the closed system of court
and noble private patronage of individual chefs? How did French haute cuisine retain its cachet in the bourgeois market society of the nineteenth century?

Trubek situates haute cuisine historically, insisting correctly that its Europeanwide reputation among ancien régime aristocrats alone cannot explain its popularity among bourgeois consumers in France and abroad in the nineteenth century. Rather, consumer demand on the part of upwardly mobile bourgeois converged with the mission of chefs to establish themselves as bona fide professionals, creating a flourishing market for this luxury commodity. These factors not only sustained haute cuisine, Trubek demonstrates, but also reinvented it for the modern era. As the haute bourgeoisie sought to fashion itself as a leisure elite, restaurants, gentleman’s clubs, and hotels proliferated to meet their needs, multiplying the venues for haute cuisine. At the same time, chefs striving after professional recognition did a great deal to promote the celebrity status of haute cuisine among consumers and to keep standards of quality high by fostering competition within the upper echelon of producers. Far from undermining the art of haute cuisine, Trubek argues, commodification and competition bolstered its glamour.

Unlike the elite cuisines of China or India, French haute cuisine set the standard for elegant dining throughout Europe and the United States during the nineteenth century. For this reason, Trubek maintains that it can be taken as a case study in cultural imperialism. She notes the irony, for example, of the British penchant for French cuisine contrasted with their overweening sense of superiority to the French in every other arena. In Britain and elsewhere, she contends, the French culinarily colonized by dominating knowledge about cooking. Bourgeois Britons and others craved French food not only for its sensual pleasures, in other words, but also because it endowed the consumer with the authority of the connoisseur.

Trubek is both an anthropologist and a classically trained professional chef who teaches at the New England Culinary Institute. Her training as an anthropologist shows in ethnographic descriptions of the nineteenth-century kitchen, including passages on the food itself and the techniques of haute cuisine. But her book is less a study in anthropology than it is a social and cultural history of haute cuisine. Trubek uses the writings of gastronomes, trade journals, cookbooks, and some archival materials to reconstruct the world of cuisine from a variety of perspectives: those of the bourgeois diners who sought to distinguish themselves through their association with elite cookery, the chefs striving for recognition as professionals, the British restaurant goers who detested the French but loved their cuisine, the humble kitchen workers organizing for control over working conditions, and the bourgeois housewives whose domestic cookery was belittled by the experts.

Trubek is at her best depicting the internal conflicts within the world of haute cuisine. In seeking the status of professionals, chefs attempted to define haute cuisine as an art different from, on the one hand, the everyday domestic cooking of bourgeois housewives in the private sphere and, on the other, the menial labor of subordinate kitchen workers. To do so they formed organizations (the Société des Cuisiniers Français was the most prominent), launched trade journals and instructional journals for the wider public, founded a culinary school, and mounted food competitions, conferences, and exhibitions. In Trubek’s description, bourgeois women who subscribed to instructional cooking journals and attended culinary expositions and contests played an important role in supporting these initiatives, despite the fact that the very same journals and expositions consistently conveyed the message that domestic cooking was an inferior cuisine.

By the same token, chefs were at pains to signal their distinction over other haute cuisine workers, sous-chefs, garde-mangers, cuisiniers, aides de cuisine, and pâtissiers
among them. Certainly, as Trubek shows, workers in the food trade were cognizant of the differences between themselves and chefs. Like other kinds of laborers, haute cuisine workers began to organize their own associations and publish their own trade journals from the 1880s on, responding largely to the emergence of large-scale industrial food enterprises and addressing issues—working conditions, hiring practices, and wages, among them—that the elite Société des Cuisiniers Français did not. The public, however, did not see the differences between chefs and their underlings as clearly. French chefs’ quest for professionalization ultimately failed, Trubek argues, because— unlike doctors and lawyers—chefs were unable to establish clear boundaries between their labor and expertise and that of women and workers. While part of the problem was too many cooks, so to speak, material barriers to professionalization were also important: the chef remained, in part, a manual laborer who did physically demanding work for pitifully inadequate wages.

More than anything else, Trubek’s book concerns the creation and consolidation of a new bourgeois cultural identity in the market society of the nineteenth century. Both bourgeois consumers pursuing cultural refinement and chefs striving after the authority of the professional, after all, lay claim to elite status through cultural capital. Chefs thwarted in their efforts to earn public recognition as professionals were like many on the margins of the bourgeoisie, who tried and failed to attain middle-class status. By considering both successful and unsuccessful attempts at social mobility, Trubek points toward the complexity of class formation in the nineteenth century. She does not, however, develop this argument explicitly, nor, in the end, does she weave together the various narratives to tell one coherent story. Part of the problem is that her portrait of the bourgeoisie is painted with too broad a brush and lacks the shading that might have allowed her to see her different protagonists as part of the same process of class stratification in the new, democratizing market society. Yet, while the book does not provide a completely satisfying synthesis, it offers an eminently readable, historical account of the curiously persistent power of French haute cuisine.

LISA TIERSTEN

Barnard College


“Above the mind is the heart; above individuals, society; above Voltaire, Jesus Christ.” Thus admonished the editor of France départementale, a little-known Parisian periodical, in 1834. Four decades later, in a speech marking the centennial of Voltaire’s death, Victor Hugo proclaimed: “To protect the poor, the ailing, . . . that is the war of Jesus Christ; and what man wages this war? Voltaire.” Despite the political chasm between them, representations of Voltaire the philosophe and Voltaire the quasi-evangelical reformer coexisted during the nineteenth century—a century of incessant and unmatched political interest in this figure. So claims Stephen Bird in the present book, an intelligent, informative, but underargued effort to lay bare the “reinvention,” between 1830 and 1900, of the “emblematic” Voltaire—symbol of France’s division into rival political camps. Informed by Pierre Nora’s Lieux de mémoire (Paris, 1984–92), Bird’s reading of Hugo and other novelists, pamphleteers, journalists, politicians, and
pedagogues yields a pithy conclusion. Voltaire’s “protean . . . opus—at times deeply conservative in political and religious matters, liberal and irreligious at others”—made him palatable to diverse political schools and, hence, one of “the most ubiquitously [politici|z|ed and] popularised members of the French literary canon in this period” (pp. 2, 163).

Most specialists of postrevolutionary France have encountered this political “reinvention” firsthand. The contribution of this monograph (based on the author’s University College, London, dissertation) is to display its multiple facets and correct oversimplifications. Bird analyzes this phenomenon on five intersecting planes—political discourse (mainly in the press), caricature, statues, “working-class editions” of Voltaire’s works, and schoolbooks—and displays its magnitude. Installed between 1830 and 1900, the six Parisian statues of Voltaire granted him an unparalleled visibility. During these same decades, publishers issued over one hundred editions of Voltaire’s works at sixty-five centimes or less per volume. Educators likewise drew repeatedly from his oeuvre, though only in the 1880s did they tap the philosopher of *Candide* alongside the historian of *Le siècle de Louis XIV*.

Voltaire’s political resurgence owed much to predictable associations: anticlericalism and “Voltaireanism” (defined here as rejection of all orthodoxies) as well as tolerance, free speech, and other rights consecrated during the early French Revolution. In one respect, Republican and liberal appreciation of Voltaire clashed with traditionalist denunciation of a rationalist and iconoclastic, if not atheistic, Prussophile. But Bird looks beyond such neat cleavages. Republicans and liberals debated among themselves Voltaire’s contribution to the Revolution and disagreed—especially after 1848—about the exact meaning of Voltaireanism, between anticlericalism and love of reason and justice. Likewise with their political adversaries: whereas some Catholics equated Voltaire with Satan, others emphasized his underlying faith in order to delineate a Christ-like figure, “harbinger of a reformed Christianity” (p. 153). In addition, the era’s most prevalent and durable representation of Voltaire was also the most consensual: Voltaire the aesthetic and moral conservative, the bulwark against romanticism, the “Christian moralist in spite of himself” (p. 196). This representation reached its apex under Louis-Napoleon, who sought to subvert a potent symbol while, as elsewhere, building consensus. The Second Empire thus found it easier to mobilize Voltaire—on the Pantheon’s pediment, for instance—than did the July Monarchy, forced as it was to court Catholic as well as anticlerical support. While “militant” Republicans reclaimed the anticlerical Voltaire at century’s end, the advent of the Third Republic announced the decline of a figure that many Republicans now perceived as politically superfluous, needlessly contentious, insufficiently democratic, and too malleable to stand as precursor of their regime.

Bird’s perceptive account, grounded in the era’s political history, broadens our understanding of Voltaire’s legacy. We already knew, for instance, that even radicals such as Louis Blanc condemned the deleterious impact of Voltairean upon a society in need of religiosity (Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830–1852* [Princeton, N.J., 1984], p. 51). Bird uncovers not only left-wing attempts to fashion composites of faith and reason around Voltaire but also internal misgivings about a figure who had scorned the peuple. His most suggestive chapter analyzes the campaign of Léonor Havin, editor of the Republican Siècle, to erect a Parisian statue of Voltaire in the late 1860s. Bird describes Havin’s vision of an “open air pantheon” (p. 44); the rumblings of traditionalists; the unwillingness of some Republicans to attach anachronistic political ideas to Voltaire; and the protracted search for a politically suitable location, from the Place Monge to the (renamed) Place Voltaire.
More revealing yet was the success of a subscription that drew over two hundred thousand contributors—many of them self-described artisans and laborers—from all of France. The large number of collective subscriptions (undertaken in cafés, freemasonry lodges, and the like) illustrates the vigor of the French associative realm in the mid-nineteenth century.

In this chapter as elsewhere, the author is at his best when explaining “how . . . Voltaire’s legacy [was] politicised” (p. 2)—the question he posed at the book’s outset. But his decision to ignore both the Restoration and the centennial of Voltaire’s death (in 1878) because they have been the subjects of “extensive research” (p. 7) reflects a disappointingly narrow approach to a phenomenon that invites further-reaching questions and arguments. Why, besides his “protean” status, Voltaire proved better to “think with” than other literary figures; what these multiple, fragmented representations of Voltaire reveal about the era’s need for and use of literary illustrations; what, beyond politics and religion, Voltaire meant to French men and women of diverse social stations: these problems remain unresolved. Bird does suggest, borrowing from Chantal Martinet, that collective participation in the Siècle’s subscription fulfilled a yearning for community. To deepen and substantiate such claims, however, he would have needed to expand his Paris-centered corpus, rich in political sources, to include local forms of sociability as well as inventories made after death, festivals, almanacs, and other windows into popular and material culture.1 As well as it retraces the posthumous fate of a key literary figure, Reinventing Voltaire leaves the reader with a feeling of incompleteness. Voltaire has much yet to tell us about the political culture of nineteenth-century France.

STÉPHANE GERSON

New York University

By John Milner.

In Art, War, and Revolution in France, 1870–1871, John Milner undertakes a large task—recounting the history of the Second Empire, the Franco-Prussian War, and the Paris Commune as experienced and represented by French artists and writers. The book contains 395 illustrations, most of them in black-and-white reproduction (many of them, of course, were created in black and white), but many of them in glorious color. Some are famous works of art; others are rarely seen or reproduced. It is a pleasure to see so many French drawings and paintings of this period gathered in one place, although some of the images are very small.

In the text of the book, Milner tells the story of this tumultuous and bloody period of French history through the writings of artists, essayists, and novelists. Historians will find the text general and descriptive rather than analytic, but Milner’s account of artists’ experiences and reactions to this turbulent period is not found in most histories and is quite interesting. Some artists fled; others stayed. Some were apolitical; others,

1 We learn little about the latter, yet razors bearing Voltaire’s image had already surfaced under the Restoration. See Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815–1830 (Berkeley, 2000), pp. 190–91.
deeply involved in events. Some were lucky enough to have their studios and most of their artwork survive the war; others, like Alfred Sisley, lost everything when their homes were destroyed.

Most interestingly, Milner reveals the nonartistic side of artists’ lives, largely through their letters and those of their families. Ernest Meissonier, a renowned military painter, was a colonel in the armed forces. Édouard Manet served under him as a lieutenant, writing letters to his wife and painting when he could. Rosa Bonheur stayed in her home and worried about what to do if it were overrun by the Prussians (which it was). Gustave Courbet, an ardent republican, worked feverishly to protect the paintings and sculptures in the Louvre during the war, only to be held responsible for the Commune’s destruction of the Vendôme Column. Honoré Daumier produced biting caricatures criticizing the French government’s handling of the war and the Commune. And the young painter Frédéric Bazille wrote letters while he tramped from one end of France to the other with the Zouaves; in 1870 he was killed in battle.

Milner is interested in the reactions of writers as well as artists, but his handling of this material is less successful than his treatment of the private writings of the artists. Most of the writers he selects for inclusion (primarily Émile Zola, Edmond de Goncourt, and Jules Clarètè) were harsh critics of the Commune. Omitting the writings of more sympathetic observers and participants gives a misleading impression of intellectuals’ reactions to the Commune. It also influences Milner’s interpretation of it. While he strives for objectivity, like virtually all writers on the Commune, he fails to achieve it, adopting as his own the opinions and judgments of the conservative writers he quotes. He thus refers, for instance, to the confrontation between the National Guard and more conservative Parisians on March 22 as “a massacre”—of the conservatives—and criticizes the tone of Courbet’s letters to his family as “absurdly optimistic and self-assured” (pp. 143, 152). Other interpretations are possible in these and other instances.

The strength of the book lies not in its history, however, but in its analysis of the period’s art and the artists who created it. Milner categorizes paintings, drawings, woodcuts, photographs, and so on, according to their message and the speed with which they were produced. He regards those that were completed and displayed rapidly (especially in the illustrated press) as fulfilling a largely reportorial function. Those that were produced years after the fact, from his perspective, are less reportorial and more clearly adversarial. This distinction is a useful organizing device, despite the danger that the reader will begin to see the quickly produced drawings and woodcuts as “objective.” Milner’s text makes it clear, however, that both early drawings and later paintings are personal statements representing what artists felt as well as what they saw.

Representations of the French and Prussian struggle for control of France in the winter of 1870 demonstrate Milner’s point. In battle after battle, the French were depressingly defeated. Artists who worked quickly presented bleak, snow-covered landscapes, wounded and defeated men, and scenes of carnage and death (see pp. 55, 100). There was, as Milner says, “little scope for a positive interpretation” of what was happening (p. 89). Later, defeats could be recast as heroic resistance. Alphonse de Neuville’s 1878 painting of the French surrender at Le Bourget is a case in point. With the passage of eight years, he could represent the French as showing “great bravery, only conceding defeat in the face of overwhelming Prussian might” (p. 89). In 1870, Milner argues, no such interpretation was possible.

Historians and art historians who have worked on this period of French history, as well as anyone else who is interested in the history of art and artists’ lives, will find
the book a pleasure to read. To have so many works of art reproduced in one place is in itself a considerable contribution to scholarship.

Gay L. Gullickson

University of Maryland


In the early afternoon of December 9, 1886, the Parisian deputy Germain Casse was attacked and stabbed in the stomach as he talked with a constituent at the Palais Bourbon. When it was discovered that his assailant was the popular sculptor Jean Baffier and not some shiftless socialist or anarchist, there was widespread speculation that the artist had gone insane. The critic Albert Wolff argued that Baffier had “a mind unhinged by disappointments and misery” (p. 15) and therefore could not be held responsible for his crime. But police questioning soon revealed a radically different state of affairs. Baffier’s assault was not a spontaneous act of passion or madness but the culmination of a long-standing fight against the Republican establishment, a fight that involved not only explicit political action but also polemical pamphleteering and provocative monumental sculpture.

In his excellent new book, Monumental Intolerance, art historian Neil McWilliam explores this “idiosyncratic figure” and probes “the interconnections among his various spheres of activity,” convinced that Baffier’s life and work can help to illuminate the art of the Third Republic and “the cultural life of the period more generally” (p. 3). Focusing on the “interplay among cultural modernism, political conservatism, and the turbulent experience of social change in the decades straddling the fin de siècle,” McWilliam concentrates on a cluster of themes originally identified by Kenneth Silver in his study of the postwar “rappel à l’ordre,” Esprit de Corps (Princeton, N.J., 1989), and later fleshed out in such works as David Cottington’s Cubism in the Shadow of War (New Haven, Conn., 1998), Romy Golan’s Modernity and Nostalgia (New Haven, Conn., 1995), and Mark Antliff’s Inventing Bergson (Princeton, N.J., 1993) (p. 4).

However, while recognizing the “pathbreaking” nature of works such as these, McWilliam also criticizes their oversights and limitations. First, he takes issue with the key role played by Charles Maurras and the Action Française in these studies, arguing that “the ‘extreme right’ is certainly not reducible to royalism, just as the aesthetic vehicle canvassed as most appropriate for the expression of an essential Frenchness was not confined to classicism” (p. 5). Second, he also rejects the exclusive focus on the art of the avant-garde displayed by these works. He rightly claims that the avant-garde “represents a small and—for many contemporaries—insignificant constituency within fin-de-siècle cultural life” (p. 4), and that any study that wants to make general claims about the visual art of the early twentieth century must come to terms with the hegemonic institutions such as the Academy and the Salons as well as dominant practices such as official commissions. Third, he challenges the “unreflexive readiness within art-historical study” to privilege Paris and “fetishize the metropolis,” effectively excluding provincial France, treating it simply as “malleable raw material for the itinerant landscapist” (pp. 5–6).

In order to address these problems and “bring into focus aspects of cultural nationalism that have been previously invisible in accounts of the period” (p. 5), McWilliam turns to Baffier. Claiming to have written a “historical study of an artist rather than a
purely art-historical study,” he uses the sculptor as the entry point into a series of historical, artistic, and ideological problems (p. 5). In lucid, thematically based chapters, he begins with an aspect of Baffier’s life or work that then opens up topics of more general historical and theoretical interest, such as regionalism and national identity or the problematic nature of war memorials and the public commemoration of national trauma. In an especially useful and convincing discussion, he turns to Baffier’s political writings in order to demonstrate the fragmentation of the fin de siècle ideological landscape and the complexity of the Right in particular. In contrast to historians who see Maurras behind every reactionary agenda, he argues that Baffier explicitly rejected Maurras’s Latinism as a bastardization of the Celtic roots of French culture and instead developed the idea of “atavistic localism,” a glorification of peasant tradition and medieval inheritance in the service of a return to feudal harmony and social cohesion.

However, despite its many important contributions to the literature on the French Right, Monumental Intolerance is not without its problems. First, like many books in the social history of art, the art itself is given decidedly short shrift. Too often it is treated as merely the embodiment or transparent signifier of an underlying ideology, rather than as an independent material artifact deserving sustained scrutiny of its own. Second, for a book so tightly focused on one figure, Baffier feels strangely disembodied much of the time. Like his art, he too often becomes a mere cipher that McWilliam must work with in order to access the ideological discourse of the Third Republic. We rarely get a sense of what motivates or compels him beyond the generic explanation of anxiety over cultural crisis. Not that McWilliam does not drop some tantalizing hints. At a certain point in the text he writes that “it is Baffier’s own family that stands at the heart of his work…. Baffier’s parents, in particular, their faces weathered and bodies hardened by years of extenuating labor, serve as archetypes for an entire class. The portrait busts of Mère and Père Baffier . . . testify to the suffering of peasants, whose burden is borne with quiet dignity tinged with wistful forbearance. Their pensive, absorbed state characterizes a number of works in which simple agricultural tasks are endowed with almost sacramental power” (pp. 182–83). Might these passages not imply that, at least on one level, the apotheosis of the peasantry in Baffier’s sculpture and ideology functions not as a celebration of rural life but as a flight from it, a form of aesthetic compensation for the broken bodies of his family? While I am not suggesting that McWilliam essay psychoanalytic interpretations, more attention to the intersection of the personal and political would have added depth and humanity to his book.

Despite these criticisms, Monumental Intolerance remains an impressive work. Intelligently conceived, clearly written, and forcefully argued, it deserves a place on the shelf beside the “pathbreaking” works that the author so admires.

IHOR JUNYK

Toronto


By Robin Walz.


Robin Walz’s Pulp Surrealism leaves no doubt that the French surrealists were aware of, and even inspired by, some currents of the mass print culture that surrounded them in the earliest phases of their attempted cultural revolution. Walz’s study, which he
calls “an interpretive history of the intersection between mass print culture and surrealism” (p. 3), claims more than an intersection between the two. The book’s conceit is that the period itself was surreal—as evidenced in its mass print culture. Hence, the surrealists did not create surrealism (“the science of the ephemeral” [p. 2]) but discovered it in their very surroundings. Put another way, Walz makes the historian’s usual claim that artistic and literary movements cannot be explained by individual psychology or in a narrow context of high-culture antecedents. Rather, such aesthetic movements both reflect and comment on something meaningful in their broader historical context. For Walz the question becomes, what drew the surrealists to this mass culture? His answer: the mass culture itself was actually sensational, extraordinary, spectacular, insolent, and surreal.

The book is composed of four chapters that present different examples of mass print culture and its divergent connections to the surrealist project. The first chapter looks at the Passage de l’Opéra and Parisian guidebooks in relation to Louis Aragon’s _Le Paysan de Paris_, arguing that Paris was the “ideal surrealist text” and thus that Aragon’s “guide to the surrealist imagination” was written in guidebook form (p. 37). The chapter also presents a very interesting consideration of the nostalgia for “vieux Paris” that followed in the wake of Haussmannization.

The second chapter is a delightful romp through the wildly popular series of novels, _Fantômas_, a sort of French “Batman and Robin” replete with gadgets, large-scale disasters, spectacular robberies, and an amazing gallery of peripatetic rogues. Walz describes the popularity of the series and analyzes its generic structure—especially what he calls the emphasis on “swerves and dodges”—and concludes that the series was surrealist avant la lettre, which is why the surrealists liked the novels. The final two chapters treat the “haiku” of the popular press, the _fait divers_, first in a detailed account of the notorious and murderous “Bluebeard of Gombais,” Henri Landru, who was tried and executed for murdering ten women. The second examines the frequent suicide reports in the daily papers. Both chapters explain that these newspaper tropes caught the eye of the surrealists because of their illogic and dark humor. In essence, the _fait divers_ “shared affinities with the surrealist revolution in daily life” (p. 139).

One of the significant contributions of _Pulp Surrealism_ is that it treats culture in the 1920s as more than simply a response to World War I, thus demonstrating a sensitivity to certain cultural continuities that span the period from the 1880s to the 1930s. Walz also separates the production of mass culture from its reception. He rightly argues that despite what might be perceived as the socially and politically conservative context of their production, the novels he studies were open to popular interpretations that differed from the values of their bourgeois authors. Yet _Pulp Surrealism_ does not make enough of a case for an “alternative” periodization for what is usually known as the “interwar years.” Furthermore, it only makes vague references to other significant transformations such as the advent of automobiles, the wireless telegraph, and film, missing a chance to connect with other studies, such as Michael Miller’s _Shanghai on the Métro: Spies, Intrigue, and the French between the Wars_ (Berkeley, 1994), which make a very strong argument about culture in the 1920s and 1930s and seem to strike the right balance between the 1920s as a “postwar” response and as a generative era shaped by technological innovation, among other things. As Walz puts it here, the reader is left to wonder what separates this “surreal” culture from the mass print culture of the prewar period. The genre of the _fait divers_ that Walz describes was hardly new in his period, having been firmly ensconced since at least the 1860s with the advent of the mass press. What is different about these tales from the 1920s seems vital, and there were differences—not the least of which was the use of photography, especially exploited in
glossies such as *Déetective* and in new dailies such as *Le Soir*, known as the newspaper for the “cinematic” era.

Walz seems to be suggesting that all mass culture from the 1880s on was surreal but that it wasn’t until the 1920s that intellectuals finally noticed and named it. If that is the case, what does one make of such important cultural movements before the turn of the century as Emile Zola and his naturalist school or the “other” modernist avant-garde, the impressionists, who may have had a shorter run as “insolent” artists than did the surrealists but whose influence was more profound and long lasting? The surrealists were also more than writers; they were painters, photographers, and filmmakers. The book’s emphasis on mass print not only constrains our vision of mass culture but also our sense of the work of the surrealists. And, if the war, like the car, is one major event that separates the 1880s from the 1920s, from the vantage of mass culture nothing could have been so novel and important as the rise of film, whose influence on mass print culture and high culture continues to shape our own creative and critical discourses.

But was Paris more “surreal” than, say, “real”? After all, the nineteenth-century realists also saw the city as their ideal text. For example, the opening of Balzac’s infamous story “La fille aux yeux d’or” is a clever replica of such early guides to Paris as *Le Diable à Paris*. Guidebooks to Paris have a long and interesting history but one that belies Walz’s description of them as “stable texts” that stood in for a constantly changing city. Aragon surely did read contemporary guidebooks to Paris, but he also read Balzac, Zola, and other city literature. If the surrealists saw in Paris an inspiring landscape, it may more confirm the centrality of Paris to modern cultural innovation and the “painting of modern life” than its status as a surreal panorama.

Walz brings to the study of mass culture the hierarchizations that mark scholarship in fields bound by aesthetic judgment and quality control. For example, he appears to hang the openness of the *Fantômas* on the quality of the novels themselves as somehow rich enough to sustain a certain level of complexity. Many students of popular and mass culture have argued instead for the essentially fluid meaning of such forms and practices, however mundane and banal. The popularity of the material under consideration in the study is more taken as a given than explained as a historical phenomenon. We learn that the surrealists were drawn to these instances of mass culture, but we do not know otherwise why they were so popular or whether the surrealists saw in them elements that the general public did not. *Pulp Surrealism* thus shows a genuine appreciation for the complexities of mass culture while it also insists on a hierarchy of product that privileges what Walz perceives to be “insolent” strains of mass culture. In this way, he cheers on the good taste of the surrealists who rescue mass culture from its otherwise banal and quotidian nature.

*Pulp Surrealism* shows, significantly, that the seeming originality of the avant-garde was really a vision inspired by everyday life. In the end, the book’s preoccupation is to endorse mass culture because it was meaningful to intellectual and artistic elites. What one strains to imagine, however, is what the metro rider on his way to work reading about the exploits of Landru, the concierge perched in her loft with *Le Soir*, and the audiences in the Gaumont theater who faithfully turned out for the next installment of the film version of the *Fantômas* novels made of the fantastic and surreal world they consumed with enthusiasm and gusto.

Vanessa R. Schwartz

*University of Southern California*

The long Franco-German rivalry over Alsace not only occasioned military conflict but also strongly influenced how French and Germans imagined both themselves and each other. From 1789 onward, the two emergent nation-states strove not only to claim the region but also to make its residents into proper citizens. While Alsace became central to the nationalist imaginings of many French and Germans, their competition meant that Alsatians’ own sense of national loyalty remained ambiguous and deeply problematic.

David Allen Harvey’s fascinating book explores this competition between forms of collective identity in modern Alsace and its eventual resolution. He argues that the complexity of the Alsatian case between 1789 and 1945 permits us to gain new perspectives on collective identities: how they emerge, why they appeal to individuals, and how social actors reconcile different identity constructs to one another. The Alsatian experience also promotes a reappraisal of the two types of social consciousness most closely associated with modernity: nationality and class. Harvey rejects the notion that collective identities are somehow fixed and that class and national loyalties should be seen as fundamentally at odds with one another. Rather, he stresses that identities are discursive creations, whose meanings and relevance are constantly in flux (p. 5). Moreover, individuals exercise significant choice in their adoption of particular identity constructs. Hence, precisely because multiple variants of both class and nationality identities coexisted and competed in Alsace, workers had a considerable range of options that they could exercise to achieve their personal and collective goals. The history of Alsatian workers between 1789 and 1945 thus emerges as one of their ongoing struggle with the question of identity and “primary loyalty,” a narrative that ended only in the wake of the Second World War.

Harvey explains that a dialectic between identity discourse and worker experience drove the shifts in Alsatian workers’ collective identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Between the French Revolution and the Second World War, five specific discourses framed the imaginations of Alsatian workers. Each took root because it promised the workers tangible advantages (e.g., a sense of citizenship or better working conditions). Each would eventually lose sway, however, as working-class living and working conditions and the larger social and geopolitical environment evolved.

The first discourse to emerge was that of French republicanism. By linking French national sentiment with the ideal of social egalitarianism, it empowered Alsatian workers to demand political and economic rights due to them as French citizens. Significantly, this identity took root in Alsace before the linguistic and cultural assimilation of the province to French norms had occurred. In other words, Alsatians adopted a French model of citizenship while still holding on to the characteristics that, beyond the Rhine, defined them as Germans.

After the Revolution of 1848, republicanism proved less attractive, for the French state promoted economic liberalism and order over social justice. This permitted the shift to the second identity discourse in Alsace: paternalism. Although it was profoundly antilabor, Alsatian workers drew certain advantages from the paternalist discourse, notably improved living conditions. At a time when local perceptions of Germany (especially Prussia) remained largely negative, paternalism’s promotion of Frenchness also appealed to Alsatian workers. Hence, despite the economic and political dislocations accompanying Germany’s annexation of Alsace in 1871, paternalism lived on, precisely because it could express opposition to the Germans.
The expiration of the antisocialist legislation in 1890, however, combined with the German state’s growing intervention in the social sphere (which undermined the position of the patrons), allowed a new narrative identity to gain favor: international socialism. Socialism was particularly compelling for two reasons. On the one hand, it offered Alsatian workers the class unity that earlier discourses denied and, with it, a means for gaining additional improvements in work and living conditions. On the other hand, the internationalist dimension of socialism promised a way to transcend the Franco-German divide that increasingly threatened all Alsatians after 1900.

Alsatians greeted their French liberators with enthusiasm in 1918; nonetheless, French efforts to “de-Germanize” Alsace bred profound discontent toward “the interior” by 1920. Disillusioned with Germany and now France, Alsatian workers replaced the discourse of socialism with that of Alsatian autonomism. In one of the more penetrating chapters, Harvey shows how the ongoing Franco-German competition over Alsace destabilized the region, provoked social tension, and divided the ranks of the working class. Only in 1929, when the French state pursued a more conciliatory line toward Alsace and the depression forced greater attention to economic concerns, did the working class begin to forsake the autonomist cause.

A final identity discourse emerged in the 1930s, when the struggle against fascism and the pursuit of a more just society gave Alsatian workers a renewed sense of unity and purpose. The Popular Front synthesis of socialist internationalism and French republicanism spoke directly to Alsatian concerns over working conditions and, even more so, the growing threat of German National Socialism. The continued strength of German sentiment in interwar Alsace, however, limited the discourse’s appeal outside of the working class. After 1945, though, with German claims on Alsatian identity thoroughly discredited by the Nazi occupation and with the French state abandoning its traditional support of liberal economics, this socialized French republicanism did become the basis for a collective identity not just for workers but for all Alsatians.

Constructing Class is an impressive achievement. The complexities of Alsatian history between 1789 and 1945 pose many challenges to the historian. For the most part, Harvey has acquitted himself of them admirably. Nonetheless, a few criticisms are in order. Most significantly, the relationship between the collective identity of “Alsatians” and “Alsatian workers” remains ill defined throughout the book. This is a critical issue, not only for properly understanding sociopolitical dynamics within Alsace but also for comprehending the articulation and employment of these discourses. Indeed, workers developed none of the three narratives that were explicitly cross-class in nature (republicanism, paternalism, autonomism). Similarly, it would have been helpful for Harvey to have distinguished more rigorously between Alsace and industrialized Alsace (including the spatial evolution of this latter category) in his discussions. The comparative framing of the entire study could also have been more balanced. To his credit, Harvey insists upon the importance of extraregional events in the articulation (and rejection) of identity discourses. However, developments in France do not receive the same sort of consideration as those in Germany. Furthermore, while Harvey goes out of his way at times to situate his argument within German historiographical debates—one of the most egregious instances is his reference to structuralist-intentionalist interpretations of Nazism (pp. 192–93)—he makes few efforts to link his insights to French and more broadly European historical concerns. These remarks aside, David Harvey has written one of the more stimulating recent accounts of collective identity construction in modern Europe. It merits the close attention of specialists and nonspecialists alike.

Anthony J. Steinhoff

University of Tennessee, Chattanooga

Comparative histories based on extensive primary research are a rarity these days, and on these grounds alone Stephen Harp’s ambitious study of close to a century of schooling as nation building in Alsace and Lorraine should be welcomed and applauded. Harp’s important book will not only appeal to educational historians but also offer engaging arguments and hypotheses to those interested in the formation of national identities, the link between region and nation, the connection between language and national identity, and the role of borderlands in European history.

Learning to Be Loyal focuses on the relationship between primary schooling and national identity during what the author considers to be the critical period of mass schooling and mass nationalism. Harp explores how states used primary schools to construct an imagined national community and turns to educational policy as a window into the process of modern nation building. His central argument is that continuities between French and German educational policies in Alsace and Lorraine far outstripped the differences between them. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, both governments increasingly thought that language was linked to national identity, both placed a heavy emphasis on history and geography as a way of introducing children to their region and their nation, and both saw primary education as a key vehicle for promoting the construction of national identity. For Harp, France and Germany participated in a larger European process that saw primary schools play a crucial role in the creation of contemporary national identities. On the local level, however, French and German efforts to integrate Alsace and Lorraine into a greater national whole met with limits. While both states could at times appear ruthless in their linguistic and educational policies, both had to concede a measure of autonomy to local authorities in order to ensure successful implementation of those policies. As a result, both provinces enjoyed a degree of independence in the educational realm that was not shared by other parts of their nation.

Harp uses his findings to argue convincingly that the oft-repeated distinction between a German, ethnic conception of identity and nationhood and a French, civic-republican one is not as compelling or significant as has often been claimed. The great strength of his study is to illustrate how at the grass roots the construction of French and German national identities marched in parallel (despite the ideological difference between the republic and the empire), a finding that is all the more striking in two provinces that were imagined to exemplify the profound differences between both nations.

Harp has combed regional and national archives, mastered an impressive primary and secondary literature in French and German, and is deft at placing the nitty-gritty of regional history within a larger French, German, and European framework. His area of study—the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine—lends itself well to a comparative history of France and Germany across a range of domains. In the educational realm, Alsace and Lorraine boasted high male literacy rates and one of the best primary school systems in France by the 1830s.

Harp’s approach has limits, however. The comparative angle so well sketched out
in the preface, the introduction, and an outstanding comparative chapter on the growing patriotic content of education during the Great War is not always fully substantiated throughout the book. The two chapters on French administration—one on the years before 1870 and a second on the interwar years that is remarkable in its brevity (eighteen pages)—stand in contrast to the five chapters devoted to the period of German rule from 1870 up to the Great War. Much of this, no doubt, reflects the book’s original incarnation as a dissertation concerned only with the period of the German annexation. But this severe imbalance is a pity because it is precisely following Alsace and Lorraine’s reintegration into France after 1918 that some of the central issues that interest Harp—from nation building to the relationship between language, culture, region, and nation—are brought into sharpest relief. French administrators harshly imposed the French language in the primary schools on a population that overwhelmingly spoke German, and their longer-term objective (achieved only after the Second World War) was to change radically the linguistic and cultural affiliation of the border provinces’ inhabitants. The Germans, as Harp underlines, understood the relationship between language, education, and nation in similar terms, but given the fact that the region’s population already massively spoke German, their undertaking was surely less radical in nature. And from the perspective of those interested in educational history, the rich analyses of curriculum, teachers, pupils, and their parents are largely confined to the period of the Kaiserreich and find little equivalent under French republican rule.

Finally, Harp’s focus on nation building comes at the expense of a more finely grained comparative analysis of the relationship between regional and national identity. In the footsteps of Celia Applegate’s work on the Palatinate (A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat [Berkeley, 1990]) and Alon Confino’s study of Württemberg (The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918 [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997]), Harp underlines how the multiple attachments to an Alsatian and Lorrainer Heimat helped local inhabitants both imagine themselves as part of the nation and attach themselves to it. But he pays little attention to the fact that under French rule Heimat (la petite patrie) was not a source of allegiance to the nation; this significant difference suggests that the similarities between French and German senses of nationhood are perhaps not as marked as Harp would lead us to believe.

The contested borderland of Alsace-Lorraine, once at the center of polemical and historical literature in France and Germany, lost its place in the limelight after the Second World War. Stephen Harp, however, is part of a growing generation of historians who have taken an interest in borderlands as a key site in which to examine the forging of national identity and to compare educational, social, and political change from the higher echelons of the administration to the grass roots. Harp’s thought-provoking monograph is a fine example of how the history of borderlands can shed light on larger national and European issues; this is why it should elicit interest well beyond a small circle of educational historians.

Laird Boswell

University of Wisconsin, Madison

In France, as elsewhere, historical monuments have constituted a well-established, state-sponsored administrative domain for well over a century. As objects of scholarly attention, they have long figured as a defining focus for historians of art and architecture, and more recently they have drawn historians interested in commemoration or collective memory. The essays in this volume aim to define and establish the pertinence of ethnological approaches by highlighting the inventive, paradoxical ways in which monuments are collectively conceived and used, especially by the populations living near them, as well as the social relationships engaged by such thoughts and actions. As a conveniently concrete locus for the consideration of social uses of the past, historic monuments are here shown to shed light on the complexities of ongoing identity construction and expressions of power.

The articles included in this volume were originally presented at a seminar on anthropological approaches to historical monuments, coorganized in 1997 by the French Ministry of Culture’s Ethnological Heritage Delegation (Mission de Patrimoine Ethnologique), the Center for Anthropological Research in Toulouse, and the Ethnographic Research and Action Group of the Aude (GARAE). The seminar, held near the old city of Carcassonne, one of the most heavily visited historic monuments in France, brought anthropologists (and several historians) together with specialists on monuments from the Ministry of Culture. The resultant collection itself provides a fascinating illustration of the multiplicity of meanings that can be attributed to historic monuments as well as some of the jockeying for power and identity that may occur around them.

Daniel Fabre opens the collection by addressing the oddity of juxtaposing historical monuments and ethnology. His rich and stimulating essay lays out the conceptual and institutional developments in France over the past several decades that have made it possible to imagine bringing the two together, and it goes on to offer a research agenda at this new confluence. In particular, he notes the dramatic expansion—in numbers and diversity—of objects whose historic value has been officially recognized to merit state-sponsored protection as reflections of a collective past. Such attention to a widening array of ordinary things, usages, and their physical contexts, he argues, is related to the dominance of *Annales* history in France since the 1960s and is consistent with the incorporation of the elastic notion of “historic monuments” into the emergent—and even vaguer—rubric of *patrimoine* [heritage]. This move was institutionally marked in 1980, officially designated in France as the Année du Patrimoine, by the creation of a Direction du Patrimoine within the French Ministry of Culture. This new office comprised the well-established agencies long concerned with historic monuments as well as several newly minted delegations, notably a Mission du Patrimoine Ethnologique (in addition to one concerned with photography and another with industrial heritage).

Fabre sketches the sequence of subsequent attempts by ethnologists to position ethnological expertise within the world of officially sanctioned national history and monument/heritage administration, an endeavor coinciding in time with efforts by many of the same ethnologists to assert the legitimacy of research in France within the world of ethnological scholarship. From the outset, ethnologists have insisted on the importance of the intangible dimensions of monumental or patrimonial objects and the value of situating them within social and symbolic systems of meaning. Initially, ethnological
expertise in this domain rested on familiarity with the historic (or folkloric) rural lifeways represented by vernacular objects, relevant to their selection, conservation, and presentation as representative of a collective past. Increasingly, however, the ethnological enterprise in France has shifted to the present, promising insights about the social dynamics of contemporary populations relevant to their reception or construction of a shared heritage. With this collection of essays, focusing on the social processes illuminated by historic monuments in contemporary urban as well as rural settings, ethnological knowledge is yet more firmly situated in the present.

The heart of the collection comprises a series of fieldwork-based case studies from southern France, Italy, and Spain, offering lively documentation of the social processes by which monuments may inspire indifference as well as celebration, conflict as well as solidarity. These cases also provide intriguing examples of the coexistence of distinct “communities of interpretation,” each attributing quite different meanings to a given monument, the past it represents, and its significance to the present. For instance, S. Sagnes’s essay on a landmarked church in the Aude department notes the indifference manifest in published local histories and townspeople’s comments to the building’s significance to architectural history (for which it was landmarked). She argues that for local populations its importance is that of a parish church: a locus for marking important life events of community members and a tangible symbol of a singular collective identity. The art or architectural historical significance of monuments—as well as their power to freeze time—are similarly displaced in B. Palumbo’s analysis of the ongoing social and political cleavage between two parishes in a Sicilian town; here the church building, ritual objects, and annual ritual associated with each, as well as the history of conflicts involving these, are deployed to maintain the distinct identities of each group and the active antagonism between the two. M. Bergues considers another kind of social cleavage, as well as differing assessments of representations of the past, in her essay on a rural area in the Dordogne department. On the one hand, newcomers and vacation-home owners aim to secure their attachment to their adoptive home through active commitment to the development of sites and activities around local heritage, but, on the other, local farmers, taking for granted their roots in the area, consider fixed and romanticized visions of old-fashioned lifeways to be both unappealing and false.

A subsequent section offers multiple approaches to the old city of Carcassonne, designated a national landmark in 1849 and a world heritage site (UNESCO) in 1997. M.-G. Colin, its head curator, offers a sketch of the city’s history since its origins in the Roman empire, ending with a comment on the challenge of simultaneously conserving the important architectural and historical heritage of the site and accommodating the mass tourism it draws. Historical ethnologist J.-P. Pinie`s challenges this view of the inherent and self-evident importance of the site, as well as suggesting some of the political stakes involved in decisions about its management, in his analysis of shifting official assessments of its value over the first half of the nineteenth century. He begins with the Napoleonic regime’s decision to dismantle and recycle building materials once the citadel had outlived its military usefulness, and he ends with its designation as a national landmark under the July Monarchy and the beginnings of its restoration by Viollet-le-Duc. C. Amiel’s essay, drawing on interviews with current residents having long family roots in the old city, is, like those in the previous section, concerned with the perceptions of those who routinely live with a monument, but her case is a major site drawing substantial scholarly and touristic attention. She begins by asking why residents of historic Carcassonne have retained no negative memories of the displacements caused by turn-of-the-century renovations and then argues that their
collective identity rests on a conception of the site as a contemporary monument whose history begins with its renovation, rather than as part of an unbroken chain linked to the pasts imagined by tourists or scholars.

The final section includes several essays exploring the general significance of historical monuments. O. Poisson, a high civil servant in the Historic Monument administration, notes that although monuments and heritage function to help connect people to a place, objects recognized as monumental (or patrimonial) are apt to be things that stand outside of ordinary contemporary life, marking instead a past unambiguously distinguishable from the present (e.g., Roman ruins, archaic rural objects). This argument offers an interesting way to think about the contrasting conceptions of a given site discussed in many of the case studies, while these in turn add nuance and flesh to his formulation.

Fabre ends the volume with a provocative essay that draws on the work of Alois Riegl to argue that monumentalization—and a fortiori patrimonialization—are symptoms of specifically modern relationships to the past. He thus elaborates a theoretical justification for the position displayed throughout the volume: that an ethnology of monuments can (or must) be about life in the contemporary world, rather than about particular objects or the archaisms they putatively represent. With the exception of architectural historian J.-M. Leniaud, who uses examples from classical Greece and Rome to challenge the claim that monumentalizing the past or preserving a collective heritage is an especially modern impulse, none of the other authors explicitly addresses this line of argument. Indeed, the striking diversity of monumentalized objects considered here, and the wide range of ways they are shown to be conceived and used, invite caution about oversimple formulations of the phenomenon.

Nonetheless, this collection effectively redefines—and establishes the interest of—ethnological approaches to consecrated historical objects. Offering relatively little information about such objects themselves or the officially sanctioned histories they represent, these case studies instead provide stimulating and empirically well-grounded illumination of collective uses of the past and of the multiplicity of meanings and social relationships that can be engaged around things anointed as Historical. This volume will be especially valuable to those concerned with lieux de mémoire—and what historian can afford not to be?—shown here to be considerably more complex, ambiguous, and interesting terrain than has often been suggested.

Susan Carol Rogers

New York University


Bologna, one of the loveliest and most interesting cities in Italy—as well as perhaps the best place outside the Vatican to study the history of the papacy and its territories, in no small part because of its imposing university library—fortunately does not appear on many tourist itineraries. Perhaps in consequence, unfortunately, it has not attracted much attention from scholars. There is certainly nothing like the “myth of Florence” or the “myth of Venice” that have so captivated Anglo-American historians. This is apparently solely a function of anglophone ignorance, since Nicole Reinhardt briefly
discusses a similar myth among Bolognese historians of the libertà di Bologna, which she interprets as compensation for its loss of communal autonomy. Despite this myth, she notes that native Bolognese have also neglected the early modern history of their city. Now, first with Guido Dall’Olio’s Eretici e inquisitori nella Bologna del Cinquecento (Bologna, 1999) and here with this book, that situation is beginning to change.

Reinhardt’s book is a largely unrevised thesis. Submitted to the European University Institute in Florence, it was written under the direction of Wolfgang Reinhard; Paolo Prodi, dean of Italian historians of the early modern state, was on the committee. Both are practitioners of social science history in the grand style, and thus—unsurprisingly—Reinhardt spends a fair amount of time on theory and method. Her introduction addresses the problem of modernization, discussing Reinhard’s theory of the evolution of early modern government as well as Prodi’s alternative view of the development of early modern papal “absolutism.” With commendable independence, Reinhardt largely rejects both approaches, preferring instead to take off from Reinhard’s more recent investigation of the mechanisms of clientalism and patronage. She offers a theory that, rather than acting as agents of change, both mechanisms presented stumbling blocks to centralization of power in papal hands. Although she necessarily joins the chorus of criticism of idealist worship of the state as canonized by Hegel, she does not therefore reject his dialectical method, arguing that patronage relations between Rome and Bologna were doomed to undercut papal centralization of power and that Paul V fully realized this.

Against Reinhard, Reinhardt argues that the pope’s clientage in Bologna was largely a consequence of his papacy, not a precondition of it, despite his lengthy earlier tenure as vice-legate of Bologna. Paul successfully kept the Bolognese away from informal sources of power in Rome by denying them access to the college of cardinals (he appointed only one Bolognese cardinal) and, therefore, largely neutralized the institutional strength they enjoyed, given their permanent presence on the Rota. Paradoxically, perhaps, the great powers in Bologna rarely or never sought papal patronage. Instead, it was the newcomers, the would-be senatorial families, who approached the pope successfully. Precisely this success, however, doomed them to a limited role in Bologna, where the two great faction leaders, the Pepoli and the Malvezzi, continued as much as possible to stay aloof from papal incursions. Nevertheless, in nearly every important contest, especially over patronage (and in the case of university appointments), the pope usually got his way. Exercising papal power directly was a much more useful tool than patronage. But as Reinhardt also emphasizes, despite the apparent lack of interest or downright incompetence of the Bolognese senators, the pope was far from able to destroy Bolognese autonomy; at least as of 1621, she finds a situation adequately described by neither “absolutism” nor “autonomy.” She hints—perhaps as a nod to Reinhard—that, in the long term, the new elite created by papal patronage identified with the papal state and that this alliance eventually led to its success. But demonstrating the point would go well beyond the limits of her book, just as it would undercut her thesis.

Its heart is a study of relations of godparentage employed as a means of uncovering clientage. Reinhardt is forced to this study in part by limitations of sources; only one substantial archive of family correspondence survives (the Malvezzi-Campeggi), and the diplomatic sources she mines in the Vatican are very little help. She also undertook this approach for reasons of method, since it lends itself readily to network analysis (the Verflechtung of her title) at the same time as it helps to put a human face on what can be a very mechanical approach in the hands of some of the sociologists and anthropologists who invented the method. An almost complete set of registers for the city
of Bologna (but not for the contado) gives her a sample of about six hundred baptisms between 1589 and 1621. Their analysis reinforces the view of arrivistes attaching themselves to papal families through godparentage, while the grand factions instead maintained their ties to great princely houses, especially the Medici and the Farnese. The evidence on which this chapter rests appears in appendixes of fifty-six pages, which amount by themselves to a useful prosopography of the Bolognese elite in the early seventeenth century, a contribution on a smaller scale like Christoph Weber’s on the papacy and papal administration in general.

The first part of the book is an institutional portrait of Bologna, especially the workings of the two centers of power—the papal legation and the senate—as well as a narrative of how the papal legates dealt with their assignments, usually in the absence of any clear instructions from Rome (a point Reinhardt does not fail to emphasize in defense of her subordinate thesis that the appearance of papal absolutism may be just that—appearance and no more). Much similar anecdotal material also appears in the analytical sections, almost amounting to a history of Bolognese politics in the early seventeenth century.

Curiously, despite detailed treatment of the legates and the machinery of papal government, one institution is entirely lacking: the Inquisition. It is, of course, not strictly relevant to Reinhardt’s remit. One suspects, however, as an extrapolation from Gigliola Fragnito’s work on the congregations of the Index and the Inquisition, that there was more than a little friction between legate and inquisitor; this would also have helped to undercut even Paul V’s drive to control.

THOMAS F. MAYER
Augustana College

The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice. By Luca Molà.

The title of the book and the author’s stated intention (p. xviii) of “filling the gap in Venetian historiography” are both far more modest than the actual achievement. To be sure, Luca Molà is correct that little has been written in the modern era about silk production in Venice, whereas other sectors of the economy—salt, glass, spices, and above all banking—are relatively familiar. He also demonstrates that the gap that he addresses is a major one, as his chosen sector is revealed to have been crucial to the Venetian economy and fisc. Employers in 1529 claimed that the industry employed some 25,000 persons, and while this figure surely exaggerates (the entire city population was only about five times that), it indicates that a large part of the city depended on silk for a livelihood. To take another index, Molà estimates that the “annual turnover of the raw silk trade” (p. 305) in the Venetian dominion—and raw silk was but a portion of the overall industry—nearly equaled the total revenues of the state.

Had Molà only filled that gap, the book would have been useful and a success. He has, however, accomplished much more. This will be the definitive study of the Venetian silk industry, which, considering that Italy was preeminent in silk production during the Renaissance (and beyond) and that Venice was one of the very largest producers of the peninsula, already marks it as a major contribution. (The achievement is all the more remarkable when one takes into account that the book originated in a Ph.D. dissertation, which usually produces a far more restricted monograph.) But it goes beyond that. Molà has worked out some enormously tricky problems regarding
the materials and processes of production, and his findings will be of great assistance
to all future scholars, Italianists or otherwise. The book’s command of the secondary
literature relating to production throughout (and, occasionally, beyond) Europe is so
thorough that it might serve profitably as a guide to readers interested in the industry
on the continent generally. Additionally, many of the structural issues relating to the
Venetian silk trade were common to other centers; here too the general reader will
profit from a detailed but lucid narrative.

The first section (chaps. 1–2) is the most geographically diffuse, as Molà examines
the spread of the silk industry from a few Italian centers to the peninsula at large and
to the rest of Europe, and looks at the ways in which states attempted to attract and
retain a highly mobile workforce. The second section (chaps. 3–8) is concerned with
the silk industry in Venice proper. Working through the stages of production from
obtaining raw materials to spinning, dyeing, weaving, and marketing, Molà demon-
strates a dazzling command of highly complex technical issues of materials and process.
He also forcefully argues that—contrary to repeated but untested assumptions—guilds
and government overseers were not forces for inertia and stagnation, leading in the
long run to a loss of industrial dominance. Rather, producers and Venetian magistrates
proved highly responsive to changing consumer tastes, for example diversifying their
product lines with lighter, cheaper cloths, new hues, and cloths of mixed fibers. They
embraced new techniques—the use of cochineal dyes from the New World, for ex-
ample—and encouraged technological innovation through the pioneering use of in-
dustrial patents. Far from protecting obsolete systems, the government constantly
forced the industry to adapt to others’ innovations in order to protect market share.

The final section (chaps. 9–11) looks at “Venice” in the larger sense, examining silk
production and marketing throughout the Venetian mainland dominion. Here too the
archival research is exhaustive, and Molà’s command of the material is entirely sure.
Here too, as well, there is argued a strong thesis that runs counter to much prevailing
wisdom. In the past it has been maintained that Venetian magistracies were primarily
collected to protect the home industries, to the point of stunting mainland economies,
or worse—“eviscerate” is one of the verbs applied to the effect of Venetian rule on
local production. On the contrary, says Molà, Venice proved far less protectionist than
other states. Mainland producers (Verona and Vicenza in particular) were allowed to
export silk thread outside the dominion, at relatively low tax rates; there was no demand
that all goods flow through the capital. While in theory the home industry enjoyed a
monopoly on the weaving of velvets and other fine silks, in actuality upper-end pro-
duction flourished throughout the dominion. In the 1570s, to be sure, Venetian guilds
made a concerted effort to shut down weaving outside the city, but the effects were
only temporary and mainland weavers soon returned to production, tacitly and some-
times explicitly encouraged by Venetian governors.

One might not expect that such a dense, highly technical account would make for a
good read, but it does. Molà’s passion for his subject is palpable, and he soon convinced
this reader not only that the subject matters intensely but that even the smallest details—
especially the details, perhaps—are of urgent importance. Richard Goldthwaite (on
the jacket blur) is quite right that this is excellent economic history and that it will set
the standard for future studies; it is also unusually engaging.

JAMES S. GRUBB

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Alexander De Grand’s political biography of Italy’s first “minister of the underworld” offers an illuminating and original account of parliamentary life during the liberal period. The Hunchback’s Tailor follows Giovanni Giolitti from his election to the Chamber of Deputies from his home district of Dronero in 1882, through his five premierships, to the demise of representative government after Mussolini’s seizure of power. The book ends with a short but provocative historiographic essay on the interpretations of Giolittian legacy, including the negative verdicts of contemporaries, both antifascist and fascist, as well as more positive reassessments in the aftermath of World War II.

Giolitti’s career overlapped the life span of liberalism. He entered the new national bureaucracy in 1862 at the age of twenty and somehow defied the traditional divisions in high politics on the peninsula. He worked five years in the Ministry of Justice before moving on to the Ministry of Finance, where he did duty directly under Quintino Sella and then Marco Minghetti. If these two leaders of the historic Right sponsored Giolitti’s initiation into public administration, his tenure in the civil service reached its apex once the Left took office. Following a brief and bumpy interlude when Agostino Depretis first became premier, Giolitti got himself appointed secretary-general of the Court of Accounts, the highest oversight body in Italian officialdom, and finally counselor of state, a position that made him eligible to stand for parliamentary election. Thus, at the age of forty, he ran for deputy. He would represent the college of Dronero from 1882 until his death in 1928.

Giolitti began his reign in parliament as a state builder rather than a statesman. In the Chamber of Deputies, he sounded more like a civil servant than a lawmaker, voting with the majority on most issues except those dealing with taxes and expenditure. But his expertise in finance placed him in a unique position during the 1880s, years of economic crisis and agricultural depression. Francesco Crispi named him minister of the treasury in 1889, but he resigned the post in 1890 over concerns with the government’s failure to balance the budget. In 1892, the king asked Giolitti to form a cabinet, with disastrous results. His administration fell eighteen months later amid rumors of banking scandal, and his political future seemed dead.

This inauspicious start makes Giolitti’s easy preeminence in parliament seven years later all the more remarkable. He returned to power first in February 1901 as Giuseppe Zanardelli’s minister of the interior and then in November 1903 as prime minister. He went on to establish what were to become the hallmarks of the Giolittian “system.” He made concessions to traditionally disaffected camps in Italian politics in order to consolidate opinion at the polls. He easily cultivated the radicals. He held out an olive branch to the socialists by insisting on the neutrality of government in labor disputes. He courted Catholics by letting Zanardelli’s divorce bill die in committee. The election of Pius X to the throne of Saint Peter signaled a change in the Holy Penitentiary’s prohibition on voting in national races, so the policy of rapprochement with clerical moderates delivered concrete results in the 1904 elections. After decades of papal intransigence, the Roman church no longer sought to undermine the legitimacy of the liberal state.

Unlike partisan portraits of Giolitti, which paint him either as a cynical manipulator of single-member constituencies or as the patron of the underprivileged, De Grand’s
biography describes a fundamentally conservative character, one who believed the system was strong enough to give labor some liberties. Italy’s greatest prime minister after Cavour arrived on the scene as a civil servant with common sense and a clerk’s concern for a balanced budget. In opposition, the parliamentarian from Dronero acquired social vision and legislative experience. As minister of the interior and as premier, he set a progressive domestic agenda but left the socialists out of the governmental loop. The economy flourished during the heyday of Giolittismo. Between 1901 and 1910, the nation saw prodigious industrial growth and enjoyed higher productivity rates than did Europe as a whole.

After 1911, the year universal manhood suffrage became law and also the year the government embarked upon war with Turkey, Giolitti became increasingly pessimistic about the prospects of the liberal regime. He did not attempt to redress regional disparities, adopting different measures for different parts of the country. His hostility to the piazza increased after 1914, when he withdrew from government. Alien to the new world of mass parties and public rallies, he returned to power in 1920 only to lose his majority following the 1921 general elections. Even under the specter of Mussolini’s dictatorship, Giolitti stayed true to his own construction of the parliamentary state, if not parliamentary democracy. He delivered his last speech in the chamber on March 16, 1928, the sole deputy to speak out against a fascist law eliminating freedom of choice at the polls. A bitter man of eighty-six, he died four months later.

An Anglo-American audience will find in De Grand’s biography a great resource on one of the outstanding statesmen of fin de siècle Europe. Well written and cogently argued, his book offers a balanced account of the dominant personality behind the political and administrative apparatus of the liberal state. It integrates new primary documentation—personal papers and records on the banking scandal, for the most part—with the standard liberal scholarship on Giolitti available only in Italian.

Alice A. Kelikian
Brandeis University

Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy. By Susan Zuccotti.

The debate over Pius XII’s “silence” during the Holocaust continues to stir controversy, producing a steady stream of publications, including several recent bestsellers (John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope [New York, 1999]; Garry Wills, Papal Sin [New York, 2000]; James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword [Boston, 2001]). Weighing in on the question of whether Pius XII did try to save Europe’s Jews from annihilation, Susan Zuccotti focuses especially on the situation in Italy during the war. If there was one place where the Pope had the ability to influence both government action and popular perceptions, it was certainly Italy. Moreover, since not only the Pope and his secretary of state were Italian but so too were virtually the entire Curia and papal diplomatic corps, the Vatican’s relationship with Italy was like no other in the world.

Zuccotti begins with the well-known fact that Pius XII never spoke out publicly against the destruction of Europe’s Jews. Indeed, he never publicly uttered the word “Jew,” nor did he ever identify the Germans as responsible for any crimes against them. The debate to which this book contributes concerns Pius XII’s defenders’ argument that his silence was motivated by his desire to protect his vigorous behind-the-scenes...
efforts to save as many Jews as possible. Zuccotti systematically refutes this claim, demonstrating that the Pope, although the recipient of increasingly desperate pleas that he take action—not only from Jews but from many Catholic clergy as well—did almost nothing to save the Jews. The first chapters of the book offer some historical context by focusing on the Vatican’s views of the Jews in the years leading up to the war. Zuccotti’s main point here is that antisemitism was deeply rooted in the Vatican. There is little new in this portion of the book, and there are a few misleading statements. Enrico Rosa, author of a series of antisemitic articles in *La Civilta` Cattolica*, is identified twice (pp. 12, 25) as a Jesuit who was a “regular contributor” (p. 12) to the journal. He was more than that, having served for sixteen years as the director of the journal. Zuccotti’s characterization of the close Vatican oversight of the journal as a product of the twentieth century is similarly misleading, as this oversight began practically with its founding in 1850. Her statement that Pius XI “asked three Jesuit priests to prepare a document condemning racism” (p. 32) is also a bit off, as he asked only one, the American John La Farge, and it was the (antisemitic) head of the Jesuit order who added the other two.

Following this section, the book turns to the war against the Jews in various Catholic areas of Europe, including those, like Slovakia and Croatia, where priests played a major governmental role. Here Zuccotti shows that even when various papal nuncios reported on the shipping of tens of thousands of Jews to their deaths and called on the Pope to take action, their pleas went unheeded.

This section of the book, together with the discussion of the Pope’s failure to issue any public protest over the Nazi seizure of a thousand of Rome’s Jews in October 1943 and their deportation to death in Auschwitz, will be of interest to the general reader, although it adds little to the existing scholarly literature. Where the book does make an important original contribution is, paradoxically, in establishing the extent and nature of efforts to save Italy’s Jews by Catholic clergy. The French Capuchin priest Father Marie Benoıˆt, for example, after working on behalf of Jews in France earlier in 1943, came to Rome in June of that year and began working with the Italian Jewish refugee aid organization, Delasem. Although he contacted Pius XII several times asking for aid in these efforts, his calls went unanswered. Yet, the Roman Capuchin monastery became the center of a large clandestine effort to save Jews and helped 4,000 of them to find hiding places during the Nazi occupation in 1943–44. Similarly, in Turin, several Catholic groups aided the Jews, including the Salesians, who sheltered scores of them in their church schools and buildings. A young Dominican priest, Father Giuseppe Girotti, without his superiors’ knowledge, hid many Jews in his monastery. Arrested in August 1944, he was deported to Dachau, where he was murdered.

The most that can be said for Pius XII, writes Zuccotti, is that he rarely tried to prevent acts taken on behalf of the Jews by Catholic clergy in Italy. It was not true, as his defenders have argued, that the Pope sought to shelter Jews in the Vatican itself. He did not.

To explain his silence, Zuccotti appropriately points to the Pope’s preoccupation with not offending the Germans or the German government. Not only did Pius XII retain a fondness for Germany from the dozen years he spent there as a papal nuncio, but from the very outbreak of the war he also harbored the (in retrospect illusory) ambition of one day brokering an end to the war. The deal he had in mind would have prevented Germany’s destruction and thus retained its role as a bulwark against the church’s primary enemy, Soviet communism.

Zuccotti does more than offer historical analysis, for she also passes moral judgment throughout the pages of the book. In discussing the Vatican, the Pope, and other church
institutions, she continuously uses such phrases as “they should have acted vigorously” (p. 112); “steps he should have taken” (p. 166); and “it should have been the norm rather than the exception” (p. 201).

For an outstanding historical study of the “silence” of Pius XII, readers of Italian should consult the newly published book by Giovanni Miccoli, *I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio XII* (Milan, 2000). But for insight into the actions that Catholic clergy did take in Italy to save the Jews, and the lack of support they received from the Vatican for these efforts, *Under His Very Windows* is a valuable addition to the literature.

**DAVID I. KERTZER**

Brown University

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**A Bishop’s Tale: Mathias Hovius among His Flock in Seventeenth-Century Flanders.** By Craig Harline and Eddy Put.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, with assistance from the foundation established in memory of Philip Hamilton McMillan of the Class of 1894, Yale College, 2000. Pp. x + 387. $27.95.

Mathias Hovius was a hardworking churchman of no charisma but great competence. Son of a lowly fuller, he rose to become archbishop of Mechelen, in the Spanish Netherlands, from 1596 to 1620. Had the archdiocese commanded a reasonable endowment, someone of higher rank and greater ambition would likely have filled the post, but in the 1590s Mechelen was still recovering from the Dutch Revolt against Spain. The town itself had been sacked by English troops in 1580, while scores of rural churches had been reduced to rubble. The spiritual and institutional devastation of the Catholic Church was on a similar scale. Hovius, who had escaped the “English Fury” by hiding in a wardrobe, oversaw the church’s reconstruction and worked to reform it along Tridentine lines. It was a herculean task, requiring all the steadfast diligence of a man whose motto was Patience Conquers the Mighty.

This book is less a biography of Hovius than a chronicle of his endeavors as reformer and rebuilders. It focuses less on the man, who comes across as rather colorless, than on the world he tried to change, which was anything but. As archbishop, Hovius had to cope mostly with problems—at least, that is what the surviving records, as reflected here, mostly document: obstinate heretics, philandering monks, pilfering nuns, rival schools, stubborn villagers who did not bother with the sacrament of confirmation, combative canons who fished more than they prayed, impoverished pastors who slept in churches and let their hens lay eggs on the altars. As Craig Harline and Eddy Put emphasize, Hovius was “almost always . . . negotiating, not merely imposing” solutions to these problems (p. 305). Indeed, resolving them required much effort, clever strategizing, and a favorable conjuncture of forces. These did not always come together, leaving glaring abuses and a frustrated archbishop. However, there were satisfactions too, such as the saintliness of a gifted boy, the miracles worked by the Virgin on a distant hill, relics that could be authenticated, and the support Hovius received time and again from the pious Archdukes Albert and Isabella. Using a prelate as a window onto contemporary religious life is an unusual and creative strategy, for which the authors deserve much credit. Although it gives the resulting picture a modest clerical bias—lay folk appear much less prominently in this “bishop’s tale” than do clergy—overall the strategy succeeds excellently in offering readers a panoramic view of Catholic religious life in Flanders at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Written in
lively, clear prose, this book is no microhistory but has some of the qualities of one. Though a bit long for the purpose, it would serve very well to teach undergraduates.

The book is organized as a series of episodes, each pegged to a specific date, though the stories often range backward and forward in time. Inevitably, some are more interesting than others, the best of them combining colorful personalities or events with a wider significance. Hovius’s escape from the English, which opens the book, draws readers directly into the Dutch Revolt and how individuals experienced it. The rise of Sharp Hill (Scherpenheuvel), in eastern Brabant, from a local shrine to a major pilgrimage site exemplifies the recasting of old practices that the Catholic/Counter-Reformation so often entailed. Just a stone’s throw from the front line in the war between Spanish and Dutch forces, it was transformed by princely patronage and a spate of new miracles into a “‘national’ monument to the Virgin” and “symbol of old faith against new” (pp. 107, 97). The disruption of a Corpus Christi procession by Protestant sailors visiting from the republic illustrates the problems that the much longed-for peace between Spain and the Dutch (the Twelve Years’ Truce) paradoxically brought to the archdiocese. By contrast, the provincial church council held in 1607 was a dull affair. Its recounting is instructive chiefly in revealing the obstacles the Roman curia, to assert its supremacy, would throw in the path of reformist bishops. In this case the obstacles took two forms: the requirement that Rome approve the council’s decisions, and a rogue priest with powerful friends and the title of papal pronotary. Hovius overcame the former with a combination of persistence, tact, and well-placed gifts; he dealt with the latter, Henri Costerius, by having him arrested in the middle of the night and then compiling a mountain of evidence of his misdeeds. If there was one category of cleric who caused Hovius the most headaches, however, it was surely canons, as several stories—colorful, but a bit repetitive—attest.

Aside from a bit of trimming, there are few changes that would have made this extremely fine book even better. One is the inclusion of more direct quotations from the authors’ primary sources. The sparseness of such quotations probably contributes to making the book such an accessible, easy read, but it leaves the reader without much sense of Hovius’s voice, his use of language, and that of other characters. Given the broad audience the book is intended—and deserves—to have, it should definitely have included a fuller explanation of the political structure of the southern Netherlands and the institutional structure of the archdiocese. The two charts intended to convey this information are too compressed and difficult to read to be of great use. The book does provide other good reference materials: a guide to Dutch pronunciation, a glossary of ecclesiastic terms, and a map. The authors reserve for a postscript their review of the historiography and an account of the extraordinary challenges they faced in pursuing their archival research. Thank goodness there are fewer and fewer archivists around who would menacingly promise, “If you’re good, then you’ll get more” (p. 307)!  

Benjamin J. Kaplan

University of Iowa
Mad for God: Bartolomé Sánchez, the Secret Messiah of Cardenete. By Sara Tilghman Nalle.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, with assistance from the Program for Cultural Cooperation between Spain’s Ministry of Education and Culture and United States Universities, 2001. Pp. x + 228. $49.50 (cloth); $16.95 (paper).

Cuenca, a small city of undeniably dramatic beauty, also holds the dullest collection of inquisitorial records in Spain (or so I previously believed). Their very unremarkableness helped give exemplary value to God in La Mancha (Baltimore, 1992), Sarah Nalle’s earlier study of the Catholic Reformation in the diocese of Cuenca. However, her new book uses the abundant records of Cuenca’s Holy Office to craft a microhistorical portrait of a remarkable sixteenth-century prisoner, Bartolomé Sanchez. This rustic “Spanish Menocchio” deployed his homemade resources in a prolonged and tragicomic standoff with Cuenca’s Inquisitors, who never quite knew what to do with him.

Sanchez’s case began after he engaged in some bizarre behavior in his village church at Cardenete in March 1552, inspired by a vision that he interpreted through obsessively studying his cheap book of hours. When he continued to expound some radically anticlerical heretical notions, his parish priest finally denounced him to the Inquisition, and he was arrested a year later. Questioned by Cuenca’s Holy Office, Sanchez claimed that he was a prophet sent by God to revenge the innocent victims of the Inquisition, dropping hints that he was nothing less than Elijah reincarnated. After much leisurely interrogation and a bout of exasperation when he destroyed the religious imagery in his cell (pp. 87–89), Sanchez was finally sentenced to be burned at an auto-da-fe in April 1554; but he recanted just before reaching the scaffold and was “reconciled” six weeks later (p. 108).

After a relatively quiet period in Cuenca, Sanchez returned to Cardenete, where he burned his penitential sanbenito in April 1556. Now a recidivist, a category that ordinarily generated an automatic death sentence, he was nevertheless allowed to make a second and transparently insincere retraction at the instigation of a savvy cellmate (p. 122). Cuenca’s inquisitors merely ordered him whipped. After a delay of fifteen months, during which Sanchez’s case was briefly brought before the Supreme Council of the Spanish Inquisition (pp. 128–30), Cuenca’s judges ruled Sanchez insane in August 1558 and arranged his admission to a well-run asylum in distant Zaragoza. However, he soon escaped back to Cardenete, from which he was promptly shipped back to Cuenca, where his paper trail finally ends in March 1560 (pp. 161–62).

Madness comprises a major theme within this short book, and here one senses the fine German hand of Erik Midelfort, prize-winning historian of sixteenth-century madness (A History of Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany [Stanford, Calif., 1999]), whose department Nalle joined for a year (p. ix). A few years before encountering Sanchez, Cuenca’s Inquisitors had judged a case both wildly different from and similar to his: that of an exfriar and hermit, a kind of pícaro who claimed to have been whipped by Holy Offices throughout the Iberian peninsula (including Portugal) for proclaiming himself alternatively as the Messiah, Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, and, for bad measure, Martin Luther. Having no adequate local institution for insane people, they sent him to an asylum in Toledo (p. 88). Sanchez, in contrast, seemed sane to everyone, except when he got going on religious themes; at one point, the Inquisitors described him as “insane and possessed” (p. 136), but demonic possession was not a fashionable diagnosis in Spain at that time and no one proposed that he be exorcised. As Nalle astutely notes (p. 143), Sanchez’s most peculiar outbursts tended to come shortly before
Easter; one might add his burst of sacrilege in his cell before Christmas 1553 as well as his confident expectation that God would punish the Inquisition for its sins on All Saints’ Day.

The most important comparison running through Nalle’s book, implicitly and finally explicitly (pp. 165–66), is with Domenico Scandella, a.k.a. Menocchio, today a kind of sixteenth-century rustic folk hero on university campuses across America and Europe thanks to Carlo Ginzburg’s pioneering microhistorical intellectual biography. Because Nalle’s account examines many of the same issues as Ginzburg’s study, it seems fair to compare these highly original, vehemently anticlerical, and equally loquacious autodidacts, each of whom underwent two trials after being originally denounced by his village priest. The differences outweigh the very real similarities between them. Although the Spanish Inquisition is conventionally considered far more bloodthirsty than the Roman Inquisition (and it is beyond doubt that the Spanish tribunal burned at least ten times as many people), Menocchio was treated far more harshly than Sanchez. When back with their families in their home villages after their condemnations for heresy, the Spaniard burned his sanbenito, while the Italian merely left his at home; but it was Menocchio—considered “almost a heresiarch” at his first trial because he had one simpleminded follower—who was burned in 1599 as a relapsus, after consultation with the Vatican. In contrast, the Spaniards, including the Supreme Council, simply wanted Sanchez to disappear when he refused to keep silent about his peculiar beliefs.

Why was the Cuenca Inquisition so reluctant to punish this relapsed heretic for an incredible list of heresies, blasphemies, and sacrileges, for which they would have promptly burned anyone with Jewish or Moslem (or even French) ancestors? Sanchez was treated so indulgently because he was an “old Christian,” an ordinary rustic with rudimentary literacy (p. 101) who was ipso facto considered incapable of committing serious heresy (see p. 94). I am inclined to reverse a phrase in Nalle’s conclusion to the effect that Cuenca’s Inquisitors “did not believe in Sanchez’s sanity (and therefore his guilt)” (p. 165). Instead, it was because they, in their enormous condescension, could not believe in his guilt that they tried so hard to find an excuse to doubt his sanity. Of course, there may have been several more Bartolome Sanchezes in early modern Spain; buried in a footnote (p. 205, n. 7) is the information that almost 5 percent of the certified madmen in Spain’s largest special institution had been sent there by the Spanish Inquisition.

**Northwestern University**

**WILLIAM MONTER**


Brihuega nowadays is a fairly sleepy town near the Madrid-Barcelona highway. Most Spaniards have heard of it thanks to the battle that took place near there in 1710, which turned Philippe d’Anjou, the Bourbon candidate for the Spanish throne, into Felipe V.

During the sixteenth century Brihuega was a medium-sized center of textile production, with a population of some four thousand inhabitants. Like most such towns in Castile, it found itself increasingly threatened by a lethal combination of foreign competition and sluggish local demand. Before lasting decline set in, however, a large number of townspeople opted to seek their fortunes elsewhere. Amid the flood of sixteenth-century Spaniards who made their way to the New World, the case of the briocenses who voted with their feet was exceptional in at least two respects. First was the sheer size of the outpouring: from 1560 to around 1620 some thousand persons left their town behind, the vast majority of them for good. Even more striking, however, was the fact that almost all of the migrants wound up in the same place, in Puebla de los Angales, a rapidly growing city founded in the 1530s some seventy miles to the southeast of Mexico City. The contrast with conditions at home could not be greater, for Puebla was well on its way to becoming the center of a remarkably dynamic regional economy. The migrants from Brihuega contributed their share to its development, and before long their skills and experience helped make it New Spain’s leading textile producer.

Thus the tale Altman tells is not one of the exploits of conquistadores and other pioneers. Instead, her concern is with the daily routines and aspirations of ordinary people, and in particular with the causes and consequences of the myriad decisions they made while adopting new roles far from home, as merchants, slave owners, and above all as obrajeros, that is, supervisors or proprietors of small-scale textile factories. Altman reviews virtually all aspects of the migrants’ lives, from their economic activities on both sides of the Atlantic to their religious beliefs, demographic and marital behavior, and basic norms of social and political organization. To this end she reconstructs detailed stories of a number of migrants and their families. While she expresses some regret for the necessarily “impressionistic and anecdotal” quality of her discussion (p. 183), surely more than one reader will applaud the individualizing focus that allows her to add some new flesh to the old bones of social history. Taken together, this cluster of biographies shows the briocenses deriving substantial advantage from their opportunities for improvement. Above all, it reveals how they built for themselves lives that were largely similar to the ones they left behind yet enhanced materially by the resources the empire put at the disposition of those willing to take advantage of their own hard work, along with that of others.

The extent of Altman’s achievement should be measured not only by its results but also by taking into account the sources with which she had to wrestle. It is clear that she has made the best of a bad situation, as relatively few local records from Brihuega have survived. The absence of municipal, parish, and above all notarial records forced her to look in other directions, including the Simancas archive, where she found the only census material from the period. The papers of the Inquisition were especially useful, providing a wealth of information about the families who were required to turn in detailed genealogies to accompany their petitions for familiarships and other offices. Not surprisingly, Puebla produced much thicker documentation, especially in the economic sphere, and Altman puts it to good use as she traces a broad range of continuities and discontinuities in the lives of common folk grasping for new chances of success near the outer frontiers of the Spanish world.

When all is said and done, what is new in this book? Many of its findings in regard to religion, family, and social relations among the briocenses come as little surprise. Considerably more novel is the chapter on public life, which treats the reader to a view of local society and politics—especially their conflicts—at the ground level. Altman suggests that here the emigrants wound up losing, as they were obliged to leave behind their long-standing if limited participation in parish and municipal politics when they
moved to the more hierarchical and oligarchical setting of Puebla. She also carefully documents the existence in Brihuega of tensions between Old Christians and descendants of Jewish converts, tensions that oddly enough may have surfaced as the latter became more thoroughly integrated in local society. Little is really known of this sort of micropolitics in early modern Spain and its empire, and even the brief presentation offered here leads one to question the accepted wisdom regarding the exclusion of the popular classes from public affairs, especially in Castile. There are, to be sure, matters left undone. For example, more could have been made of the lack of evidence for briocenses being active in any particular devotional confraternity in Puebla. When early modern Spaniards wanted to make a statement about collective identities, they often did so by founding or reshaping lay brotherhoods. Their failure to do the same in Puebla may suggest that from the beginning their desire for local integration was stronger than their willingness to seek institutional means of articulating, much less shoring up, their ties with their place of origin.

In a fine conclusion, Altman reflects on the two stages of her long-term research on Spaniards in the New World. In her earlier work on migration from Extremadura, she focused on its impact on the sending society (see Emigrants and Society: Extremadura and Spanish America in the Sixteenth Century [Berkeley, 1989]). In Transatlantic Ties, she has reversed her emphasis, preferring now to observe the emigrants themselves. The transition is a rewarding one. The many strengths of this level-headed and well-written book serve to remind us that, alas, all too rarely historians undertake sustained research on both sides of the Atlantic. Even less often do they come up with such impressive results.

JAMES S. AMELANG

Universidad Autónoma, Madrid


Despite an explosion of interest in “historical thanatology” over recent decades, the mortuary culture of early modern Germany, unlike that of England, France, or early America, is still relatively unexplored in English-language scholarship. Craig Koslofsky’s short but assured study of death rituals in Lutheran Germany does a great deal to remedy that deficiency. As the title suggests, the leitmotiv of his book is the impact of the Protestant Reformation on society’s ways of handling the dead, and his starting point is the assertion (arguable but admissible) that “the Reformation transformed the funeral more profoundly than any other ritual of the traditional Church” (p. 2). Nonetheless, this is far from being a narrow study of doctrinal and liturgical reform. Although Koslofsky gives a clear and convincing account of the thought of Luther and other reformers on these issues, he is critical of French historiography (as exemplified by Michel Vovelle and Philippe Ariès) for focusing rather artificially upon “attitudes towards death” and for showing insufficient awareness that “the history of death in early modern Europe is never a history of death alone” (p. 155). Since death (like age or gender) can be considered a social construct (albeit one with a biological root), it
follows that its performance and meanings cannot be divorced from wider social and cultural themes.

The conceptual and methodological underpinning of the book is candidly confessed at the outset. It takes its bearings from ethnographic and anthropological studies of death rituals, especially those of Robert Hertz and Arnold van Gennep, and applies the insights of these pioneers through the more recent prism of “practice theory” to get at issues of change as well as structure. Death ritual represents not merely a declaration of the social order but also a potential reordering—as Koslofsky wittily puts it, “liminality is opportunity” (p. 8)—and conflict and appropriation are recurrent themes of the narrative. In general the theoretical ballast is applied with a light touch, though in places it can seem to overbalance the evidence. In line with the Hertzian dictum that the understanding of death depends upon identifying the interconnectedness of opposing pairs of concepts (body-soul; individual-community; living-dead), Koslofsky pays considerable attention to a dual separation of the living from the dead as a consequence of the Reformation: a spiritual separation as intercessory prayers were abandoned, and a physical separation as the location of burial was increasingly shifted from church and churchyard to new extramural cemeteries. This parallel distancing of bodies and souls is regarded as “an essential cultural precondition of the German Reformation as well as one of its most profound consequences” (p. 41). Yet it is by no means clear that the relocation of burial sites was a necessary corollary of Protestant reform: it took place on a distinctly limited scale in England, for example, and even in Germany was an exclusively urban phenomenon. Certainly, Luther regarded extramural burial as biblical, but, as Koslofsky himself has to admit, the official rationale for closing traditional graveyards was always on public health grounds rather than theological ones (the foul airs they exuded were believed to exacerbate the plague), and the process was already well established before the Reformation as a consequence of fifteenth-century demographic growth.

More persuasive is the reading of Lutheran funerals as sites of social and political capital and exchange. There is a useful account of the restructuring of the traditional funeral order to reflect the perceived needs of the community rather than those of the dead, with the funeral sermon increasingly coming to define the event as a religious and social ritual (though why funeral sermons were so much more a feature of the Lutheran than of the Reformed Protestant world remains something of a mystery). In the later seventeenth century the funeral was transformed again by the increasing popularity of the nocturnal burial (Beisetzung). Initially a shameful proceeding, which like other forms of “dishonourable burial” functioned as an instrument of social discipline, nighttime burial was increasingly taken up by the elites, to the chagrin of clerics losing the opportunity for instructive (and lucrative) sermonizing. By the early eighteenth century the Beisetzung had become normative. Koslofsky sees in the development a reaction to excessive cost which could simultaneously remain a badge of social distinction, as well as the influence of piety, and (more speculatively) a baroque fascination with the cultural possibilities of the night (as exemplified elsewhere in firework displays and the court festivals of Louis XIV). It was also a decisive move from public to private. Depopularized and declericalized, the funeral was on its way to becoming a family rather than community affair. Here the argument might have followed its own strictures and asked more directly if this was linked to a wider movement to social exclusivity on the part of elites, for example in the withdrawal from participation in popular festivity posited by Peter Burke. Alongside the narrative of the “rise and fall” of the Lutheran funeral, Koslofsky offers an exciting analysis of its potential for expressing and engendering conflict, particularly in his account of the parody and inver-
sion practiced by the crowd at the 1592 funeral of Christian Schütz, a crypto-Calvinist minister in Electoral Saxony whose interment was caught up in a wave of popular anti-Calvinism after the death of Christian I. There is a danger of overreading such cases: the fact that one of the female mourners was attacked by a boy with a dirty broom may or may not represent a specifically gendered symbolic enactment of pollution and purification, but there is no dissenting from the overall conclusion that “the liminal periods created by religious ritual represented and reconstructed the social order, and were thus seized upon as opportunities for religious violence” (p. 132).

One might wish that the book had more to say about commemoration, about the practices and beliefs of the people as opposed to the elites, and about the deep underlying continuities in mortuary culture which undoubtedly ran across the Reformation divide. But there is no need to close on a negative note. Koslofsky has produced a book which is engagingly written and of interest to scholars across a wide range of specialisms. At a time when cultural historians are increasingly taking their bearings from literary theory rather than from social anthropology, he demonstrates that paradigms derived from the latter can still be deployed to produce fruitful and imaginative results.

Peter Marshall
University of Warwick


Scholarly interest in republicanism as an intellectual tradition and as a political movement has reached German historiography in the last decade. Looking over the largely monarchical political landscape of the Holy Roman Empire and the German nineteenth century, historians have tended to see republicanism in central Europe as a municipal phenomenon—certainly in the autonomous city-states, such as Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Bremen, but also in the many cities subject to the rule of a prince. The nature and origins of this republicanism have remained in dispute. Sometimes it is seen in the context of a clash between princely authority and corporate, urban institutions running from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Other authors emphasize the revival of the republican traditions of classical antiquity, along the lines of J. G. A. Pocock’s “Machiavellian moment.” Still others point to the importance of the Jacobin tradition, stemming from the French Revolution.

Ralf Pröve’s study of republicanism in Germany obtains its focus through its temporal, spatial, and topical emphases. Pröve’s work covers the years 1780–1850, following Reinhart Koselleck in seeing these decades as a period of conceptual transformation in which the intellectual world of the old regime gave way to that of modernity. In selecting a region from the socially and politically heterogeneous German landscape, Pröve turns from the southwest, focus of many studies of republicanism, to the north and east. His work discusses in detail the Mark Brandenburg and the Principality of Hessen, with briefer looks at Thuringia and Mecklenburg. Finally, and most importantly, Pröve quite properly observes that the armed, male citizen, defending his rights,
weapon in hand, was central to all versions of republicanism. His study is therefore an investigation of such armed corps—militias, or civic and national guards—as a way to understand both the theory and practice of republicanism.

Proeve analyzes the intellectual debate on arming the population, beginning with eighteenth-century Enlightenment critiques of the mercenary armies of the absolutist monarchs. He brings out the transforming effect of the French Revolution and its wars that spurred the debate about popular armed formations, both in imitation of the revolution and in opposition to it. This debate reached its peak at the time of the uprisings against Napoleonic rule in 1813. During the Restoration, interest in militias became intertwined with liberal demands for a constitution, a connection further developed in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.

The author then moves from the debate over armed formations to their actual creation and activities. He starts with a little-known incident, Napoleon’s organization of a municipal watch corps in French-occupied Berlin in 1807, and shows how the various forms of militias founded by the Prussian reformers, for all their anti-Napoleonic intent, made use of and expanded on Napoleon’s initiatives. Intensive studies of the civic guard in the 1830 revolution and subsequent constitutional conflict in the Principality of Hessen and of civic guards in several German states during the 1848 revolution round out the book.

Proeve sees these armed corps as central to the republican ideals of universal political participation and individual devotion to the common good and as an important vehicle for the transformation of old regime municipal republicanism into early nineteenth-century liberalism. The militias encompassed virtually the entire municipal citizenry—even day laborers could be included, insofar as they were heads of household—but their internal structure reflected social hierarchy. Guard members invariably elected the town notables as their commanding officers, reserving lower-ranking and noncommissioned officer positions for smaller businessmen or master craftsmen.

This leading role for the notables represented a sharp change from the town watches of the eighteenth century. Then, every effort was made to fob off participation onto members of the very lowest classes. Following the upheaval of the French Revolutionary era, it became a badge of honor for the municipal elites to participate in leading roles. Proeve regards these armed corps as the most widespread and significant instance of political participation in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century. Enlisting all adult male heads of household, the guards exemplified pre-1850 German liberal societal ideals; their actions in support of constitutional government reflected liberal political ideas as well, which thus appear as somewhat transformed versions of a republican tradition with multiple origins.

The book is well written and generally convincing. At times, its scholarly apparatus seems a bit disproportionate to its empirical investigation. (Does the work really need to begin with a ninety-five-page-long review of the literature?) Such features reflect both the culture of German academia and the economics of German scholarly publishing. However, in spite of the work’s considerable extent, there were two areas where I felt that the author might have had more to say.

One such area is the gender dimension of his subject. Long neglected in German historiography, gender ideals and gender relations have enjoyed a growing interest in recent years. Proeve, however, does not address them in his study, although they seem very relevant to his work. The members of the armed formations under study were all armed men. Qualification for service involved being a patriarchal head of household, a general precondition of citizenship both in the republican tradition and in at least one important version of early nineteenth-century German liberalism. There was clearly an
ideal of manhood or of masculinity involved in the collective bearing of arms and the elaborate ritual culture of parades and celebrations surrounding it.

A second problem of the book involves the two separate tracks of the author’s investigation: his studies of the contemporary intellectual debate about armed formations and of the actual practice of these groups. While armed formations may have been in theory a central feature of republican and early liberal ideals, their practice often looked quite different. Prove documents, in quite interesting detail, the frequent incompetence and dereliction of duty of members of the guards, their heavy drinking while on duty, their preference for display and parades over the preservation of public order, and the increasing reluctance of the small-town burghers of central and northern Germany to serve in these corps after a brief period of initial enthusiasm. Such circumstances do not exactly provide evidence for the role of militias as vehicles of political participation and public spiritedness.

Yet even granting these criticisms, this book remains an important work. It offers another demonstration of the significance of the republican tradition in central Europe and its gradual transformation into nineteenth-century liberal and democratic ideals. The book underscores the importance of militias in moments of political crisis in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century and shows the important role they played in public life.

Jonathan Sperber
University of Missouri, Columbia


Much of the historiography on the Habsburg monarchy of the nineteenth century has focused on the rise of nationalism and on national movements as essentially bourgeois phenomena. In addition, historians have tended to bundle the rise of the bourgeoisie with the fall of the high aristocracy, the success of the former inevitably signifying the doom of the latter. The practical effect of this causal equation has been to obscure the continued power, influence, and social place of the old aristocracy. Ralph Melville’s excellent book, Adel und Revolution in Böhmen, is a major contribution to the scholarship on the Habsburg Vormärz, or “Pre-March,” and a long overdue study of the place of the Bohemian aristocracy in the critical transition to modern political and economic life. The purpose of Melville’s study is to examine the connections between landholding, local administration, and political activity. This approach allows him to bring his considerable evidence to bear on larger questions such as the impact of political, economic, and social modernization; the roots and consequences for regional differences in the Habsburg monarchy; the nature of reform programs; and the outbreak and defeat of revolution. By questioning the overwhelming attention focused on the “liberal-bourgeois ascendancy” in the pre-March years and looking in depth at the varied political reforms advocated by members of the Estates opposition in the 1840s, Melville’s work serves as a significant contribution to the debate on the role of class and the national movements in the causes and outcomes of the Bohemian revolution of 1848.
Beginning with an in-depth analysis of the structure of landholding within different regions of the monarchy, Melville presents a distinct picture of the “world of lordship” and the power of the landed class, as well as of regional differences among non-Hungarian Habsburg lands. What emerges from this study is the degree to which Bohemia was unique in the structure and nature of its landholding and lordship. Melville rightly takes issue with the idea of the world of lordship as a world in decline, particularly in relation to Bohemia, and with arguments based on the notion that landholding and lordship were corroded from within by the conflict between the structure of Grundherrschaft (feudal lordship) and the demands placed on the agrarian economy by the modern state and modern economic development.

Melville’s portrait of Bohemian landholding and lordship reveals the degree to which Bohemian Grundherrschaft, in comparison with that of other provinces or regions, was dominated by a type of holding that was large, cohesive, productive, and directly farmed by the owner. While this conclusion in and of itself is not new, he paints a picture of Bohemian lordship and land management that is more vibrant, rational, and modernizing (if not yet modern) than has generally been supposed. Rather than focusing on the continued status of peasants as serfs owing labor or robot, Melville points to the revisions that had taken place vis-à-vis labor contracts in practice, and, like Herman Freudenberger (“Industrialization in Bohemia and Moravia,” *Journal of Central European Affairs* 19 [1960]: 347–56, and “Progressive Bohemian and Moravian Aristocracy,” in *Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from Maria Theresa to World War I*, ed. Stanley Winters and Joseph Held [New York, 1975], pp. 115–30), he discusses the significant role played by the large Bohemian estates in industrialization and improved agricultural techniques. More critical for his argument, and more relevant to the rest of the book, is Melville’s conclusion that the size, coherence, and productivity of Bohemian estates contributed directly to preserving the role of manorial/patrimonial administration and by extension the power of the nobility. As Melville convincingly argues, the “world” of the manorial subject was encompassed by the estate, at least in legal and administrative terms, which meant that the borders of estates were remarkably coterminous with local administrative units and institutions.

In his view, the preservation of local control in administration was central to the ability of the aristocracy to retain a considerable measure of power, and in fact it formed the basis for the opposition of the aristocracy to the government. Thus, whereas peasants’ labor obligations may have been negotiable, challenging the patrimonial hold on local administration was not; it was this fundamental question of local administrative control around which various reform agendas in the Vormärz emerged and on which the aristocratic “participation” in the revolution faltered.

In order to elucidate the various connections between landholding, local power, and the role of the aristocracy in the revolution in 1848, Melville moves away from the local level for most of the book, extrapolating from local conditions to the politics of reform and of the Diet. In order to do so, he devotes considerable attention to the careers and political agendas of a number of aristocrats, particularly Count Leo Thun and Count Franz Stadion. These individuals, in both their political activities and their positions, are illustrative of the permutations of reform advocated in the Vormärz and ultimately enacted (or rejected) during and in the aftermath of the revolution. Melville’s chapter on Count Leo Thun, who as Governor of Bohemia was the highest official in the Bohemian administration during the revolution, is particularly informative. Thun has been one of the figures nearly universally reviled for his role in 1848, and he held a number of views which seem on first glance to be difficult to reconcile: long-standing outspoken support for the Czech national movement, resolute adherence to traditional
aristocratic administration, and apparent support for a new administrative order. Melville’s argument suggests that it is easier to understand the course of the revolution (not to mention Thun’s career) if one keeps in mind the nature of local administrative power. Ultimately Thun—and arguably the aristocracy more broadly—was defeated in Prague not by the military, the Czech national movement as such, or the Viennese government, but by his own political views.

By basing his discussion on the question of administrative reform and the role of the Estates (i.e., the landowners) in administration, Melville’s work untangles the different strands of the revolution—class, nation, military, ideology. Connecting the structure of landholding, and all that land tenure and patrimonial administration meant in terms of local power and provincial political activity, Melville greatly improves our understanding of the nature of political opposition in the Vormärz, of the role of the aristocracy in the revolution itself, and of the connection between political opposition and the national movement. It is in relation to this last issue that the national question appears. In Melville’s view, in addition to the obvious consequences of the brutal suppression of the revolution in June 1848, it was precisely the attempts by powerful aristocrats to preserve their prerogatives in local administration that were the source of much of the “anti-feudal” rhetoric of the national awakenerers and that explain the inability of the elites to reach a “revolutionary” understanding with bourgeois representatives of the national movement. As he notes, by refusing to see the rights of the Czech people, as evidenced by the nobles’ struggle to maintain local power, bourgeois proponents of the national movement effectively excised the nobility from the national community. As Melville himself describes, the historiography of the nobility in this period and this part of the monarchy is particularly thin. He can congratulate himself that, with this book, it is considerably less so.

RITA KRUEGER

European University Institute


On the basis of a generation of critical scholarship, museums have come to occupy a crucial intersection for interdisciplinary cultural studies, one befitting their recognized centrality to relations of power and knowledge. The defining texts in the study of museums have, with few exceptions, been collections of essays by scholars in a variety of fields: art history, anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and area studies, as well as history—for example, Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture, edited by George Stocking (Madison, Wis., 1985); Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display, edited by Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine (Washington, D.C., 1991); and The New Museology, edited by Peter Vergo (London, 1989). Nor has the pattern greatly changed. Thus, in the field of critical museum studies with which both these books identify themselves, Susan Crane’s speculative, theoretically
informed, and somewhat heterogeneous collection seems much more familiar than James Sheehan’s focused, comprehensive, altogether more traditional monograph. Considering the two together enables an assessment of the distinctive contributions of these different scholarly genres. The fact that half the essays in Crane’s volume either concern Germany or are informed by the author’s knowledge of German history facilitates the comparison.

Examining the period from the beginnings of public museums to World War I, Sheehan aims to place German art museums in their historical context, with special attention to aesthetic theory and artistic practice. The book moves chronologically, with chapters devoted to the eighteenth-century background, the “age of revolution” (1789–1830), the high point of the nineteenth-century museum boom (to 1880), and the period from 1880 to 1914, which Sheehan associates with modernism. His compass includes all of modern Germany, with a brief excursion to Vienna to discuss the design of the Kunsthistorisches Museum, but he pays special attention to the major German art centers of the nineteenth century, Berlin and Munich. The book traces the evolution of museums from royal collections open to the genteel public, to showcases for works from classical antiquity and Renaissance painting (the traditions deemed most likely to improve citizens’ morals), to more diverse and practical institutions with a generous representation of modern art and national traditions. Sheehan largely succeeds in his goal of relating the development of museums to the broader canvas of German history.

He notes, for example, that well into the nineteenth century princely courts retained considerable influence over the construction and funding of museums as well as their collecting and exhibition policies. Only in the 1870s and 1880s did academically trained experts begin to replace courtiers and well-connected artists as curators; at the same time, in most of the German states, supervisory responsibility for museums devolved from courts onto government agencies.

Museum collections nevertheless remained the property, often personal, of the prince, and throughout the nineteenth century they served to promote dynastic glory, even as they increasingly catered to the desire of the upper-middle classes to proclaim their elite status through Bildung, or culture. A keen awareness of the tension created by these multiple roles, and of a number of others, runs through Sheehan’s book. Were museums designed primarily to instruct or to provide aesthetic pleasure? If most museum administrators could agree on the compatibility of these aims, the question remained of what kind of instruction they should offer and for whom: a narrative of the history of art for the bourgeoisie? Or a general course in taste for craftsmen? Such debates obviously had a crucial bearing on the arrangement of works of art in the galleries, which until quite late in the nineteenth century tended to follow fairly rigid chronological schemas and divisions by national school. But they also involved what Sheehan describes as a tension within historicism between an enabling sense of connection with the past and a more melancholy strand that foresaw the fading of present glories (p. 87). This dialogue in turn led to questions about the place of the present in the history of art. Although the creation of a National Gallery in Berlin to showcase modern German art emerged from strong public interest in the 1850s, the proper character of such a museum remained controversial, leading to a famous 1899 confrontation between Emperor William II and the museum’s director, Hugo von Tschudi, over the latter’s weeding out and reinstallation of the collection along international modernist lines.

Each of Sheehan’s chapters follows the same tripartite structure, beginning with a discussion of theories of aesthetics and conceptions of the role of art and of museums, continuing with a section on museums as institutions, including issues of collecting,
leadership, and public response, and concluding with a discussion of museum architecture. Although this approach affords the analysis continuity, it also leads to a certain predictability. Notwithstanding Sheehan’s assertion that the book seeks “to demonstrate how these ideas, institutions, and structures worked together” (p. xii), the organization sometimes conveys the impression that museums simply emerge from and respond, largely passively, to particular complexes of ideas, and that museum buildings then express these museological conceptions. This is in part a consequence of the focus of the first sections on the aesthetic ideas of leading thinkers, notably Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. With the possible exception of Karl Friedrich Schinkel, the curators and architects discussed in subsequent sections cannot live up to these formidable opening acts.

Yet as some of the contributors to Crane’s collection argue, museums played an active, even transformative role not only in political controversy but also in epistemic disputes crucial to the ways scholars think and write about culture even today. In her essay “The Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in the German Museums,” Suzanne Marchand persuasively argues that in the late nineteenth century, German museums, as the institutional focus of disciplines challenging the primacy of textual over material evidence in the study of culture, “helped to launch a critical attack on humanist scholarship” (p. 180). In “The Museum’s Discourse on Art: The Formation of Curatorial Art History in Turn-of-the-Century Berlin,” Alexis Joachimides traces the development of a serious rift in art history between university-based scholars and curators. Sheehan depicts the relationship between the emerging field of academic art history and curators as a harmonious one, at one point using the term “elective affinity” (p. 91), but Joachimides portrays it as both publicly and personally contentious. From Wilhelm von Bode to Max Friedländer, curators believed that art history had to concern itself with questions of authorship and attribution, the central issues of connoisseurship, whereas even the academic art historians we now associate with formalism, such as Heinrich Wölfflin, were interested in more abstract categories, visual laws, and culture on a larger scale. Both Marchand and Joachimides, moreover, place these developments in a larger historical context, including criticism of the classically based Gymnasium system by frustrated members of the middle classes, the expansion of fields like historical geography that staked a claim to German presence on the world stage, the pressures of the art market, and both domestic and international politics. Sheehan’s analysis tends to elide these kinds of connections into general discussions of the Zeitgeist.

Crane’s opening essay helpfully sets out the larger theoretical stakes of her collection. The insight that museums construct narratives to impose order on the creation of cultural meaning is not new; the contribution of this volume is to consider that process through the lens of memory, both individual and collective. As Crane writes, “the ‘fixing’ of memory in the museum constitutes an apparent permanence of the recollected, organized in static time and space. Memory of cultures, nature, and nations is set to trigger memory in and for multiple, diverse collectives” (p. 3). Topics include the silences about the Japanese past of photographic exhibitions in 1990s Tokyo (Julia Adeney Thomas), the importance of memory in the birth of the museum in Renaissance Europe (Paula Findlen), the appropriation of the imperial Chinese past in the Forbidden City (Tamara Hamlish), and the reactions of Native Americans to Euro-American ethnographic exhibitions of their culture (Diana Drake Wilson); all share a critical approach to their subjects and a questioning of the narratives promulgated by the museums they study. Of particular interest to readers of Sheehan will be an essay by Michael Fehr, director of the Karl Ernst Osthaus Museum of Hagen. This museum occupies the
building commissioned by Osthaus at the turn of the century as the Folkwang Museum; in a brief discussion, Sheehan rightly presents it as one of the first museums in Germany to offer, in an interior designed by the Belgian art nouveau architect Henry van de Velde, a total aesthetic experience of modernism. Sheehan notes that the city of Hagen never really appreciated Osthaus’s patronage, and after his death in 1921 it sold off most of his collection to Essen. From Fehr we learn that the building survived and that since his arrival in 1987 it has served as a kind of “ironic museum.” Featuring changing works of installation art, the museum confronts visitors with the institution’s complex and in many ways painful past.

To the extent that Fehr’s installations, and those of visiting artists, involve falsified or fictive labels (calling original works copies, for example, or inventing a history for a series of oil paintings of the pre-1920 Folkwang Museum that Fehr himself commissioned), they follow criteria of truthfulness quite distinct from those of professional historians. Fehr cites as inspiration the Museum of Jurassic Technology (MJT) in Los Angeles, a real space with exhibits invoking fictional people and events. In a ruminative essay on museums and narrative, Crane casts the MJT as a kind of modern cabinet of curiosity, one that takes as its primary object the norms and procedures of the museum itself. Like Fehr, she finds that “an artist mode” (p. 42) of museological production can free both the institution and its visitors from some of the constraints of its conventional procedures. Like the critic Wolfgang Ernst, whose contribution, “Archi(ve)textures of Museology,” consists of a series of disconnected aperçus, she considers narrative temporalization one of the most powerful of the ordering structures of the museum, an Enlightenment imposition on the more disparate stories attached to curiosities. Indeed, for Ernst, the very notion of historical progress that informs the arrangement of Sheehan’s book “was an effect of such museal staging and framing” (p. 20). The narratives with which museums surround objects create an illusion of direct dialogue between the visitor and the past; like many scholars over the past twenty years, Ernst calls on museums to be more open and reflective in their relations with the public. He would presumably sympathize with Fehr’s argument for presenting museums to the public as “spaces that present the fiction we require to find our bearings in the world” (p. 59).

Ultimately these two books will probably find different audiences. In his very brevity, Sheehan clearly aims at students in general courses in modern German and European history, and this book will certainly enrich them. The Crane volume, meanwhile, will find a home in more advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on a broad range of topics in cultural studies. Ideally, however, they would be read together, for their distinct qualities and revealing methodological differences have the potential to further necessary dialogue between historians and theorists of culture.

University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

Daniel J. Sherman

The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds. By Mark Cornwall.

From the war’s opening moments the combatant nations in World War I waged an unprecedented propaganda campaign to influence opinion at home and abroad. But not until 1917 did “front propaganda”—the deliberate use of subversive and novel infor-
mation as a military weapon—became a distinct feature of the fighting. Such propa-
ganda sought to create morale problems, promote desertions, and weaken unit cohesion. Used gingerly by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians against Russia after the fall of the tsar, front propaganda meshed with Bolshevik appeals and appeared to accelerate the collapse of Russian military units. After this success, Austria-Hungary would employ it against Serbian forces in exile, with modest results, and against Italy with more success in the first weeks after the Italian defeat at Caporetto in late 1917. Prodded by the British, the Italian leadership would regroup and launch their own front propaganda against the more susceptible Habsburg monarchy in 1918. The net result, as Mark Cornwall’s monumental study shows, contributed substantially to the eventual undermining of Austria-Hungary. Italy was, in the end, no longer the “least of the great powers.”

Cornwall explores for the first time how the military leadership viewed front propaganda. If most generals looked askance at this “ungentlemanly” weapon, army intelligence chiefs soon realized its value and would usually control its operation. The army leaders also came to realize that the living conditions of their troops could affect their ability to resist such propaganda. In the Habsburg case growing food shortages at the front coupled with news of political radicalization at home would erode troop strength. Nor was the Austrian High Command (the AOK) unaware of the need to combat the appeal of the propaganda. But its efforts toward “patriotic instruction” were doomed to failure—too little, too late, and with no convincing message to the nationalities against the increasingly sophisticated Italian efforts.

The author, drawing upon archival and research sources in ten languages, does more than just analyze the operation of front propaganda. Seeking to revise the traditional kudos given to Lord Northcliffe and British propaganda operations at Crewe House, Cornwall shows that first Vienna and then Rome grasped far more quickly than the British the utility of front propaganda as a war weapon. At the same time he examines in extraordinary detail the Italian political scene, in which leaders such as Luigi Albertini and his newspaper, Corriere della Sera, sought to push the Italian foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino, into a propaganda campaign against the Habsburg monarchy. Sonnino steadfastly refused, fearing that such a campaign would assist the Yugoslav cause and thus rob him of the chance to gain Dalmatia as promised by the Treaty of London of 1915. Even Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, who gave some credence to the campaign and backed its operators in repeated confrontations with Sonnino, always hedged his public statements. This political ambivalence deprived the Italian propaganda effort of its most formidable weapon—a direct appeal to South Slav troops in the Habsburg units to defect and bring about a united Yugoslavia.

Not surprisingly, the British attempted to change Italian attitudes about this, with the journalist Henry Wickham Steed of Crewe House pressuring Rome at least to back the Czech cause and, eventually, the creation of a Czech Legion to fight against Habsburg forces. But there would be no comparable South Slav unit.

The success of the Italian operations, which Cornwall is careful not to overstate, owed much to the monarchy’s situation in 1917 and 1918. The death of Emperor Franz Joseph, limited internal liberalization, the reconvening of the Austrian Reichsrat, food shortages, the example of the Russian collapse, and America’s entry into the war all combined to create fertile conditions for Italian front propaganda. But this only happened after General Pietro Badoglio had replaced Luigi Cadorna as chief of staff and after British pressure had led to the creation of a Padua Commission to coordinate the efforts. The campaign was helped by the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in early 1918 and later by the American-British pledge to destroy the Habsburg monarchy. These steps were certain to offer inducements to the disaffected nationalities to leave the war effort.
Although handicapped by the Yugoslav issue, the Padua group produced thousands of leaflets, many dropped from the air into Habsburg ranks. A quick example suffices: from mid-June to mid-September 1918 the commission produced 375 separate manifestos, each drawing upon a different nationality theme but with one common refrain for the Habsburg soldier: why continue fighting? From midsummer until early October desertions and illnesses reduced Habsburg troops on the Italian front from 650,000 to 400,000 men. By the time the Italians won the battle of Vittorio Veneto, the Habsburg army was a pale shadow of its former self.

The most spectacular Italian propaganda activity, however, came on August 9, 1918, when Gabriele d’Annunzio led a squadron of Italian planes over Vienna, dropping specially crafted messages calling upon the Viennese to end the war. Not only did the flight reveal the vulnerability of the capital, it also served as a painful reminder that the Habsburg’s erstwhile prewar ally, Italy, could manage to avenge the humiliations of the earlier Iszono campaigns.

Cornwall carefully notes the circumstances that made front propaganda a weapon of modern warfare. Increasing literacy among troops played a role; clever use of domestic newspaper quotes in manifestos played a role; and airplanes to deliver the messages that ensured that front propaganda would not be a matter for the trenches alone were also involved. Nor does he ignore the more prosaic and more familiar front-line efforts to encourage defectors from the other side, a tactic in which the Italians were increasingly successful in those units containing sizable numbers of Czech soldiers.

Deftly using archival sources from six countries, Cornwall has reconstructed and revised our knowledge of a hitherto neglected aspect of the campaign against Austria-Hungary. He provides a necessary corrective to the usual emphasis on British propaganda efforts in the First World War, an assessment the postwar Austrian and German generals reinforced since it was more flattering to them to credit London rather than Rome with this success. Even if Sonnino blocked a major campaign, the Italian military were appreciative of the advantages of front propaganda.

In the final analysis, Cornwall argues, it was the monarchy’s internal problems and not front propaganda that caused the ultimate collapse in late 1918. Those internal problems, which he analyzes in less detail, included food shortages, increasing political discontent, and a political apparatus unable to separate itself from Germany. The hoped-for peace dividends from the end of the Russian fighting never came to Austria-Hungary. But if front propaganda did not itself undermine the monarchy, its use by the Italians certainly sped up the process. Cornwall offers new insights into the collapse of the monarchy while revising the traditional less-than-friendly assessment of the overall Italian war effort. His ability to weave military actions, domestic politics, and international diplomacy together has produced a major work on the last years of Habsburg rule.

Samuel R. Williamson Jr.

University of the South


As its title reveals, Malachi Hacohen’s biography of Karl Popper ends when Popper left the safety and isolation of exile in New Zealand for a professorship at the London School of Economics. Ending at that point is justified, however, since by 1945 Popper’s
foundational work was behind him, his most famous book had been written, and his philosophical instincts were set in stone. This biography intends to show how Popper’s philosophical mind-set was formed by the intellectual culture of post–World War I Vienna and, Hacohen adds, by Popper’s experiences as an assimilated Jew. “I rehistoricize the life that he dehistoricized. My aim is not only to provide a fuller and more accurate account and recover a rich culture that vanished but also to rescue the young Popper for the present, to see how the adventurous socialist who revolutionized the philosophy of science and formed a compelling vision of the Open Society can help us rethink our problems today” (p. 21).

Hacohen claims to correct both Popper’s *Autobiography* and widespread misconceptions of Viennese culture and Popper. With regard to these misconceptions, Hacohen briefly mentions Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin’s *Wittgenstein’s Vienna* and Jürgen Habermas on Popper. With regard to Popper’s own account, Hacohen identifies Popper’s “self-aggrandizement” in erasing his first faltering steps and in muting his early socialist politics. At first he gives the impression that Popper’s later political conservatism will loom large in his study, but by its end these political issues recede against Hacohen’s emphasis on Popper’s youthful encounters with educational theory and psychology in the 1920s as the lost prolegomena to his philosophy of science and methodology.

The resulting biography is a very mixed success. I will return in a moment to its reconstruction of Popper’s youthful thought and first steps toward philosophical independence. These parts of the biography are a contribution to the study both of Popper and of philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. But in Hacohen’s less innovative commentary on Popper’s political writings and often uncertain summaries of the central philosophical debates, the results either echo Popper’s accounts or muddy the waters. The lack of critical engagement with Popper’s ideas, again contrary to the biography’s initial claims, further weakens its effect. There is also a tiring imitation of Popper’s worst stylistic tics. The terms “brilliant,” “genius,” “revolutionary,” “radical” are incessantly repeated, and Hacohen even combines them when he proclaims that Popper then “radicalized his revolution” (p. 199). I do not begrudge Hacohen this admiration for Popper, and undoubtedly a biographer must think his subject important. But the repetitive drumbeats, when combined with long sections largely confirming Popper’s own version of the central issues, give the resulting work a veneer of promotion rather than assessment.

In discussing Popper’s early intellectual development, Hacohen strives to correct the order of events. “Popper formulated neither the induction nor demarcation problem before 1930, and his intellectual breakthrough in the logic of science required him to renounce a previous research program for psychology as ‘psychologism’” (p. 14). This correction of Popper’s memory is somewhat less important, I think, than the biographical detail on Popper’s interest in neo-Kantianism, educational psychology, and physiological psychology found in Hacohen’s early chapters. The details cannot be summarized here, but suffice it to say that Hacohen makes a persuasive case for the influence of the psychological Kantianism of Jacob Fries (1775–1843) transmitted to Popper by Leonard Nelson (1882–1927). Fries’s claim against Kant was that a priori principles are a posteriori anthropological facts about human development. Fries’s position seems to have led Popper into a serious consideration of debates about the relationship between psychology and logic (along with his strange bedfellow Edmund Husserl) and very likely shaped his lifelong commitment to epistemological naturalism (often buttressed by appeals to biological adaptation). As Hacohen puts it: “He gave to Kant’s question of how it was that our subjective epistemological apparatus conformed to objective relationships in the universe a genetic-biological answer” (p. 167).
Furthermore, this early dose of Kantianism, as Popper himself stressed (but without the details), made him immune to logical positivism and its cure for metaphysics. But Hacohen’s account of and assessment of the influence of M. Schlick, R. Carnap, and O. Neurath again largely follows and then confirms Popper’s published views.

Hacohen does add a new twist, though not a very Popperian one. He defends Popper’s “antifoundationalism” in epistemology as the right answer to what he repeatedly calls “poststructuralism.” He states that he wrote the biography in part to “show that an intellectual biography is possible after poststructuralism” (p. 21). He even claims in his reconstruction that “Popper and the Vienna Circle did address ‘poststructuralist’ problems, but their answers were different and, in my view, better than ours. They did not echo poststructuralism, but voiced an alternative to it” (p. 262). Hacohen is confident that some answer is needed to this utterly undefined position since he announces that “poststructuralism has made a laughing matter of traditional scientific and historical empiricism” (p. 270). This movement or attitude or position (sometimes Hacohen puts the word in shudder quotes and sometimes not) is virtually central to his assessment of Popper’s significance. “Popper negotiated these tensions brilliantly in his work. His philosophy arbitrated the claims of order and change, certitude and criticism, universality and difference. The resolution was unique. . . . Permanent negotiation of freedom, difference, and change with rationality, universality, and order, constant experimenta-
tion with theories and tradition: This was his philosophy’s great appeal. He provided a liberal response to both dogmatism and ‘poststructuralism’ by finding a place for both in a process of perpetual revision and rethinking” (pp. 148–49).

I doubt that this type of response constitutes Popper’s value to philosophy, if Popper should prove as enduring a figure as Hacohen now believes him to be, and I further doubt there is a coherent position called “poststructuralism.” On several central features of Popper’s thought—for instance, his defense of methodological individualism, his arguments against historical laws, his claim to have solved the problem of induction, his theory of probability, and his defense of psychophysical dualism—serious criticisms are already on the table. Hacohen has not defended Popper with respect to such deep criticisms nor added to our critical understanding of Popper’s widely read political and cultural philosophy. But on the early roots of Popper’s approach to psychology, science, and logic, Hacohen’s biography has much to offer.

There are, I must finally mention, gaps in the bibliography. Modesty prevents me from pointing to some, but the failure to include (and I only list some examples) Mark Notturno’s *Objectivity, Rationality, and the Third Realm: Justification and the Grounds of Psychology: A Study of Frege and Popper* (Boston, 1985), Barry Smith’s *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano* (Chicago, 1994), or Alberto Coffa’s *Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station* (New York, 1991) is insular and odd.

Robert D’Amico

*University of Florida*


The years of the Weimar Republic were a period of agricultural crisis. A study of the largest of the agricultural interest groups, the *Reichslandbund*, is thus necessarily a story of lobbying in times of crisis. Stephanie Merkenich portrays the *Reichslandbund*
as an organization that combined lobbying—in other words, a practical self-interested politics ready to bargain and to compromise—with a more or less uncompromising opposition to the political system. Her portrait of the association is an issue-oriented, organizational history told from the retrospective point of view of the organization’s voluntary dissolution during the institutional Gleichschaltung after 1933. The author is convinced that the history of the Weimar Republic can only be written from the perspective of its dissolution. There is a problem with this method, since the outcome of the story is, after all, unknown to its participants. Especially when an organizational history, like Merkenich’s, focuses primarily on the activities of groups, such as the association’s leaders, it is difficult to leave out of account the fact that the end of the story was not known in advance by the participating characters.

The Reichslandbund was an attempt to create “a unified agricultural front that crossed the boundaries of party politics” (p. 59). It was organized after World War I. Originally, it was formed from the union of the right-of-center Bund der Landwirte and the regional agricultural associations that had together constituted the Deutscher Landbund. These regional Landbünde were grassroots organizations that saw themselves as “trade unions for the agricultural population.” Unlike the Bund der Landwirte, they were not limited geographically to the areas east of the Elbe but existed in western and central Germany as well. Politically, the Reichslandbund was quite far to the right-of-center. A majority of its leaders were closely associated with the German National People’s Party (DNVP), and some of them supported the Kapp-Luttwitz uprising in 1920. For Merkenich, this is the decisive point. Even though the association later (in the middle years of the Weimar Republic) developed into an interest group prepared to bargain and compromise, Merkenich nevertheless locates its politics at the extreme right of the political spectrum. In her opinion, “a neoconservative social model, affirming the traditional social orders” (p. 114) and an “instrumentalization of antisemitism” (p. 121) characterized its social views. As the numbers of landowners in the parliaments shrunk, the Landbund concentrated its efforts on behind-the-scenes politics and on cooperation with the bureaucracy. Later it sought to exercise influence in the circles around Hindenburg. Himself a landowner, Hindenburg shared the concerns and interests of his class.

Merkenich does not try to hide the increasing pragmatism that characterized the leading circles of the Landbund in the years after 1924. She stresses the opportunities that were missed when many landholders, after clearing themselves of indebtedness during the period of hyperinflation, immediately plunged into renewed speculation on an apparently lucrative future during the agricultural boom that set in after 1924. Even the agrarian politicians of the Landbund criticized the narrow economic perspective of the landowners. At the same time, however, the Landbund gave only half-hearted support to the efforts of those representing the agricultural workers to replace the patriarchal relations between employers and employees with a more modern system. Unfortunately, Merkenich does not discuss the consequences of these outmoded social relations for the movement of population away from the rural areas. The chief reasons for the inner problems of the Landbund lay in its favoring the interests of economically inefficient landowners and in its rejection of a modern policy toward agricultural labor.

Agrarian politics after 1924 revealed that the close ties between the Reichslandbund and the DNVP would lead to friction with other economic interests. For the DNVP was a nationalist party representing the interests of industrial employers and employees as well. No resolution of the tariff controversy could satisfy both consumers and producers, both agrarian and industrial interests, at the same time. In the eyes of the Reichslandbund, even the DNVP did not do a satisfactory job of representing the
interests of the agrarian sector. Negotiations over a German-Polish trade agreement, one that favored the interests of consumers and industry while significantly damaging agricultural interests, led to a split between the representatives of the various interests within the DNVP (p. 207). When, paradoxically, the Social Democratic chancellor Herman Müller was the first to introduce a policy designed to offer consistent protection for agriculture, it was already too late. The Reichslandbund did exercise considerable influence on this change in agricultural policy, which reached its peak during Heinrich Brüning’s chancellorship. In the years after 1925 most of the agricultural ministers had been drawn from among its members. But by the end of the 1920s the DNVP, which had represented the interests of the Landbund, had acquired a significant rival in the Christlich-Nationalen Bauern- und Landvolkpartei (CNBL), and the pragmatism of the nationalist party was countered by the maximalism of the client party. This made for the split of the Reichslandbund into a radical wing and a pragmatic wing.

These are the author’s results. She is never able to present a clear thesis, and one finds few unambiguous evaluations. This may be a result of the fact that she has cast her research into the classical mold of an investigation into political associations during the period of the Weimar Republic, but her results partly contradict her approach. Earlier research on this topic held that radical interest groups led their members down a path of making unattainable demands, a path whose failure was a foregone conclusion. The resulting disillusionment was exploited by the National Socialists, even when they did not receive, as they often did, the active support of these groups. The author is clearly indebted to this perspective, one that arose during the 1960s and 1970s. Her very choice of terms betrays this, as does her often supercilious treatment of the experiences and expectations of the historical subjects. She often refers to the “ideology of the associations” (how does this differ from a modern “philosophy of the firm?”), or to a “premodern rural social model” (p. 355), or even to “pathological ideas” (p. 118). In her introduction, Merkenich disclaims the intention of writing a “mental history of the landowners” (p. 14). But that disavowal comes back to haunt her. She places too much emphasis on treating the politics and policies of the associations in terms of the organization of power, and she never examines the extent to which contradictions in their policies were an expression of genuinely ambivalent views rather than of mere “ideology.”

In fact, many of Merkenich’s results argue against viewing the Reichslandbund in the role of organizer and manipulator. The author fails to pose the critical question: how could an interest group manage to reject the political system while at the same time attempting to achieve concrete results for its members by working within this system? Her portrayal of the agrarian protest movement proves that it was primarily a movement from below that brought pressure to bear on the pragmatic bargain practices of the association’s elites. Spurred by a crisis that threatened their very existence, farmers in northern and eastern Germany became more militant and violent in their protests. At the end of the 1920s, a movement took shape to put a stop to foreclosure sales of landholdings, to raise the threat of a tax boycott, and to agitate for a boycott on the delivery of goods. In view of such protests, which included among their targets even officials of the Reichslandbund itself, and which were to give the National Socialists their most spectacular electoral gains, one cannot avoid the impression that the association’s functionaries did not lead events but were led by them. Scattered citations (such as those on pp. 199 ff.) indicative of the increasing integration of the Reichslandbund into the existing system (an integration based not so much on an agreement about principles as on a pragmatic calculation of self-interest) support this view. Opposition to the existing state was not, as the book’s title suggests, the principal motive
of the Reichslandbund. Rather, it was the urgent need to compromise with different interest groups and the increasing disaffection this caused among a membership that had expected much more. The high expectations on the part of the members had not been primarily the result of agitation from above. They arose mainly because the agrarian landowners, in part because of their indebtedness, in part because of the pressure of structural changes in the economy, saw themselves pushed to the very edge of the abyss. For those involved, the agrarian crisis of the late twenties and early thirties was an experience of economic collapse on a massive scale. The farmers were not just angry as a result of political agitation; they were motivated by fear for their very existence.

One can make a convincing case that the Reichslandbund did more to halt the movement toward radicalization than to stir it up. Nearly all the representatives of the association—and not just the four who left the DNVP on December 12, 1929 (p. 265)—distanced themselves more or less vocally from Alfred Hugenberg’s policy of destroying the republic. The policy of aid for the eastern provinces, which made the first real attempt since 1930 to relieve the indebtedness in the east and to establish a sound economic basis there, was promoted above all by Landbund representatives. The complete destruction of the existing system was not in the interests of a lobbying group that aimed at concrete results.

Merkenich does not come to these conclusions. Admittedly, she does distance herself from the earlier attempts to assign primary guilt to the conservative, agrarian elites. In the end, however, she faults the “uncompromising antiliberal attitude of the old, conservative right wing” (p. 361) for calling into existence an autonomous agrarian movement that was to become, in the Christlich-Nationalen Bauern- und Landvolkpartei, a competitor, to the DNVP. But the author fails to recognize that the CNBL, admittedly an interest party, could only have been established because it was impossible to pursue interests successfully with a political party that aimed primarily at the destruction of the system itself, like Hugenbergs DNVP did after 1929. One could put the matter another way. Although the interest groups may, in fact, have contributed significantly to the weakening of the structure of the Weimar Republic, they nevertheless served as a gathering place for precisely those who wanted to maintain the Weimar system, for the simple reason that they were able to achieve concrete results within its framework. They were egoistic but had to be pragmatic, too.

THOMAS MERGEL
Ruhr-Universität, Bochum


In 1998, the annual conference of German historians (Deutscher Historikertag), roughly the equivalent of the American Historical Association meeting, devoted considerable attention to the past of “German Historians in National Socialism” (see Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialisimus [Frankfurt am Main, 1999]). Like the members of every other German profession, historians lined up behind the Nazi state, and it is hardly surprising that those who survived and prospered under the Third Reich in no way challenged the regime. However, over four decades after the end of the war, German historians were soberly con-
fronting the fact that among those who had most enthusiastically supported the Third Reich and delivered to it the “scientific” justification for massive population transfers in eastern Europe were some of same people who had contributed significantly to rebuilding the historical profession in West Germany after 1945. In 1947, Theodor Schieder accepted a chair in modern history at the University of Cologne after the position was rejected by Hans Rosenberg, a German Jewish émigré who had survived National Socialism by moving to the United States. A decade later, Schieder became editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, the most venerable historical periodical in the Federal Republic, and from 1967 to 1972 he headed the Association of Historians in Germany. When that same organization met in 1998, it was more concerned with what Schieder had done in October 1939 to justify and legitimate the “Germanization” of Posen and West Prussia, the creation of Lebensraum, the defense against influences of “foreign origin,” and the immediate “relocation” (Umsiedlung) of nearly 3 million Poles from areas that Germany had recently occupied.

In Historiker im Nationalsozialismus, Ingo Haar, a contributor to the 1998 conference, goes well beyond what he was able to do in that context and provides an exhaustively researched account of how willingly many historians embraced the racist, antisemitic principles of the Nazi state. Indeed, well before the Nazis came to power a group of “young conservative” historians had railed against the Weimar Republic and linked a reordering of eastern and southeastern Europe along ethnic lines with a revision of the Versailles treaty. Methodologically, they focused on ethnicity, population size, historical patterns of settlement, and the transmission of culture, and they juxtaposed “membership in a Volk”—defined in racial terms—with citizenship and “membership in a state” defined by a constitutional order. This thoroughly racist “ethnopolitics” was part of Weimar’s “revolution from the Right,” and it placed particular emphasis on the “German mission in the east.” Interdisciplinary groups of scholars—sociologists, cartographers, economists, and historians—devoted particular attention to those parts of eastern Europe that contained large populations of German descent. Proud to be identified as “fighting” academics, their goal was not only the revision of the Treaty of Versailles but also the defeat of those historians within Germany whose peace with Weimar and whose acceptance of a “small” German Reich were seen to undermine Germany’s attempt to reclaim its rightful place in central Europe. Rejecting Friedrich Meinecke, the elder statesman of the historical profession in the 1920s, as methodologically reactionary because of his focus on the state and high politics, they had even less tolerance for “outsiders” such as Arthur Rosenberg, Veit Valentin, Hajo Holborn, and Hans Rosenberg, whose work Meinecke had promoted and supported.

January 1933 created a dramatically different political context in which these right-wing historians could work and ensured that many of their colleagues who were Jews and Social Democrats would leave Germany, some never to return. Those ready to pursue the “struggle for the east with intellectual weapons” found a broad basis on which cooperation and collaboration with National Socialism was possible and quickly took over the scholarly infrastructure of journals, publication projects, access to archives, and institutes that allowed them to pursue their goals. Their accommodation with the new order was effortless. They did not require the Nazi state to integrate them into the Third Reich; rather, they willingly integrated themselves in a process that Haar calls Selbstgleichschaltung (p. 368).

Joining those who enthusiastically welcomed the Nazi triumph was Hans Rothfels, the mentor of some of the most energetic scholarly proponents of reversing the “de-Germanization” (Entdeutschung) of eastern Europe. However, Rothfels was soon to learn that the Nazis would classify him according to “blood,” not according to his
conservative political convictions, his conversion from Judaism to Protestantism, his status as a World War I veteran, or his passionate commitment to “Germanizing” eastern Europe. For the party leadership in Königsberg and Danzig, he was not haltbar. As a “non-Aryan,” he posed a threat to those he influenced; it was inconceivable for a “Jewish professor to teach German history” (p. 202), no matter how closely his beliefs conformed to the principles of National Socialism. It is astonishing to read that as he departed from Königsberg and addressed a circle of students that included Schieder and Werner Conze, Rothfels affirmed his commitment to the vital task of reordering eastern Europe and his promise to continue this important work “elsewhere” (p. 240). Elsewhere for Rothfels was ultimately Brown University and the University of Chicago, though he would return to a chair at Tübingen University in 1951.

Many of those who stayed behind—including Conze and Schieder—went into the Nazi Party, not exile, and provided the Nazis with the “ideological scaffolding” (p. 252) that they needed to plan policies of resettlement, removal, and, ultimately, mass extermination in eastern Europe. Thus, Conze determined that historically Jews represented a disruptive force in Poland and exhibited “sympathies to the Russians” (p. 285). As a consequence, the Jewish population was seen as detrimental to the development of a stable “population and social order” (Volks- und Sozialordnung). Once the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939, scholarly analyses of historical patterns of settlement and demography became the blueprints for moving Germans in, classifying some Poles as salvageable, and determining that others—particularly Jews and gypsies, who were deemed to have no historic ties to the soil—should be removed altogether. By the early 1940s, Conze explicitly advocated the “removal of Jews from cities and small market towns” (p. 316). His scholarly accomplishments and his political loyalty were rewarded by his promotion to a professorship in 1942. And Schieder, who had bemoaned the “destruction and expulsion of the indigenous German population” under Polish rule, could now advocate the “removal [Herauslösung] of Jews from Polish cities” (p. 331). With the invasion of the Soviet Union, Schieder’s gaze shifted even farther eastward, and in 1942 he compiled a report on the demography of Białystok, concluding that “the Jews [had been] completely removed” and now could be found only in the “ghettos of the cities.” Such reports did not collect dust, and Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia and by 1941 Reich Commissar of the Ukraine, opined that only such “unselfish and successful activity” had allowed the Nazis to achieve the “reconstitution” of the region so quickly (pp. 354–55). Although Haar does not ascribe specifically murderous intentions to the historians at the center of his study, he does convincingly show that proposals for “population transfers and extermination” ultimately represented two complementary parts of the same Nazi policies (p. 337).

Haar ends his story in 1945. An epilogue would have helped. As historians of the postwar period know, some of the key figures in Haar’s account emerged from the Third Reich unscathed. Theodor Oberländer, minister for expellee affairs under Konrad Adenauer, is a central character in Haar’s story. Only in the late 1950s, as more and more West Germans showed a willingness to confront the Nazi past and acknowledge the extent of Oberländer’s involvement in resettlement policies in eastern Europe, did his activities in the 1930s and early 1940s come under intensive scrutiny. The pasts of others—in particular, Conze and Schieder—long remained completely unexamined, absorbed in that “particular quiet,” the phrase Hermann Lübbe used to describe the silence around the Nazi past that, Lübbe argued, was necessary for the postwar Federal Republic to incorporate former Nazis into a democratic civil society. Haar’s analysis does not extend to an examination of why it took almost forty years for historians to raise questions about the pasts of such prominent members of their own profession, but for those interested in pursuing these topics, his book will be essential reading.
The story Haar tells has much to say about what links politics, history, and national identity; the significance of institutional structures and resources for determining what kind of work scholars can do; and the potential risk run by any historian who aspires to influence the future and shape the present through the study of the past. These are issues that concern not only German historians; but, unfortunately, not all those interested in these questions will read German, and even some who do will not make it through this weighty tome. It would be regrettable if what Haar has discovered remains accessible only to specialists, and I can only hope that Haar will have an opportunity to offer some of his findings to a broader audience.

ROBERT G. MOELLER

University of California, Irvine


One way to gauge the contribution of this brooding, thoughtful set of essays is to locate it in the context of Omer Bartov’s earlier work on the German army in the Second World War—more on that below. But another context should be identified too, and celebrated. The Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis was established in 1988, in part as the brainchild of John Gillis. Its effort to center historical study (as opposed to balkanizing it) has made a real difference in a profession in which radical individualism is the rule. Bringing together groups of scholars, the Rutgers Center has produced important work on commemoration, on the social and cultural history of war, on religious thinking and action, and on utopia. Bartov (who has recently moved from Rutgers to Brown University) has drawn on it all, deepening his own pioneering research on the German army, presented here in a series of four interlocking essays filled with intelligence and sensitivity. In a way, his essays show how important it is for an original scholar to work within a collective of fellow historians; would that this were the case throughout the profession.

Bartov’s angle of entry into the subject of the radical violence of twentieth-century warfare is cosmopolitan. He addresses Israeli themes and American discursive practices, particularly those of American Jews, and moves easily along the spectrum of contemporary German and French debates on these issues. In this respect, he is a direct descendant of another scholar of brutalization in the twentieth century—George Mosse. Mosse traversed some of the same fields of historical study visited by Bartov, though Mosse’s familiarity with the Italian case went beyond Bartov’s repertoire. In other respects, Bartov’s mastery of the archives of German military history (and Israeli literature) gives his account of brutalization and survival a grittiness that Mosse’s work never had. This is hardly surprising, given Mosse’s flair for intellectual history, understood as the study of ideas in their cultural contexts, and Bartov’s contribution to the cultural history of warfare. Despite these differences, the two historians ought to be placed in the same intellectual milieu, between New York and Jerusalem, with Berlin and Paris as midpoints on this impressive intellectual map.

That said, the differences in their interpretations are striking. Mosse presented the catastrophes of the twentieth century as the unfolding of a broad project, summarized in his book The Nationalization of the Masses. His was the voice of the gentleman scholar, filled with irony and a very well developed sense of the absurdity of the tragic
Bartov’s research made it impossible for anyone to argue that the German army could retrieve any notion of honor out of the criminality of its behavior on the eastern front. The first essay of this book deals with the ambiguous category of “honor,” a word standing for a code of values that survived the bloodshed of Verdun and the Somme. Here is a subject Mosse investigated in particular through his study of commemorative forms. Both Bartov and Mosse have charted the glorification of the rank-and-file soldier and his prototypical status as the “new man” of fascism. For Bartov, it was such men in Wehrmacht uniforms in the Second World War who committed and abetted atrocities of staggering proportions. This “revolutionary reconceptualization of glory” from 1918 to 1939 and beyond led to soldiers who were able to see their murdering of civilians as a “glorious” or even “liberating, redemptive” act (p. 30).

The second essay deals with French and German material equally, though Bartov’s use of French archival sources is occasional. He has interesting things to say about the “moral debacle” of Vichy, set against the backdrop of the catastrophic bloodletting of 1914–18 and the curious ambivalence of French leaders toward the risks of war in the 1930s. As Antoine Prost has shown in much greater detail, to such men war was simultaneously unthinkable and just around the corner. Here was a recipe for disaster. Bartov points out effectively to what extent French recollections of the Great War and the Resistance obscure as much as they reveal; the same is even more the case with respect to German suffering in the latter months of the Second World War. His point is that an emphasis on the “traumatic memory” of mass suffering frequently confuses historical accounts of this tormented period.

The third essay comes to the subject of identity in terms of adversarial images. The notion of bifurcating the world into enemies and allies is, after all, not particularly new, but the terrifying power of the modern industrialized state and a biologized version of social engineering made it possible for such antinomian distinctions to be “remedied” by mass murder. Here the notion of victimhood distorts history and turns it into a vicious spiral, for self-defined victims can turn on their supposed tormentors and remove them from the face of the earth. Thus the Holocaust was a monumental act of revenge, a response to the supposed victimization of the German people by Jews and other “parasites.” Bartov goes further and sees the obsession with victimhood as leaving indelible marks on the national identity not only of Israel but of France as well. Once again, his sense of the French case is never as solidly based as his instinct for German or Israeli history.

The fourth chapter concerns utopias. Here Bartov’s touch is not as sure, since he defines “utopia” so broadly as to include what historians do alongside what Fourier or Marx were up to (p. 156). But putting aside such slips, we can see much of value in his argument that the Holocaust was a utopian project, with utopia defined as a dark star. Much of the rest of the chapter is a set of reflections on the Holocaust, with only a very loose link to the beginning of the essay. There is an extended discussion of the writings of the Holocaust survivor Ka-Tzetnik, which once again shows Bartov’s versatility in dealing with material in Hebrew, Yiddish, French, German, and English. He demonstrates that Ka-Tzetnik, in his writing, reversed his now famous statement at the Eichmann trial that Auschwitz was “another planet.” The killers and the degraded prisoners were all too human to Ka-Tzetnik; to Bartov this universal judgment explains why this account of the Holocaust has by and large been ignored in discussions of the subject (p. 210). But when Ka-Tzetnik burned the only extant copy of his own poems first published in 1931, he pointed out how deeply our sense of the past before the
Holocaust is polluted by that unprecedented crime. This is Bartov’s challenge to historians, a challenge repeated in the conclusion to this book, which is a set of reflections on literary reactions to the Holocaust in recent years. His central claim is that in a host of ways Auschwitz has transformed our sense of the past, just as it has undermined identities, blurred the distinction between fact and fiction, and raised doubts about our ability “to make moral judgments of universal applicability” (p. 224).

On many points, Bartov is entirely convincing. The Holocaust has indeed shaped notions of national identity and ethnic identity in Israel, the United States, France, and Germany. The notion of the past is indeed contested terrain today, in part because we have to face the testimony of men like Ka-Tzetnik, voices hard to square with any belief in enduring human values. On this level, Bartov’s book is powerful and persuasive. On other points, though, Bartov’s analysis is uncertain or incomplete. Given the topic, this is hardly surprising. He cannot possibly prove his huge claim that “the Holocaust is at the center of a crisis of identity . . . which has become the characteristic feature of the twentieth century, originating in World War I and felt with even greater urgency today” (p. 229). In these essays, the author has offered us much to think about, though not as much as he thinks he has done. This book is less comparative (or universal) history than relational history, that is, the work of a distinguished German historian who uses material from other nations and cultures in relation to his core interest in order to deepen his understanding of it. And what a subject it is. Mirrors of Destruction is not really a book of essays; it is four books in the making. We await their arrival with somber anticipation.

JAY WINTER

Yale University


With the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic and the opening of East German archives, important new documents and archival sources have been made available to researchers interested in the immediate postwar reconstruction of Germany and the beginning of the cold war as well as the struggle between Western parliamentary democracy and the introduction of a Communist dictatorship in East Germany. This development is especially welcome for the history of Berlin, the center of Allied confrontation and of the first crisis after the wartime cooperation between East and West had ended. The occupation of Berlin by the Soviet Union and the initial period of exclusive Soviet control, from May 1945 until early July 1945 (when the first American and British troops arrived in the city; the French followed only in early August), led to a situation in which Soviet occupation policy determined the direction of political and economic reconstruction.

These two well-edited volumes of hitherto basically unavailable documents present transcripts of all meetings of the Berlin City Council (Magistrat) from May 20, 1945, until its last meeting on November 20, 1946. The members of the council had been appointed by the Soviet commandant after they had been handpicked by Walter Ulbricht, the leading Communist among the German emigrants in the Soviet Union. He returned from exile in Moscow with other party cadres determined to set up a Com-
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A communist-dominated government under the protection of the Soviet armies. Although not all appointees of the Council were members of the Communist Party (KPD), Communists took over crucial parts of the administration from which they could influence developments to an extent far beyond that warranted by their actual support in society. When the Western powers arrived, they accepted the Soviet decisions.

These two volumes include excellent biographies of all members of the City Council, including information about their later political careers, photos of the most important members, the names and tenure of all deputies, and a list of orders of the Allied Kommandantura for the governing of Berlin until 1949. A very good index, a bibliography, and a detailed introduction to recent research make this edition a must for all those interested in the postwar history of Berlin.

For researchers it is especially fortunate that the protocols of the City Council meetings are mostly extensive reports of what actually happened, including discussions, rather than just the results of meetings. The editor has also added several unpublished speeches by the Communist deputy mayor that illuminate the KPD’s attitudes. The deputy mayor was really in charge of the city government; Mayor Werner, who did not belong to any party, was a mere figurehead.

The 128 documents deal both with political developments (essentially a confrontation between the Social Democratic Party [SPD] and the KPD) and the overwhelming challenge of reconstructing economic and social life in a city devastated by war. The first volume deals with 1945; the second covers 1946. A number of problems stand out in both volumes. The lack of housing, electricity, and heating, especially during the winter, created difficult living conditions. The lack of a functioning infrastructure and even of office equipment significantly impaired the reconstruction of city government. Many members of the council, furthermore, had no previous administrative experience. Turnover was high. There was never any distinct decision about the constitutional responsibilities of the council. It acted under Soviet and, later, Allied control with many interventions. Practically from the beginning the four powers enforced policy only in their respective sectors, instead of keeping all of Berlin in perspective as had been planned.

This was especially true with the food supply for the population, which had to be provided by the Allies. It was delivered mostly to their own sectors, while the council was responsible for distribution. Fallow land was used for the cultivation of vegetables to improve the diet of the population and prevent a famine. The food situation was further aggravated by the constant flow of refugees and expellees on their way to the West. This led to the introduction of a residence requirement, which, however, could hardly be enforced.

The documents also reveal the council’s efforts to deal with a wide range of other issues. It had to struggle to get tuberculosis, typhoid fever, venereal diseases, and other health problems under control. Decisions about removing the rubble had to be made, new job opportunities created. Finding supplies of raw materials for industry, repairing the transportation infrastructure, and finding solutions for social problems all occupied city administrators. Abandoned furniture and household appliances from salvage operations were distributed to improve living conditions. The victims of fascism and other groups had to be provided for. Evacuated children had to be brought back to the city. All this was attempted while the city budget was not maintained by taxes or other income. When the Allies rejected a real estate tax proposed by the City Council, city lotteries were introduced as an emergency measure. Price and wage controls were also considered.

Other highly controversial issues included education and religious instruction in
schools. Denazification had led to a shortage of teachers, so new teachers had to be trained, new textbooks had to be introduced, and schools had to be opened in order to get children and youth off the streets. After the experience with National Socialism the churches demanded religious instruction in public schools.

Most of these problems had to be dealt with pragmatically and did not present opportunities for ideological conflict between the new German parties. But the activities of the City Council also constituted a chance to influence political attitudes. Furthermore, the political climate in Berlin changed with the forced merger of the KPD and the SPD in the Soviet zone of occupation in April 1946.

These volumes present an important collection of source materials not only for the social and economic history of postwar Berlin but also for the policies and goals of the new German parties. They shed light as well on the Allied intervention and the beginning of the cold war confrontation.

Hermann J. Rupeper  
Vanderbilt University


This book is a fine addition to the scholarly literature on literacy in early modern Europe. Based on exemplary archival research, Literacy and Written Culture in Early Modern Central Europe succeeds on a number of levels. Originally published in Hungarian in 1996, this study significantly broadens our understanding of literacy and written culture in the Hungarian Kingdom between 1600 and 1800, and it will no doubt remain the standard work on the topic for many years to come. But the book also represents an important contribution to the methodological discussion of the study of literacy, since István Tóth is fully versed in the literature and provides a model of sensitive analysis and interpretation of the place of the written word in central European culture, from the peasantry on up through the landed gentry and various levels of nobility. The result is a book not only about literacy as such but also about the intellectual culture and mind-set of the various orders of Hungarian society and the role of the written word in that culture.

The primary geographical focus of empirical research is on the large and diverse Vas County in western Hungary, although the author’s research ranges beyond to other Hungarian counties, and he makes fruitful comparisons to other central European regions. The study begins with a chapter on the social history of elementary schools, foregrounding such figures as “schoolmasters who did not teach” and “Lutheran pastors who did not know how to write.” Given the fact that teachers’ incomes in outer parishes were below that of ox herders and gamekeepers, and that schoolmasters earned the bulk of their incomes for their work as cantors, it does not seem surprising that many schoolmasters could barely read and write themselves. Furthermore, children of school age (six to nine years of age) attended school only in winters, and sporadically at that, and Habsburg “enlightened” school reforms were not actually enacted until well into the nineteenth century. Thus, “the majority of rural residents still remained outside the walls of schools in the second half of the eighteenth century, never acquired reading and writing skills and continued to live in the world of oral communication” (p. 46).

Subsequent chapter titles are “The Slow Advance of Literacy in Peasant Culture,”
“Literacy among the Nobility,” “The Lower Nobility and the Oral Tradition,” and “Nationalities and the Spread of Literacy after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.”

The author examines a vast body of archival material including wills, letters patent, diaries, reports of school visitations, marriage registers, and a host of legal documents to come to the conclusion that literacy—whether defined as ability to read, to read and write, or to sign one’s name—was quite low in the Hungarian Kingdom in the early modern period, probably around 20 percent for peasants in Vas County in 1770 and often not much higher among the landed gentry and lower levels of nobility. The author emphasizes the difficulty of arriving at firm figures, the difficulty of relying on signatures for data about literacy, and so on, but he makes a valiant attempt to base his conclusions on firm evidence. One painstaking method the author employs is to cross-reference names and signatures whenever possible—did this person who signed his name with a cross on his will ever actually sign his name to another document? Do certain signatures appear in pairs, indicating that one person signed for both? The author manages to pursue such laborious quests without being overly tiresome (most of the time), often bringing the reader along on the hunt rather than simply reporting results.

This kind of study begs a few questions, most of which the author is able to answer. Probably the most salient question is, What is the point of studying “literacy” if a large majority of people were illiterate? If analyzing signatures versus crosses does not yield much hard data on literacy, since signing with a cross did not necessarily mean someone was illiterate, why bother spending so much time and effort tabulating them? If the nature of calculations concerning the real proportion of the literate during the early modern period is “extremely approximate” (p. 64), again, what is the point of all this hard work? The broad answer to such questions is that the author is seeking to understand not only the levels of literacy and numeracy but also the role played by letters and numbers in everyday life, the ways in which literacy was regarded by the community, and the transformations that began to take place during the eighteenth century in literacy and numeracy in the cultural life of Hungarians. Tóth really wants to understand “the role literacy played in the life of the community” (p. 68) as much as to come up with firm figures. He argues convincingly that if we really want to understand the statistics, we need to understand the communal meaning of the written word. The book thus branches out beyond a straightforward analysis of literacy into social history. The one area in which the author could go further in integrating the study of literacy into general social history is in his treatment of schoolmasters. Why talk about “schoolmasters” as a discrete category if in fact teaching was an adjunct to other tasks? The author seems to lament the poor training and ability of schoolmasters, yet should we even consider them to be “schoolmasters” in a modern sense? The evidence presented in the book suggests that it would be more accurate to simply talk about different forms of “teaching” that occurred in various places and ways, as an adjunct to the more important business of subsistence in early modern central Europe.

The author does not shy away from talking about “oral culture,” even though it is becoming increasingly clear that very few European cultures have ever been purely oral. The term surely must have meaning when legal documents might require support from oral testimony, when property lines were based on living memory, and when lost letters patent could be verified by oral testimony from witnesses who had seen—but could not read—them. The author documents such cases as well as evidence that, as the written word, and the ability to read and write, began to be more highly regarded over the course of the eighteenth century, things like signatures and land surveys started to gain the upper hand on oral testimony and living memory.

Thus despite the statement at the beginning of the book that the author wants to
avoid “the gathering of colourful stories that freely roam in space and time” (p. 2), a fundamental strength of the book lies in its ability to weave local history into the quest for statistical certainty. As the book progresses, colorful stories and anecdotes begin to creep in at a growing pace. We learn about nobles who could not read their own letters patent and who showed them to as many people as possible so that if they were lost (a common enough occurrence through war and fire) there might be oral testimony to shore up their claims to nobility. We learn about eyeglasses—who had them, who didn’t—and about the changing sense of time as literacy became a cultural value. We learn that a fair number of Hungarians spoke a kind of pidgin Latin, but that reports of widespread Latin literacy, as was the case with glowing reports of Hungarian literacy generally, were overblown. We learn about semiliterates, about gender differences in literacy (the same as almost everywhere else), and about what those who could read did in fact read, and how they read it.

The author thus effectively places the study of literacy into its larger sociocultural context, with interesting and informative results. There may not be terribly many surprises here for the informed student of literacy, but the depth of research, the felicity of the prose, the picaresque anecdotes, and the many insights into the nature of early-modern central European cultural and intellectual life should be enough to interest most scholars of the place and period in this book.

Benjamin W. Redekop

Kettering University


One of the several virtues of Peter Duncan’s book is its lucidity. Another is its broad scope, suggested by the sprawl of the title, in sharp contrast with the economy of the treatment of messianism within its covers. The book might be advertised as everything the nonspecialist wants to know about Russian messianism in 148 pages of text.

Different eras are given strikingly different coverage. The period during which the Slavophiles flourished—roughly the middle third of the nineteenth century—is really the seedtime of modern Russian messianism and nationalism, but Duncan covers these vital years in just over ten pages. Similarly, his chapter on left-wing messianism “from Herzen to Stalin” gets only thirteen. In contrast, the messianic tendencies within the nationalist revival of the Brezhnev era merit forty-one pages. The reason for these anomalies appears plain: Duncan seems to have done his dissertation on the Brezhnev period. The remainder of the book is intended to round out consideration of the problem to cover the earlier centuries of Russian history and the chaos of recent times. Perhaps Duncan would have liked to write a longer book. But Routledge decided to charge the reader ninety dollars for this short book. If it were a hundred pages longer, as it arguably should be, one can only imagine what it might cost!

Duncan, however, has done pretty well within the procrustean bed that has been fashioned for him. Although there is not a great deal of analysis, his straightforward narrative is clear, knowledgeable, and judicious in its judgments, and his ample bibliography will be useful to those interested in more extended treatments of the people and movements that the author takes up. But, with the notable exception of the Brezh-
Duncan defines messianism in its most basic form as the “proposition or belief that a given group is in some way chosen for a purpose. Closely linked to this is the view that the great suffering endured by the group will lead somehow to the redemption of the group and possibly of all humanity” (p. 1). The personage who chooses the group for this redemptive purpose has usually been a deity of some kind, but in more recent periods the Weltgeist or the demiurge of History has done the honors. Duncan attributes the persistence and vitality of messianic thinking in Russian history to the vast suffering of the people over the centuries, to the stimulus offered by the teachings of Orthodox Christianity, and to the geopolitics of Russia, which provided such opportunity for invasions from both east and west and thus for popular suffering on a grand scale. He is commendably cautious about the importance of the “Third Rome theory” during the long centuries between the Time of Troubles and its rediscovery by nineteenth-century thinkers. He also says little about linkages between the various instances of messianism, a subject of considerable interest to previous scholars.

Toward the end of the book (pp. 146–47), he adds the suggestion that Eastern Europe (Poland and Serbia are plausibly cited) also reveals a susceptibility to the messianism of suffering, defeat, victimization, and redemption, thus suggesting a kind of messianic regionalism. Another passage, however, reveals the author’s rather Western ambiguity about Slavic extravagance. “Alternatively,” he writes, “one might see Russian messianism as an example of collective paranoia: on the one hand, a persecution complex, linked to the memories of being invaded, and more recently to a fever of conspiracy theories, centring on world Jewry or the CIA and to the fear of being excluded from Europe; on the other hand, the delusions of grandeur typified by ‘Moscow the Third Rome’ . . .” (p. 147).

Duncan understands there to be two poles to his subject, a “state-oriented messianism,” which is “linked with the idea of Moscow’s domination of other people (nationalist messianism),” and a messianism “linked with the idea of the Russian people being a model for other nations to follow (universalist messianism)” (p. 3). The closer one moves toward the nationalist messianism pole, the more closely the history of Russian messianism resembles a simple history of Russian nationalism, and indeed most of the writers cited belong to both histories.

There are a number of questions about the category of “messianism” that might have been elaborated. For example, the border between foreign policy adventures impelled by messianism and those undertaken out of a more sober raison d’état is often fuzzy and hard to discern, as is the relationship between expansionism and messianism—particularly in the case of Russia! And I would have welcomed some discussion of the extraordinary continuity between the Russian intellectual world of the 1870s and that of the 1970s, or even later. The Slavophiles have been alive in Russian culture with a depth, power, and longevity unique in Europe, to say nothing of the United States. But Russian Messianism, for all its virtues, is not a richly speculative work.

Finally, there are a very few minor errors. On page 51, both P. N. Tkachev and A. I. Helphand (Parvus) get a wrong initial. But I assume that on page 2 the copy editor rather than the author is guilty of rendering ancien régime as ancient regime!

ABBOTT GLEASON

Brown University

The late American geographer John Kirtland Wright coined the word “geosophy” to mean “the study of the history of geographical knowledge” (Human Nature in Geography [Cambridge, Mass., 1966], p. 83). One of geosophy’s more intriguing subfields deals with the way people have thought of a particular region. In this regard, geosophy is more interested in the way places excite the imagination than in the more technical aspects of geography’s academic evolution. While not consciously based on Wright’s teachings, probably the best known example of this approach is Frederick Jackson Turner’s notion about the American frontier. Mark Bassin’s new book about the ideas generated by Siberia’s southern Pacific coast in mid-nineteenth-century Russia is an exciting and important new contribution to geosophy.

This long awaited revision of Bassin’s Berkeley dissertation has two objectives. At its most basic level, Imperial Visions is an account of Russia’s expansion into China’s northeastern frontier during the nineteenth century. Bassin begins with the first arrival of Cossacks in the region about two hundred years earlier, when adventurers like Yerofei Khabarov spoke of a “region beautiful and bountiful” around the Amur River whose seemingly fertile lands might provide Siberia with much-needed grain and other crops. The area could well have become another dominion of the Muscovite tsar had it not been for the intervention of the Qing dynasty, which was just then consolidating its own youthful rule over China and environs. Determined opposition from the Manchu kept the Russians at bay for well over a century, until the increasingly evident decay of the Qing in the 1840s once again whetted territorial appetites west of the Urals. The Middle Kingdom, no longer in a condition to resist, yielded the left banks of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers according to the Treaties of Aigun in 1858 and of Peking in 1860, respectively.

This story has been told before, most recently in the earlier chapters of S. C. M. Paine’s Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, N.Y., 1996). Nevertheless, it is a major episode in the formation of the Russian empire, and Bassin’s account is one of the best I have read. My only reservation concerns the complete absence of archival sources. This would have been understandable had Bassin brought his book to press in the 1980s, immediately after he defended his thesis. However, by the early 1990s nearly all of the relevant collections were freely accessible. Bassin’s revision would have benefited from visits to the diplomatic, military, naval, geographical, and other archives now open to scholars in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The more intriguing goal of Imperial Visions is to explain how the acquisition of the new Pacific region inspired the Russian nationalist imagination. Here Bassin is at his best. Based on a thorough reading of a very wide range of publications in Russian, French, English, and German, his book is a superb essay in Russian intellectual history.

In a nutshell, Bassin argues that, toward the latter years in the unpopular reign of Tsar Nicholas I, the Amur region became the repository for hopes about national regeneration and destiny among progressives in the imperial metropole. For some, developing the territory promised to open an enormous virgin land to agricultural and commercial development, much like the Mississippi drainage in the young United States (the title
of Bassin’s original dissertation was “A Russian Mississippi?”). Others considered the Siberian frontier in more ethereal terms. Inspired by German Romanticism and disillusioned by the autocracy’s constraints on intellectual activity, leading members of the intelligentsia thought of the unknown Pacific tract as a blank screen on which they might project their fantasies about a better future. Bassin explains: “For one brief historical moment, an obscure region . . . was able to attract the interest of the entire society, excite widespread enthusiasm, and even excite the dreams of the country’s most outstanding social and political visionaries” (p. 2).

By the early 1860s, however, it became clear that the river was virtually unnavigable, while the region’s allure to settlers and businessmen soon proved to be chimerical. The “Amur euphoria,” as Bassin calls it, ended just as quickly as it began. That the Asian territory should have intrigued Russians in the middle of the nineteenth century is not surprising, however. The same era also marked the beginnings of the famous debate between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. That discussion concerned the empire’s kinship with Europe. Bassin performs an important service by reminding us that Russians also gave much thought to their relationship with Asia.

Imperial Visions promises to make a major contribution to the growing scholarship about Russian national identity. I do hope that the publisher will soon issue an affordable paperback edition to make it accessible to the wider audience the book richly deserves.

DAVID SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE

Brock University


This intelligent, well-researched, and learned book does more than teach us it wasn’t easy to be young during the Soviet twenties. Both methodologically and interpretatively, Anne Gorsuch’s study suggests future paths for historical work on the now completed Soviet period. Persuasively combining newer discursive strategies with the deep research characteristic of social history, she has extensively considered comparative and theoretical issues to produce a work of mature scholarship.

For some time, students of the Soviet Union thought that the 1920s, with their openness, were “good” and that the 1930s, with their repression, were “bad.” A decade of scholarship since the opening of the archives has scarcely convinced us that the women and men who lived through the 1930s were “lucky to be young, alive, and Soviet.” Nevertheless, we do now have a much richer and more complex view of that immensely trying decade. Conversely, scholars are moving toward a less positive view of the New Economic Policy (NEP). One of the signposts of this rethinking is Eric Naiman’s painfully smart, even scary book Sex in Public (subtitled The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology [Princeton, N.J., 1997])—a work which, it must be noted, provides a particularly compelling argument for keeping one’s sex in private. Gorsuch’s approach is less sensational than Naiman’s but equally revisionist. For her, the NEP was a time of uncertainty and variety but, most of all, anxiety. The lives of the young were not limited to the rubrics, concerns, and categories of the party’s Young Communist League, the Komsomol. Instead, Gorsuch presents a multiplicity of types, in-
cluding hyper-militant true believers, street people, criminals, hooligans, fox-trotters, flappers, and others. The reader is shown an entire range of what can, with some rigor, be called “lifestyles.” Despite its association with the thankfully terminated television show about the “rich and famous,” the term “lifestyle” is apt in this situation precisely because choice was part of the process of assuming identities at this time of great uncertainty. In arraying these various types, Gorsuch presents a panoply of young people trying to find their way in the wake of a revolution whose leaders provided insufficient guidance on how to act once the “people” had triumphed.

Gorsuch gives a rich account of the lives of urban young people in the street, factory, club, and dance hall. Her use of new materials from the Komsomol and other relevant archives is compelling, but the heart of her work is the extensive contemporary scientific and sociological literature on youth produced by what she calls “Bolshevik moralists.” Gorsuch constructs her account as a dialogue between those who thought about youth, on the one hand, and the young themselves on the other. At numerous points throughout the text comparisons are made to other histories ranging as far afield as revolutionary France and modern Mexico. Nor is theory neglected. Here Gorsuch is intelligently eclectic, and it is this ability to avoid being trapped by her research—to explain instead throughout the text the meaning of her material—that makes this the work of a mature scholar.

Gorsuch’s reliance on published materials raises an interesting point about recent scholarship on Russia. In attempting to ask new questions, many of us have found the categories used by Soviet and post-Soviet archivists ill suited to providing easy answers. Evidence is no longer neatly organized into particular fondy pertaining to institutions. We must face the fact that the producers of the documents we read were not necessarily interested in the same things those of us who now inhabit the post-Soviet moment want to know. Studying the kinds of deinstitutionalized politics of such subjects as popular culture (extensively treated by Gorsuch) is not easily accomplished by spending all one’s time in the archives. By not fetishizing these sorts of primary sources, Gorsuch has avoided this problem skillfully.

Yet, her nonteleological account, with its variety of possibilities, raises one difficult problem. The NEP did end, and a historian has the responsibility of explaining, in some measure, why this happened. Gorsuch handles this matter elegantly by offering an epilogue in place of a conclusion. Still, this last chapter reads very differently from the body of the book. It is more conventional than is the rest of her account, although no less intelligent. While it may sound like psychobabble to some, I was persuaded by her claim that the end of the NEP was a reassertion of parental authority by the Stalinists. Did her youths of the 1920s have fun, fun, fun, ‘til their daddies took the market away, or was the market that much “fun” after all?

For all its virtues, this work could have been stronger if more attention had been paid to class as one element in explaining the lifestyle choices of NEP young people. I am not thinking here of a positivist, nineteenth-century notion of class along the lines of Engels or Georgy Plekhanov. Rather, given the kinds of choices that were being made, I do think class, as used by Pierre Bourdieu in such a work as Distinction (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), would have enriched Gorsuch’s account. If class is problematic as a category and is no longer seen as determining, it still, as Bourdieu shows, can profitably be part of the mix.

Finally, as someone who has written on sport, I cannot fail to mention the near complete absence of any mention of one of young Soviet men’s favorite activities. Gorsuch prominently cites Carole Pateman’s argument that the exclusion of women has been inextricably tied to the “fraternity” of men. Surely, the male bastion of the
playing field—and, more important, the locker room—assumed a significant role in keeping females away from an important identity-creating activity that was highly gender-specific. If the Komsomol became a “boy’s club,” sport, with its embrace of modernity, was part of that process.

Most important, however, Gorsuch has produced a model of scholarship that should attract readers well beyond the field of Soviet history. If raising children is difficult enough in our present moment of political stasis, reading about the excesses of the young during revolutionary times may provide some small assurance for today’s worried parents.

Robert Edelman

University of California, San Diego


Research into the history of mind-altering substances such as alcohol can provide fascinating and important insights into more conventional historical topics. In Russia, as elsewhere, as Laura Phillips argues, “workers’ drinking practices are a brilliant prism reflecting the deeper political and cultural attitudes of early twentieth-century laborers. It would be astonishing if they were not. After all, customs surrounding drink permeated every facet of working-class life, including leisure, shop-floor culture, politics, and family life. A Russian worker might bypass the theater, the club, movies, lectures, or books without great difficulty, but an omnipresent culture of drink inevitably confronted all who moved within the working community” (p. 6).

In this book, Phillips explores Russian working-class culture (particularly male working-class culture) in the first thirty years of this century, through the distorting lens of a vodka bottle. To be precise, she explores the working-class drinking culture of St. Petersburg/Leningrad. Her sources include memoirs, temperance and medical literature, newspapers, and government and trade union records of various kinds.

The time frame of her book crosses the revolutionary divide of 1917. In the history of alcohol, as in many other areas of Russian life, this era is marked by striking discontinuities. Before the revolution, a government concerned about its legitimacy and embarrassed by the extent of its fiscal dependence on working-class drinking began to flirt, nervously, with ideas of temperance. Then in 1914, on the spur of the moment, Nicholas II decided to turn a temporary ban on liquor sales introduced during mobilization into a permanent ban. Large areas of Russia were dry in the early years of the war, though upper-class Russians rarely had any problem finding alcohol. Gradually, though, drinkers found substitutes for vodka, and then, through paths that are still too obscure to follow precisely, they learned to make home-distilled vodka, or samogon. That these were new skills is apparent from the fact that the word samogon was itself new in 1917. One of the few political continuities over the revolutionary divide of 1917 was the commitment of all governments to the maintenance of temperance. The Soviet government banned alcohol sales but had other, more pressing concerns in its early years, which made it difficult to police the growing domestic industry of samogon-making. Then, in the early Soviet period, the Party reluctantly concluded that if the government did not legalize the production and sale of alcohol, the immense profits generated in this way would merely accrue to an emerging class of petty capitalists.
So, in 1925, the Soviet government began selling full-strength vodka. Many within the party hankered for stricter controls on liquor production and sale, but the fiscal needs of the Soviet state meant that, like the tsarist government, it, too, would have to rely on a “drunken budget.”

Phillips argues that, despite the turmoil of these years, the basic rules of male drinking culture changed surprisingly little. The drinking of hard liquor remained a widely accepted marker of masculinity; female drinking was judged much more harshly than that of males; and the tavern, though deprived of much of its color in the early Soviet era (p. 91), remained an overwhelmingly male space. In the 1920s, as in the tsarist era, “The language of workingmen shows that their most persistent assumption about alcohol concerned its relationship to gender: they understood drinking to be conduct befitting male workers; abstinence from alcohol—and from spirits in particular—was portrayed as the appropriate behaviour for women” (p. 31).

Yet Phillips also argues in chapter 6 (probably the most interesting chapter in the book) that the significance of that culture changed in important ways with the emergence of a state that claimed to identify with workers, yet disliked the way workers drank. Indeed, she describes as one of the book’s main themes “the ways in which this ‘workers’ revolution’ affected the everyday life of its main constituency” (p. 4). Worker activists saw the traditional drinking culture of urban males as backward and harmful to working-class discipline, and the Party inherited these attitudes, setting itself firmly against that culture, at least in its public rhetoric.

The result was a series of compromises between the new “workers’ state” and male working-class culture. In the factories, the many rituals associated with drinking in the prerevolutionary world (such as prival’naia, the round of drinks bought by a new worker) vanished, driven out by a new and more puritanical breed of managers and officials. But drinking did not vanish; it merely took more furtive forms. “In the 1920s, administrative efforts to keep alcohol out of factories increasingly forced laborers to gulp their alcohol down outside the mill itself, but the revolutionary state’s cultural activists were hardly successful in eradicating drunkenness on the job” (p. 50). And attitudes to drinking at most levels of society remained stubbornly traditional. In 1926, as many as 50 percent of Leningrad doctors still subscribed to the view that hard liquor was necessary to revive the spirits of workers and prescribed accordingly (p. 62).

Finally, the compromise negotiated between drinkers and state took the form of humor, a bitter humor that was to become typical of much of Soviet life. Drinkers often appropriated the solemn language of official temperance literature. For example, “in a meeting at Krasnyi Treugol’nik, a certain Burilov suggested that ‘fighters’ against alcoholism should ‘[drink] a bottle a day, drink 30 bottles a month’ in order that 30 alcoholics would remain ‘without vodka’” (p. 131). One of the few criticisms I would make of a very good and interesting book is that there is not enough about drinking as a recreational activity, as fun. I also wish that Phillips had offered us her thoughts on changes in the 1930s and beyond. The need of the Stalinist state for revenues, and the movement of traditional working-class males into leadership positions in the 1930s, suggests that that may have been the era in which these two cultures reached a semi-formal accommodation which survived for much of the Soviet era. But I would have liked to know Phillips’s views on the issue.

David Christian
San Diego State University
Russia’s First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the
Romanov Dynasty. By Chester S. L. Dunning.

Late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth century, Muscovite Russia endured several decades of misery that contemporaries dubbed the “Troubles.” One dynasty expired and a new one ascended the throne, but not before at least two usurpers and numerous pretenders attempted to claim the crown for themselves. In addition, the country fought off invasions by both Swedes and Poles, in the process losing significant portions of territory. Catastrophic famine and a series of bad harvests helped institutionalize both serfdom and slavery, while warfare devastated several towns, contributing to an economic contraction whose effects were felt long afterward. Even the capital felt the Troubles, as it was once besieged by rebels and later occupied by Poles. These events were so traumatic to the political, economic, and social body of Russia that even today when Russians refer to the “Troubles” they conjure up visions of colossal destruction and institutional chaos.

In a massive new book, Chester S. L. Dunning reexamines this era, challenging what he calls “hundreds of years of misinterpretations” (p. 10). Denying that the Time of Troubles represented a “social revolution against serfdom” (p. xi), as some modern historians have argued, Dunning claims in a masterly and richly documented narrative that the struggle was primarily political. Russia’s first civil war fractured society vertically rather than horizontally.

Several decades prepared the way for the opening of hostilities in 1604, when “Dmitrii,” allegedly the legitimate heir of the old dynasty who had been reported dead in 1591, invaded Muscovy with considerable Polish help. Although it is customary to dismiss “Dmitrii” as an imposter and a Polish pawn, Dunning valorizes him as “charismatic,” “incredibly strong and agile,” “extremely intelligent and resourceful” (p. 123), and possibly authentic (pp. 131–32). By contrast, a “ruthless” (p. 60) Boris Godunov, who succeeded to the throne in 1598 on the death of Fedor Ivanovich, plays the villain. Even though Godunov engaged in poor relief unparalleled for the era, his policies engendered dissatisfaction among elites that doomed him and his reign.

Godunov’s death in 1605 helped “Dmitrii” ascend the throne, but the success was short-lived. In 1606 Vasili Shuiskii, another of Dunning’s villains, murdered the newly enthroned sovereign, seizing the throne for himself and clinging to power until 1610. Although “Dmitrii” was dead, the specter of Dmitrii continued to haunt Russian politics. Another “Dmitrii” presented himself, and, aided by fresh military leadership, fought on under a standard that the author describes as conservative: “their goal was as much religious as political: to restore the God-chosen ruler to the throne” (p. 260). Now generalized away from the southern frontier where hostilities had begun, the civil war penetrated the Volga River valley and deep into Russia’s heartland, approaching the very gates of Moscow. Russian gentry and peasants joined forces with Tatars, Cheremis, Mordvians, and Chuvash against a man whom they all deemed a usurper.

Foreign intervention dominated the last years of Russia’s “Troubles,” with Polish troops occupying Moscow and the Polish king contemplating ways to seize the Russian throne. Shuiskii was deposed in 1610 and “False Dmitrii” was also dispatched, but identifying a successor proved contentious. Only in 1613, after a national militia successfully expelled the Poles from Moscow, was it possible to name a teenager, Mikhail Romanov, to the throne. Although many difficulties persisted, formally the “Troubles” and the civil war had come to an end.

In explaining this era, Dunning leans on comparative history, especially the “dem-
ographic/structural” model of Jack A. Goldstone (*Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* [Berkeley, Calif., 1991]), according to which rapid population growth, price inflation, and rising social demands taxed early modern states beyond their ability to cope. In applying this analysis to Russia, Dunning sees intra-elite competition as the driving force behind Russia’s civil war; in an era of relative scarcity, “younger sons of elite families . . . increased much more rapidly than the increase in the overall population” (p. 21), leading to hardship and disaffection among cadet families. Although Russia’s elite did split over the various contenders for power, evidence on Russia’s population in this era is not strong; nevertheless, nearly everyone agrees that late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth century Russia’s population stabilized or perhaps even contracted. And before the late seventeenth century there are no reliable estimates of population growth among elites, undermining Dunning’s explanation (Ia. E. Vodarskii, *Naselenie Russii v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII veka* [Moscow, 1977], pp. 63–73).

But whether or not structural vectors explain the conflict, Dunning emphasizes that Russians of all stations responded to political values in taking sides. But how can we know what seventeenth-century Russians thought? Acknowledging that there are no new sources to plumb, the author instead seeks help in comparative history. Unfortunately, the history of England or the Ottoman Empire can tell us little about what Russians of that age felt, but Dunning is undoubtedly right in emphasizing that when whole towns committed to the cause of the rebels they made a dramatic statement of political preference.

For readers of this journal, Dunning’s most important claim may be that, from the perspective of the twenty-first century, “it is possible to trace many of the problems associated with Russia’s ‘historical backwardness’ and the poverty and oppression of its people under both the tsars and commissars to the aftermath of the civil war carried out in Tsar Dmitrii’s name” (p. 480). In the author’s view, seventeenth-century sovereigns looked back at the ‘Troubles and concluded that Russia’s “traditional, God-centered ideology” (p. 476) was responsible. Therefore, the Romanov tsars consciously adopted a more rational ideology that significantly enhanced the political potency of both tsar and patriarch and helped multiply the secular and clerical bureaucracies. The long-term result was a “widening split between the Russian people and an increasingly impersonal central government and church that intruded more and more into the lives of the tsar’s subjects” (p. 477). Although Dunning’s account does not fully dispose of social explanations of the “Troubles,” there can be no doubt that Chester Dunning has authored a powerful political history of one of modern Russia’s defining moments.

DANIEL H. KAISER

Grinnell College


The world is a stage, Julie Cassiday seems to be saying in her book. The subjects of her study are Soviet show trials, films and plays about Soviet courts in the first decades of their existence, and that strange and yet characteristic Soviet institution of the 1920s, the agitational courts (*agitsudy*). She deals with the period leading up to the purge trials of the great terror, and therefore the book, at least to some extent, can be regarded as
a background study to that series of horrendous events. In effect she is saying that the script had been prepared gradually and unconsciously, the stage was set, the roles defined, and all that remained was to find the players. Here one cannot say that “life” imitated “art,” for “life” and “art” were the same. The verbiage from the show trials could easily be taken from movies, and vice versa. The characters of the “enemies” as depicted by Soviet prosecutors were exactly the same as figures presented on the screen and on stage. They were vermin, rats with human faces, who had a completely unmotivated hatred not only for Soviet life but also for everything decent. These were people without redeeming qualities, people who had been rotten from the day of their births.

It is necessary to put both “art” and “life” in quotation marks, for “life” had little to do with reality. The accusations and confessions in the trials were nothing but a pack of shameless and far-fetched lies, and Soviet films of the 1930s that depicted enemies and subversives can be regarded as art only by stretching the meaning of the term beyond what is reasonable. Drama requires conflict. Interesting conflict requires protagonists equally matched, and that was not possible in Soviet “art.” Tragedy requires a tragic hero who fails. Nothing could be further from the depiction of the enemy in Soviet films than the character of the tragic hero.

Cassiday’s approach to her subject matter is that of a scholar of literature: she analyzes films, plays, and trial transcripts as literary texts. In the process she has some interesting things to say. Her analysis, for example, of such well-known films as The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks, By the Law, and Don Diego and Pelegaia is fresh and insightful. She is correct in noticing the subversive messages in these films, whether or not they were intended as such by their creators. She is entirely correct in dismissing Lev Kuleshov’s orthodox interpretation of his own film, By the Law.

Cassiday mentions the Nuremberg trials and the Scopes monkey trial in order to show that it is an error to believe that the Soviets were unique in attempting to couple drama and justice. To be sure, in the Scopes trial, as in the trial of the mining engineers in Moscow in 1928, there was drama. The kitten and the tiger are both felines, but they are by no means alike. She argues that the Soviets were not wrong to make justice into theater. She writes, “Contrary to expectations, the theatricality of the Soviet courtroom did not undermine the justice handed down to Stalin’s enemies of the people. Instead, the theatricality constituted the gruesome justice of the Soviet show trial, giving it a distinctive form, function, and undeniable force” (p. 27). I do not understand what kind of justice she has in mind, gruesome or not. Since these sentences come from a crucial paragraph of her introduction, I also do not understand what exactly the argument and purpose of her book are.

Although she does mention the Vera Zasulich trial and “revolutionary theatricality,” the historical and political context is missing in her discussions. We do not learn who the Bolsheviks were and what ideology drove them. Undoubtedly, the show trials were propaganda. But who organized this propaganda, and how effective was it? We never learn. There is no Soviet background: no mention of famines, denunciations, or methods of extracting confessions. This is a book on show trials in which the names Henrik Yagoda and Nikolai Ezhov do not appear. Cassiday is interested in texts. There are plenty of references to Andrei Vyshinskii and Nikolai Krylenko, for they were “actors” in the drama. Reading this book one might come to believe that it was not Stalinists who were carrying out mass murder against their own people, but that there was a play that was to be acted out. We are never told explicitly who was the author of the play, which seems to have developed on its own. The actors in this book do not act in the
sense of making decisions for which they can be held responsible; they are merely participants in a drama. Literary analysis is not the best way to approach the extraordinary topic of mass murder.

PETER KENEZ

University of California, Santa Cruz


These two fascinating and innovative books are concerned with a set of early Soviet practices and symbolic strategies that it is difficult to name in a single word. Neither "leisure" nor "entertainment" would sound purposive enough for a culture where watching a comic skit could cause a trade union leader to ask anxiously, "Does anything remain in workers' heads but laughter after a Blue Blouse performance?" (Lynn Mally, Revolutionary Acts, p. 70), or where participants in a late 1930s New Year’s ball had to be "strictly cautioned to have fun" (Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, p. 103). As Mally’s book, in particular, demonstrates, the term “art” is also of at best dubious relevance. The amateur drama groups of the early Soviet era with which her book is concerned explicitly repudiated “aesthetic drama” in favor of “social drama” (p. 19), and their performances sought not only to challenge audiences in the manner of most modernist art but also to break down the barrier between representation and action altogether. They were concerned with “production” in an industrial as well as a theatrical sense: in some groups, notably the “agitbrigades” of the late 1920s, actors were selected on the grounds of ideological probity and their “excellent records on the factory floor. . . . Their performance skills rated no mention at all” (p. 153). The fact that amateur theater could become no more than “a fighting weapon in the battle for the Five-Year Plan in four” (ibid.) not only heralded an assault upon the autonomy of art so dear to the old intelligentsia but also attested the Soviet state’s move to a reliance upon legitimation via ritual that had closer parallels in the early modern world (Russia under Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, France under Louis XIV) than in late imperial Russia. Perhaps the most specific single word one can use for the subject of study would be deistva, or “ritual enactments,” a Russian concept echoed in the title of Mally’s book, Revolutionary Acts.

To outline this terminological problem is not to engage in philological pedantry: it is of primary relevance to both analyses, in particular Petrone’s. The word “celebrations” in Petrone’s subtitle foregrounds a daringly permissive grouping of some superficially very different phenomena of Stalinist public culture: physical culture parades and other mass demonstrations; eulogistic tributes to polar explorers and pioneers of aviation; the rehabilitation of Christmas festivities (secularized as “New Year tree parties” and carnival-masquerades); the celebration of the centenary of Pushkin’s death in 1937; and the bombastic propaganda hymning the introduction of the Soviet Constitution of 1936. The disparateness of the material considered sometimes lends the book
the feel of a collection of essays (albeit always lively and worthwhile ones) rather than a book constructed around a strong central argument, especially given the absence of any preliminary exploration of how the term “celebrations” is to be understood (readers are informed that, “from the first days of the revolution, the Soviet leadership recognized the importance of celebration culture” [p. 13], but they are not told what Petrone supposes the essence of such a culture to be). Elided also are issues of inclusivity: why, one wonders, are the celebrations surrounding the building of the first metro line in Moscow not analyzed? Why has Petrone chosen to focus on the Pushkin jubilee (the subject of a fair amount of specialist work already) and not on the equally important (but less familiar) festivities that marked Gorky’s return to the Soviet Union? Why, above all, is there no consideration of the celebrations for Stalin’s sixtieth birthday in 1939? But as Petrone’s study progresses, it takes on a momentum that overrides superficial objections of this kind. Outwardly, there may have been little in common between New Year parties and hagiological tributes to polar heroes, but the grouping together of these phenomena does convey the synthesizing ambitions and eccentric paradoxicality of Stalinist national populism (narodnost’), its attempts to fuse together solemnity and entertainment, moral indoctrination and tutelage in consumerist aspiration. The book’s title is technically a mistranslation of Stalin’s famous dictum (the leader in fact said not “Life has become more joyful” (radostnee), but “Life has become jollier” (veseleee)), but the mapping of “joy” on to “jollity” was in fact one of the most characteristic aspects of high-Stalinist celebrations and ceremonial occasions, and Petrone has captured something very important about 1930s popular culture in highlighting this point.

Petrone’s main interest is in celebrations as discourse, and her book is essentially a semiotic study, an exegesis of both overt and buried meanings in the celebrations that she analyzes. The introduction, “Interpreting Soviet Celebrations,” emphasizes the author’s intention of illustrating how official rituals and ceremonies could be manipulated and appropriated by the ordinary people whom Soviet leaders aimed to transform into a sort of secular laity (“Soviet citizens may have willingly participated in the celebration of the anniversary and reveled in their ‘holiday escapades’, but they may not have imbibed all of the ‘culture’ and political knowledge which government officials intended,” p. 20). However, the body of the book is little concerned with this issue (apart from a brief discussion of how the Pushkin jubilee allowed Soviet intellectuals to address politically tricky areas such as resistance to authoritarian political systems). It might have been interesting to compare official celebrations of polar heroes with the popular cult of zakal (self-tempering via exposure to extreme cold, as manifested most notoriously by the practice of taking January dips in frozen rivers), or to consider how the license extended to New Year parties allowed some leeway for Soviet citizens to hold private celebrations, whether group banquets in communal flats or—for the privileged few in individual apartments—parties for family and close friends. Despite Petrone’s recognition that “three distinct groups” were involved in creating celebrations—“the central government that set official policies on celebration, the Soviet cadres who controlled celebrations at the local level, and the people who participated in them” (p. 20)—the book does not reveal much about the participants, or about the mediation of top-level directives on their way to becoming practice. There is some evidence indicating that the process of rehearsing parades could be laborious: documents housed in the archive of the Komsomol Central Committee indicate that rehearsals for the 1939 Physical Culture parade in Moscow turned into a shambles because large numbers of students from the Joseph Stalin All-Soviet Institute of Physical Culture failed to show up regularly or at all, sometimes wangling sick notes in order to provide a thin justi-
fication for their absence. One suspects that this kind of organizational nightmare was not uncommon, and some consideration of the practical difficulties behind making the kind of triumphant celebrations demanded by the regime run smoothly might have been useful.

One of the strengths of Mally’s book, in contrast, is its meticulous dissection of the institutional background and day-to-day practical stresses behind the organization of one particular type of early Soviet ritual performance: the drama shows staged by amateur theatrical groups. The book is immensely informative about every area of its chosen theme; the expression of standpoints with regard to the traditional “entertainment/instruction” dichotomy; the careers of the activists involved (several of whom, including Nikolai Ekk, went on to become film directors); the nature of the repertoire involved; production techniques and performance spaces. Sometimes, to be sure, I wished Mally had been a little more expansive about the precise content of the shows these groups put on: for instance, it would have been useful to know more about the immensely popular plays of Sofia Belaia than simply that they were “potboiling melodramas” (p. 36), and interesting to have had more information about the scenarios published by the agitbrigade journal Club Stage than that “these outlines suggested places where local material could be inserted, leaving relatively little to the imagination” (p. 155). Concrete citations showing exactly how much cultural activists working in the center were prepared to leave to the “imagination” (or more likely, the political discretion) of local kul’torgi, and also of what issues they felt must be disseminated to mass audiences across the Soviet Union, would have been an illuminating contribution to the understanding of top-down cultural control.

This is not to say that Mally’s study lacks interpretive depth. On the contrary, it is a fascinating and intricate examination of shifts in the ambitions, and in the official standing, of amateur troupes. To simplify, three phases of development are identifiable. The early to mid-1920s was dominated by improvisatory and participatory performances, such as those staged by the “Blue Blouse” movement, with emphasis on “small forms” and tight links with traditional popular-cultural genres, such as the circus—among the characters employed in sketches staged by TRAM (the Theater of Worker Youth) was a foul-mouthed slob by the name of Sasha Chumovoi, exactly the kind of comic social deviant familiar in prerevolutionary street theater, such as the puppet show Petrushka. During the period of the First Five Year Plan, however, the most characteristic type of group was the “agitbrigade,” who staged much more explicitly didactic playlets before “captive audiences” (p. 152) whom they sought to browbeat by the recitation of political slogans and by hortatory rituals, such as compulsory votes on issues of the day. Finally, in the early 1930s, top-down pressures brought amateur theaters closely into line with professional theaters of the day: from now on, the expectation was that they would perform standards of the mainstream repertoire in permanent performance spaces and would model techniques of acting and production on those of the theatrical professionals who were often employed as consultants to amateur troupes.

Much of the discussion contributes not only to an understanding of Soviet theatrical life but also to a grasp of broader patterns of transformation in Soviet society. For instance, the history of the centralization of cultural production is enriched by Mally’s account of the amateur theaters’ fate in the 1930s. It is no coincidence that 1932, the year when “informal” literary groupings were finally wound up and the Union of Soviet Writers instituted, also saw an all-out assault on the technical inadequacies of amateur dramatists and directors, as expressed in critical responses to the all-Soviet amateur theater Olympiad of 1932. Here as elsewhere, the misleadingly neutral term “profes-
artistic endeavor. The book also does much to illuminate the history of early Soviet activism, whose self-deludingly arrogant character is all too clear from the description here of agitbrigades performing “lightning raids” on villages and congratulating themselves on effecting once-and-for-all social change in the course of a single afternoon: “As a result [of our performance], the village voted unanimously to rid itself of kulaks,” one actor involved in such a brigade boasted proudly in 1931 (p. 159). Extrapolating from examples such as this, which point to the highly authoritarian character of many low-level activists, Mally calls into question the conventional understanding of the “cultural revolution” of 1928–31 as a phase of “assaults on established authority” (p. 179). Equally, she argues cogently that the repudiation of avant-garde practices in the mid-1930s should not be seen simply as a reversion to the ideals of the prerevolutionary “theater for the people” (even if the term narodnyi teatr came into favor once more at this point). The Soviet government’s “commitment to nurturing and training amateurs” marked a fundamental distinction between the practices of the 1930s and those of the 1900s or 1910s (pp. 218–19).

Read together, these two books are complementary in a whole range of stimulating ways. On the one hand, Mally’s attention to the complex patterns by which central directives were interpreted at the grassroots, and her sense of evolutionary drive, help to orchestrate the rather static and particularist account of Soviet culture given by Petrone’s book (which pays little attention to the question of the relationship between “celebrations in the time of Stalin” and those at other times and in other places, or to the question of how celebrations actually functioned on the ground). On the other hand, the character of Soviet “acts” as propaganda artifacts emerges more clearly from Petrone’s book, whose strength is its imaginative attention to symbolic meaning. Mally’s book is an excellent way into the minds of rank-and-file Soviet subjects such as amateur actors; for anyone interested in the ambitions of those who aimed to direct the lives and aspirations of such individuals, there could be no better introduction than Petrone’s study of “celebrations in the time of Stalin.”

Catriona Kelly

New College, University of Oxford


The book under review resulted from the new conditions for research created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990, on the eve of the collapse, David Ransel went to Russia to work in libraries and archives to investigate the differing rates of infant and childhood mortality between ethnic groups, principally Russians and Tatars, in rural areas. As a result of the collapse, he was able instead to begin an oral history project interviewing village women about their experiences. Over the next few years, with the assistance of Russian and Tatar colleagues, more than a hundred women were interviewed in different regions of European Russia. (The questionnaire used and a list of the interviewees are included as appendices.) The project evolved into a broader study of women’s experiences of courtship and marriage, fertility choices (including
abortion—legalized in 1920), giving birth, Christian baptism and Moslem rites, coping with infant death, and looking after the children who survived.

One of the main features of the book is a comparison over three generations. The first generation of interviewees comprised women born around 1912, who grew up, married, and started families in the early years of Soviet power, before and during the destruction of customary family structures and culture by the collectivization of agriculture and “dekulakization” that began in earnest in 1930. The second generation was born between 1912 and 1930. They married and had their children in the new, collectivized villages, at a time when the Soviet authorities were starting to spread their modernizing values and culture to rural Russia. The extension of modern medical care and welfare for mothers and children took rather longer. The lives of these women, at the very time they were building their families, were disrupted by World War II. Some of the women lived in occupied territory. All experienced the drain of their menfolk to the army, many of whom were never to return. The third generation was born after 1930. They married and had children in the postwar period, when effective medical care and support became available in rural Russia for the first time.

Kansel states at the outset that the book has two purposes. The first—the result of the new opportunities for research—is “to introduce into the history of twentieth-century Russia voices of ordinary women in the villages.” This aim is realized in the heart of the book, chapters 3 through 8, which are based on the interviews. The second purpose, closer to the original aim of the project, is to trace the spread of modern Western medical discourse on reproduction and child care into rural Russia from its very tentative beginnings in the eighteenth century to its arrival in the 1950s and 1960s. This is the main subject of the first two chapters, which are based on written sources, but it is also addressed in the rest of the book. It is the former aim that predominates, however, and a harsh critic might consider the discontinuity between the two parts of the book a weakness. The long concluding chapter, “Life and Loyalty in Hard Times,” which summarizes and compares the experiences of women of the different generations, regions, and ethnicities, strongly suggests where the main interest and, indeed, sympathies of the author came to lie.

It is, of course, impossible in a review to do justice to the richness of the book. The experiences of women of the middle generation compared with their mothers and daughters can serve as an example. They fell between the two worlds: the old “patriarchal” world and the new, modern world of Soviet collective farms in the latter part of the twentieth century. Neither are in any way idealized in the book, but nostalgia for the old world crept into the testimonies of some of the women. In the old world, rural women were valued by their families as workers on the family farm first and as mothers second. Pregnant women continued to work until the onset of labor and resumed work shortly after giving birth. They left their infants in the care of older women and children, who persisted in customary child-care and feeding practices, such as tight swaddling and early introduction of solid food, which medical professionals (who lived and worked mostly in urban areas) had been concerned about for generations. The results were appallingly high rates of infant and childhood mortality and very high rates of fertility to replace them. However, the customary village and religious cultures did provide some emotional support for women. These women’s suspicions of the early attempts by the Soviet authorities to “emancipate” them are testament both to the resilience of the customary ways and to the fear rural women felt about what might replace them. Women of the youngest generation were largely freed from the control of customary family structures and had finally abandoned most of the harmful older practices. They were still expected to work on the collective farms, but they had ma-
ternity leave and benefits as well as modern medical care and advice to lighten slightly the “double burden” of full-time work outside the home and full-time motherhood and household tasks inside. Women of the middle generation, however, were expected to work on the land and raise families, but they had neither the support of the fast-disappearing customary family structures and culture of their mothers nor the modern medical care and welfare of their daughters. Moreover, from the early 1930s, the Soviet government impressed on them the duty of rearing large numbers of workers for the construction of socialism and soldiers to defend it. Until the 1950s, the government’s pronatal policies consisted largely of negative measures, in particular the ban on legal abortions from 1936 to 1955. In practice, abortion was virtually the only way open to women to limit the numbers of children they had, and many resorted to dangerous illegal terminations in their struggle to “survive and endure” in the lost world of mid-century rural Russia. Very few had the ten children needed to qualify for the “heroine mother” awards established in 1944. The anger and bitterness, but also the dignity, of this generation of women, who are now facing old age in the uncertain environment of post-Soviet Russia, is one of the lasting images of this compelling book.

*University of Strathclyde, Glasgow*  

**David Moon**